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Abstract 
This work enters into debates about about the meaning and significance of messianism. 
in the Anglophone context of 'continental philosophy'. It does so by investigating the 
work of two traditionally opposed German philosophers, T. W. Adorno and Martin 
Heidegger. These figures stand behind the alternative traditions of recent philosophical 
messianism: historical materialist and neo-Heideggerian, or post-Hegelian and anti-
Hegelian. Where the former tradition classically proposes the possibility of progress in, 
or towards history, without clearly questioning the metaphysical grounds of this 
possibility, the latter tradition questions the ontological nature of grounding itself, but 
often at the price of forfeiting a concept of historical change. The tum to messianism 
within historical materialism, inspired by Walter Benjamin, involves an attempt to give 
an account of these grounds. While sympathising with the motivation behind this tum, I 
suggest that it risks upholding a metaphysics that is equally as problematic as the one it 
opposes. I seek to interpret Adorno's late conception of an expression of 'waiting in 
vain' as a critique of historical materialist meSSIamsm. Since Adorno's idea IS 
fragmentary, and still relies upon traditional metaphysics, it is read in relation to 
Heidegger's ontological account of waiting, according to his overall understanding of 
metaphysical modernity as a will to domination. The question of waiting connects the 
thought of Adorno and Heidegger - this has been understated in the secondary 
literature. I suggest that the connection is all the more convincing when their respective 
ideas of waiting are understood in relation to their philosophies of music and of 'the 
musical'. This theme is examined within a broader context of music and philosophy. It 
is pursued in order to respond to the overall problematic. A 'musical' concept of waiting 
can address some of the metaphysical problems encountered in a philosophy 'after' 
messianism, because it can propose an alternative notion of promise. The example of 
this expression is the music of Luigi Nono. A critical examination of his works is taken 
to elucidate the spatiotemporal character of an expression of waiting in vain, m a 
manner that both enriches and problematises the solely philosophical readings. 
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Introduction 
Philosophy After Messianism? 
During the last twenty years or so, there has been a resurgence of philosophical interest 
in the question of messianism. This literature, received in the Anglophone context under 
the banner of 'continental philosophy', has tended to follow two alternative traditions: 
historical materialist and neo-Heideggerian; or, post-Hegelian and anti-Hegelian. l The 
explanation for its emergence is, at one level, clear enough. The messianism in question 
asserts the possibility of change in the most unlikely of times. The messianic names the 
minimal promise of a different time to come. It is premised upon the indeterminacy of 
the future, from the standpoint of messianic historical time. As Walter Benjamin 
concludes his 'Theses on the Philosophy of History' (1940), 
We know that the Jews were prohibited from investigating the future ... This 
does not imply, however, that for the Jews the future is turned into 
homogenous, empty time. For every second of time was the strait gate 
through which the Messiah might enter.2 
The 'weak messianic force' is perceived most keenly in hopeless times, in times when 
the Messiah is not expected. Responding to Jacques Derrida's Specters of Marx (1993), 
Fredric Jameson observed the following: 
You would not evoke the messianic in a genuinely revolutionary period, a 
period in which changes can be sensed at work all around you; the 
messianic does not mean immediate hope in that sense, perhaps not even 
hope against hope; it is a unique variety of the species hope that scarcely 
bears any of the latter's normal characteristics and that flourishes only in a 
time of absolute hopelessness, a period like the Second Empire, or the years 
1 Where this broadly post-Heideggerian tradition is concerned, see, for instance, Giorgio 
Agamben's Homo Sacer (Stanford University Press, 1998) and The Time That Remains 
(Stanford University Press, 2005), and Jacques Derrida's Specters of Marx (London & 
New York: Verso, 1993). Massimo Cacciari was 'ahead of the game' here, with such 
works as Dallo Steinhof( 1980, translated into English as Posthumous People, Stanford 
University Press, 1996). Examples in the historical materialist tradition include Peter 
Osborne's The Politics of Time (London & New York: Verso, 1995) and Fredric 
Jameson's Archaeologies of the Future (London & New York: Verso, 2005). 
2 Benjamin, Walter. 'Theses on the Philosophy of History', in Illuminations, trans. 
Harry Zohn (London: Pimlico, 1999), p.255. 
between the Wars, or the 1980s and 90s, when radical change seems 
unthinkable, its very idea dispelled by visible wealth and power, along with 
palpable powerlessness. It is only in those trough years that it makes sense 
to speak of the messianic in the Benjaminian sense.3 
2 
Insofar as the trough years persist, Jameson's remark remains pertinent, and even self-
evident. The philosophical-messianic literature on has waned of late - a consequence 
both of its perceived resignation and of a tum away from substantial considerations of 
history. This study will acknowledge that there are fundamental problems with existing 
forms of philosophical messianism, and with historical materialism, but will equally 
contend that the equating of all messianisms with resignation amounts to a 
misapprehension of the varieties of waiting. 
Philosophical messianism never went away. The recent studies lean upon the 
'modernist' wave. Implicitly drawing upon the newer literature, this thesis will focus 
upon two figureheads of the opposing camps: T. W. Adorno and Martin Heidegger. 
Adorno can more obviously be situated within a Jewish intellectual tradition of 
messianism - though not for everyone.4 Heidegger's relation to Jewish thought is of 
course vexed in the extreme. Nevertheless (a big 'nevertheless'), this student of 
H5lderlin remains a thinker of the messianic, so long as we read across all periods of his 
work. 'Only a god can save us', Heidegger will say, from the grave. Heidegger upholds 
the messianic ban upon depicting what is to come: 'We cannot think' the coming god 
'into being here; we can at most awaken the readiness of expectation,.5 To this extent, 
Heidegger shares with Adorno an opposition to the status quo in the name of a different 
future. 
The productive dissonance between these thinkers has, with a few exceptions, 
remained muted.6 They have been traditionally opposed, philosophically and politically 
3 Jameson, Fredric. 'Marx's Purloined Letter' in, Derrida, J. et al. Ghostly 
Demarcations: A Symposium on Jacques Derrida 's Specters of Marx (London & New 
York: Verso, 2008), p.62. 
4 The Jewish theologian Jacob Taubes finds Adorno's 'Finale' to Minima Moralia 
'wonderful, but finally empty'. Following Taubes, Giorgio Agamben claims that, 
'Despite appearances, negative dialectics is an absolutely non-messianic form of 
thought, closer to the emotional tonality of Jean Amery than that of Benjamin. ' Taubes. 
Jacob. The Political Theology of Paul. trans. Dana Hollander (Stanford University 
Press, 2003), p.74; Agamben, G. The Time that Remains, p.38. Cf. Chapter 5, p.234. 
below. 
5 Heidegger, Martin. 'Only a God Can Save Us', in Philosophical and Political 
U'ritings (London & New York: Continuum, 2003), p.38. 
6 The recent studies on 'Adorno and Heidegger' include: Duttmann, Alexander Garcia. 
The Gift of Language (London: Athlone, 2000) and The Memory of Thought (London & 
3 
- the Nazi versus the thinker of Auschwitz, both too real and too unreal an opposition. 
Adorno's polemics against Heidegger are well known. For his part, Heidegger is 
recorded as saying of Adorno: 'I have read nothing by him'. 7 Without explaining away 
the fundamental divergences, a critical comparison will be attempted in what follows, 
on the grounds that they share an approach to a shared, crucial problem. Specifically, 
Adorno and Heidegger each connect a notion of waiting to their respective, extra-
philosophical conceptions of metaphysics, both as a symptom of its crisis and as a 
means of addressing it. Moreover, their conceptions of metaphysics constitute attempts 
to understand, in various ways, modernity. The question of waiting is fundamental to 
both of these philosophical projects. It is in this sense that they contribute to the 
possibility of a philosophy after messianism. 
It will perhaps be objected that a political-philosophical appropriation of 
messianism, such as is to be found in Benjamin, is not concerned with the nature of 
waiting, and is actually opposed to waiting. Messianic thought tends to privilege the 
category of hope over that of waiting. Waiting normally signifies inactivity, not activity 
- though it is true that hope can signify inactivity, and that in some languages, hope is 
also waiting (as with the Spanish esperar). At the same time, waiting waits/or activity, 
an act or event that is awaited in advance. When waiting, we wait for something in the 
absence of that something, a something that is nevertheless made present as that which 
is awaited. In waiting, we have and do not have what we are waiting for, at the same 
time. It is on account of this perpetuating contradiction that waiting is often described in 
terms of a privation - whether as boredom, forbearance or patience.8 
The notion of patience brings us to the heart of the theological problem of 
meSSIanIsm, which can scarcely be dealt with adequately here. For it is (all too) 
tempting to introduce a distinction between two structures of the messianic along 
'Jewish and Christian' lines, especially if we contrast apocalyptic- (as opposed to 
restorative-) messianism with Protestant-Augustinian patience. Is not waiting closer to 
patience than to hope? The dominant Christian tradition of patience, the virtue, is 
New York: Continuum, 2002), and the collection of essays, Adorno and Heidegger, eds. 
lain Macdonald & Krysztof Ziarek (Stanford University Press, 2008). 
7 Cited in: Walker, Nicholas. 'Adorno and Heidegger on the Question of Art: 
Countering Hegel?' in, Adorno and Heidegger, p.87. 
8 Following Simone Wei I, Maurice Blanchot drew a connection, within his French 
language, between waiting and attention. Waiting is thus a comportment of activity. But 
waiting equally remains a privation from the act: 'Attention, waiting. Waiting, affliction 
[L 'attention, l'attente. L 'attente, Ie malheur],. Blanchot, Maurice. The Infinite 
Conversation, trans. Susan Hanson (University of Minnesota Press, 1993), p.123. 
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founded in interpretations of Paul's epistles. In one crucial sense, however, Paul 
perpetuates the ban on representations of the coming Messiah: 
by hope we are saved: but hope that is seen is not hope: for what a man 
seeth, why waiteth he yet? But if we hope for that we see not, then do we 
with patience wait for it. 
The verse from Paul's epistle to the Romans (viii: 24-25) is central to Augustine's De 
Patientia (c. 417).9 According to most Christian orthodoxies, the Messiah has always 
already come, as Jesus, and yet is equally always already yet to come, as Christ. Giorgio 
Agamben's assertion that Paul is the first and greatest writer in the messianic tradition 
rests upon an exclusive translation of 'christos' as 'Messiah' and not 'Jesus Christ' or 
'Christ Jesus' - the collapsing of the having-come and the to-come into the presence of 
the ever-same. IO 
Paul teaches of patience in Jesus Christ. Patience arises from the structure of 
Christian 'messianism' itself. Christ is 'not seen', in the flesh. The Resurrection means 
victory over sinful, worldly finitude. Christ conquers death. The Pauline-Platonic 
valorisation of Spirit over flesh, faith over works, is already a detennination of hope as 
patience. The finite knowledge of Spirit, faith, is sustained by hope. Faith is already 
hope and hope faith. Inner justification cannot be seen in the way that the outer-worldly 
is seen. Idealised hope becomes patience in the face of an otherwise unbearable 
forbearance. 'But if we hope for that we see not, then do we with patience wait for it.' 
This is not to say that patience is absent from Jewish and other messianisms (it is not) 
but rather that patience becomes constitutive of the inner-spiritual fonn of the Christian 
Church and of its consciousness; of, by way of Protestantism, a particular modernity 
(and hence capitalism, in Max Weber's thesis). For Nietzsche, the debt of patience that 
cannot be repaid becomes detenninative of passive nihilism. 1 1 But this' spirituality' can, 
at the same time, become the possibility of an auto-revaluation of values, including the 
value of the otherworldly. Nietzsche returns to waiting (see chapter 2). In contrast to 
virtuous patience before the personal God, apocalyptic messianism - after, or amidst the 
9 The authorship of De Patientia is in fact disputed. 
10 Agamben, G. The Time That Remains, p.16. 
11 'The inoffensiveness of the weakling, the very cowardice with which he is richly 
endowed, his standing-by-the-door, his inevitable position of having to wait, are all 
given good names such as "patience", which is also called the virtue'. Nietzsche, 
Friedrich. On the Genealogy of Morality, trans. Carol Diethe (Cambridge University 
Press, 1994), p.30. 
5 
event of Judeo-Christian modernity - asserts that the Messiah has not come but that, for 
this very reason, is to-come, as an event of sociality and not personality. 
Can this latter messianism be characterised in terms of waiting? If waiting is 
defined as otherworldly patience then waiting cannot bring about change in this world. 
Waiting is inactivity; the infinite deferral of the act. Waiting perpetuates the existing 
world since patience always pays the price of forbearance and suffering, the price of 
which can never be too high. Patience can wait forever. The category of waiting is in 
that case redundant to any utopian-materialist project of constructing 'heaven on earth'. 
In his commentary on Romans viii, the Protestant theologian Karl Barth argues against 
inactive waiting. Waiting is the locus of active existence: 'Existentially we see what to 
us is invisible, and therefore we wait' .12 Barth speaks of a 'we' here, but the inner-
spiritual nature of this waiting serves to evacuate any utopian-political content from it: 
Men are compelled to wait and only to wait; they are impelled to hope, and 
not to sight. By faith, however, their waiting is a waiting upon God alone; 
and this is to be at peace with Him. 
Barth's God is no post-Hegelian absolute here. For, 'we speak of a future which can 
never be in time.' 13 Barth's gloss on 'all Israel shall be saved' (Romans xi: 26), under 
the heading of 'The Goal', is similarly anti-historical. So much for waiting. And yet, an 
attempt will be made here to show why the category of waiting is, even more than hope, 
central to a philosophically 'viable' messianism - precisely because of its categorical 
mediation of passive nihilism on the one side and utopian hope on the other. Both are 
the concern of the problem and possibility of modernity. The equivocation of waiting 
becomes a question: waiting in vain? 
Why is this thesis not on Benjamin, who understood the messianic tradition so 
intimately? Benjamin remains ever-present in what follows. He lies behind much of 
Adorno's thought, often as a critic of it. Much of the post -Heideggerian studies also rely 
upon Benjamin (Agamben, Cacciari). In that case, the name of Walter Benjamin unites 
the recent literature. The 'Finale' of Adorno's Minima Moralia (1945-47) seems to 
come close to the last of Benjamin's 'Theses'. It is my contention, however, that there is 
a deeply ironic departure from Benjamin's messianism in Adorno's later work. This 
departure involves a confrontation with the metaphysical presuppositions of a 
philosophical messianism. It is ironic because Benjamin himself had confronted some 
12 Barth, Karl. The Epistle to the Romans, 6th edition, trans. Edwyn C. Hoskyns (Oxford 
University Press, 1968), pp. 314-5. 
13 Ibid. p.151; p.310. 
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of these problems in a more explicit way to Adorno, since Benjamin more explicitly 
attempted its philosophical appropriation. It is also ironic because Adorno's critique 
brings him closer to the territory of his adversary, Heidegger. 
There are accordingly two competing critiques of messianism at work in this 
thesis, each of which relates to the question of waiting. The fIrst works with the existing 
critiques of the neo-Kantian infinite task, which threatens to tum utopian messianism 
into a dystopian waiting in vain. This critique echoes the initial critiques of 
transcendental Idealism, in Hegel and Schelling (see chapter 1). The second critique 
takes metaphysics as a whole, including the post-Kantian metaphysics of the fIrst 
response, as its 'object' of problematisation. There is an inherent tension between these 
two responses; between a metaphysical and post-metaphysical orientation. 
In his discussion of Sabbatian messianism, Jameson shows an awareness of 
some of the problems encountered in its philosophical appropriation: 'we must be very 
subtle in the way in which, particularly those of us who are not believing Jews and are 
very far from such kinds of beliefs, we understand the coming of the Messiah.' 14 The 
meaning of the appropriation stands in need of elucidation as much as subtlety, so long 
as the appropriation aims to be philosophical. The younger Benjamin attempted to think 
through this appropriation by way of the Jewish neo-Kantian philosopher, Hermann 
Cohen. 15 For Cohen, the affinity of Jewish monotheism to the Kantian 'Aujkliirung' lay 
in the non-representable nature of the absolute for both (Cohen's 'infInitesimal method' 
and 'infInite task' being epistemological and ethical interpretations of Kant's system).16 
But for the later Adorno, and for Heidegger, Kantian metaphysics remains equally 
problematic. To respond with recourse to that which was appropriated becomes a 
viciously circular exercise, to the extent that the truth of the theological tradition is 
disclosed in the philosophical appropriation. Of course, the appropriation and 
expropriation of the theological was always the problem of modem philosophy as 
modem; the possibility of a system of freedom. The problem of the system of freedom 
overlaps with the concern of philosophical messianism since the latter posits the 
necessity of an open future; of that which cannot be included into its system by virtue of 
its system. 
14 Jameson, F. 'Marx's Purloined Letter', p.62. 
15 Though Scholem took the rationalist Cohen to have misunderstood the inherent 
anarchism of Sabbatianism. 
16 This is in spite of Cohen's claim to have overcome all metaphysical absolutes. Cf. 
Lambrianou, N. 'Neo-Kantianism and messianism: origin and interruption in Hermann 
Cohen and Walter Benjamin', in ed. Osborne, P. Walter Benjamin: Critical 
Evaluations, vol. I (London: Routledge, 2005), p.88. 
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F or Adorno, modem philosophy cannot hold-on to metaphysical presuppositions 
'after Auschwitz'. The problematisation of metaphysics is equally a problematisation of 
messianism, since promise is metaphysics (see chapter 5). This is the second critique of 
messianism. If metaphysical absolutes cannot be posited in their current form - as the 
ground or grounding of philosophy - then such a metaphysics cannot substitute for the 
hope embodied in the future actuality of the Messiah (the Messiah as future actuality). 
Benjamin writes that 'the Messiah might enter' .17 But so long as messianism is, the 
Messiah is. The critical-philosophical problem is that of whether philosophical 
messianism can ever be in a position to question the 'if?' along with the 'when?' 
Messianic waiting is not expectation. Expectation is characteristic of much of 
the traditional intellectual opponent to capitalism: historical materialism. A-waiting is, it 
seems, the comportment of a logical-historical unfolding, expressed in Hegelian-
Marxist terms, however difficult the struggle for the awaited will no doubt be. 
Messianism is a different kind of a-waiting. In terms of historical materialism, the 
messianic problematises expectation, not in order to cease to expect but, quite 
conversely, to begin to expect. 
However 'weak' Benjamin's 'messianic force', it remains a force. It remains in 
force. In contrast to this minimally powerful, hopeful waiting, Adorno writes in 
Negative Dialectics (1966) of 'waiting in vain [vergebliches Warten]'; of, that IS, 
hopeless waiting: 
Pure metaphysical experience becomes unmistakably paler and more 
desultory in the course of the process of secularization, and this softens the 
substantiality of the older one. It conducts itself negatively in that "Is that 
all?", which comes closest to being realized as waiting in vain. Art has 
demonstrated this; in Wozzeck Alban Berg ranked those bars as highest, 
which express, as only music can, waiting in vain, and cited its harmony at 
the decisive caesuras and conclusion of Lulu. 18 
Of course, the problematisation of metaphysics was well under way by the time of 
Adorno's intervention. It was Heidegger's life's project. Adorno and Heidegger share a 
critique of Western metaphysics that seeks to avoid the three pitfalls of passive nihilism, 
unreflective positivism (including, for Adorno, dialectical materialism) and neo-
vitalism. Judeo-Christian modernity comes to self-determine its project through a 
17 My emphasis. 
18 Adorno, T. W. Negative Dialectics, trans. Dennis Redmond, accessed at, 
www.enf.orgrdredmondlndtrans.html, on November 23,2008. All subsequent page 
numbers refer to the German text of Negative Dialektik (Frankfurt-am-Main: Suhrkamp, 
1966). pp.366-8. 
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representing-willing comportment of dominatio~ as the metaphysical will (to power). 
As was suggested, waiting can equally be determined in terms of a represented object of 
expectation - even, or especially, if that object is nothing. The will to nothing, passive 
nihilism, becomes the problem not only of modernity but also of metaphysics. But how 
can the existing totality be overcome, in the name of another totality, without an act of 
the - political - will? Adorno and Heidegger each propose that what is required for 
historical change is not (only) the willing of a new history, but equally a new historical 
comportment, as a new kind of waiting. 
The ground of this expression of waiting in vain remains obscure in Adorno -
especially since it appears amidst the quandary of metaphysics and systematic 
philosophy (can there be a ground without system?). Adorno seems to rely once again 
upon the inextinguishable hope in the face of despair characteristic of traditional 
messianism. Heidegger can nevertheless help to philosophically substantiate Adorno's 
expression, because for Heidegger waiting is an ontological and not traditional-
metaphysical issue (not just the being of waiting, but the waiting of Being). At the same 
time, Adorno's emphasis upon historical expression provides a critique of Heidegger's 
event of thinking (which, in some ways, marks a stoical return to Augustinian patience). 
Its expression is no less political than it is artistic in its determinacy. The philosopher of 
waiting fails to express it determinately - because he has rejected the Hegelian 
metaphysics of universal-historical self-determination (Heidegger will become 
dangerously aware of this). Heidegger's Freiburg Rectorship of 1933 is, in this sense, a 
political mis-expression, or failure of waiting-expression. Whereas, the lesser crime 
politically, the practitioner of waiting in vain, Adorno, fails to philosophise it 
adequately. This mutual inadequacy signals a third possibility. 
* * * 
The means for staging the above philosophical drama is mUSIC. This may seem 
arbitrary, but there is a long tradition of philosophising with music, up to and including 
Adorno and Heidegger. This tradition has been motivated by three affinities between 
metaphysics and music, the order of which changes historically: mathematics (form), 
language and affect. The idea of music in modern philosophy comprises a mythic 
mimesis of ancient encounters with mousike (derived from the muses, mousa, and their 
divinities, the mousai). For the Presocratics, mousike was, by virtue of its unification of 
9 
the muses, synonymous with philosophy itself.19 In Plato, it comes to mean education, 
paideia?O These two ideas of music, as unity and as education, each in relation to a 
question about language, re-appear in early German Romanticism, and in Benjamin's 
Goethean critique of it - 'the muse-ical [das Musische]'.21 
The mimesis of mousike is also necessarily modern on account of the 
fragmentary nature of the ancient models. Mousike is contested within Plato and his 
dialogues, the word receiving no stable meaning. In Plato's Republic, mousike means 
education and music alone. The modern philosophical inventions exploit this 
equivocation, fuelled by the contemporaneous rise of absolute music (at the end of the 
eighteenth-century). Again, there are no complete models, since little that was 
performed was written down in the ancient world. Philosophical ideas of music meant 
the re-invention of another musical tradition, often in the absence of music: the harmony 
of the spheres. This is also Platonic and Neoplatonic. In the Timaeus, Plato describes an 
original harmonious attunement of cosmic soul and body. The harmonic-intervallic 
ratios uncovered by Pythagoras are the measure of attunement.22 Neoplatonism 
develops this idea, via neo-Pythagorean Platonism, and bequeaths it to modem 
philosophy. It reappears in the Rationalist systems, in the pantheism controversies of 
German Idealism, and even in historical materialism. 
Adorno's claim that 'music alone' can 'express' waiting in vain is taken entirely 
seriously in this thesis, not so as to valorise modem music, but rather in order to 
understand what might be meant by the 'musical' expression of waiting in vain - as a 
means of elaborating the nature of this expression. To this end, Adorno's writings on 
music, which constitute over half of his writings, will be examined. Adorno's 
philosophy of music is integral to his overall philosophy. Philosophy 'is truly the sibling 
of music,.23 Adorno thus seems to follow in the above tradition of 'philosophy and 
music'. He is nevertheless anti-traditional because his idea of music is informed by an 
experience of modern music (rather than a classical idea of music). There are other 
historical exceptions where theory and practice are concerned. Notably, Johannes 
19 Murray, P. & Wilson, P. Eds. Music and the Muses (Oxford University Press, 2004), 
~.372. 
° Plato, The Republic, trans. Desmond Lee (London: Penguin, 1955), p.71. 
21 Benjamin, W. 'The Concept of Criticism in German Romanticism', in Selected 
Writings, vo1.1 (Harvard University Press, 1997), pp.179-80. 
22 Plato, Timaeus and Critus, trans. H. D. Lee, (London: Penguin, 1965), p.48. 
23 Adorno, T. W. Negative Dialectics, pp.l14-116. 
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Kepler based his Harmonice Mundi (1619) on the polyphony of Orlando di LassUS. 24 
Again, Adorno disrupts this tradition, with an idea and practice of dissonance. 
Music is less obviously integral to the work of Heidegger. But a notion of music 
appears at two decisive moments of his thought. As in Adorno, both of these moments 
are connected to a thinking of the whole, to metaphysics, in relation to modernity as 
(historical) totalisation. The first moment corresponds to an attempt to ground 
philosophy in the 'fundamental attunement [Gnmdstimmung]'. In his 1929-30 lecture-
course, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, Heidegger explicitly draws upon 
the musical connotations of Stimmung - which relates etymologically to notions of 
tuning and, more distantly, to the voice, Stimme: 
An attunement is away, not merely a form or mode, but a way [Weise] - in 
the sense of a melody that does not merely hover over the so-called proper 
being of man, but that sets the tone for such being, i.e., attunes and 
determines the manner and way [Art und Wie] of his being.25 
This sense of at-tunement, which is also to be found in Benjamin and Adorno, recalls 
the N eoplatonic tradition. But a reason why Adorno and Heidegger can draw upon this 
tradition without being avowedly N eoplatonic is that the relating-attunement becomes 
non-harmonious, moving from vibration into becoming; nature into history. 
But why is this philosophical appropriation not precritical, echoing the above 
problem with messianism? And why is it not a historicist appropriation? The dissonant 
attunement gives a qualitative sense of the danger of modernity - as a problem and as an 
opportunity. In Heidegger, this appears in the contention that 'profound boredom' is the 
fundamental attunement of 'our contemporary Dasein'. More explicitly, where music is 
concerned (this is his second musical moment), Heidegger will situate music at the 
height of Western metaphysics, only to suggest that its nihilism is to be 'twisted free' 
of, out-of this height musically. This means reading Heidegger against Heidegger (see 
chapter 2). The resulting 'dialectic of nihilism' can be connected to Adorno's 
philosophy of music, which always exceeds music alone: 'The unity of the two spheres 
of music is that of an unresolved contradiction' (see chapter 3).26 
24 The third part of Kepler's study is devoted entirely to the theory of harmony. Cf. 
translators' introduction to Kepler, Johannes. The Harmony of the World, trans. E. J. 
Aiton, A. M. Duncan & J. V. Field (American Philosophical Society, 1997), xvii. 
25 Heidegger, M. The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, trans. William McNeill 
and Nicholas Walker (Indiana University Press, 1995), p. 67. 
26 Ibid. pp.392-3. 
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The assessments of music in Adorno and Heidegger were prompted by a 
German musical culture that, for the most part, no longer exists. As was Thomas 
Mann's assessment of German music in Doctor Faustus (1946). For Mann, modem 
music allegorises the German will to destruction. It is remarkable that Mann's musical 
advisor, he who forbade poetry after Auschwitz, has so little to say about the 
deployment of music in the Third Reich, including its sadistic use in the camps. It was 
left to a poet and survivor - one who took exception to Adorno's literal ban by 
honouring it in spirit - to enunciate the catastrophic destiny of the land of J. S. Bach.27 
Of course, Paul Celan was interested in the possibility of an-other destiny. And is not 
Todesfuge a work of musico-poetic dissonance of its own? Was Mann then simply too 
Platonic about dissonance in his contemporaneous book? 
The problem of historical memory after Auschwitz goes on - but not, today 
surely, the problem of a specifically German imperialism. Imperialism has migrated 
elsewhere. The old debates over music in German philosophy nevertheless remain 
strangely timely, given the spectacular success of music since the war. Music now 
crosses borders, those of language and culture, more readily than other cultural 
commodities, almost as if mimicking the movement of exchange itself. Music even 
seems to impinge upon the meaning of utopia and dystopia by way of the question of 
totality (see chapter 4). In his 'philosophical biography', Nietzsche (2000), Rudiger 
Safranski writes that, today, 
Music is all-pervasive as white noise, atmosphere, and milieu, and has 
become the acoustic backdrop of our entire existence. Anyone who listens 
to a Walkman while sitting in a subway or jogging through the park is 
straddling two worlds. Travelling and jogging are Apollonian activities; 
listening to music is Dionysian. Music has socialised the act of 
transcendence and turned it into a sport for the masses. Discotheques and 
concert halls are today's cathedrals. A substantial portion of the population 
between the ages of thirteen and thirty now lives in the extralinguistic and 
prelinguistic Dionysian spheres of rock and pop. The inundation of music 
knows no bounds.28 
Safranski conflates Adorno's 'two spheres' of music into one here. This is symptomatic 
of the difficulty in maintaining a notion of art music (given the problem of 'classical 
music') today. Rather than pointing the way forward for a musical avant-garde, this 
27 Cf. Felstiner, John. Paul Celan: Poet, Survivor, Jew (Yale University Press, 1995), 
fp·28-30. 
Safranski, Rudiger. Nietzsche. A Philosophical Biography, trans. Shelley Frisch 
(London: Granta, 2002), pp.l 0 1-2. 
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thesis suggests that an expression of waiting in vain is in some crucial sense musical. 
The expression takes the form of the constellational gesture or artwork. The question of 
art is at the forefront of the philosophies of Adorno and Heidegger. In comparison to 
Adorno's statement on the relationship between philosophy and music, Heidegger says 
that 'art' is 'the sister of philosophy. ,29 Of course, Heidegger means poetry, as not 
musIc. 
It might then seem strange that the example of an expression of waiting in vain 
that we shall encounter will be a work of modem music: Luigi Nono's Prometeo 
(1984). The fact that this work works against the medium of music offers only a partial 
response to this problem. There is a tradition of philosophers employing examples of 
music, often in philosophies of time (see chapter 3). As ever, the vulgarity of the 
employment of this example becomes a virtue when it serves the function of 
clarification: in this instance, that of the spatio-temporal character of an expression of 
waiting in vain. Waiting is clearly an experience of time (examined in chapter 3), but it 
is also, as utopian waiting, an experience of (no-) place (the theme of chapter 4). 
Prometeo is a work 'about' time and 'about' space, in an interrelated manner. 
The use of this example is complicated and enriched by the fact that its text was 
compiled by a philosopher well versed in Benjamin, Heidegger and messianism. 
Prometeo is a self-consciously messianic work, with all of the dangers that implies. 
Some of Cacciari's writings will be discussed. But it is Nono, the artist, who provides 
this study with an authority on modem music that is external to Adorno (and, obviously, 
to Heidegger). Nono's later work takes music in a direction that Adorno did not foresee. 
Prometeo is thereby a critique of Adorno's musical waiting in vain as much as it is an 
expression of it. This, it is hoped, is in keeping with the claim that ideas of music are 
nothing without musical works, and, more crucially, that there is no waiting without 
expression -construction. 
Other, non-musical examples of waiting could no doubt have been examined; 
examples of time-based media, such as film. More obviously: Samuel Beckett, about 
whom there is a philosophical literature coming from both the historical materialist and 
the existentialist traditions. If Beckett were to be included, the example would be, as it 
is in Adorno, Endgame and not Waiting for Godot. The latter is no parable of the 
messianic, understood as a task. It remains fmnly within the idiom of post-war 
existentialism (and is quite compatible with Barth's patient waiting). The jargon of this 
29 Heidegger, M. The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, p.5. 
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existentialism becomes, according to Adorno, the object of Endgame's ridicule.3o Even 
Heidegger, upon seeing a performance of Godot, is reported to have said: 'That man 
must have read Heidegger,.31 
Each of the five chapters comprise a response to the question of 'waiting in 
vain?' by way of specific readings of Adorno, Heidegger and (in two of the chapters at 
least) Nono. It will be necessary to take into consideration a broader philosophical 
literature. Each chapter is supposed to contain both itself and the whole. There is also a 
sequential order. The music-philosophical debate moves from early Romanticism in the 
first chapter, to Nietzsche and Wagner in the second, to Schoenberg and the post-war 
musical avant-garde in chapter 3, and to N ono in chapters 3 and 4. The final chapter 
addresses the question of the title more explicitly than the preceding ones, on the basis 
of their findings: what is it that is musical about an expression of waiting in vain? 
30 Much of Adorno's 1958 essay on Endgame is taken up with the attempt to distinguish 
Beckett from traditional (and literary) existentialism. In Beckett, 'Absurdity is relieved 
of the doctrinal universality which in existentialism, the creed of the irreducibility of 
individual existence, linked it to the Western pathos of the universal and lasting'. 
Adorno's assessment is applicable to Waiting for Godot, in which the meaninglessness 
of indeterminate waiting becomes its determinate meaning. Adorno, T. W. 'Trying to 
Understand Endgame' in Notes to Literature, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen 
(Columbia University Press, 1991), vol. 1, p.241. 
31 Cited in: Magee, Bryan. Talking Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 2001), p.74. 
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Melancholy Science as Dissonant System 
It has been stated on more than one occasion that the philosophy of Adorno is one of 
resignation. Adorno seems to have accepted this 'reproach', in advance, having 
characterised his thought as 'melancholy science', the only possibility of philosophy 
amidst conditions of 'damaged life'. 1 A totalising theory of reification (the 'totally 
administered society') leads to a reification of the theory itself. In determining late 
capitalist society as a total object, such a theory denies its own objective and political 
efficacy. Objections to resignation in Adorno have in fact come from traditions of both 
Marxism and Nietzschean vitalism. Adorno puts forward a competing interpretation, or 
critique, of each of them. The melancholy science is, say the former, critique without 
practice; say the latter, the mere opposite of the joyful science.2 Some of the objections 
have, no doubt, been anti-philosophical (where philosophy is conflated with idealism). 
But the objection to a decisively theoretical abstraction from practice can be, and has 
been put philosophically as an objection to the legacy of neo-Kantianism in twentieth-
century philosophy. Few of the detractors pursue this objection, and many are subject to 
it themselves. 
In Negative Dialectics, Adorno writes that 'praxis' is 'delayed for the 
foreseeable future,.3 Practice is not thereby ruled out. But that it is not explicitly ruled 
in, that the possibility of such praxis is delayed indefinitely, raises the problem of the 
infinite task - a maxim of neo-Kantianism. Is Adorno's indefinitely deferred praxis the 
regressive infinity in disguise, as it is (I will suggest below) in Kant's Critique of Pure 
Reason? Is the infinite task a possible task? Or is it a form of waiting in vain? If the 
melancholy science is an infinite task, then it invites those problems associated with the 
1 Adorno, T. W. Minima Moralia, trans. E. F. N. Jephcott (London: Verso, 1978), p.lS. 
The 'reproach of resignation' appears in Adorno's radio-lecture, 'Resignation', in The 
Culture Industry (London: Routledge, 200 I), p.198. 
2 Combining these two traditions to some extent, Antonio Negri considers Adorno a 
representative of the 'deconstructive phase of critical thought', that, with the 'exit from 
modernity, has lost its effectiveness'. The 'new task' is not deconstruction, but 
'constructing, in the non-place, a new place'. Negri, Antonio & Hardt. Michael. Empire 
(Harvard University Press, 2000), p.::! 17. 
3 Adorno, T. W. Negative Dialectics, pp.l5-l6. 
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Kantian antinomy of reason, later replicated III neo-Kantianism under different 
circumstances to those of Kant. 
In Hegel Contra Sociology (1981), Gillian Rose categorised Adorno under 'neo-
Kantian Marxism'. But three years earlier, she had published a sympathetic introduction 
to his thought: The Melancholy Science. In this earlier study, Rose reassures both her 
reader and herself that the 'melancholy science is not resigned, quiescent or 
pessimistic.,4 By the time of her Hegel study, however, Rose concurs with a more 
traditional understanding of melancholy, as a sickness, without examining the nature of 
this sickness. Freud distinguished 'melancholia', the masochistic displacement of a lost 
but unknown object for the ego, from 'mourning [Trauer]', which works through the 
loss of a known object, the beloved. When 'completed the ego becomes free and 
uninhibited again.,5 Freud's distinction serves to indicate that melancholy is not one-
dimensional here.6 
Rose's attack was directed against a perceived sociological tum in philosophy 
(to theory) in the early twentieth-century, but also against a consolidating post-modem 
tum (as a consequence) towards its end. The disavowal of truth is the philosophical 
counterpart to the disavowal of the lost non-object, masochistically enjoyed and thus 
constantly reaffirmed. Rose was right to raise the problem of neo-Kantianism in Adorno 
and in contemporary philosophy generally, but surely wrong to respond with a 
restoration of Hegel and 'the law'. 7 Moreover, Rose's tum against Adorno can be 
understood as a consequence of her previous definition of the melancholy science. This 
definition remained incoherent on account of her restricted account of melancholy. 8 As 
4 Rose, Gillian. The Melancholy Science (London: Macmillan, 1978), ix. 
5 Freud, Sigmund. 'Mourning and Melancholia', trans. James Strachey (London: 
Hogarth Press, 1964), p.245. 
6 But Freud only takes us so far philosophically with this problem, to the extent that 
analysis, as a form of mourning, is the working-through of a known object (a human 
subject comprised of ontologically definitive characteristics) and not a hitherto 
unknown subject-object. Is it possible to mourn in the name of utopia, without 
melancholia? 
7 Cf. Osborne, Peter. 'Hegelian Phenomenology and the Critique of Reason and 
Society', in Radical Philosophy 32 (1982), p.14. 
8 Rose initially reads Ursprung des Deutschen Trauerspiels as a work of history and not 
philosophy. 'The melancholy portrayal of objects and persons in baroque drama 
conveys the prevalent attitude to the natural world at the time.' Elsewhere, she 
acknowledges Benjamin's motivation against neo-Kantianism, but understands this as 
an intra-Kantian gesture. Benjamin 'attempted to revise Kant's notions of experience 
and knowledge.' Benjamin's speculative transformation, not revision, of experience is a 
confrontation with the regressive infinity, not a repetition of it. Rose, G. Hegel Contra 
Sociology (London: Athlone Press, 1981), p.22, p.32; The Melancho~v Science, p.37. 
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Rose would have known, the melancholy science translates, 'Die traurige Wissenschaft' 
- hence, Trauer, not Melancholia. 9 
According to Rose, neo-Kantianism reduced Kant's systematic project to a 
dichotomy between validity and value; the Marburg and Freiburg Schools tending to 
follow these two concerns respectively. Or, neo-Kantianism merely formalised Kant's 
failure to mediate his theoretical and practical projects systematically (and without 
opting for the responses of either German Idealism or materialism). For these reasons, 
Rose could have said that the dualism is already anticipated in the first Critique, which 
attempts to deduce a ground of reason transcendentally that can only be confirmed 
empirically, in 'what it does'. Practical reason 'constitutes the keystone of the whole 
structure of pure reason'. No transcendental Idealism, and thus no Subject, without 
actual freedom. lO Freedom is not, however, critically deduced in Kant's second 
Critique, which accordingly leans upon the 'deduction' that is not given in the first (see 
chapter 5). Reason is the uniquely human task arising from its antinomical nature. The 
critique of pure reason shows the task of reason to be critique; the pursuit of knowledge 
through science. Upholding the principle of sufficient reason, Kant conceives of science 
as the pursuit of 'conditions [Bedingungen]'. The central problematic of the Kantian 
system can be said to concern the contradiction of conditioned, Bedingt, and 
unconditioned, Unbedingt; of nature and freedom. 
If 'the conditioned is given', Kant states in the Critique of Pure Reason, 'then 
the whole sum of conditions, and hence the absolutely unconditioned, is also given, 
through which alone the conditioned was possible. ,11 Kant uses 'given' in two opposing 
senses. The conditioned is given in experience, as appearance. Whereas the sum of 
conditions, which is (the) unconditioned, is given as an 'idea'; not in experience (by 
which Kant means sense; the idea is supersensuous). As with the thing-in-itself, the 
unconditioned is necessary transcendentally, as the ground of appearance ('through 
which alone the conditioned was possible'), but equally, this metaphysical realm is not 
available to experience itself. Since the unconditioned can only be known in this way, 
each of the four antinomies refer to the question of whether the unconditioned totality, 
the whole, is finite or infinite; that is, whether it is unconditioned or not. 
9 Rose later distinguished between mourning and melancholy, in her unfinished, 
posthumously published Mourning Becomes the Law (Cambridge University Press, 
1996), p.ll. 
10 Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), p.3. 
11 Kant, I. Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer & Paul W. Wood (Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), A4091B436, p.461. 
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The problem is that the antinomies are answers, not questions. According to 
Adorno, the third antinomy 'develops thesis like antithesis non-contradictorily in itself. 
To that extent it by no means comfortably disposes of the antithesis, but wishes to 
demonstrate its inevitability.' 12 But is not this inevitability comforting (a happy non-
ending)? Elsewhere in Negative Dialectics, Adorno defends infinity without considering 
its problems. 13 He tends to understand Kantian critique as the direct anticipation of 
Hegel's 'determinate negation', as if the antinomy were what Kant himself called it: 
'dialectic' .14 Adorno thereby overlooks Hegel's overall 'Aujhebung' of Kant's 'abstract 
reason', in the name of 'actual reason' - the cue for Rose's Hegelian attack upon neo-
Kanti ani sm. 
Of course, the antinomy of reason is 'given to us as a problem' .15 The 
unconditioned grounds and ends reason. But since the antinomy of reason is by its own 
account constitutively insoluble, Kant must, in the end, side with (a particular) infinity, 
towards which there can be no progress, and hence no task of reason. Crucially, Kant's 
mechanistic paradigm of conditions looks like what Hegel will come to term the 'bad 
infinity' .16 Kant's distinction between a mathematical and a philosophical infinity does 
not pre-empt Hegel's attack (and this bears upon Adorno's delayed praxis). Negative, 
indefinite infinity (an 'indeterminately continued regress') is contrasted with the 
positive, mathematical infinity. The former names the non-finitude that accompanies the 
finite conditioned, negatively. But this throws Kant back onto the antinomy, and its 
infinite insolubility.17 According to Heidegger, the second edition of the first Critique 
'helped to prepare the tum away from an uncomprehended finitude toward a comforting 
infinitude' . 18 Kant's own dissatisfaction with the antinomy of reason can be sensed from 
his third Critique (of Judgement, 1790), which allows for that which was ruled-out of 
the previous Critiques: an experience of reason. But this exceptional experience of the 
12 Adorno, T. W. Negative Dialectics, pp.238-239. 
13 Ibid. pp.24-27. 
14 Kant, I. Critique of Pure Reason. A4981B526, p.513. 
15 Ibid. A647/B675, p.592. 
16 Or, the 'spurious infinity', since the infinite 'straight line' is an infinity (the 
mathematical infinity) but not the, absolute infinity. Hegel, G. W. F. Science of Logic, 
trans. A. V. Miller (London: Humanity Books, 1969), p.149. 
17 Kant, I. Critique of Pure Reason, A510-111B538-9, A5121B540, pp.521-2; 
A518/B546, p.525. 
18 Heidegger, M. The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, trans. William McNeill 
and Nicholas Walker (Indiana University Press, 1995), p.209. Heidegger's 1929 reading 
of Kant was of course opposed to neo-Kantianism, as his debate with Ernst Cassirer 
makes clear. Cf. Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 5th edition. trans. Robert Taft 
(Indiana University Press, 1997), Appendix IV, pp.193-207. 
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sublime is accordingly natural, not historical. In the face of an infinitely sublime 
'object', 'our own position is secure' .\9 
Adorno is a critic of bourgeois, 'instrumental reason'. He is a philosophical-
materialist critic of philosophical idealism (this is why he is worth saving today, in light 
of the manic reactions to left-wing melancholy).20 Nevertheless, Adorno's critiques of 
reason raise as many questions as they answer. What is the ground of the critique of 
reason (which Adorno tends to use interchangeably with 'rationality')? Which reason, if 
any, makes such critique possible? Hence, when is critique, to use the Hegelian term, 
actually critical? The awkwardness of these questions is exacerbated by the fact that 
Adorno's alternative, unstated (unnameable?) reason looks Kantian in form, albeit with 
historical content added-on. In Dialectic of Enlightenment, progressive critique is 
construed as the reflexive self-consciousness of regress, myth. This reflection is a 
second-order myth, as, for instance, mimesis (art as the myth of myth). For Fichte, who 
attempted to complete Kant's system, self-consciousness is similarly, at bottom, 
reflexive. Reflection is the answer to the perpetuating contradiction of' I' and 'not I'. As 
an infinite task, the contradiction gives rise to the infinite longing for knowledge (the 
science of knowledge). It is infinite because the 'not l' remains constitutively 
unknowable, Kant's thing-in-itself. 'Man must approximate, ad infinitum, to a freedom 
he can never, in principle, attain. ,21 Fichte faces the same objections made of Kantian 
reason. The structure of 'reason' in Dialectic of Enlightenment seems neo-Fichtean -
surprising, perhaps, given that the domination of the 'not l' as nature would be a model 
of regress in the study. 
It is nevertheless suggested in what follows that many of the resources to 
address these problems can already be found within an intellectual milieu of Adorno (a 
milieu that nevertheless needs to be produced). As was suggested, the philosophical 
history of melancholy forms a part of this milieu. As does Adorno's philosophy of 
music. Rose's methodological neglect of Adorno's writings on music, which 'constitute 
19 Kant, I. The Critique of Judgement, trans. James Creed Meredith (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1952), p.ll O. 
20 In his review of Erich Kastner, 'Linke Melancholie' (1931), Benjamin attacks the 
Weimar intelligentsia, a 'phenomenon of bourgeois dissolution'. Benjamin does not 
write'Trauer' here, but his critique anticipates some of the mis-interpreters of himself 
and Adorno. 'Left-Wing Melancholy', trans. Ben Brewster, in Selected Writings 
(Harvard University Press, 1997), vol. 2, p.424. 
21 Fichte, 1. G. Science of Knowledge, trans. Peter Heath & John Lachs (Cambridge 
University Press, 1982), p.115. 
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over a half of his published work', might also account for her limited interpretation.22 It 
will be suggested that Adorno critically disrupts a tradition of the harmony of the 
spheres, and produces a philosophy of dissonance as melancholy science. This 
constellational dissonance comes to the fore where we find Adorno at his most 
systematic; in his 'anti-system'. 23 On the other hand, in reversing this musical (muse-
ical) philosophy, Adorno perpetuates the mythical tradition of mausike. Adorno draws 
upon all three of the associations of 'music and philosophy' listed above - language, 
form and affect - only to subvert them. 
System, Logos, Music 
Adorno's writings on music almost always reflect upon something other than music. 
Language is a case in point. And it is through the problem of language that Adorno 
addresses one aspect of the problem of philosophy. This can be understood as an 
intervention into debates arising from (mostly German) philosophical and music-
aesthetic traditions. Adorno reads these debates through the early writings of Benjamin, 
especially after the war (in the context of his co-editing of Benjamin's collected 
writings). Like Benjamin, Adorno contends that the problem of philosophy lies, 
immediately, in its mode of presentation. For, 'presentation [Darstellung] is not a matter 
of indifference or external to philosophy, but immanent to its idea. ,24 The question of 
presentation is immanent to the question of the possibility of systematic philosophy, to 
the extent that the philosophical system is the mode of (re-)presentation of the whole. 
The problem of the system and of the whole is already the problem of (the regressive) 
infinity, introduced above - either because the whole is said to be infinite 
(unconditioned) or because the system incorporates that infinity within it. 
The problem of presentation leads to questions about the presentational meaning 
of language as such, since language is (at one level) the medium of philosophy. The 
system that re-presented the whole would have rendered language transparent to itself. 
Such a system would be a language beyond language, resulting in a dualism that 
signalled the impossibility of the system. But this impossibility only follows from a 
representational paradigm of language. Benjamin introduces this problem in his 
Episterna-Critical Prologue to The Origin of German Tragic Drama (1928). Under the 
22 Rose, G. The Melancholy Science, x. 
23 Adorno, T. W. Negative Dialectics, Prologue. 
24 Ibid. pp.29-31. Translation amended. 
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influence of Cohen, Benjamin invokes the problem of logic, in all but name, only to 
transgress the boundaries of Cohen's rationalist account of experience. The attempt to 
re-present the logos, 'more geometrico', is a 'renunciation of that area of truth towards 
which language is directed', because logos, as language, is constitutive of the 
presentation of philosophy.25 The Latin phrase refers to the Rationalist systems that 
employed (and continue to employ) a mathematical conception of representation - as if 
philosophy were the measure of a preconstituted whole.26 
Inasmuch as it is determined by this concept of system, philosophy is in 
danger of accommodating itself to a syncretism which weaves its spider's 
web between separate kinds of knowledge in an attempt to ensnare the truth 
as if it were something that came flying in from outside.27 
Benjamin does not move from this statement to a disavowal of the system. Rather, he 
responds with a mode of presentation that is systematic yet fragmentary. Benjamin 
attempts to circumvent the formal logic of representation - of system and whole - with 
a mode of presentation called 'constellation'. In his later work, Adorno reformulates 
Benjamin's constellation amidst a renewed questioning of the possibility of philosophy 
as metaphysics. Indeed, Negative Dialectics begins and ends with the question of this 
possibility. Its introduction reflects 'On the Possibility of Philosophy' by way of a 
consideration of presentational form. The concluding 'Meditations on Auschwitz' 
address the contemporary possibility of metaphysics as such. 
Adorno attributes the 'antinomical character of systems' to the 'antinomy of 
totality and infinity'. This Kantian definition proves, as was said, to be problematic. But 
Adorno is attracted to the negativity of the antimony as a critique of positive syncretism. 
Echoing Benjamin, the 'systematic need' of Rationalism is attributed to the bourgeois 
'ratio' itself. Hence, 'the systems of the seventeenth century had an especially 
compensatory purpose. ,28 Rationalism imports a positive-scientific criterion of truth 
25 Benjamin, W. 'Epistemo-Critical Prologue', in The Origin a/German Tragic Drama, 
trans. John Osborne (London: Verso, 1998), p.27. Translation amended. 
26 Benjamin thus attempts to draw a distincion between the Rationalism of Descartes 
and Spinoza on the one hand, each of whom indroduce their systems with the epigram 
on geometric method, and Leibniz on the other, whom Benjamin will rely upon for his 
idea of the monad. This contradictory approach to Rationalism explains the 
contradictory 'harmony of the spheres' of the 'Prologue' itself. As wi 11 be suggested, 
the relationship between Spinoza and Leibniz, in a text like Benjamin's, is complicated 
by the reception of Spinoza in modern German philosophy and literature (as 
'Spinozism '). 
27 Benjamin, W. 'Epistemo-Critical Prologue', p.28. 
28 Adorno, T. W. Negative Dialectics, pp.31-33. 
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into philosophy, irrationally. Adorno questions the appropriateness of mathematical 
reasoning for philosophical presentation. Mathematical reasoning is 'successful' in that 
it equates to that which is represented. But philosophical presentation does not equate to 
the whole, as an absolute identity. Neither are the two sides incommensurable. An 
understanding of language as non-representational is appropriate to the problem of 
philosophical presentation insofar as it recognises in (its) language a corresponding non-
correspondence to (of) the whole. The 'model' of the constellation is 'the conduct of 
language', because the constellation, 
offers no mere sign-system for cognItIve functions. Where it appears 
essentially as language, becoming portrayal [DarstellungJ, it does not define 
its concepts. It obtains their objectivity through the relationship in which it 
posits the concepts, centred around a thing.29 
Benjamin and Adorno each dismiss the propositional answer to the question of the 
system, but not the question of the system itself. They put forward a new response to the 
old problem. Since they accept the terms of the problem, they must give an account of 
the presentational mode of philosophy and of the categorical legitimacy of metaphysics. 
Adorno is perhaps never more metaphysical than when he writes about music. 
In an essay entitled 'Music, Language and Composition' (1956), Adorno writes 
the following: 
Music is similar to language in that it is a temporal succession of articulated 
sounds that are more than just sound. The succession of sounds is related to 
logic; there is a right and a wrong. But what is said cannot be abstracted 
from the music; it does not form a system of signs.30 
The ground of the comparison between music and language is 'temporal succession' 
and 'articulated sound'. This is more evident in Adorno's German. 'Sprache' does not 
readily accommodate itself to the French langue-parole distinction. Sprache is also 
speech. Adorno exploits characteristics of both langue and parole in his Sprache. 
Hence, in Aesthetic Theory, Adorno considers the 'articulation' or 'linguistic quality', 
Sprachcharakter, of the artwork. 'Art's linguistic quality gives rise to reflection over 
what speaks in art'. Adorno rejects the twofold possibility that the artist or the beholder 
speaks, subjectively. And yet, the work does speak, as if it were a subject. Lyric poetry 
29 Ibid. pp.164-66. 
30 Adorno, T. W. 'Music, Language and Composition', in Essays on Music, ed. Richard 
Leppert (University of California Press, 2002), p.113. 
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and mUSIC are obvious cases of Sprachcharakter. Although it 'remains undecided 
whether the latent "I", the speaking "I", is the same in different genres of art', Adorno 
hints at a preference: 'Here again music gives the most extreme expression to certain 
characteristics of the artistic, though this by no means bestows any primacy on music. ,31 
Insofar as Sprachcharakter refers to speech, Adorno upholds a traditional 
affinity between music and the voice - that of the human or even animal. It is a 
philosophical-anthropological observation that has a certain empirical validity. 
Instrumental music evolved out of choral and vocal traditions. But does not this 
association of language, music and the voice all amount to a sustained phonocentricism? 
Derrida had found in Jean-Jacques Rousseau both a privileging of the voice - the self-
present 'spirit' as the exclusion of the 'dangerous supplement' to speech, writing - and 
a latent understanding of writing as 'differance'. 32 Rousseau belongs and does not 
belong to the history of the metaphysics of presence. Central to Derrida's 
deconstruction is Rousseau's Essay On the Origin of Languages, in which Something is 
said about Melody and Musical Imitation (1781). But modern music, says Adorno (and 
Rousseau?) is a kind of writing. 'The traditional doctrine of musical forms has its 
sentence [Satz], phrase, period and punctuation.,33 Music has a grammatical 'right and a 
wrong'. There is something, perhaps everything, of ecriture in Sprachcharakter. 
But given that music has no privilege over what is 'right and wrong', even 
where art alone is concerned, the question of the specificity of Adorno's question - of 
the relationship between music and language - comes to the fore. Why is music as logos 
privileged? Music is the other of 'communicative language [meinende Sprache]', and 
'meinende Sprache' is the problem of the possibility of experience, Erfahrung. 
Benjamin and Adorno each conceive of Erfahrung metaphysically, as a relation to the 
whole. Philosophy begins and ends with experience, not formal logic. In his essay 'On 
the Final Scene of Faust' (1959), Adorno makes a distinction between 'communicative 
language [der kommunikativen] , and 'expressive discourse' .34 Communicative language 
communicates everything and, for that reason, nothing. The subject is not called upon, 
inter-subjectively, to produce meaning. Sociality would not be possible without 
31 Adorno, T. W. Aesthetic Theory, trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor (London: Athlone 
Press, 1997), 
pp.l66-167. Hullot-Kentor translates 'Sprachcharakter' both as 'articulation' and as 
'linguistic quality'. 
32 Derrida, 1. Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (John Hopkins 
University Press, 1976), part II, 1-3. 
33 Adorno, T. W. 'Music, Language and Composition', p.113. 
34 Adorno, T. W. 'On the Final Scene of Faust', in Notes To Literature, vol.l, p.112. 
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communicative language. But the hegemony of the solely communicative becomes a 
symptom of alienation; the alienation of sociality. For Hegel, language is 'the existence 
of spirit'; for Marx, 'practical consciousness that also exists for other men' .35 To say 
that the human being is the social being and the linguistic being is to say the same thing 
in a different way. It is likely that Adorno makes these connections in the light of 
Benjamin's essay, 'The Storyteller' (1929). 
The underlying thesis of 'The Storyteller' IS that the transformation of 
communication presents both a danger and a possibility for the transformation of social 
experience. 'The new form of communication is information. ,36 Information, 
communicative language, is a story without its being told, listened to and transmitted. 
This calls for a transformation of social experience - or rather, for a kind of 
communication that would bring about such transformation. Benjamin has by the 1920s 
moved away from the 'idealist' problem of philosophical presentation. Though still a 
question of language, in the most expanded sense of logos, the question of the whole 
must exceed institutional philosophy, in a more systematic manner, because it would in 
that case present the whole in practice and not only theory. 
Erfahnmg, which Benjamin relates to happiness, connotes a notion of the whole 
of life, within a whole tradition or community (but not yet society). Hence, the figures 
of the 'first child' and the 'mature man'. This is a prominent trope in the Classicism of 
Goethe, with whose writings Benjamin was particularly familiar. 'The happiest man is 
one who can link the end of his life with its beginning. ,37 The link, a narrative, is not 
merely the representation of the individual contents of (a) life. It is qualitative, as lived 
through. Erfahren comes from /ahren, to journey. Erfahren is to journey through; also, 
to leam.38 Goethe's naturalistic and Neoplatonic pantheism is prominent in Benjamin's 
35 Hegel, G. W. F., Phenomenology o/Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford University 
Press, 1979), p.395; Marx, Karl. & Engels, Friedrich. The German Ideology, ed. C. 1. 
Arthur (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1974), p.51. 
36 Benjamin, W. 'The Storyteller', in Illuminations, p.88. 
37 Goethe, 1. W. Maxims and Reflections, trans. Elizabeth Stopp (London: Penguin, 
1998), p.16. 
38 In his study on Goethe's pantheism, Wilhelm Dilthey observes that it is through a 
conception of the whole of life that Goethe comes closest to expressing a 
philosophically systematic position. Like Kant, Goethe takes the possibility of the 
system to be the concern of the antinomy of finitude and infinity. That the infinite, in 
the whole of nature, must remain 'impenetrable' to human knowledge, leads Goethe to 
doubt the possibility of a 'universally valid metaphysical system'. At the same time, it is 
due to the 'energy' produced in this very contradiction - of the finitely 
'comprehensible' and the infinitely 'impenetrable' - that we 'experience [eifahren], 
life, as a 'journey [Zugr. Typical of the cult of Goethe in the German intellectual life of 
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metaphysics. Goethe is a post-Kantian critic of idealist philosophy. The 'Epistemo-
Critical Prologue' begins with a citation from Goethe's monadological theory of 
colour.39 And through his Leibnizian appropriation of Goethe, Benjamin configures a 
harmonious conception of the whole, the very conception that Adorno attributes to 
bourgeois Rationalism on the basis of Benjamin's own critique of it in the same 
'Prologue' : 
Just as the harmony of the spheres depends on the orbits of stars which do 
not come into contact with each other, so the existence of the mundis 
intelligibilis depends on the unbridgeable distance between pure essences.40 
Benjamin may well have been familiar with Leibniz's belief that music is 'an 
expression of the universal harmony which God brought into the world' .41 In 
appropriating Benjamin's constellation, Adorno unwittingly draws upon its harmony of 
the spheres. The correlation of semblance and harmony is itself N eoplatonic. But this is 
not uniquely precritical. The Copernican tum (the dedication is not accidental) did not 
break-up the harmony of the spheres. Kant transferred it to (the task of) the 'harmony of 
the cognitive faculties' .42 
Adorno similarly takes over Benjamin's Goethean-Kantian conception of 
experience as a unified whole. The 'unity that artworks... achieve makes them 
analogous to the logic of experience [Eifahrung]. ,43 The unity of the artwork is 
'analogous' to the unity of experience because the artwork is the 'semblance [Schein], 
of unity. The artwork is unity 'as' disunity, harmony 'as' dissonance. Semblance is 
the beginning of the twentieth century, Dilthey conflates Goethe's concept of the whole 
of life with the whole of the life of Goethe the man: 'In adulthood, he stretched the 
sphere of the comprehensible, which he continued to reach out to. In maturity, the 
feeling of an impenetrability of the actual won more power over his soul once again. 
This is the natural course of middle age [Lebensalters].' Dilthey, W. Gesammelte 
Schriften, vo1.2 (Leipzig: Teubner, 1923), p.394. 
39 Benjamin, W. 'Epistemo-Critical Prologue', p.27. 
40 Ibid. p.37. 
41 Haase, Rudolf Leibniz und die Musik (Eckhardt, 1963), p.25. Leibniz's dictum, that 
music 'is the hidden arithmetical exercise of an unconscious mind that it is calculating' 
appears in the same year as the Monadology (1714), the principle source of Benjamin's 
appropriation. Much has been made of Leibniz's contemporaneity with 1. S. Bach, but, 
as ever, it is seemingly an idea of music that the philosopher is thinking of But there is, 
no doubt, a deeper, shared mathesis in the 'work' of these figures. Leibniz, G. W. 
'Principles of Nature and Grace', in Philosophical Essays, trans. & eds. Roger Ariew & 
Daniel Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989), p.212. 
42 Kant, 1. The Critique of Judgement, trans. James Creed Meredith (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1952), p.59. 
43 Adorno, T. W. Aesthetic Theory, p.136. 
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neither the full expenence of truth, nor is it mere deception. This equivocation 
corresponds to the social equivocation of art. In the essay on Faust, Adorno states that 
the 'two antagonistic media', communicative and expressive language, are 'nevertheless 
still one, never completely separate from one another'. This internal inseparability, 
semblance, is the (political) problem and possibility of art. The artwork posits its 
otherness to communicative language as semblance. The artwork communicates in spite 
of, and because of, its otherness. The artwork is in this precise sense incomprehensible. 
And it is incomprehensibility that provides the final clue to the meaning of Adorno's 
characterisation of music as Sprache. Modem music is and is not language: 
Music aims at an intention-less language, but it does not separate itself once 
and for all from signifying language, as if there were two different realms. A 
dialectic reigns here; everywhere music is shot through with intentions.44 
A dialectic reigns here. Music's 'similarity to language is fulfilled as it distances itself 
from language. ,45 The meaning of music, as art, is not intentional; meinende Sprache. 
But neither is it meaningless. Its meaning is, though the term ought to be qualified, 
ambiguous. Is not this movement from the intentional to the ambiguous an abstraction? 
And if so, why is the abstraction of music privileged over other abstractions? Adorno 
does single-out the abstraction of music (see chapter 3). But at issue here is the role of 
music in Adorno's dialectic of language, as it pertains to the problem of the system. In 
order to elucidate this, Adorno's 'dialectic' of music and language will be examined a 
little further. 
Modem music abstracts from intentional meaning to such an extent, a limit, that 
the opposite happens: 'intentions flood into it'. This is another way of saying, though 
Adorno does not always keep to his insight, that modem music is not absolute because 
it is musically absolute. Even absolute music occupies an already interpreted world of 
significations. But the intentionless is not merely the occasion for further intentions, a 
receptacle of signs. That would not be dialectical but reciprocal. The intentionless has a 
singular character. The musical idea intimates at the intentionless: 
What music says is a proposition at once distinct and concealed. Its idea is 
the form [Gestalt] of the name of God. It is demythologised prayer, freed 
44 Adorno, T. W. 'Music, Language and Composition', p.114. 
45 Ibid. p.117. 
from the magic of making anything happen, the human attempt, futile, as 
always, to name the name itself, not to communicate meanings.46 
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It is now possible to begin to understand Adorno's attempt to think the problem of 
philosophy with an idea of music - and with music's 'idea'. The constellation 'offers no 
mere sign-system for cognitive functions'. Music is Adorno's paradigm for a non-
representational mode of presentation. Music 'does not form a system of signs'. The 
signifier, philosophy, does not signify the signified, the whole. But this is only the 
negative side of Adorno's dialectic. By itself, it would amount to a form of anti-
systematic philosophical scepticism. There is equally a positive, though 'futile', 
intimation of the absolute; the 'name of God'. Music is the idea of naming in that the 
name is non-representational language. In the name, signifier and signified are 
expressed as one. The expression is itself naming. Returning to the two ends of Negative 
Dialectics: intimation is a metaphysical ground for philosophical presentation. But 
without this possibility of presentation there would be no expression of the intimation: it 
would remain mute. This understanding of the name and of naming would, once again, 
have come to Adorno from Benjamin; in particular, from the essays 'On Language as 
Such and on the Language of Man' (1916) and 'The Task of the Translator' (1921). 
The Post- German Idealism of Benjamin and Adorno 
In the essay 'On Language', Benjamin conceives of language as fundamentally non-
representational: 'all language communicates itself in itself; it is in the purest sense the 
"medium" of the communication. ,47 This is contrasted with the 'bourgeois conception 
of language' .48 A philosophy of language, rather than a science of language, considers 
the name, because the name mediates 'spiritual being' and 'thing' .49 Naming is the 
possibility of mediation. However, Benjamin's critique of the bourgeois conception of 
language cannot succeed, on the evidence of the 1916 essay alone. For it relies upon a 
version of what Adorno will call the bourgeois conception of philosophy itself: 
nominalism, the idea that the thing lies in its name alone and not in a reality 
independent of the name. Not only are things named (the 'language-lamp'), there are 
'thing languages', in which 'we find a translation of the language of things into an 
46 Ibid. p.ll4. 
47 Benjamin, W. 'On Language as Such and the Language of Man', trans. Edmund 
Jephcott, in Selected Writings, vo1.l, p.64. 
48 Ibid. p.65. 
49 Ibid. pp.63-4. Translation amended. 
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infinitely higher language.' Benjamin names some of these languages, languages of art: 
'a language of sculpture, of painting, of poetry.' Music is deliberately not listed: 'We 
are concerned here with nameless, non-acoustic languages, languages issuing from 
matter.' Benjamin combines a realist pantheism with an idealist nominalism: 'we should 
recall the material community of things in their communication [Mitteilung]. ,50 Adorno 
is critical of Benjamin's precritical nominalism. But matters are more complex than this. 
For Benjamin directs his version of nominalism against the regressive infinities of 
Kantian philosophy, in an attempt to understand metaphysics anew. This might look 
like a return to the pantheism of the Goethezeit. It is, in part. But Benjamin's pantheism 
is equally post-Kantian, when read in a specific philosophical context. 
Benjamin's 'On Language' equivocates between being a treatise on naming and 
one on names. The latter, nominalism, is replicated in the 'Prologue': 'Ideas are 
displayed, without intention, in the act of naming.' Ideas as names are nothing prior to 
an act of naming. Essence does not precede existence here. Except that Benjamin's 
commitment to a notion of anamnesis leads him to conceive of these ideas as the 
'limited number' of 'pure essences' .51 Benjamin's ideas are disclosed historically. 
'Philosophical doctrine is based on historical codification'. Ideas are, like Goethe's ur-
phenomena, hypothetical and contingent. But their hypothetical contingency must 
equally exclude the (hypo-) thesis for (their) finite plurality. For, which plurality of 
ideas and names? This Platonic immutability in Benjamin's thought is nevertheless 
opposed by a mutable philosophy of active naming. 
There is strong evidence within Benjamin's treatise 'On Language' of a deep 
affinity to Schelling's system of freedom, as represented in three texts: Philosophical 
Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom (1809), the Stuttgart Seminars 
(1810) and The Ages of the World (three drafts, 1811-15). In light of the Freiheitschrift 
in particular, a post- and not anti-idealist Benjamin can be discerned. Benjamin shares 
Schelling's post-Goethean intention to overcome the regressive infinity of 
transcendental Idealism on the one hand and mechanistic pantheism (and nominalism) 
on the other - without upholding Hegel's absolute identity in contemporary history. 
Schelling has moved away both from transcendental Idealism and from the system of 
absolute identity (including intellectual intuition). 
The affinity of these texts is attested to by their shared approach to a shared 
question. Is it possible to give a systematic (necessary) account of freedom; a 
50 Ibid. p.73. 
51 Benjamin, W. 'Epistemo-Critical Prologue', p.37. 
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philosophy of the name and of naming? While acknowledging the contradiction, both 
answer in the affirmative, taking up the opposing standpoints in the Trauerspiel of 
world history: God and humanity. Philosophy 'is properly speaking the progressive 
demonstration of the absolute' .52 For Schelling, the theological and political question of 
the existence of evil is the question of how actual human freedom can be dependent 
upon absolute freedom, since every act of freedom is, qua its freedom, absolutely free 
(unconditioned). As in Benjamin's text, God is in some way presupposed. But this 
theological tradition is, as Jiirgen Habermas suggested, a heretical one that traverses 
Jewish and Protestant mysticisms. This counter-history forms another connection 
between Schelling and Benjamin; one that opens up a form of messianism that is not 
neo-Kantian.53 The 'theological' standpoint is, in Schelling and Benjamin, 
complemented by and opposed by a phenomenological standpoint; that of historical 
facticity. 
F or Schelling, the theological problem dovetails with the Kantian problem of 
idealism (freedom) and the Naturphilosophie problem of realism (and nature). Indeed, 
the Freiheitschrift is best understood against the backdrop of the 'pantheism 
controversy', the 'thunderbolt' (Hegel) that struck German philosophy in the 1780s and 
continued in spite of Kant's attempted break with dogmatism. Affirming Kant's break-
through ('the higher light of Idealism shines upon us'), Schelling now accuses Kantian 
Idealism of failing to mediate itself wholly, leading to the collapse of its system. The 
Rationalist systems of Spinoza and Leibniz did at least posit a single Substance. For 
Kant, this was dogmatism, since an unconditioned (or self-conditioned) Substance could 
only be posited from the standpoint of God, not philosophy. Schelling has no problem 
with putting himself in the position of God. His complaint is rather that the Rationalists 
do this in a thoroughly unproblematic manner, reducing the divine to a thing, thus 
extinguishing freedom in fatalism. Instead, the identity of God and nature (pantheism) 
must remain the problem and task of philosophy. Hegel says this. But according to 
Schelling, Hegel remains on the side of spirit, against nature. This becomes clear by the 
52 Schelling, F. W. 1. 'Stuttgart Seminars', trans. Thomas Pfau, in Idealism and the 
Endgame of Theory (State University of New York Press, 1993), p.199. 
53 Habermas, Jiirgen. 'Dialectical Idealism in Transition to Materialism: Schelling's 
Idea of a Contraction of God and its Consequences for the Philosophy of History', trans. 
Nick Midgley & Judith Norman, in The New Schelling (London: Continuum, 2004), 
pp.64-5; cf. 'The German Idealism of the Jewish Philosophers', in Philosophical-
Political Profiles, trans. Frederick G. Lawrence (London: Heinemann, 1983). Given the 
likely influence of Baader and Molitor on Benjamin, the tradition of which Habermas 
speaks also traverses Catholic mysticism. 
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time of, for instance, the Aesthetics lectures, in which spirit names the 'inwardisation 
[Erinnerung], of nature.54 Hegel extends the Fichtean '1' to the 'We', leading to 'the 
complete annihilation of nature', the 'not I' .55 
Pantheism means 'One in All', or 'All in One'. If God is every-thing, or if all 
things are in God, then human freedom cannot be free. Schelling frames this dilemma in 
terms of the identity philosophy familiar to Hegel. What is the identity of identity and 
difference? This (il-)logical judgement has hitherto been misunderstood. Anticipating 
Adorno's understanding of the problem of (re-)presentation and language, Schelling 
writes that, 
The reason for such misinterpretations, which other systems have also 
experienced in full measure, lies in the general misunderstanding of the law 
of identity or the meaning of the copula in judgement. 56 
Philosophy, as judgement (Ur-teil), is a matter of presenting the opposition absolutely 
such as it is not absolutely opposed. To this end, Schelling employs language familiar to 
his earlier, monistic Naturphilosophie. But he has now grown dissatisfied with the 
attempt to define Science by way of the natural sciences. For Jacobi, the unique insight 
of Spinoza lay in the consistency with which he employed the principle of sufficient 
reason. His philosophy concurs with the view of the natural sciences that nature, 
including humanity, is entirely conditioned. Hence: atheism and fatalism, for God and 
freedom are each unconditioned. Jacobi states, against the natural sciences, that the 
acceptance of the impossibility of the unconditioned for human reason leads to a 
necessary act of unreason: faith. Schelling wants to uphold a notion of freedom without 
the dualism of faith and reason; to paradoxically produce a system of freedom.57 
Schelling attempts to overcome the contradiction of Spinozism, for which nature 
is immanent, and Idealism, for which nature is transcendent, by describing nature in 
54 'The spirit in its truth is absolute. Therefore it is not an essence lying in abstraction 
beyond the objective world. On the contrary, it is present within objectivity in the finite 
spirit's recollection or inwardization of the essence of all things rim endlichen Geiste 
die Erinnerung des Wesens aller Dinge] - i.e. the finite apprehends itself in its own 
essence and so itself becomes essential and absolute'. That 'things' refer here to nature 
is clear from the fact that the Symbolic form of art is that one most burdened with 
outwardly sensuous matter; whereas, by contrast, the Romantic arts are the most 
spiritual and hence inwardly sensuous (including, of course, music). Hegel, G. W. F. 
Aesthetics, vol.l, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998), p.lO!. 
55 Schelling, F. W. 1. 'Stuttgart Seminars', p.215. 
56 Schelling, F. W. J. 'Philosophical Investigations', p.223. 
57 Ibid. p.220. 
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non-mechanistic terms - by attributing freedom to it. Rather than this being solely 
dogmatic or anthropomorphic, the attribution is the necessary act of freedom itself: 
Man never obtains control of [the] condition [which existence requires in 
order to be actual], although in evil he strives to do so; it is only loaned to 
him, is independent of him; thus his personality and selfhood can never rise 
to perfect act. This is the sadness clinging to all finite life, and if in God, 
too, there is a condition which is at least relatively independent, then within 
him there is a well of sadness, which, however, never comes to actuality, but 
serves only for the eternal joy of overcoming. Hence the veil of 
despondency spread over all of life, the deep, indestructible melancholy of 
alllife.58 
'Schwermut' and 'Melancholie' arise from the contradiction between free existence and 
the condition or ground of existence, which, as conditioned, cannot be free. This is, so it 
seems, the famous lament to finitude, which always comes too soon from the standpoint 
of this eternally 'perfect act'. Except that, since melancholy is the experience of the 
contradiction of existence and ground, it is the original possibility of actual, finite 
freedom. Actual freedom is the concern of nature because it means the determinate and 
material act of freedom. Freedom must be actual, not ideal, in order to be free. As in 
Kant, there must be an unconditioned ground of freedom, an intelligible character. But 
this remains formal-transcendental, and hence too dualistic for Schelling: 'there is no 
transition from the unconditioned to the conditioned. ,59 Man and nature are melancholy 
together. As Heidegger puts it in his lectures on the FreiheitschriJt, 'nature also is 
intrinsically ego-like' .60 Adorno, who never discusses Schelling's system of freedom, 
nevertheless acknowledges that the philosophical concept of construction comes from 
Schelling. Referring to the earlier 'J ena' Schelling, Adorno writes that, 'Nature itself is 
seen as an aspect of subjectivity.'61 This shows that Adorno is latently aware of the 
issues at stake in the system of freedom - in his own philosophy, as mediated through 
B . . 62 enJamm. 
In comparable terms to Schelling, Benjamin writes of the 'deep sadness 
[Trauer] of nature': 
58 Ibid. p.271. 
59 Ibid. p.258. Translation amended. 
60 Heidegger, M. Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom, trans. Joan 
Stambaugh (Ohio University Press. 1985), p.89. 
61 Adorno, T. W. 'On Some Relationships Between Music and Painting', p.77. 
62 In the same essay on music and painting, Adorno quotes from Benjamin's essay 'On 
Language', in relation to the languages of art. Ibid, p.71. 
Because she is mute, nature mourns. Yet the inversion of this proposition 
leads even further into the essence of nature; the sadness of nature makes 
her mute.63 
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The muteness of nature is at once a lament to its alienation from the language of man 
and its call to be named by that language, to become logos. Nature already possesses 
'linguistic being', not as a language of its own but as a waiting-to-be-named. Since the 
name is a unity - of word and thing - this waiting has a redemptive-utopian meaning. 
According to Schelling, in 'his perfect existence, man must await a ... perfect state of 
nature' .64 This differentiates Benjamin from Adorno (initially at least) for whom 
naming, as waiting, is seemingly constitutively in vain: 
In the utopian and at the same time hopeless attempts at naming is located 
music's relation to philosophy, to which, for this very reason, it is 
incomparably closer, in its idea, than any other art. But the name appears in 
music only as pure sound, divorced from its bearer, and hence the opposite 
of every act of meaning, every intention toward meaning.65 
To say that naming the name is in vain is to propose a transcendent or ideal name 
beyond all naming. Naming in vain is the impossibility of intimation. Not awaiting, but 
waiting in vain (nature as thing-in-itself; unconditioned). For Benjamin, by contrast, the 
absolute name must be constitutive of naming. For Schelling too, freedom 'can only be 
thought as what posits and what is posited at the same time' .66 Melancholy waiting 
expresses disunity within unity. It is a positing of unity, the whole, as that which is not-
hence, a peculiar manner of positing. Adorno does not say that all naming is in vain, but 
rather that naming the name in art and (institutional) philosophy is in vain, since they 
each remain fonns of appearance, Schein (or, 'pure sound'). Adorno thus follows 
Benjamin's subsequent tum against idealism from within language - which, for Adorno, 
means music, or rather, that which is dissonantly musical. 
The melancholy of which Schelling and Benjamin write is no subjective feeling. 
Schelling acknowledges that 'many are driven to' the possibility of a pantheism that is 
not fatalistic 'by the liveliest feeling of freedom' .67 This Romantic feeling is but a clue, 
since it remains too immediate. It might just as well be the delusion of freedom, 
63 Benjamin, W. 'On Language as Such', p.73. 
64 Schelling, F. W. 1. 'Stuttgart Seminars', p.242. 
65 Adorno, T. W. 'On the Contemporary Relationship of Music and Philosophy', trans. 
Susan H. Gillespie, in Essays on Music, p.140. 
66 Schelling, F. W. 1. Ages o/the World (second draft), trans. Judith Nonnan (The 
University of Michigan Press, 1997), p.125. 
67 Schelling, F. W. 1. 'Philosophical Investigations', p.222. 
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ideology. Melancholy is more than feeling because it expresses a relation beyond the 
immediate to a possible whole, negatively. This is what is meant by the attribution of 
melancholy to nature: 'It is by means of melancholy [Schwermut] that man feels a 
sympathetic relation to nature'. 68 This mode and mood of relating that is more than a 
feeling can be termed an attunement, Stimmung, on account of what Agamben has 
termed its 'acoustico-musical dimension'. Melancholy is an attunement, as both mood 
and relation. 
Agamben highlights a connection between Stimmung and Stimme, also at stake 
in Benjamin's idea of nature.69 However, Agamben does not consider the possibility of 
the specifically non-harmonious attunement that is latently proposed by Schelling and 
Benjamin: 
Stimmung appears in the German language like a translation of the Latin 
concensus, of the Greek armonia. From this point of view, Novalis' notion 
of Stimmung, not as a psychology, but as an 'acoustics of the soul', is 
illuminating. 70 
The attunement of melancholy is a negative relation of the whole. In his lectures on The 
Fundamental Concepts 0/ Metaphysics, Heidegger refers to 'melancholy' as another 
name for the 'Grundstimmung' of 'profound boredom' (see chapter 5).71 Melancholy is 
a fundamental attunement. As fundamental, as the concern of grounding the whole, this 
melancholy is not ostensibly resigned: 'Joy must have sorrow, sorrow must be 
transfigured into joy'. Schelling speaks of the 'attraction of nature', which 
simultaneously gives rise to 'longing'. 72 
But this brings us to a certain limit of the Freiheitschrift. For the indeterminate 
longing of nature looks like the ideal, not actual will (transcendent, never empirical). In 
The Ages a/the World, this becomes the distinction between an eternal will 'to nothing' 
68 Schelling, F. W. 1. 'Stuttgart Seminars', p.230. 
69 The idea of muteness in language reappears in the Trauerspiel study, in connection 
with melancholy. The language of these plays is polarised between speech and writing. 
Jacob B6hme, an important theologian for both Schelling and Hegel, understood this 
polarity as 'the Language of Nature [Natur-sprache],. Benjamin surely has B6hme in 
mind when he describes the relationship between experience and storytelling: 'This 
whole created world speaks not so much with the human voice as with what could be 
called "the voice of Nature". ' Benjamin, W. The Origin a/German Tragic Drama, 
~.202; 'The Storyteller', p.l 03. 
o Agamben, G. Language and Death, trans. Karen E. Pinkus with Michael Hardt 
~University of Minnesota Press, 1991), pp.55-56. 
I Heidegger, M. The Fundamental Concepts a/Metaphysics, pp.182-3. 
72 Schelling, F. W. 1. Ages a/the World, p.147. 
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and a particular will 'to something'. In the FreiheitschriJt, Schelling attempts to explain 
their connectedness through a notion of existence as productive contradiction. But is not 
this the existential hypostatisation of Kant's third antinomy? The intelligible character is 
not the harmonious 'kingdom of ends', as Kant has it, but is conversely 'evil'. It is the 
darkness against which the light shines (but is evil nothing?). Since evil is similarly 
foundational (the 'unground'), existence cannot appropriate its ground or condition. 
Existence never actually gets a foothold on nature, meaning that there is no actual 
freedom and hence no determinacy. Sorrow and joy are then not dialectical, but 
infinitely-regressively reciprocal. Not Trauer, but Melancholia. 
Schelling is aware of this problem, as can be sensed from his increasing interest 
in theogony. Rather than separation from the absolute infinitely perpetuating itself, 
Schelling now speaks of 'periods', 'potencies' and 'ages of the world'. In his essay, 
'Dialectical Idealism in Transition to Materialism: Schelling's Idea of a Contraction of 
God and its Consequences for the Philosophy of History' (1970), Habermas reads The 
Ages of the World and the Stuttgart Seminars as unrecognised, foundational works of 
historical materialism. Schelling upholds the 'Promethean task' of appropriating the 
divine out of opposition to it, without, like Hegel, upholding the actuality of the 
appropriation in the status quo. Habermas recalls Schelling's 'baroque worldview': 
'Does not everything bear witness to a fallen world? ,73 This is Schelling's 
phenomenological argument, from experience, including his experience of politics: the 
failed French Revolution (for Benjamin, the First World War and, increasingly, 
capitalism as such). Not only does the corruption of the world show an absence of unity, 
the corrupt world presents itself as a false unity of its own: 
This natural unity, this second nature superimposed on the first, to which 
man must necessarily take recourse, is the [modem] state; and, to put it 
bluntly, the [modem] state is thus a consequence of the curse that has been 
placed on humanity. Because man no longer has God for his unity, he must 
submit to material unity.74 
The Habermas of the 1960s is drawn to these texts (rather than the Freiheitschrift) 
because they open up the possibility, through historical stages, of a negation of the 
negation. Melancholy remains a form of alienation: 'man... must submit to material 
unity.' But if man is the 'inverted God', an expansion through love into nature as a 
consequence of God's egoistic contraction into Himself, then why, asks Habermas, can 
73 Habermas, 1. 'Dialectical Idealism in Transition to Materialism', p.55. 
74 Schelling, F. W. 1. 'Stuttgart Seminars', p.227. 
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this material submission not be overcome materially? Schelling does not grasp the 
opportunity to pursue this possibility, which is instead half-grasped by Marx. 
Schelling's system will split, in the late philosophy, into a rationalist materialism on the 
one hand and a mythological idealism (which opposes 'material unity' as such) on the 
other. 
Nevertheless, unlike in Hegel's system, Schelling's account of alienation from 
nature includes nature on the side of the alienated. The negation of this absolute 
separation, of nature and spirit, is the hope of their reconciliation: 'the production of the 
human race offers a prospect for the resurrection of nature. ,75 Habermas reads Schelling 
in terms of the problematic of identity and difference. The hangover of 
Naturphilosophie in Schelling's system of freedom means that his Bohmean theogony is 
proto-materialist without being materialist in a positivist-naturalistic way. Schelling's 
'second nature' appears as a polemical inversion of Hegel's concept (the term was no 
doubt 'in the air'). The modem state leads not to freedom but to submission. Second 
nature is the time of the fall from first nature. And this is the problem with the 
interpretation of Schelling in Habermas. In following Schelling's auto-critique, from 
freedom to history, Habermas follows and exaggerates its onto-theogonic 
presuppositions. This involves a regression in the concept of nature. The immanent 
critique of pantheism that is the FreiheitschriJt becomes an immanent critique of theism 
in these subsequent texts. In the former treatise, there is a fundamental equivocation 
over nature's independence from man and God. Hence, Schelling can define nature both 
as the 'dark ground' and as 'the will of love, through which the word is spoken'. 76 
Melancholy is already both 'subjective' and 'objective'. Whereas, in the subsequent 
fragments, nature refers to the initial potencies alone, which precede and ground 'spirit' 
(hardly mentioned at all in the FreiheitschriJt, because existence does its work). 'God 
himself is above nature, nature is his throne, subordinate to Him.' 77 This comparison is 
complicated by the divergence in the employment of 'potencies' and 'stages' between 
the Stuttgart Seminars and The Ages of the World. But nature undoubtedly slips back 
into the ground towards the end of Schelling's system of freedom. In the FreiheitschriJt, 
by contrast, nature is as much the end as it is the beginning: 'each successive process 
comes closer to the essence of nature. ,78 
75 Habermas, 1. 'Dialectical Idealism in Transition to Materialism', p.78. 
76 Schelling, F. W. 1. 'Philosophical Investigations', p.267. 
77 Schelling, F. W. 1. 'Stuttgart Seminars', p.2IO. 
78 Schelling, F. W. 1. 'Philosophical Investigations', p.241. 
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Specifically, there are two connected problems in Habermas, who was right to 
connect Schelling's system of freedom to historical materialism, but for the wrong 
reasons. First: the presupposition of creation, fall and redemption of nature (the 
potencies; AI, A2, A3). This remains the immanent problem of the Freiheitschrift. 
Habermas ultimately understands this teleological story according to an anthrotheology 
along the lines of Ludwig F euerbach. In which case, why go back to Schelling? The 
'transition to materialism' is from Schelling and not Feuerbach, Habermas implies, 
because the latter's sensuous humanism is but the abstract negation of 'dialectical 
idealism', not its sublating-transition. The second problem is a consequence and 
embellishment of the first. The materialism that Habermas finds in Schelling is a 
traditional and not historical materialism. Nature as the ground of spirit is read as the 
material conditions of society. But this involves a split in nature and spirit that Schelling 
had already confronted in Spinozism. According to Habermas, 
what seems to be called for is ... something that precedes reason itself, a 
ground on which reason denies its own grounding without being able to 
seize hold of this grounding as such. Matter is such aground. 79 
The younger Marx opposed the materialism of sensuous matter with 'practical, human-
sensuous activity'. 80 It would be unfair to attribute vulgar materialism to Habermas 
unreservedly, since he seeks to deploy Schelling against that materialism - in a similar 
way that, he writes in 'Ernst Bloch: A Marxist Schelling' (1960), Marx deployed 
Bohme's dynamic conception of nature 'against the mechanistic materialism of the 
English seventeenth and the French eighteenth centuries. ,81 But Habermas confusedly 
synthesises the equivocation of the Freiheitschrift. Apropos of Bloch's late Schellingian 
sympathies: 'Matter as World Soul. ,82 
Habermas follows Schelling's Aristotelian tum, to an opposition of matter and 
spirit (the unmoved mover in the moved), only to reintroduce this idea of nature back 
into the Aristotelian Marx, partly on the philological basis that Marx may have 
interpreted Hegel's dialectic via Schelling'S Berlin lectures.83 But Habermas has to 
acknowledge the incongruity: 'Of course Marx confines the material life-process to the 
79 Habermas, 1. 'Dialectical Idealism in Transition to Materialism', p.53. 
80 Marx, K. Early Writings (London: Penguin, 1975), p.422. 
81 Habermas, 1. 'Ernst Bloch: A Marxist Schelling', in Philosophical-Political Profiles, 
fp·67-8. 
Ibid. p.69. 
83 It was Engels, not Marx, who attended Schelling's lectures. In any case, Marx's 
dialectic is not that of Engels. 
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reproduction of social life, where Schelling, the natural philosopher, still understood it 
as universal. ,84 Habermas makes no distinction here, between the Spinozist Schelling 
and the auto-critique of the FreiheitschriJt, which states that, 
The error of [Spinoza's] system lies by no means in the positing of things in 
God, but rather that there are things in the abstract concept of the world's 
beings, instead of the infinite substance itself, which in fact is also a thing 
for him.85 
Against Spinozism, Schelling introduces a concept of alienation that, against idealism, 
is immanent to nature and spirit taken as a whole. Habermas remains an idealist to the 
extent that his alienation still pertains to the opposition of inner and outer, spirit and 
nature. Not only that, matter now refers solely to the pejorative sense of second nature: 
reification. This concept of matter cannot do the work Habermas wants it to, in relation 
to the 'double meaning' of reification in Marx (though in another sense, Habermas 
exaggerates the 'romanticizing anthropology of the Paris Manuscripts,):86 
The theme of work is thus the reification of the species life [Gattungswesen] 
of mankind: this is because man sees himself doubled not only intellectually 
in consciousness but actually in work, and thus sees himself in a world of 
his own making.87 
That Habermas seeks an account of externalisation as reification from Hegel, before 
subjecting it to the critiques of Schelling and Marx, displays an understandable need for 
a metaphysically inflected historical materialism. 
But what if the Marxian inauguration of historical materialism is read back into 
Schelling's system of freedom, as a philosophy of historical 'existence', not 'matter'? 
Its affinity to the concepts of alienation and second nature invites this possibility. In his 
comprehensive study of The Concept of Nature in Marx (1962), Alfred Schmidt sought 
84 Habermas, J. 'Dialectical Idealism in Transition to Materialism', p.79. 
85 Schelling, F. W. 1. 'Philosophical Investigations', p.230. 
86 Schmidt, Alfred. The Concept of Nature in Marx, trans. Ben Fawkes (London: New 
Left Books, 1971), p.128. Schmidt contends that Marx increasingly distances himself 
from this early nature-Romanticism. But for Schmidt, this is at the price of doing 
without a concept ofreification. For the early Marx, famously: 'The devaluation of the 
human world grows in direct proportion to the increase in value of the world of things 
[ ... ] The realisation of labour is its objectification. In the sphere of political economy 
this realisation of labour appears as a loss of reality for the worker, objectification as 
loss of and bondage to the object, and appropriation as estrangement, as alienation. ' 
Marx, K. Early Writings, p.324. 
87 Cited in: Habermas, 1. 'Dialectical Idealism in Transition to Materialism', p.78. 
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to avoid the 'neo-existentialist tendency ... to reduce Marx's thought to an unhistorical 
'anthropology' centred on the alienation problematic of the early writings,.88 Unlike 
Habermas, Schmidt does not seem to think that metaphysics is necessary as the ground 
of that which supersedes it, materialism (Schmidt is quite open about Marx's social 
Darwinism, for instance). 89 Schmidt and Habermas share a philosophy of natural history 
that diverges significantly from the idea of their teacher. Adorno's philosophy of 
'natural-history', revisited in Negative Dialectics, is too metaphysical for Schmidt and 
not metaphysical enough for Habermas. In the former there is no place for longing; in 
the latter there is only longing. Again, the latter is a consequence of the creeping 
Aristotelianism within Schelling's system of freedom (the potencies), which Habermas 
reads by way of the 'precritical' Bloch.90 The former position is a consequence of its 
positivist historical materialism. In Negative Dialectics, in contrast to both of these 
positions, Adorno writes of an expression of waiting in vain, amidst the 'fall' of 
metaphysics; a metaphysics that is synonymous with the name of Aristotle.91 
This expression of waiting in vain inevitably takes on existential overtones 
(Sartre is approvingly cited on four occasions in the Metaphysics lectures of 1965, much 
to the chagrin of Schmidt no doubt). Insofar as there is a continuity within Adorno's 
thought, between the melancholy science, the idea of natural-history and an expression 
of waiting in vain, a genealogy may be traced to the Freiheitschrift (without, as 
Habermas puts it, 'getting into the question of intellectual historical continuity'). This is 
not the existentialism of Kierkegaard, which, however ironically, 'has nothing to do 
with the System', including Schelling's.92 Kierkegaard's existentialism forms a strand 
of the incomplete system of Heidegger's Being and Time. 'Resoluteness' before the 
88 Schmidt, A. The Concept o/Nature in Marx, p.9. 
89 Ibid. p.37; pp.43-46. 
90 Habermas, 1. 'Ernst Bloch: A Marxist Schelling', p.76. 
91 In his essay on the Ages o/the World, Slavoj Zizek draws a parallel between 
Schelling's positivist tum and the tum within Frankfurt School critical theory, from the 
first to successive generations: 
in both cases, we have first a condensed great breakthrough that, however, ends in failure and is then 
followed by a kind of compromise formation, an immense system elaborated in great detail, yet 
somewhat flat, with the impetus of the earlier work lost [ ... ] The problem with the late Schelling is ... not 
that he is a reactionary "irrationalist" (the standard hardline Marxist approach), but that he is too 
"rationalist." The ultimate irony of this homology between Schelling and Habermas, of course, is that 
Habermas ... the first to formulate clearly the "regressive" character of Schelling's late philosophy with 
regard to the Weltalter, plays the same "regressive" role in the history of the Frankfurt School. 
ZiZek, Slavoj. 'The Abyss of Freedom', in Schelling, F. W. 1. Ages of the World, pp.36-7. 
92 Kierkegaard, Soren. Fear and Trembling, trans. Alistair Hannay (London: Penguin 
Books (1985), p.42. 
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'fundamental state-of-mind', 'anxiety', means 'bringing oneself into a facti cal taking-
action' .93 'Authentic' existence, Dasein, is not thereby the determinate taking action of 
itself - the act of freedom. Being and Time tends to remain, against Heidegger's 
intentions, formal-transcendental (see chapter 5). In Benjamin's Schellingian 
reflections, by contrast, the attunement of melancholy is already naming as the act of 
freedom. The possibility of this determinacy is the possibility of a praxis-oriented, and 
thus politically-oriented, theory. According to Adorno's idea of natural-history, a 
philosophical account of alienation does not exclude a philosophy of history, as the 
history of determinations (including those mis-determinations of the false 
consciousness), but rather presupposes it, since historical determinacy and nature are 
inseparable. The result is a notion of historical facticity - not the subjectivist 
existentialism that rightly worries Schmidt. In his early lecture on 'The Idea of Natural 
History' (1932), Adorno complains that Wilhelm Dilthey 'did not engage facticity with 
sufficient seriousness', in spite of his critique of historicism.94 It remains to be shown 
how the melancholy science is historical, without explicitly following the response of 
The Ages of the World. The melancholies of Schelling and Adorno diverge, as divergent 
historical facticities: 1810 is not 1965. 
The Melancholy Science of Natural History 
In his study of the baroque Trauerspiel, Benjamin distinguishes between a productive 
and an unproductive melancholy - as if to anticipate Freud.95 Baroque, post-
Reformation (but not counter-Reformation) melancholy is 'sublime melancholy 
[erhabene Melancholie], - in the sense, perhaps, that it sublates, hebt auf, the medieval-
Christian, 'pernicious kind' of melancholy. This sublation is signalled in the 
appropriations of non-Christian sources - notably, 'Arabian' astrology. Saturn 'rulers] 
over the melancholy disposition. ,96 Benjamin's distinction within melancholy shows the 
two faces of the baroque, one looking to the medieval and the other looking to the 
modern.97 
93 Heidegger, M. Being and Time, trans. lohn Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1962), p.341. 
94 Adorno, T. W. 'The Idea of Natural History', trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor, in Telos 60 
(New York: 1984), p.122. 
95 Benjamin, W. The Origin of German Tragic Drama, p.151. 
96 Ibid. p.149. 
97 It is perhaps because Habermas does not make this distinction, in his account of 
Schelling'S 'baroque world-view', that his materialism comes to resemble the 
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According to Benjamin, the allegorist 'betrays the world for the sake of 
knowledge,.98 This dialectical formulation captures Benjamin's melancholy science of 
allegory (where this melancholy must be understood as the 'sublime' kind). The 
allegorist distances (things) in order to know (things), and hence to bring (things) into 
nearness, for the first time. Benjamin is as interested as Schelling in the question of 
actual, not contemplative freedom. Or at least, the allegorist is ironically contemplative. 
Allegorical practice must be temporal, or rather temporalising (hence the Origin of 
Benjamin's title), since the same (thing) cannot be simultaneously distant and near. 
There is, in effect, a temporal-historical splitting of 'world', just as there must be a 
splitting of 'nature' in Schelling. The 'world' that is betrayed is the 'fallen world'. But 
this world is all-too-near. Adorno call this world a 'second nature', explicitly recalling 
Schelling (it comes to him from Lukacs, who denounced Schelling as 'irrational'). 'The 
natural lawfulness of society is ideology.,99 The distancing of this all-too-near world, in 
allegory, yields a world of 'knowledge'. Distancing on its own would be an abstract 
negation, leading to the passive nihilism of world denial. Of course, such 'knowledge' 
might be understood as completely theoretical and not practical at all - hence the figure 
of contemplation, DUrer's Melancholia. But read in relation to Benjamin's essay 'On 
Language' and Schelling's Freiheitschrijt, this melancholy dialectic implies human-
sensuous activity, in a situation of its possibly finite 'delay'. This temporalised idea of 
nature means that the attunement is of itself temporal. The 'despondency' of this 
attunement is the dissonance between the existing facti city and that which the existing 
facticity excludes, as possibility. 
In his 1932 lecture, Adorno is curious about, if not positively motivated by 
Heidegger's failed attempt to produce a systematic philosophy of history after Hegel, in 
Being and Time. Like Heidegger, a more obvious heir to Schelling, Adorno is interested 
in 'the concrete unity of history and nature.' 100 Adorno's response involves the 
synthesis of a Lukacsian interpretation of reification along with Benjamin's account of 
allegory. The idea of natural-history is, as a consequence, deeply ironic. History tends 
'pernicious kind', according to which death places man in a subservient relation to God. 
This is the opposite of what Habermas wants to say. But his sense of matter comes 
closer to the spiritless body than it does to labour, practice or even techne. Crucially, in 
this regard, Benjamin suggests that 'the dualism of Descartes is baroque', meaning that 
Descartes is a philosopher of the baroque period, not a baroque philosopher; a late 
scholastic, not the father of modem philosophy, who is of course Leibniz. Ibid p. 21 7. 
98 Ibid. p.157. 
99 Adorno, T. W. Negative Dialectics, pp.347-351. 
100 Adorno, T. W. 'The Idea of Natural History', p.117. 
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towards nature through reification: second nature. Yet nature can become historical 
through allegory. As Benjamin writes, "'History" is writ across the countenance of 
nature in the sign language of transience'. For Adorno, the 'deepest point where history 
and nature converge lies precisely in this element of transience.' 101 Reification, 
transience as decay, here becomes also the possibility for interpretation; transience as 
new growth, in this baroque world. Reification is the all-too-near world, interpretation is 
the allegorical distancing, and new growth is knowledge. 
As in the FreiheitschriJt, nature and spirit are dialectical, as existence - or 
rather, for Adorno, historical facticity. The difference is that, whereas Schelling can 
define nature philosophically as well as philologically (in his theogonical 
hermeneutics), Adorno's early concept tends to rely upon the philological alone: the art 
and literary historical elements of Benjamin and Lukacs. These traditions are conferred 
with a truth content that is not accounted for, as if the ruse of reason were assumed to be 
at work within them. By contrast, Schelling also philosophically argues that nature 
cannot be the absolute other of spirit, and hence history; not if we are to have spirit and 
history at all. To make such a claim, as Fichte does, is to engage in a performative 
contradiction, since it is already made from the standpoint of spirit as not nature. 
This philosophical deficit of 'The Idea of Natural History' leads Adorno to 
repeat the neo-Kantianism that he outwardly opposes (as 'critical idealism') in both 
historicism and Being and Time (see chapter 5). Is not the irony of the 'Idea' its 
problem? If history tends towards nature and nature towards history then another 
infinite regress ensues, which sides with nature and not history, just as Kant's antinomy 
sides with a bad infinity. This problem is surely repeated in Dialectic of Enlightenment, 
which in many respects comprises the development of the 'Idea' under a horrifically 
changed historical facticity.102 Enlightenment is (only) ironic. In the lecture at least, 
Adorno is latently aware of this issue, since it is internal to the nature-history problem. 
The problems of historicism and value-judgement in the human sciences, to which 
Adorno is in part responding, are forms of the problem of the regressive infinity. Like 
Schelling, Adorno worries that history either dominates nature (Hegel) or simply leaves 
nature to its own law (historicism, positivism, ideology). There are of course varying 
and contradictory notions of nature at stake in Adorno's idea: fate, myth, death - even 
Being. Adorno takes over a messianic idea of nature from Benjamin, but this in turn 
101 Ibid. p.119. 
102 cf. Hullot-Kentor, Bob. 'Introduction to Adorno's "Idea of Natural History"'. in 
Telos, no.60 (1984), p.l 04. 
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seems to rely upon a later Kantian determination of nature as the unconditioned, 
harmonious 'kingdom of ends'. The opposition of nature to history is already a 
metaphysical problem, to the extent that metaphysics is the philosophical question of 
the whole. It is in this sense that Adorno is aware of the problem of the regressive 
infinity in his idea of natural-history. 
Benjamin's 'Schellingian' Trauer can be reemphasised within Adorno's 
melancholy science - so as to make it more Scientific - given that Schelling had 
confronted similar problems in the Kantian philosophy of his day. As was suggested, 
there is a limit to Schelling'S response. The younger Adorno is aware, and wary, of his 
proximity to Schelling: 
if philosophy wanted to be nothing more than the shock that the historical 
presents itself at the same time as nature, then such a philosophy would be 
subject to Hegel's criticism of Schelling's philosophy as the night of 
indifference in which all cats are grey. How does one avoid this night?I03 
Of course, Hegel's critique pertains to Schelling's system of absolute identity.lo4 Yet the 
notion of 'absolute indifference' remains fundamental to the FreiheitschriJt. And insofar 
as the treatise does not succeed in breaking-out of the mutability of the existential 
aporia, Hegel's criticism stands. Habermas ultimately knows that The Ages of the World 
cannot do the historical work that he wants it to. Towards the end of 'Schelling's Idea of 
a Contraction of God', Habermas reads the dialectic of contraction and expansion 
through Hegel's dialectic of externalisation. lo5 In Adorno's later version of natural-
history, by contrast, Hegel's 'world spirit is the ideology of natural history'. In fact, 
Habermas attempts to find a metaphysical ground for the negation of this second nature, 
which requires an alternative account of sublation. Hence, Habermas pursues an 
immanent critique of the Hegelian dialectic. Is it possible to produce a strong concept of 
history without either the assumption of progress or the presumption of catastrophe? In 
order to answer this question, Hegel's phenomenological deduction of history, as the 
whole, must be briefly reconstructed. This is found in the Phenomenology of Spirit 
103 Ibid. p.122. Translation amended. 
104 Hegel was equally dismissive of the FreiheitschriJt, though this time on 
methodological grounds: 'Schelling has made known a single treatise on freedom. It is 
of a deep speculative nature, but it stands alone. In philosophy, a single piece cannot be 
developed.' Cited in, Snow, Dale E. Schelling and the End of Idealism (New York: 
SUNY Press, 1996), p.142. 
\05 The 'external world ... obtains its existence through self-consciousness' own 
externalisation and separation of itself.' Hegel, G W F. Phenomenology of Spirit, p.294. 
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(1807) - and not, as Habennas contends, in the Science of Logic (1810) - because only 
the phenomenological argument remains critical, not dogmatic. 
Hegel seeks to overcome the subjective Idealism of Kant and Fichte by showing 
that cognition is constitutively recognition. In the Phenomenology, Hegel substantiates 
his existing criticisms of Fichte's solipsistic, infintite reflection (which must become 
speculative reason). 106 The subject, always already inter-subjective, is the production of 
an object - crucially, without remainder, in-itself (Hegel does not need the 'subject' in 
the Phenomenology). If the 'not-I' is not to remain perpetually 'in itself' (as 'negation') 
then it must be cognised without becoming 'all reality' once over. Only another self-
consciousness, or the otherness of self-consciousness, can negate the negativity of the 
in-itself. The' in itself turns out to be a mode in which the object is only for an other.' 
This is the 'Notion of Spirit', which is worked-out in the (historically) successive 
shapes of consciousness. The success of Hegel's overcoming of transcendental Idealism 
will depend upon whether his whole can actually be historically constituted (and 
constitutive). According to the dialectic of (mis-)recognition, the other (in itself) is but 
what is cognised by others, to-come. 'Absolute knowing' is, to anticipate the end of the 
Phenomenology, the necessary possibility of humanity as a historical whole. Knowledge 
is as finite as humanity; humanity is as finite as knowledge. Hegel will later 
acknowledge the circularity of this 'speculative' gesture ('With What Must Science 
Begin?). If Hegel cannot get to the end then he cannot begin at the beginning. The 
virtuousness of the circle is contingent upon its becoming. The fact that a quasi-
naturalistic finitude is also pursued in the Phenomenology ('Force and the 
Understanding', which arrives on the scene [for whom?] prior to self-consciousness) 
raises a suspicion that Hegel only secures his historically 'finite' absolute by way of a 
106 In his DifferenzschriJt (1801), Hegel states that, to speak of a 'limited' moment of 
reflection only becomes meaningful with respect to the 'connection' of reflection to 'the 
Absolute', as a totality of connections. There is no limit to infinite reflection. For Hegel, 
reflection, or rather reason, now connects the limited to the whole in a manner that 
detennines both: 'reflection nullifies itself and all being and everything limited, because 
it connects [the limited] with the Absolute. But at the same time the limited gains 
standing precisely on account of its connection with the Absolute.' These (Spinozist) 
claims are only substantiated in the Phenomenolgy to the extent that the absolute 
remains a postulation here in the DifferenzschriJt. Hegel needs the phenomenology of 
(re)cognition in order to break out of the solipsistic shell of subjective reflection, 
critically. The Difference Between Fichte 's and Schelling's System of Philosophy, trans. 
H. S. Harris & Walter Serf (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977), p.94. 
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lapse into the Naturphilosophie that Schelling was to critique. l07 By 'dominating' 
nature, rather than incorporating it, Hegel unwittingly falls back into it. 
Schelling confronts the problem of beginning more severely than does HegeL if 
only because Schelling dwells upon the problem to a greater extent. Knowledge of the 
absolute is not a presupposition, not even speculatively (as the speCUlative is understood 
by Hegel). This is the irony of Hegel's remark about Schelling's 'shot from the pistol'. 
The absolute is constantly presupposed, and thus posited in Hegel. This positing is 
(only) confmned retrospectively, from the phenomenologically 'impossible' standpoint 
of that which remains, the end. For Schelling (at his most 'progressive', let us say). the 
problem of knowledge of the absolute is phenomenologically constitutive of existence. 
For this reason, the speculative unity of humanity and nature in the absolute must 
correspond to an experience of the speculative, from the standpoint of a historical 
facticity that is not yet this unity (the not yet of this unity). There is accordingly an 
active 'hesitation' over the identity of dialectics and the historical whole for Schelling. 
Whereas, Hegel does not hesitate in producing this identity in the presentation of his 
system. According to Schelling, 
From time to time the opinion is ventured that the most complete dialectic is 
to be regarded as science itself; but this reveals a restricted outlook, 
inasmuch as the very existence [Daseyn] and necessity of the dialectic 
proves that the true science (to"'topLa) has not yet been found. 108 
This 'not yet' is the fundamental problem of philosophy. Since the philosophical system 
negates its representational mode of presentation ('more geometrico '), it strives towards 
the presentation of a whole that is not yet; an unknown whole. This task can only be 
expressed in the future anterior tense: 'Then God is in all actuality everything, and 
pantheism will have become true.' 109 Schelling too speculates (the perfect future 
anterior). But his speculation is phenomenologically internal to the problem of 
existence, as the melancholy attunement. Rather than being the 'potency' of something 
positive, this distancing imposes its sheer negativity in the name of nearness, positive 
freedom. 
Hegel tends to use the traditional (pre-Schell ingi an) concept of existence 
(especially in the Science of Logic). Nevertheless, the famous passages from the Preface 
to the Phenomenology come close to an idea of facticity as at once alienation and 
107 Hegel, G. W. F. Phenomenology of Spirit, p.l 04. 
108 Schelling, F. W. 1. Ages of the World, p.116. 
109 Schelling, F. W. 1. 'Stuttgart Seminars', p.243. 
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negation of alienation. The 'science of the experience of consciousness' is 'the path of 
despair', not the flight from despair. I 10 It is this concept of 'Erfahrung' that Adorno 
interprets in Hegel, alongside Benjamin's post-Kantian conception. And it is the 
experience of the speculative that Hegel stands accused of neglecting, not the 
speculative possibility of the whole as such (on the contrary). The actual divergence of 
the rational from the actual, amidst the facticity of contemporary capitalism, calls for 
the experience of the speculative in existence. Rose distinguishes Hegel's speculative 
from Kant's regulative, only to treat the speCUlative as a logical problem of the copula 
in speculative judgement. This diverges from Schelling's problematisation of the copula 
because the posited predicates are of a different order. In Rose, they are already 
mediated, by positive tradition. The positing of the predicates themselves remains 
unproblematic (why the identity of this religion and this politics?). In which case, the 
copula is equally unproblematic, against the stated intentions of the speculative 
judgement itself. This can equally be directed against Rose's earlier attack on Adorno, 
who, she writes, failed to produce 'a speCUlative sociology of the proletariat' .111 For, 
rather than positing a universal subject abstractly, only to apply the speculative 
'framework' after the fact, the speculative must also be a positing, the positing also 
speculative. This results in a different conception of positing - a non-representing 
positing and a presenting non-positing (see chapter 2). 
In philosophical mediation, Adorno writes, what 'is suspended is nothing other 
than the expression of the inexpressible in itself.' This is comparable to music. The 
suspended is not merely a decision for indecision. This would be the negative moment 
alone. According to Adorno, and if we follow Benjamin, the inexpressible, that which 
music names in vain, makes expression possible, for the first time. Strictly speaking, the 
inexpressible is not inexpressible. The speculative whole, as the name, is constitutive of 
naming, of the melancholy science. Adorno's 'intimation' is too negative (too 
Romantic) because it has already decided to be in vain. Whereas, an expression of 
waiting in vain might be open to the possibility that it is not, after all, in vain. Adorno 
comes close to this conclusion in his later reflections on metaphysics (see chapter 5). 
This reading of Adorno would distinguish him from Schelling, who remains an 
absolute Idealist. The pure indeterminacy of absolute indifference takes on a positive 
character, anticipating Schopenhauer's will that wills nothing. Idealised longing 
becomes a longing for nothing. Hence, it could be said that Schopenhauer 
110 Hegel, G. W. F. Phenomenology of Spirit, p.49. Translation amended. 
III Rose, G. Hegel Contra Sociology, p.32. 
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misunderstands the indeterminacy of music by absolutising it - or rather, the champion 
of Rossini understands music only harmoniously (see chapter 2). Longing is both too 
abstract and, for that reason, too determinate (the will to nothing remains a will to some-
thing re-presented). Adorno's upholding of the Bilderverbot extends to representation 
both in the sense of the image and in the sense of a structure of willing that places a 
totality before it, in its presence (re-presentation=Vor-stellung). For these reasons, the 
messianism of Benjamin and Adorno diverges from that of Ernst Bloch's Principle of 
Hope, which is full of 'wishful images' (of course, Bloch's monumental study was 
influential upon Benjamin's Arcades Project). The determinacy of these images, their 
political orientation, distinguishes Bloch's speculative materialism from the idealist will 
that wills nothing. But this will to something is, like the will to nothing, close to a 
representing-willing: 'Antizipation'. An expression of waiting in vain does not posit the 
object of longing, utopia. Neither does it proscribe all such positing. An expression of 
waiting in vain is anticipation without expectation (as anticipatory). This is the nature of 
its positing. 
It is notable in this regard that Bloch does not recognise modern music after 
Schoenberg'S expressionism. Habermas connects this 'being affronted by modern art' to 
a 'melancholy of fulfilment'. He unwittingly reveals the gap between the melancholies 
of Bloch and himself on the one side, and Benjamin and Adorno on the other. I 12 Bloch 
remains a Wagnerian. Of course, Wagner does not equate to Schopenhauer. But the 
dissonant Wagner only reveals himself as a prophet of what was to come by way of 
Schoenberg and after (see chapter 2). 
A reconciled Adorno and Bloch could nevertheless agree in the 1960s that the 
problem of utopia presents itself as: 'Something's Missing' .113 This expression, taken 
from Brecht's The Rise and Fall of the City of Mahogony (1928-9), is surely closer to an 
expression of waiting in vain than to Sehnsucht (some-thing is missing; not nothing, nor 
everything). Adorno's expression of waiting is his alternative, dissonantly historical 
dialectics. His account of the constellation and the modern artwork, each a 'monad', is 
an attempted extension and partial substantiation of the melancholy science. Before that 
can be shown, a philosophical tradition of the musical idea in modern philosophy will 
be briefly reconstructed in order to show how Adorno develops and opposes it. 
112 Habermas, J. 'Ernst Bloch: A Marxist Schelling', pp.72-3. 
113 'Something's Missing: A Discussion between Ernst Bloch and Theodor W. Adorno 
on the Contradictions of Utopian Longing', in The Utopian Function of Art, trans. Jack 
Zipes & Frank Mecklenberg (Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1988). 
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Ideas of Music and the Musical Idea 
In his early writings, Benjamin reiterates the belief, shared by Herder, Hamann and 
Rousseau, that music is a language sui generis: 'the last remaining universal language 
since Babel' .114 This tradition includes early German Romanticism. It is therefore 
surprising that, in The Literary Absolute (1978), Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-
Luc Nancy take their study of the lena circle to concern 'exclusively the question of 
literature'. They 'eliminate ... music in particular', only to entitle their first chapter, 
'Overture: The System Subject'. The anonymous 'Earliest System-Programme' 
provides them, quoting Novalis, with 'the musical theme' of the early Romantic project. 
'An overture, then, in more than one sense' .IlS What is this other sense, if the question 
of music has already been methodologically eliminated? Lacoue-Labarthe would later 
come to recognise the problem of this elimination, referring to Agamben' s translation of 
Benjamin's 'das Musische' as the "'concurrence" of all the arts'.116 Benjamin's 'muse-
ical', introduced in his thesis on early Romanticism, reflects his ongoing confrontation 
with Neoplatonism and nominalism, along with the regressive infinity (Schlegel's 
infinitely becoming literature). The muse-ical does not name the totality of (the names 
of) the muses, but rather their individuation with respect to the whole, 'generated by a 
refraction [durch eine Brechung bezeichnet].' This generation, bezeichnen, is, in that 
case, to mark or to name, zeichnen. The muse-ical compliments Benjamin's philosophy 
of naming, but is not of itself a coherent response to the problems of Fichtean idealism 
. I R .. 117 III ear y omantlclsm. 
The interest of the early Romanics in an idea of music can be understood 
according to a broader Romantic aesthetics. Karl Dahlhaus has shown that evaluations 
of instrumental music follow the rising importance of aesthetic autonomy. For most 
eighteenth-century aestheticians, moral sentiment was to be represented in historical and 
allegorical themes - hence the dominance of history painting, sculpture and literature. 
But what if art can be morally sentimental, sensuous, without narrative or 
representation? What if art can intimate at narrative, representation, as such? What was 
114 Benjamin, W. The Origin of German Tragic Drama, p.214. 
115 Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe. & Nancy, Jean-Luc. The Literary Absolute, trans. Philip 
Barnard & Cheryl Lester (State University of New York Press, 1988), p.28. 
116 Lacoue-Labarthe, P. Musica Ficta, trans. Felicia McCarren (Stanford University 
Press, 1994), pp.62-3; p.152f. 
117 The other main problem being the Classicist paradigm of the muses itself. 
Benjamin, W. 'The Concept of Criticism in German Romanticism', in Selected 
Writings, vol. I , pp.179-80. Translation amended. 
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previously considered to be banal was now considered profound. Absolute music as 
autonomous art; according to E. T. A. Hoffmann, a critic of Beethoven's instrumental 
music: 'the independent art' .118 
But sentiment and autonomy are not at all the same things. The early Romantics 
rejected 'the eighteenth century culture of sentiment and social life, a culture they found 
narrow-minded.,119 They are drawn instead to the ambiguity and rhythm of music. In 
one of his thirteen Athenaeum fragments to mention music (but no music), Friedrich 
Schlegel writes: 
Many people find it strange and ridiculous when musicians talk about the 
ideas in their compositions; and often happens that one perceives they have 
more ideas in their music than they do about it. But those who have a 
feeling for the wonderful affinity of all arts and sciences will at least not 
consider the matter from the dull viewpoint of a so-called naturalness that 
maintains music is supposed to be only the language of the senses. Rather, 
he will consider a certain tendency of pure instrumental music toward 
philosophy as something not impossible in itself. Doesn't pure instrumental 
music have to create its own text? And aren't the themes in it not as 
developed, reaffirmed, varied, and contrasted in the same way as the subject 
of meditation in a philosophical succession of ideas? 120 
Schlegel's musical idea is not merely one idea among others. It approximates that which 
Schlegel will elsewhere disavow: an idea of ideas, the Idea. Where the 1 1 6th 
Athenaeum fragment sets-out the programmatic 'aim ... to reunite all the separate 
species of poetry... with philosophy', the above fragment describes 'the wonderful 
affinities of all arts and sciences,' in relation to an idea of music and a musical idea. 
Which idea of music informs this idea? Which works - ultimately, which work -
informs it (if in-forming is the correct and revealing term)? The absence of music 
criticism in the lena circle would suggest that this idea of music is in fact traditional and 
Classicist. Music, or rather that which is musical, denotes a concurrence, as flow and as 
bringing together. Benjamin appears to draw upon this tradition when he defines 'the 
muse-ical' as a 'harmonic discontinuum'. The musical idea is in both cases systematic, 
as if to invoke the Presocratic mousike. 
Several of the recent interpretations of the early Romantics, including 
Agamben's (above) draw upon this sense of harmonious flow (the flow of the message 
118 Dahlhaus, Karl. The Idea of Absolute Music, trans. Roger Lustig (The University of 
Chicago Press, 1989), pp.I-17. 
119 Ibid. p.6. 
120 Schlegel, Friedrich. Philosophical Fragments, trans. Peter Fitchow (Minnesota 
University Press, 1991), p.92. 
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from Hermes: herme-neutics). Manfred Frank and Andrew Bowie have, in different 
ways, reconfigured the early Romantic experiment as a model of interpretation, 
according to which musicality and rhythm are central (see chapter 3). Paul de Man 
attempted to show the constitutive blindness and insight of all criticism by way of a 
critique of Derrida's deconstruction of Rousseau. Music is the secret to Rousseau's 
modem break with Platonic mimesis. Rousseau already knows what Derrida is trying to 
make him say, but Derrida is necessarily blind (or, deaf) to him. De Man's reading turns 
on a (pre-)conception of music. In Rousseau's Essay, 
Diachronic structures such as music, melody, or allegory are favoured over 
pseudo-synchronic structures such as painting, harmony, or mimesis 
because the latter mislead one into believing in a stability of meaning that 
does not exist. 121 
What does it mean to speak of music as such as 'diachronic structure'? As with 
Schlegel and Novalis: which music? It should be noted that de Man opposes music to 
Platonic harmony. Nevertheless, the early Romantic problem is unproblematically 
repeated. For de Man, 'movement', 'narrative' and 'succession' are the musical 
attributes of rhetoric; musical, because they are fundamental attributes of music. But 
there is no music to which these attributes could be attributed, given that they are 
attributable to any and all music - except, that is, modern music. There are two 
connected problems here. Firstly, generalisation (cliche), and secondly, the 
determination of this generalisation as harmony - drawing, no doubt, upon the 
pantheism of the early Romantics themselves: 'Every philosophy of philosophy that 
excludes Spinoza must be spurious' .122 
Bowie gives an account of the historical convergence between philosophical 
Romanticism and Romantic music. Against Dahlhaus, he stresses the significance of 
practice for theory.123 Dahlhaus has good reason not to stress this, where the early 
Romantics are concerned at least. As one commentator on the relationship between Jena 
Romanticism and music has noted, 
It was amongst the dying wishes of Friedrich von Hardenberg (Novalis) in 
March 1801 to hear his brother play a piece by Mozart on the harpsichord. 
121 De Man, Paul. 'The Rhetoric of Blindness: Jacques Derrida's Reading of Rousseau', 
in Blindness & Insight (London: Routledge, 1993), pp.132-3. 
In Schlegel, F. Philosophical Fragments, p.255. 
123 Bowie, Andrew. Aesthetics and Subjectivity (Manchester University Press, 1990), 
p.222. 
Mention of any great knowledge or apprecIatIon of music, of specific 
composers and musical works, and evidence of any practical musical skill 
are, nevertheless, absent from the corpus of his writing. 124 
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The closest instance of music criticism in the early Romantic circle occurs with 
Schelling's lectures on art, given at the University of Jena between 1802 and 1803. 
They provide the first elevation of music within a philosophical system: 'The art form in 
which the real unity [with the ideal] purely as such becomes potence and symbol is 
music.,125 But Schelling's sole example, Haydn's Creation, is faulted for its 
programmatic content. Hence, this is not early Romantic criticism: the work offers no 
standard for critique. 
A certain non-convergence thus reigns between early Romantic ideas of music 
and contemporaneous music, specifically Beethoven, pointing to a larger issue. While 
N ovalis was asking for Mozart on his deathbed, Beethoven was composing, or about to 
compose, mature works: the opus 30 piano sonatas, opus 31 violin sonatas, and the 
Eroica Symphony all date from 1801-2. This moment of Beethoven's oeuvre marks a 
sublation - completion and negation - of musical Classicism (including that of Mozart 
and Haydn). Modem music is, after Beethoven, dissonant, in the expanded sense of 
being paradoxically autonomous in, and thus against, bourgeois society. The staccato 
chords that announce the Eroica are ruptures in the Classicist orthodoxy of a music of 
the spheres (the Eroica as Copernican revolution in music). This reversal of harmony 
was already Friedrich Schlegel's programme - but for literature. 
Hence, early Romantic wit concerns the unity of ideas, and its Bund. But there is 
an opposing, dissonant moment, since this Bund is 'without any exaggeration ... the first 
"avant-garde" group in history' .126 Wit tends to become ironic, not affirming the 
actuality of a concurrent polis, but negating it (only abstractly, in the case of its 
aestheticism). The 'musicality' of the early Romantics is not affirmative, according to 
the ideology that 'music brings people together'. Commodity music has, no doubt, 
contributed to a sort of (dystopian) social synthesis (see chapter 4). But what if the 
musical idea were informed by a dissonant, not harmonious music? Dissonance could in 
124 Hodkinson, 1. 'The Cosmic-Symphonic: Novalis, Music, and Universal Discourse', 
in Donovan, Siobhan & Eliott, Robin (eds.), Music and Literature in German 
Romanticism (Rochester: Camden House, 2004), p.13. 
125 Schelling, F. W. 1. The Philosophy of Art, trans. Douglas W. Scott (University of 
Minnesota Press, 1989), p.l 09. 
126 Lacoue-Labarthe, P. & Nancy, J-L. The Literary Absolute, p.8. 
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that case be understood against the pre-established hannony of the bourgeois ratio and 
its system. 
Dissonance of the Spheres 
There is a tension within Adorno's reception of Benjamin's early writings that can be 
understood by way of Schelling's immanent critique of pantheism. The introduction of 
alienation into pantheism raises the possibility of a mutable and historical metaphysics. 
We also find in Benjamin (and Schelling, supported by Goethe) a precritical, immutable 
pantheism. The Platonic idea becomes a Leibnizian monad, and a name. This might be 
understood as a critical reappropriation of Leibniz, in the manner of Schelling. 
According to Heidegger, the affinity of Leibniz to German Idealism lies in the fact that 
'Substance, self-existent beings are what they are as perceptio and appetites, 
representing and striving.' 127 For Benjamin too, of all the Rationalists only Leibniz 
remains attentive to the individual and the whole in an active manner. But Benjamin 
tends to leapfrog the critical debate back into a Leibnizian ontology: 
The idea is a monad. The being that enters into it, with its past and 
subsequent history, brings - concealed in its own form - an indistinct 
abbreviation of the rest of the world of ideas [ldeenwelt], just as, according 
to Leibniz's Discourse on Metaphysics (1686), every single monad contains, 
in an indistinct way, all the others. 
Leibniz is initially appropriated analogously here ('just as'). Yet significantly, the 
terminology shifts from 'ldeenwelt' to 'Welt'. The monadology becomes a binding 
account of 'world', not a restricted epistemology or logic. 'The idea is a monad - that 
means briefly: every idea contains the image of the world [Bild der Welt].' 128 Neither is 
this ontology confined to the younger Benjamin, since this thought evolves, to some 
extent, into the' dialectical image' of the Arcades Project. 
For Kant, Hegel and Schelling, Leibniz's metaphysics remams incoherent, 
because he gives no account of individuation with respect to the whole, from the 
standpoint of the experience of such individuation. In Schelling's terms: how is the 
individual free of the whole, but not in the sense of (negative) freedom/rom it? In the 
words of Leibniz himself, the monads, in 'a confused way all strive after the infinite, the 
127 Heidegger, M. Schelling's Treatise on the Essence 0/ Human Freedom, p.95. 
128 Benjamin, W. 'Epistemo-Critical Prologue', pp.47-8. 
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whole.,129 The absolute of Leibniz is infinite and whole, a 'simple' and 'infinite 
Substance'. Creationism is invoked in order to resolve an absolute contradiction, and to 
avoid fatalism. Ours must be the 'best of all possible worlds', chosen from an infinity of 
possible worlds. 'God is sure always to choose the best' .130 God saves Leibniz from the 
regressive infinity, but he pays the price of relinquishing pantheism in the name of an 
updated theism (notwithstanding the important differences between the Monadology 
and the Theogony). God, not man, establishes the 'pre-established harmony'. Of course, 
Benjamin writes of 'the unbridgeable distance' between monads. But this distance is 
itself harmonised, 'between pure essences' - in a similar way to the 'harmonic 
discontinuum' of the muses within the muse-ical 'ideal'. 
The melancholy science negates this harmony of the spheres. Translated from 
Rationalism to the bourgeois ratio, harmony serves to conceal an absence of harmony. 
A science that upheld this nominalism would be powerless against it, since the 
archetypal names, of a second nature, preclude the possibility of naming; of Science 
itself. For these reasons, Adorno takes up Benjamin's constellational monad in Negative 
Dialectics, only to extirpate its metaphysical (including Marburg neo-Kantian) 
presuppositions: 
One need by no means start out from its own content, according to 
metaphysical investigations like Benjamin's Ursprung des deutschen 
Trauerspiels, which grasp the concept of truth itself as a constellation.6 One 
could return to a scholar of so positivistic a bent as Max Weber. He indeed 
understood the "ideal types", quite in keeping with subjectivistic 
epistemology, as an aid in approaching the object, excluding every 
substantiality in itself and to be reliquefied any which way. But just as in all 
nominalism, however null and void it may consider its concepts, something 
of the constitution of the thing strikes through this and reaches beyond the 
thought-practical advantage - not the least motive for the critique of 
unreflective nominalism - so are the material works of Weber derived far 
more from the object, than the southwestern German methodology would 
lead one to expect. In fact the concept is adequate grounds for the thing, 
insofar as the investigation of an at any rate social object becomes false, 
where it limits itself to a dependency inside its domain, which grounded the 
object, and which ignores its determinations through the totality.131 
129 Leibniz, G. W. The Monadology, trans. Robert Latta (Oxford University Press, 
1968), p.250. 
130 Leibniz, G. W. Discourse on Metaphysics, § 13, trans. Jonathan Bennet, accessed at, 
www.earlymoderntexts.com/fJeibniz.html.onNovember23.2008.Cf. The 
Monadology, pp.247-9. 
131 Adorno, T. W. Negative Dialectics, pp.166-8. 
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Adorno finds in Weber a post-metaphysical interpreter of Goethe's ur-phenomena, to 
counterpoise against Benjamin's metaphysical Goethe. Does Adorno, in supposedly 
rejecting Benjamin's metaphysics and supposedly affirming Weber's positivism, 
thereby reject metaphysics as such? If so, what does Adorno mean by 'the totality'? If 
Adorno's philosophy is solely one of scientific critique, motivated by the sciences other 
than philosophy (Science) then it can offer no response to the question of the ground of 
its critique. Such a determination of philosophy as critique appears to lead to the 
problem of methodology. Philosophy becomes an instrument, applied to a pre-
constituted totality. Adorno writes of the 'investigation of. .. an object' in relation to 'its 
determinations through the totality'. Does not this positivistic (and deterministic) 
totality lead to the problem of value, without Weber's novel response to it? (see 
chapter 4) 
F or Rose, the problem of methodology is the neo-Kantian problem of validity 
without value, and value without validity. Adorno's post-metaphysical constellation can 
be said to avoid this fate (of unreflective positivism), if it is understood in terms of his 
overall, 'dissonantly musical' philosophy. Adorno does not refute Benjamin's 
nominalist metaphysics. Instead, he radicalises it. The greatest possibility of philosophy 
today may indeed be as an instrument, amidst the exceptional facti city of an actually 
established harmony: history as (second) nature. Adorno's nominalism is a reflective 
nominalism in that the monad refers to a speculative whole, negatively, just as the 
melancholy attunement is the attestation of 'Something's Missing'. Adorno's 
nominalism is accordingly a dissonant nominalism. The monad - as the critical 
constellation or the artwork - is the (non-)positing of a speculative whole against the 
existing whole, unreflective nominalism, just as allegory is directed against second 
nature from 'within' it. The speculative whole does not mean a depiction of utopia, but 
rather the semblance of wholeness in the 'coherence' and 'unity' of the monad as 
dissonant semblance (see chapter 4). 'Unreflective nominalism' means nominalism that 
is not self-conscious of its nominalism, and thereby considers itself the only possible, 
and to that extent true whole. The system presents itself, in ideology, as utopia. It 
thereby precludes the thinking of a different whole. The question of utopia today, 
Adorno remarks to Bloch, is one of thinking 'the totality as something that could be 
completely different', in a situation where 'people [are] sworn to this world,.132 
Adorno's philosophy of dissonance is, almost uniquely, informed by his 
expenence of modem music. As in Schoenberg, dissonance is atonal, not untonal. 
132 Adorno, T. W. & Bloch, E. 'Something's Missing', pA. 
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Dissonance, though antithetical to harmony, must act upon harmony. Hence, the 'task of 
d . b . h· 133 art to ay IS to nng c aos mto order.' This does not imply an ordered chaos; a 
harmony of the Dionysian and Apollonian forces (The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit 
of Music). Neither does Adorno's remark signify a call to replace order with chaos 
(acosmism). The determination of dissonance as 'complimentary harmony' in fully 
'twelve-tone' music threatens to negate the specificity of dissonance altogether. 134 
Instead, chaos is brought into an existing order in the name of a different, quasi-
messianic 'order'. Hence, the anti-system of negative dialectics is not anti-systems. The 
negative of negative dialectics corresponds to the anti- of the anti-system. 
Adorno's philosophy of dissonance can be understood in relation to nominalism 
and music. This is because nominalism is equally the problem of formalism, and 
because music has been understood as pure form as much as pure language. Adorno and 
Horkheimer explore the mythic prehistory of nominalism in Dialectic of Enlightenment. 
Odysseus cheats Polyphemus by naming himself without naming himself. His 'name 
Udeis can mean either "hero" or "nobody"': 
Odysseus discovered in words what in fully developed bourgeois society is 
called formalism: their perennial ability to designate is brought at the cost of 
distancing themselves from any particular content which fulfils them, so that 
they refer from a distance to all possible contents, both to nobody and to 
Odysseus himself. From the formalism of mythical names and statues, 
which, indifferent like nature, seek to rule over human beings and history, 
emerges nominalism, the prototype of bourgeois thinking. 
Nominalism is formalism because the posited, absolute difference of name and named -
the name of Odysseus, somebody, names nobody - means that language comes to be a 
formal container. Content, world, can be represented absolutely in form, particularly by 
way of 'modem mathematics' .135 
This notion of language having become mathematics appears in Adorno's 
reflections on music and language. The 'intertwining' of music and language 'has not 
been realised in all new music. Much has absented itself, with modish phrases, from the 
dialectical effort and merely rebelled reactively against the linguistic element.' 136 
Adorno has in mind both Stravinsky's Neoclassicism and, more contemporaneously, the 
133 Adorno, T. W. Minima Moralia, p.222. 
134 Adorno, T. W. Philosophy of Modern Music, trans. Anne G. Mitchell & Wesley V. 
Blomster (London: Continuum, 2003), p.85. 
135 Adorno, T. W. & Horkheimer, Max. Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. Edmund 
Jephcott (Stanford University Press, 2002), p.47. .. , 
136 Adorno, T. W. 'Music, Language and CompOSItIon, p.119 
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Serialist and Aleatoric schools, which both employ quasi-mathematical means as ends 
in themselves. Adorno's musical modernism is, in a sense, equally a musical post-
Romanticism. It follows the break with the Neoplatonic understanding of music as a 
synthesis of harmonia, rhythmos and logos. The first two elements come to dominate 
the third - the rational-geometric organisation of space and time respectively.137 This 
break is all the more decisive, given that, with musical Romanticism, music not only is 
not primarily mathematical, it is now primarily Sprache: a song without words. 138 
Modem song with words must, for that reason, be an 'absurdity' .139 There is no going 
back - hence Adorno's worry about a return to mathematics, in both music and 
philosophy. Hence too Adorno's claim that modem music (or rather, modem art) must 
distance itself from language so as to return dialectically to language. A kind of 
formalism, of abstraction, becomes the bleakly ironic means to an end (content), not an 
end in itself. 
In his thesis on early Romanticism, Benjamin does not explicitly pursue the 
musicality of the muse-ical, perhaps because this would threaten to exacerbate, not 
address his problem: 'what is missing in SchlegeL .. is the content of art. ,140 Absolute 
music is supposed to be what Eduard Hanslick termed 'tonally moving form', with 'no 
nameable content,.141 In this sense, Schlegel's musical idea (of literature) is a symptom 
of his formalism; a consequence of the regressive infinity within Fichtean Idealism. 
Given Adorno's dialectic of music and language, there is a sense in which the 
formalism of modem music becomes its virtue. Adorno radicalises Schlegel's irony, and 
brings it closer to tragedy, or rather: Trauerspiel. In his 1929 essay on Alban Berg's 
Wozzeck, which he later takes to exemplify an expression of waiting in vain, Adorno 
relates the 'tragic irony' of this 'Trauerspiel' to the 'distance' of (messianic) hope 
reflected in the music - since dissonant music is itself traurig. 142 Where unreflective 
137 Dahlhaus, K. The Idea of Absolute Music, trans. Roger Lustig (The University of 
Chicago Press, 1989), p.8. 
138 I refer to Felix Mendelssohn's Lieder ohne Worte (1830-45). 
139 'Since the happily hapless meeting of Odysseus with the Sirens all songs have ailed; 
the whole of western music suffers from the absurdity of song in civilization, yet the 
motive force of all art-music is song.' Adorno, T. W. & Horkheimer, M. Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, p.4 7 
140 Lacoue-Labarthe, P. & Nancy, J-L. The Literary Absolute, p.93 
141 Hanslick, E. "'Content" and "Form" in Music' (1854), trans. Geoffrey Payzant, in, 
eds. lost Hermand & Michael Gilbert, German Essays on Music (New York & London: 
Continuum, 1994), p.84. 
142 Adorno, T. W. GS 18, pp.472-479. Adorno and Benjamin attended the second 
performance of Wozzeck, in 1925. Cf. Benjamin to Adorno, December 27th, 1935, in 
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nominalism names names, dissonant nominalism names in the name of the name itself. 
It is in this task that Adorno compares philosophy to music. The name is awaited and 
named on account of its determinate indeterminacy (rather than its 'hopeless' 
transcendence). The delay of praxis to which Adorno refers is not necessarily infinitely 
deferred. The constellation and artwork call for a third category, in-between theory and 
practice. Practice-oriented thought is in this sense an expression of waiting in vain. 
The monad is both the principle of private property, within the whole market, 
and (positive) freedom, within the social whole. Leibniz presents the danger and the 
possibility of modernity. Adorno refers to the danger in his 'Meditations on 
Metaphysics', at the end of Negative Dialectics. The Lisbon earthquake prompted 
Voltaire to deride the 'best of all possible worlds', the pre-established harmony of 
Leibniz. Whereas this natural catastrophe challenged the unity of reason in the age of 
Rationalism, the historical catastrophe challenges the unity of Western metaphysics as 
such. This is why Adorno attempts to ground his 'micrology', his dissonant nominalism, 
in the 'fall' of metaphysics. This is also why we must return to the metaphysics of the 
idea of natural-history. 143 
The Complete Correspondence, trans. Nicholas Walker (Harvard University Press, 
200 I), pp. 119-120. 
143 Adorno, T. W. Metaphysics: Concept and Problems, trans. Edmund Jephcott 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), p. 101. 
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The Metaphysics of Willing 
in the Case of Wagner 
Through Wagner modernity speaks most intimately, concealing neither its good nor its evil-
having forgotten all sense of shame.! 
Nihilism. It is ambiguous.2 
- Friedrich Nietzsche 
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In spite of the obvious divergence between Adorno and Heidegger, a convergence can 
be seen to have taken place at a precise time. Both converge upon the figure of Richard 
Wagner in the second half of the 1930s. Adorno's book In Search of Wagner is, unlike 
Heidegger's lecture course on Nietzsche, an explicit treatment of the composer. But 
Wagner is no less fundamental, implicitly, to the first of Heidegger's Nietzsche lecture-
courses, 'The Will to Power as Art' (1936). This coincidence might initially be 
explained away as a continuation of the divergence - a divergence between the one who 
fled National Socialism and the one who supported it. In Search of Wagner comprises a 
search for the 'source of Hitler's ideology', an ideology supported by Heidegger from at 
least 1933 up to at least the time of the last of the Nietzsche lectures: 'European 
Nihilism' (1940).3 Heidegger's assessment of Wagner is mediated through his readings 
of Nietzsche. As David Farrell Krell puts matters: 'Take the thinker of the "blond 
beast". Add another who is a card-carrying member of the Nazi Party. The result bodes 
1 Nietzsche, Friedrich. 'The Case of Wagner' , in The Birth of Tragedy and The Case of 
Wagner, trans. Walter Kaufmann (London: Vintage, 1967), p.156. 
2 Nietzsche, F. The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufman & R. 1. Hollingdale (New 
York: Random House, 1968), Book I, §22, p.17. 
3 Where this second 'at least' is concerned, I am thinking of Lowith' s recollections of 
Heidegger in Rome. Cf. Lowith, Karl. My Life in Germany Before and After 1933, 
trans. Elizabeth King (London: Athlone, 1994), p.44: p.60. 
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ill for the matter of thinking that is Heidegger's Nietzsche. ,4 Add an anti-Semitic 
composer, and the matter does not seem to bode any better. 
Several factors contradict, without refuting, this thesis of a continuity of 
divergence. Most obviously, Heidegger explicitly opposes Wagner and Wagnerism in 
his lectures. Wagnerism was in decline during the 1930s, yet Wagner had become 
sanctified by Hitler personally. In his posthumously published interview with Die 
Spiegel (1966, pub.1976), Heidegger retrospectively situates his break with the Nazi 
movement within these Nietzsche lectures: 'Anyone who had ears to hear heard in these 
lectures a confrontation with National Socialism' .5 This 'confrontation 
[Auseinandersetzung], to which Heidegger refers involves, in the earlier lectures, a 
refutation of biologically inflected vitalism - the interpretation of Nietzsche that had 
been cited to legitimate racism - and, in the later lectures, the implication of National 
Socialism within 'European nihilism' itself. Heidegger's confrontation with (his own) 
National Socialism thus coincides with his confrontation with Nietzsche. The 'will to 
power', as 'active' or 'classic nihilism', turns out to manifest a culmination of the 
metaphysical will, not the 'countermovement' to it, as Nietzsche supposed. Whereas, in 
the first lectures, Heidegger seeks to interpret the will to power as art, in the latter 
lectures he interprets the will to power according to a destiny of Western metaphysics, 
unfolding before his eyes: 'the absolute dominance of pure power over the earth through 
man,.6 This acknowledgement of a tragic destiny can equally be read as an attempt on 
the part of Heidegger to distance himself from historical responsibility (see chapter 5). 
The question of a philosophical and political divergence or convergence over 
Wagner is further complicated by the fact that Adorno is not simply opposed to Wagner. 
Add to this melange the fact that Adorno, the Leftist Hegelian, suppresses Wagner's 
4 Farrell Krell, David. 'Heidegger Nietzsche Nazism', translator's introduction to 
Nietzsche (London: Harper Collins, 1991), vols. I & II, ix. 
5 Heidegger, M. 'Only a God Can Save Us', in Philosophical and Political Writings, 
p.33. 
In the 'European Nihilism' lectures (1940), Heidegger alludes to the contemporansous 
French defeat at the hand of Germany in the following way: 
We today are witness to a mysterious law of history which states that one day a people no longer 
measures up to the metaphysics that arose from its own history; that day arrives precisely when such 
metaphysics has been transformed into the absolute ... It is not enough that one possess tanks, airplanes. 
and communication apparatus; not is it enough that one has at one's disposal men who can service such 
things ... What is needed is a mankind that is from top to bottom equal to the unique fundamental essence 
of modern technology and its metaphysical truth; that is to say, one that lets itself be entirely dominated 
by the essence of technology precisely in order to steer and dep.!oy individual technological processes and 
possibilities. In the sense of Nietzsche's metaphysics only the Ubermensch is appropriate to an absolute 
"machine economy", and vice versa he needs for it the institution of absolute dominion over the earth. 
Heidegger, M. Niet:::sche, vol.4, .8; pp.116-7. 
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Left-Hegelianism, and we are left with a series of contradictions and coincidences that , 
by themselves, do not necessarily contribute to a productive conversation about 
Wagner, between Heidegger, Adorno and us. To use Adorno's term: what is the 
Aktualitiit of this conversation, today? 
The problem of the relationship between modernity and the will - including the 
politics of willing - lies at the heart of both Wagner' critiques'. It will be suggested that 
Adorno and Heidegger each address this issue through an understanding of modernity 
as being, in some fundamental respect, 'musical' (and each in relation to a question 
about language). From the standpoint of a history of ideas, these coincidences are a 
consequence of the shared influence of Nietzsche, and of a wider German philosophical 
and musical tradition. However, this virtual dialogue promises to give rise to a new 
position that relates to the overall problematic of this thesis. There can be no utopian-
messianic waiting without willing (the German wollen means 'to wish for'; 'to intend'). 
At the same time, willing as intending turns utopianism into a bad science. What, then, 
is the relationship between willing and waiting? 
From the late 1930s onwards, Adorno and Horkheimer had found in Nietzsche a 
resource for responding to the problems within contemporary historical materialism -
specifically, the possibility of change amidst a perceived crisis within the Marxist 
tradition. Of course, the 'philosophical turn' in Marxism, partly motivated by the failure 
of German socialism, was already underway in the 1920s, with the work of Lukacs and 
Karl Korsch. This was subsequently fuelled by the discovery of Marx's 'Paris 
Manuscripts'. Adorno and Horkheimer nevertheless uniquely identify the question of 
humanism as a central problem of historical materialism, the means for the critique of 
which were, accordingly, to be found outside of the existing historical materialist 
discourse. 7 As a speculative 'historical materialism', the possibility of change is 
understood socially by Adorno and Horkheimer; hence, beyond the community of 
Heidegger's 'province' (see chapter 4). And yet, Heidegger's deepened account of the 
will is already intimately concerned with those metaphysical-humanist problems that 
confronted, and continue to confront, historical materialism. 
Rose notes that, 'Adorno and many other German writers of the inter-war period 
were attracted to an anti-humanist stance'. In The Melancholy Science, Rose was happy 
to go along with Adorno's response: by 'undermining humanism on its own grounds,.8 
7 Cf. Jay, Martin. 'The Frankfurt School's Critique of Marxist Humanism', in 
Permanent Exiles (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), pp.14-27. 
8 Rose, G. The Melancholy Science, p.138. 
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By the time of Hegel Contra Sociology, however, Rose loses patience with Adorno' s 
'ironic' humanism. The regressive nature of this irony meant that Adorno could not 
ground any 'speculative sociology of the proletariat'. Rose nevertheless faces a problem 
of her own, relating to the nature of the speculative positing itself (which, it was 
suggested in the previous chapter, is not speculative enough). In this chapter, another 
interpretation of Adorno's 'anti-humanism' will be proposed, as an-other, 'speculative' 
humanism. Adorno's anti-humanism, understood in relation to Heidegger's longer-
standing anti-humanism, constitutes an attempt to put humanism on a surer footing than 
the existing humanisms - including Marxist humanism, where the most is at stake. 
Reaching beyond these 'German' debates, an internal, necessary relationship will be 
introduced between waiting, capitalist modernity and the possibility of the utopian. 
Part I. Adorno and Wagner 
In Search o/Wagner was written between 1937 and 1938. In an introductory note to its 
eventual German publication of 1952, Adorno explains his intentions to contribute to an 
understanding of Nazism: 
The aim was to shake off the notion of a mere historical accident and to 
uncover the origin of fascist totalitarianism within the social processes that 
supported it. The source of Hitler's ideology was to be researched without 
regard for its relation with appropriated cultural values. The work of 
Richard Wagner forced itself to the forefront of this task.9 
The decline of Wagnerism during the 1930s gives rise to an immediate question: does 
Adorno's search for 'the source of Hitler's ideology' amount to a psychology of the 
Fuhrer? The attribution of 'Hitler's ideology' to Hitler alone would not, it seems, 
constitute a sophisticated understanding of this particular fascism, as a mass 
phenomenon. Of course, the cult of the leader is already a mass phenomenon. The 
source of Hitler's ideology precedes and circumscribes both Wagner and Hitler. Adorno 
goes in search of a historico-psychological type. 
The first two chapters of the Wagner monograph address the authoritarianism 
and the anti-Semitism of this character-type. Adorno draws upon Wagner's output as a 
whole: the theoretical tracts, the letters and the libretti. In the music too we hear the 
9 Adorno, T. W. 'Selbstanzeige des Essaybuches Versuch tiber Wagner', in GS 13, 
p.504. Cited in: Bauer, Karin, Adorno's Nietzschean Narratives (State University of 
New York Press, 1999), pp.117-8. 
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convulsive movements of this reactive-reactionary (but also: revolutionary). Once 
again, in what sense is Wagner to be understood as the 'source' of Nazism? This 
methodological anomaly points not only to a problem but also to an opportunity for the 
interpretation of In Search of Wagner. The near-exceptionality of Hitler's obsession 
with Wagner (within the Nazi hierarchy) might signal that this Wagner - the bombastic 
Wagner of Die Meistersinger von Niirnberg - is not the only Wagner. There is another 
Wagner. 
The other Wagner surely emerges at the end of the 1920s, in the interpretations 
of Otto Klemperer and Ernst Bloch. IO A young Adorno reviewed Klemperer's 1929 
performance of Wagner's early music-drama, The Flying Dutchman (written by Marx's 
Jewish friend, Heinrich Heine) in a minimalist production of Ewald Diilberg at Berlin's 
Kroll Opera. In their negation of 'metaphorical dust, hollow symbolism, theatrical piety 
and romantic costuming', the Kroll had 'mobilised a reserve of actuality [Aktualitat] in 
Wagner. .. which will explode today or tomorrow.,11 Adorno suggests that the other 
Wagner is opposed to the traditional, Bayreuth Wagner. At the same time, this untapped 
actuality was only ever a possibility; hence, 'today or tomorrow' .12 
The other Wagner is, appropriately enough, muted in the monograph. Wagner 
would remain profoundly 'ambivalent' for Adorno - the term he uses in his 1963 
lecture 'Wagners Aktualitat'. 13 As ambivalent, Wagner encompasses the regressive and 
the progressive in one. The lecture marks a shift in the direction of the progressive, for 
reasons that can only be understood in the light of the 1930s work. The commonality of 
the two moments, progressive and regressive, is not simply ironic. Rather, a progressive 
movement is possible, out of - in the sense of the emancipation from - the regressive 
one. The resources of progress are not transcendent of history. This is the lesson of 
10 Bloch, E. 'Paradoxes and the pastoral in Wagner's music', in Essays on the 
Philosophy of Music, trans. Peter Palmer (Cambridge University Press, 1985), p.153. 
Bloch wrote the programme notes for the Kroll production of The Flying Dutchman. 
II Adorno, T. W. 'Berliner Opernmemorial', in GS 19, p.270. Trans. Peter Heyworth, in 
Otto Klemperer. His Life and Times (Cambridge University Press, 1996), vol. 1, pp.278-
9. 
12 The Kroll production was presented at the 1938 exhibition of 'degenerate music', as 
'one of the greatest cultural outrages of the Weimar Republic.' Ibid. p.280. 
13 Adorno, T. W. 'Wagners Aktualitat', in GS. 16, p.543. Translated by Susan H. 
Gillespie as, 'Wagner's Relevance for Today', in, ed. Leppert, R. Essays on Music, 
p.584. 
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Horkheimer's 'Egoism and Freedom Movements' (1936), with which the composition 
of In Search of Wagner was, admits Adorno, 'intimately bound up' .14 
It is no exaggeration to say that Wagner stands at the centre of most of Adorno's 
intellectual concerns. In Wagner, not only do we find the source of German fascism, we 
find the source of the culture industry and the source of modem art. Adorno takes 
Nietzsche completely seriously: 'the philosopher is not free to do without Wagner'.15 
As in Nietzsche, Wagner stands for modernity itself. The importance of Wagner for 
Adorno can be understood in relation to the 'musical' metaphysics examined in the 
previous chapter. For the dissonant, melancholy science is already a philosophy of 
modernity. 
In Search of Wagner is a collection of essays, plural. There is no single 'main 
thesis', as Slavoj Zizek has put it, seamlessly uniting the problems of fascism, 
commodification and art - though these are indeed its chief concerns. 16 Is In Search of 
Wagner a constellation? That would depend upon whether the whole is greater than the 
sum of its parts. And it is with this question that a revealing asymmetry emerges. The 
progressive Wagner corresponds to his anticipation of modem art, to 'the artwork of the 
future'. The form of modem, autonomous art is paradoxically bound to the form of the 
commodity. Adorno had already begun to conceive of this relationship in his 
contemporaneous essay 'On the Fetish-Character in Music and the Regression of 
Listening'. The problem of art and commodity is mediatedly related to the problems of 
fascism and anti-Semitism (there is another asymmetry here). Adorno and Horkheimer 
conceive of this mediation as the problem of egoism amidst the emergence of an 
authoritarian ego, whether the ego of the actual dictator or of the spectral dictator, the 
market. The problem of their analysis therefore concerns a slippage between the specific 
fascism of Nazism, and capitalism, united under an all-encompassing bourgeois ratio. 
The proliferation of capitalism after the demise of Nazism points to the need for a 
conceptual-historical distinction, though not separation. 
Adorno finds the progressive Wagner in the music alone, thus tending to dismiss 
Wagner's dramatic narrative; his myth. This, in part, is a function of Adorno's 
absolutist conception of music - or rather, his conception of a music that becomes 
14 Adorno, T. W. Preface to In Search of Wagner. In a letter to Walter Benjamin of 22 
September 1937, Adorno writes, 'The Wagner piece is beginning to take shape, after 
much collecting of materials and many discussions with Max [Horkheimer], and will be 
focused around the concept of progress and reaction.' The Complete Correspondence, 
trans. Nicholas Walker (Harvard University Press, 2001), p.213. 
15 Nietzsche, F. 'The Case of Wagner', p.156. 
16 Zizek, Slavoj. 'Foreword: Why is Wagner Worth Saving?', in ibid. iix. 
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expressIve language in its distancing of communicative language. 17 But Adorno's 
evaluation equally arises from his Nietzschean critique of Wagner's early humanism. 
Der Ring des Nibelungen (conceived in the 1840s, but only performed in the 1870s) is 
steeped in ideas taken from Ludwig Feuerbach, whom Wagner had studied in exile, 
after his involvement in the Dresden uprising of 1848. Wagner's manifesto The Artwork 
of the Future (1849) is dedicated to Feuerbach. 
Adorno's difficulty with Feuerbach can perhaps be sensed from his (mis-) 
attribution of the Ring's libretto to Hegel and Schopenhauer: 
In its form, the Ring is a metaphor of the totality of world history which 
perfects itself by achieving consciousness of what it had been in itself from 
time immemorial. If this reminds us as much of Hegel as of Schopenhauer, 
from whom Wagner borrowed the content of the allegory, then it remains 
true that beyond all this there is one particular aspect in which the Ring is in 
agreement with Hegel's philosophy of history. And this is the ruse of 
reason. Whatever opposition there is to the totality, to Wotan's universal 
will, is also in accord with it, because Wotan's absolute spirit has nothing in 
mind but its own annihilation. I8 
Adorno conflates two critiques into one here. The first is the critique of the false whole, 
familiar to Negative Dialectics. Wagner produces a music-dramatisation of world-
history, a history that has already passed ('from time immemorial '). There is also the 
suggestion that Wagner transgresses the ban on representations of utopia (of course, 
Gotterdammerung does not end in utopia. It is perhaps more akin to a dystopia). More 
generally, Adorno disregards the central problematic of the drama of the Ring: the 
relationship between love and the law; both the law of the state and of private property, 
capital. 19 Wagner, like many of the Young Hegelians, conceives of this relationship as 
the modem problem of the political itself. Adorno's suspicion of kitsch dilettantism in 
Wagner - the representation of a system in art-myth - threatens to spill over into a 
17 This is not to say that Adorno opposed programme music. His own compositions of 
lieder, as well as the remarkable Singspiel fragment (of 1932-3, based upon Mark 
Twain's adventures) points in the opposite direction. Adorno maintains that in 
programme music, the musical component should retain a quasi-autonomous moment, 
informed by a progressive musical language of its own. Berg's Wozzeck was proof that 
a synthesis of progressive music and drama was not only possible but necessary. It is, 
then, even more notable that Adorno rejects the Ring's dramatic possibilities, if its 
Young Hegelianism can indeed be considered dramatically and politically progressive 
(did Adorno know the 'F euerbach Ending?). 
18 Adorno, T. W. In Search of Wagner, p.119. 
19 Ib·d . 1 . IX 
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scepticism towards these genuine problems that Wagner addresses extra-mythically; 
problems that extend beyond Wagner into the historical materialist problematic. 
According to Adorno, Wagner's high-Romantic valorisation of human love 
serves to conceal affirmatively its historically emergent and ideological character. In 
Minima Moralia, Adorno writes: 
The very involuntariness of love, even where it has not found itself a 
practical accommodation beforehand, contributes to the whole as soon as it 
is established as a principle. If love in society is to represent a better one, it 
cannot do so as a peaceful enclave, but only by conscious opposition. This, 
however, demands precisely the element of voluntariness that the bourgeois, 
for whom love can never be natural enough, forbid it. 20 
Love as conscious opposition to bourgeois love means the transformation of bourgeois 
love. Adorno does find 'love' in Wagner, in his music. And this more speculative love 
counters the scepticism encountered in Adorno's earlier reception of Wagner. Adorno 
can be said to conceive of the 'structure' of modem art, after Wagner, in those terms 
that the younger Hegel and the Young Hegelians had conceived of love: the ego (and its 
negation). Adorno's critique of (their) bourgeois love is filtered through the insights of 
Nietzsche, whereby the question of the ego becomes a question of the will; the question 
of egoism a question of willing. 
The drama of the Ring centres about an opposition between self-interest and 
love (recalling Schelling's system of freedom). This opposition can be mapped onto 
further, Promethean oppositions: the gods and humanity, fate and history. The Ring is 
inconclusive precisely because these oppositions are not presented dualistically. The 
gods are capable of human love, as in Wotan's partial mercy towards Briinnhilde. The 
human representatives of love, Siegfried and Briinnhilde (who becomes human for the 
love of human love) are, like the gods, flawed. The ring symbolises both love, in the 
marriage of the hero to Briinnhilde, and self-interest, when the ring reveals that a 
drugged Siegfried has tricked Briinnhilde into being released into Gunther's bondage. 
All are tainted in the Ring, by the ring. This complexity of structure corresponds to the 
difficulty of bestowing any specific political primacy upon the work. As the Ring is 
completed over the next three decades, this difficulty becomes a near-impossibility for 
Wagner, who comes to adhere to a Schopenhauerian-apolitical metaphysics of love. 
Wagner had studied Feuerbach's Thoughts on Death and Immortality (1830) in 
1849. He almost certainly read the mature works, including The Essence of Christianity 
20 Adorno, T. W. Minima Moralia, p.172. 
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(1841), in the following years.21 Feuerbach's conception of love finds its way into 
Wagner's theoretical writings, as well as the Ring. In Feuerbach's Thoughts, Wagner 
would have read the following: 
the personal being as such, only as person, does not love, but only excludes 
and repels; the person strictly conceived as person cannot love but can only 
hate, divide, estrange. In order to be capable of love, the person must be able 
to surrender his harsh, excluding, being-for-self. But the person cannot 
accomplish this surrender if there does not exist in him an abode, so to 
speak, where he is not-person, where he is not divisive separator and 
expelling distinction, but in which all is one and one is alL .. love is being-
together, being-in-common.22 
By the time of The Essence of Christianity, Feuerbach's Left-Hegelian, pre-Marxian 
'communism' is now in place. Love is understood quasi-dialectically. Self-
relinquishment is found in another ego, as a moment; in the mutual negation of another 
ego. Equally Hegelian, initially at least, egoism is not founded in the love of two 
beautiful souls, but is, in the end, universally constituted and is universality-
constituting. Love is the idea of humanity. However, this non-individual other remains 
universal humanity itself, which, being an externalisation of the Christian God's 
abstract perfection, can only be determined in the negative; beyond, in a sense, all 
possible individuals: 'The Thou belongs to the perfection of the I: only together do 
human beings form a single human being, only together are human beings what they 
are, and what they can and must be' .23 
This understanding of love arguably becomes, in Wagner's fragment Der 
Kiinstlertum der ZukunJt (1849): 'It is in communism that egoism achieves its greatest 
satisfaction, in other words, through the total denial and supersession of egoism. ,24 In 
comparison to F euerbach' s anthrotheology, Wagner finds his universality in 
androgyny?5 The 'utopian' Volsungs, of whom Siegfried is the first, are born of the 
incestuous love between Siegmund and Sieglinde: 
Bride and Sister you are to your brother - thus let the V olsung' s blood 
bloom.26 
21 Nattiez, Jean-Jacques. Wagner Androgyne, trans. Stewart Spencer (Princeton 
University Press, 1993), p.123. 
22 Feuerbach, Ludwig. Thoughts on Death and Immortality, trans. James A. Massey 
(University of California Press, 1980), p.29. 
23 Cited in: Nattiez, J-J. Wagner Androgyne, p.123. 
24 Cited in: ibid. p.125. 
25 Cf. ibid, ch. 5. 
26 Wagner, Richard. Die Walkiire, Act 1, Scene 3. 
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It is this naturalistic and biological conception of humanity that Adorno takes exception 
to. The proto-communism of the Ring is enslaved to an archaic model of community. 
Alberich's theft of the gold, which sets the curse of the ring in motion, is the despoiling 
of an original state of nature through self-interest - the extraction of capital, in the 
exchange of its curse, from pure gold. Wotan repeats the curse by (not) paying the 
giants for Valhalla, and so on. 
Siegfried, the hero, is exempt from bourgeois law, having been kept in isolation 
from it. Neither does he understand fear, meaning that he is not alienated from his 
labour and from others. Not recognising the division of labour, Siegfried forges the 
sword with no expertise at all (the smelting of the fragments being another trope of 
unity). Citing examples other than these, Adorno proposes that Siegfried is the 
prototypical Romantic anti-capitalist: 
The Romanticized concept of the proletariat. .. is complemented here by the 
no less Romantic notion that society would be able to regenerate itself if 
only it could find its way back to its unsullied origins.27 
In Wagner, we find 'the chimera of the pure, unhistorical, immediate human being.' 
This is Adorno's critique of naturalistic humanism in Wagner - by extension, in 
Feuerbach, who is notable by his absence from In Search of Wagner (and his scarcity in 
Adorno's writings as a whole, despite his student Alfred Schmidt). Importantly, as we 
shall see, Adorno considers this immediacy, the 'Romanticized idea of the proletariat', a 
spurious universality - meaning that there is another, genuine universality. 
Siegfried's sadism towards the' Jewish' Mime represents the ressentiment of the 
Germanic hero. But why does Adorno tend to read the Ring through Siegfried, who only 
appears in the third music-drama? Why, for that matter, does Adorno interpret the Ring 
through the male characters alone? Is Wagner's androgyny lost on Adorno? In the so-
called 'Feuerbach Ending' - the early draft of Gotterdammerung, which Adorno does 
not mention - Briinnhilde speaks of redemption through love, not death (of the gods), as 
happens in the final 'Schopenhauer Ending'. The ring is not the despoiling of nature 
alone. It is the origin of self-interest and of love. Against Adorno's reading, this 
contradiction is historical, but only in the sense of being pre-historical. The 
contradiction, the ring, must be sublated if the cyclical repetition of fate is to be broken 
and love is to become the law - which would no longer be the law (of history) as we 
know it. The problem of the ending is not Briinnhilde's death (for she remains, just 
27 Adorno, T. W. In Search of Wagner, p.120. 
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about, one of the gods) but rather the need to return the ring to the Rhine - to nature, 
and not to history; not even natural-history. 
Adorno substantiates his critique of the Ring's naturalism by argumg that 
Wagner's Gesamtkunstwerk rests upon a misapprehension of art and the arts - poetry 
and music in particular: 'Music is called upon to do nothing less than retract the 
historical tendency in language, which is based upon signification, and to substitute 
expressiveness for it. ,28 Adorno does not deny the mythic-Romantic unity of music and 
language. It is nevertheless a lost unity. Adorno conceptualises music as (anti-) 
language. All art is a question of 'logicity' and 'Sprachcharakter'. Where Wagner is 
concerned, Adorno equates an absence of logical deVelopment with the pre-linguistic. 
The pre-linguistic is the language of ineloquent gestures. An anecdote recalling an 
encounter between Wagner and Nietzsche, in which Nietzsche remained silent, recalls 
the tumult of Wagner's character type. Wagner's 'musical consciousness', 
exhibits one peculiar instance of regression: it is as if the aversion to 
mimicry, which became increasingly powerful with the growth of Western 
rationalisation and which played a by no means insignificant role in 
crystallising out the autonomous, quasi-linguistic logic of music, did not 
have complete power over him. His music lapses into the pre-lin~uistic, 
without being able to divest itself wholly of quasi-linguistic elements. 9 
In the absence of logical development, Wagner dramatises the individual gesture; 
paradigmatically, the Leitmotiv. Having criticised Wagner the bad-Hegelian, Adorno 
now criticises Wagner the anti-Hegelian; or rather, in musical terms, Wagner as contra-
Beethoven. In Beethoven, themes and counter-themes are developed through 
contrasting variations. These are in tum overcome in new contrasting themes and 
variations: 'the history of a theme' (Schoenberg). In spite of his revolution, Beethoven 
adheres to the sonata-form (exposition, development, recapitulation). There is no such 
history in Wagner's music-drama, complains Adorno. But Wagner is doing something 
altogether different to Beethoven. Indeed, beneath the surface of Adorno's critique of 
nominalism in Wagner lies a thesis on decadence as the possible transformation of 
egoism. And this has consequences for the question of humanism in historical 
materialism and philosophical messianism. 
Wagner's later music, including parts of the Ring, displays a dialectical relation 
to language after all, Adorno now acknowledges. Citing the Prelude to Tristan und 
28 Ibid. p.88. 
29 Ibid. p.24. 
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Isolde, Adorno suggests that the complaint of logical inconsistency - its 'unending 
melody' (Nietzsche) - arises from a Classicist or Baroque understanding of music. 3o 
Wagner not only marks the de-cadence from Baroque and Classical styles; he 
anticipates the modem music of Schoenberg and beyond. Nietzsche 'still heard' Wagner 
'with the ears of the Biedermeier listener' .31 Adorno's account of this 'progressive' 
moment of Wagner's musical consciousness has implications reaching beyond the 
consciousness of music. 
Wagner equally anticipates the culture industry. Adorno compares the repeated 
gesture of the Leitmotiv to advertising: 'the music is designed to be remembered, it is 
intended for the forgetful. ,32 In the essay 'On the Fetish Character', it is suggested that 
the Leitmotiv is a symptom of unreflective nominalism. Listening 'atomistically' and 
'less attentively' is distinctive of all 'commodity music' (see chapter 3). Chromatism 
takes the ambivalence of major and minor, which underpinned previous musical 
Romanticism, and turns it into multi-valence. Tonal multi-valence distracts and 
decentres concentration. Music as art 'can only be bodied forth' in 'the most intense 
effort of memory and anticipation'. 33 Lack of attention is a symptom of a weakened ego 
amidst a flawed society: 
the weaker the social and hence, too, the aesthetic determination the ego 
became, the less it was able to exteriorise itself as an objective expression of 
a totality, the greater the arrogance with which an unfettered individuality 
asserted itself. 
On Adorno's more ambiguous reading of Wagner, however - if we stress its dialectical 
character - the later music is a music of 'memory and anticipation', but only as a music 
of forgetting and distraction. Far from displacing concentration with distraction, or 
anticipation with presence, Wagner redefines concentration within distraction; 
anticipation within presence. 
Chromatism is supposed to oppose concentration because it goes everywhere 
and nowhere. Unending melody is no melody; no 'grand style' (Nietzsche). But Adorno 
observes that, in works such as Tristan, Wagner develops chromatic harmony within 
smaller-scale tonal structures. He thereby avoids the perpetual modulation that would 
30 Nietzsche, F. 'The Case of Wagner', p.157. 
31 Adorno, T. W. In Search of Wagner, pA5. 
32 Ibid. p.21. 
33 Ibid. p.88. 
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invite Nietzsche's charge. The three-part 'bar' form that governs this structure is itself 
quasi-dialectical: 
Wagner draws his productive force from an irreducible contradiction, and 
wrests a progressive constructiveness from the regressive moment of 
gesture. This goes as far beyond mere SUbjective expression, as it cancels as 
it preserves it in the double Hegelian sense.34 
What is this 'irreducible contradiction' from which Wagner drew his 'productive 
force'? An answer can be proposed in the light of both the later essay on music and 
language and Aesthetic Theory. The musical logic of tonality disintegrates, but modem 
music integrates another 'logicity' out of this disintegration. Far from seeking an 
unhistorical union of music and language, Adorno suggests that Wagner emphasises 
their mythic affinity in an exaggerated and even tragic manner: 
In fact, Wagner, with his radical demand for a declamation that would do 
justice to language, not only drew vocal music much closer to music than it 
had ever been before, and did so in a specifically mimetic way, but also 
assimilated musical construction itself to the gesture of language to the point 
of exaggerated clarity.35 
Wagner turns the disintegration of music - and language - against itself, as an 
integrating gesture. Wagner 'wrests a progressive constructiveness from the regressive 
moment of gesture'. The individual, empirical gesture is pushed to an extreme, and is 
exploded beyond its isolated individuality. It becomes an eloquent gesture, speaking 
beyond itself to another, and from another: the 'latent "I''' (but not the Thou?). The 
eloquent gesture is an expressive language. Wagner's nominalism is accordingly a 
dissonant nominalism. 
The Ambivalence of Decadence 
Nietzsche's definition of decadence, given in 'The Case of Wagner' (1888), is indebted 
to Paul Bourget. Nietzsche defines Wagner's decadence as literary, not musical: 
What is the sign of literary decadence? That life no longer dwells in the 
whole. The word becomes sovereign and leaps out of the sentence, the 
34 Ibid. p.37. 
35 Adorno, T. W. 'Music, Language and Composition', in Essays on Music, p.122. 
s~ntence reaches out and obscures the meaning of the page, the page gains 
hfe at the expense of the whole - the whole is no longer a whole.3 
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For Nietzsche, Wagnerian 'atomisation' signals an unreflective nominalism. Decadence 
is a symptom of the sickness that is passive nihilism. But the definition of this sickness 
in the Genealogy of Morality should be recalled in order to indicate its ambivalence. 
'Bad conscience is a sickness, there's no point in denying it, but a sickness rather like 
pregnancy. ,37 Decadence as pregnancy is the nominalism that promises to overcome 
itself, giving birth to its other: the whole. As art, this promise is broken every time. At 
the same time, this means that the political whole is not a total work of art. 
Adorno adjusts his position on Wagner in his 1963 lecture: 
I am not distancing myself from the book [In Search of Wagner] nor am I 
abandoning the conception. With regard to Wagner the situation has 
changed generally. Therefore, I would like to present - not as a revision of 
what I once thought, but as a way of taking into account what has newly 
come to our attention about Wagner - some divergences from the old text.38 
Taken together, In Search of Wagner and 'Wagner's Relevance for Today' display 
Adorno's continued ambivalence towards the composer, not a sudden tum towards him: 
The position of consciousness toward Wagner that I experience as my own 
whenever I encounter him, and which is not only mine, is even more 
deserving of the appellation ambivalent [ambivalent] than the earlier 
position - an oscillation between attraction and repulsion.39 
Wagner continues to provide lessons for modem music. The tendency to compose 
spatially, in 'blocks', is anticipated in Wagner's explosion of logical development, as is 
the allied prioritisation of colour in orchestration. Colour is no longer 'phantasmagoria', 
as it was in the monograph. Or, perhaps Adorno now acknowledges the ambivalence of 
phantasmagoria, as semblance? 
The two poles of Adorno's ambivalence correspond to Acts I and II of Siegfried 
respectively. In Act I, Siegfried dominates the music, just as he dominates Mime. The 
music recapitulates Siegfried's authoritarian character {'Siegfried's brutal forging 
36 Nietzsche, F. 'The Case of Wagner', p.170. 
37 Nietzsche, F. On the Genealogy of Morality, p.64. 
38 Adorno, T. W. 'Wagner's Relevance for Today', p.574. 
39 Ibid. p.587. 
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songs,).40 Extending Adorno's remarks, it can be said that, in Act II, the music masters 
Siegfried. Through his experience of the song of the wood-bird, Siegfried masters 
himself and frees Briinnhilde into her mastery of the master (as love). Siegfried finds 
himself outside of himself - that is, outside of his mythic representation, outside of 
bourgeois humanism as such - in the music, which stands here for a 'non-human' 
language. The wood-bird is not original nature once over. The proto-modern music of 
the 'forest murmurs' (which Adorno suggests should be performed on its own in the 
concert hall) is a post- natural-human(ist) language. As language, nevertheless, it signals 
an other humanity. Adorno's dedication of In Search of Wagner, to 'Gretel', cryptically, 
and apocalyptically, hints at this (critique of) anti-humanism: 'Horses are the survivors 
of the age of heroes' . 
The 'adjustment' in Adorno's stance towards Wagner is prompted not only by 
the (incomplete) fall of Nazism but also by a perceived divergence between the culture 
industry that Wagner anticipated and the one that transpired. The parallel development 
of, for instance, Hollywood (upon which Wagner had no small influence) and the 
musical avant-garde, leads to a resituating of the other Wagner as closer to the latter 
than to the former. Hence, a composer of the avant-garde, Pierre Boulez, could conduct 
the centennial Ring in 1976 (in a production by Patrice Chereau). Once again, Wagner 
is art and commodity. Adorno's ambivalence 'only points back to the Janus-like 
character of the work itself. Undoubtedly, every art of significance exhibits something 
like this, Wagner's especially. ,41 Art 'of significance' is modem, autonomous art. 
Autonomous art is 'Janus-like' because it is also a heteronomous commodity. 
'Wagner's especially' - meaning, it seems, that Wagner is prototypical of modem art. 
Dissonant art is art 'since Baudelaire and Tristan', Adorno states in Aesthetic Theory.42 
And did not Baudelaire want to be Wagner?43 
'Wagner's Relevance for Today' can be read back into In Search of Wagner in 
order to extend the thesis on decadence. Wagner's nominalism in music is equally, and 
40 Bloch, E. 'Paradoxes and the pastoral in Wagner's music', p.151. 
41 Adorno, T. W. 'Wagner's Relevance for Today', p.587. 
42 Adorno, T. W. Aesthetic Theory, p.15. 
43 '[Wagner] is at the moment the truest representative of modernity ... Wagner's opera 
is a serious work, demanding sustained attention; it is hardly necessary to point out how 
much this fact must tell against its chances in a country where the chief reasons for the 
success of classical tragedy lay in the opportunities which it offered for distraction'. 
Baudelaire, Charles. 'Richard Wagner and Tannhiiuser in Paris', in The Painter of 
Modern Life and other Essays, trans. Jonathan Mayre (London: Phaidon, 1995), p.137; 
p.140. Cf. Lacoue-Labarthe, P. Musica Ficta, ch.l. 
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accordingly, a nominalism of egoism. This gives new meaning to an important passage 
in the monograph: 
By reflecting and displaying its own weakness, the ego differentiates itself 
infinitely [das Ich difJerenziert sich unendlich], but by the same token that 
weakness causes it to regress to a pre-ego stage.44 
It was suggested in the previous chapter that Adorno conceives of bourgeois society as a 
false whole, in that it mis-takes its nominalist whole for the true one' false , 
consciousness in-stead of self-consciousness. The artwork resists the false whole with a 
false singularity, or the singularity of semblance. False singularity is the self-
conSCIOusness of the false whole. The necessary ambivalence of 'every art of 
significance ... Wagner's especially' is the possibility of this self-consciousness. The 
ambivalence of 'Wagner', as art, is the dialectical ambivalence of egotism and egoism 
(which is not at all to say that all ambivalence is dialectical). Ego-weakness is the 
former moment of dialectical ambivalence. If autonomous art demands autonomous 
judgement, then egoism is the other moment. 
But what, precisely, is meant by egoism here? The egoism of Horkheimer's 
'Egoism and Freedom Movements' is taken from Freud and Nietzsche. The Genealogy 
underpins this 'Anthropology of the Bourgeois Ego', an ego that misrepresents 
Nietzsche: 
The Ubermensch, the most problematic concept with which the psychologist 
left the analytical realm Nietzsche had mastered, has been interpreted along 
the lines of the philistine bourgeois's wildest dreams, and has been confused 
with Nietzsche himself. The adventurous element seemed so appealing. 
Greatness, blood, and danger have always been cherished in paintings and 
monuments. But Nietzsche is the opposite of this inflated sense of power. 
His error lay in his lack of historical understanding of the present, which led 
him to bizarre hypotheses where clear theoretical knowledge was possible.45 
Horkheimer attempts to fuse the Genealogy with a new historical materialism. As in the 
Genealogy, egoism is not interchangeable with but rather contradicts individualism, 
ego-tism: 
44 Adorno, T. W. In Search of Wagner, p.34. 
45 Horkheimer, Max. 'Egoism and Freedom Movements: On the Anthropology of the 
Bourgeois Era', in Between Philosophy and Social Science, trans. Hunter Kramer & 
Torpey (Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1993), p.l 09. 
The bou~geois revolution did not lead the masses to the lasting state of 
Joyful eXIstence and the universal equality they longed for, but to the hard 
reality of an individualistic social order instead.46 
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For Nietzsche, the ego as essence is a 'pure, will-less, painless, timeless subject of 
knowledge ... an eye which cannot be thought at all, an eye turned in no direction at all' . 
Whereas, egoism is 'only a perspective seeing, only a perspective "knowing".'47 The 
self-valorisation of the ego is reactive, in that it proceeds from suspicion - hatred - of 
the other. This 'eye', 'turned in no particular direction', is nothing of itself. Conversely, 
ego-ism proceeds from the original production of a perspective; a perspective that 
belongs to the production (of 'life'), not to the ego. Horkheimer calls this spontaneous 
production 'play'. 
Horkheimer's Nietzschean conception of egoism finds its way into Adorno. Yet 
Adorno gives it a Kantian twist. Egoism is the original power of judgement, Urteils-
kraft. Ideology, in the forms of fascism and the culture industry, interrupts the power of 
judgement by passing judgement on behalf of and in place of egoism. The strncture of 
willing is, on both sides, identical. The authoritarian will pursues subject-object 
identity, domination, and the passive will similarly (structurally) wills nothing - even 
though the outcome of this identity is qualitatively different for both sides.48 This 
insight is in keeping with Adorno's (and Benjamin's) thesis on the nihilism of 
capitalism as whole. The will to identity is concomitant with (not merely determined 
by) the exchange process: 'The exchange-principle, the reduction of human labor to an 
abstract general concept of average labor-time, is primordially related to the 
identification-principle. ,49 
Modem art places a demand on the power of judgement. Adorno's Kantianism 
is philosophical and cultural-historical here. The weakening of egoism is measured 
against gains made for it during a supposed enlightenment (Enlightenment) moment. 
Narratives of decline, of decadence, must posit a height from which the decline set-in. 
Hence, the danger of nostalgia. Adorno knows that this height was always a promise of 
46 Ibid. p.62. 
47 Nietzsche, F. On the Genealogy of Morality, p.92. 
48 In the Wagner monograph, Adorno prefers the terminology of' ego', 'das I ch', and 
'egoism' over that of subject and subjectivity. Horkheimer, who had previously 
disregarded Kant as solipsistic, subsequently takes over the Kantian interpretation of 
egoism. The autonomous subject breaks out of its solipsistic shell: The 'idea of self-
determination' is now universalised 'for the human race'. Horkheimer, M. 'Traditional 
and Critical Theory' in Critical Theory, trans. Matthew 1. O'Connell et al. (New York: 
Herder & Herder, 1972), p.229. 
49 Adorno, T. W. Negative Dialectics, pp.149-51. 
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maturity, not maturity itself. By contrast, as the category of play might suggest, 
Horkheimer's egoism remains, initially at least, nostalgic. Spontaneous egoism is 
supposed to have existed prior to the 'bourgeois epoch'. Not since Kant, but Hobbes, 
the intellectual bridge between the pre-bourgeois and bourgeois ego: 
As the dominance of bourgeois society grows more undiluted and its 
influence less restrained, people come to view one another with increasing 
hostility and indifference as individuals, families, economic groups, and 
classes.5o 
Increasing hostility presupposes a pre-bourgeois 'pleasure' in social relations - much 
like the community 'sentiment [Gemiit]' of Antonio Tonnies' Community and Society 
(1887). And unlike in Georg Simmel's contrasting metropolitan 'blase-type', 
Horkheimer's modem ego does not, at this point, promise any kind of freedom (see 
chapter 4). 
In this respect, Horkheimer formally repeats the initial archaism of the 
Genealogy. The aristocratic masters valued egoism, whereas the slaves devalued it 
through their hatred of the masters. Judeo-Christian modernity is thereafter an 
experience of decadence. Morality itself is decadent because the distinction between 
good and evil proceeds from a reactive evaluation of the good: 'it is only with a decline 
of aristocratic value-judgments that this whole antithesis between "egoistic" and 
"unegoistic" forces itself more and more on man's conscience'. 51 The reversal in values 
means that the slave morality parades as the master morality. Today - this is 
Nietzsche's tum against archaism - 'ressentiment' defines the bourgeois rulers, and the 
slavish need of rulers. According to Horkheimer, 'As much as the whole world must 
tremble before [the leaders] in fear, they themselves display the image of fear of still 
higher and supreme beings'. Is this the inspiration behind Adorno's interpretation of 
Siegfried, as (the) Fiihrer?52 
Horkheimer's 'play' is modelled upon Hobbes' instinctual desires, alongside 
Nietzsche's vitalism. Having accepted the terms of Hobbes, Horkheimer now rejects the 
their suppression under Hobbes' own scientific rationality. This vitalist-naturalistic 
egoism remains unproductive within Horkheimer's overall historical narrative. 
Horkheimer does not act upon the fundamental insight of the Genealogy: the sickness of 
bourgeois nihilism does not call for a return to the healthy life of the Greeks, or 
50 Horkheimer, M. 'Egoism and Freedom Movements', p.52. 
51 Nietzsche, F. On the Genealogy of Morality, p.13. 
52 Horkheimer, M. 'Egoism and Freedom Movements', p.69. 
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whoever, but rather for a 'self-overcoming [Selbstaujhebung]" as the Uber-mensch. 53 
Horkheimer accepts Nietzsche's diagnosis without accepting his 'bizarre' cure (but is 
evaluation possible without revaluation?). Adorno's reliance upon Horkheimer's essay 
would suggest that he too seeks to re-value the ego in tenns of egoism. And Adorno's-
modernist - post-Hegelianism paradoxically brings him closer to the 'free spirit' of the 
Genealogy than the 'Nietzschean' Horkheimer. 
In the earlier monograph, Adorno writes that, 
the fault-line discernible in Wagner's work - his impotence in the face of 
the technical contradictions and the social conflicts underlying them, in 
short all the qualities that prompted his contemporaries to speak of 
'decadence' - is also the path of artistic progress. 54 
'Decadence' is 'also' the path of artistic progress. In 'differentiating itself infinitely', 
the ego acts, as egoism.55 Egoism is here the power of differentiation. This is not 
thereby (solely) the 'regress to a pre-ego stage'. On the contrary, the act of infinite self-
differentiation means the relinquishing of the existing ego in a new egoism - and not, 
therefore, the relinquishment of egoism as such that is characteristic of F euerbach' s love 
and Schopenhauer's nirvana. In what sense is this differentiation 'infinite'? Is it a 'bad 
infinity'? Is it the sublime? 
Adorno writes in Aesthetic Theory that the experience of 'shudder' in art is not 
merely an affective 'experience [Erlebnis]'. 'This experience [Eifahrung] is contrary to 
the weakening of the I [Schwachung des Ichs] that the culture industry manipulates.'56 
There is a continuity with and a divergence from the Wagner studies here. First, the 
continuity: modem art mimics the weakening of the ego, 'manipulated by the culture 
industry', as mimesis. Art 'is modem art through its mimesis of the hardened and 
alienated.'57 In Wagner, 'the ego differentiates itself infinitely'. In the 'shudder', the 'I 
perceives its own limitedness and finitude'. If the infinite is read as the non-finite then 
the two statements become compatible. This non-finitude nevertheless looks fonnal-
53 I have opted for Walter Kaufmann's more literal rendering of'Selbstaujhebung' as 
'self-overcoming', rather than Carol Diethe's 'sublimating itself, partly because 
elsewhere Nietzsche speaks more explicitly of'Sublimierung' to indicate sublimation. 
Nietzsche, F. On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. Kaufmann & Hollingdale (N ew York: 
Vintage, 1967), p.73. Cf. Kaufmann, Walter. Nietzsche (Princeton University Press, 
1950), p.236. 
54 Adorno, T. W. In Search of Wagner, p.34. My emphasis. 
55 My emphasis. 
56 Adorno, T. W. Aesthetic Theory, p.245. 
57 Ibid. p.21. 
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transcendental in structure: the exceptional shudder always, infinitely, falls back into the 
status quo. The exception remains merely exceptional. In contrast to Kant's sublime, 
however, Adorno's shudder is historically mediated (though not historically 
subsumed?). Yet its structure is not, it seems, historical. Shudder, like mimesis, then 
resembles Horkheimer's play (there is perhaps a shared influence from Benjamin's 
reflections on mimesis). By contrast, the modem, 'post-Wagnerian' shudder - here is 
the divergence from the 'naturally' sublime shudder - is of a historically singular 
character. The relationship between the 'I that the culture industry manipulates' and the 
'I that perceives its own limitedness and finitude' is 'more' dialectical in the Wagner 
monograph than in Aesthetic Theory, where the poles tend to remain antinomical. This 
means that the possible, new egoism - occasioned by the emergence of the culture 
industry, the cultural form of capitalism - is unique to that modernity. To characterise 
Wagner in terms of distraction, boredom and waiting - descriptions of the experience of 
modernity - is then to characterise specifically modem forms of distraction, boredom 
and waiting. The infinity to which Adorno refers names an originary historical negation, 
whether understood as strictly dialectical or as post-messianic. The negation is, in this 
sense, the 'non-' of the 'non-finitude'. 
Horkheimer has Aristotle's Poetics in mind when he concludes his essay on 
egoism: 'Catharsis through dramatic plays, through play in general, presupposes a 
changed humanity. ,58 Horkheimer belatedly and confusedly concurs with the Genealogy 
that modernity is the sole pre-condition of its self-overcoming. The inversion of values 
turns life against itself. But a necessary consequence of the ascetic ideal, the self-
discipline of this inversion, is the emergence of the modem will itself. For, 'In spite 
of. .. suffering' the ascetic ideals, and because of it, 
man was saved, he had a meaning, from now on he was no longer like a leaf 
in the breeze, the plaything of the absurd, of 'non-sense'; from now on he 
could will something, - no matter what, why and how he did it at first, the 
will itself was saved... a will to nothingness... is and remains a will! ... 
And, to conclude by saying what I said at the beginning: man still prefers to 
will nothingness, than not will [Nichts wollen, als nicht wollen].59 
No will to power without the will (as Hegel knew, the Greeks were not masters). The 
will must, says Nietzsche, be re-oriented out of nothing to power - not 'passive', but 
• active nihilism' . 
58 Horkheimer, M. • Egoism and Freedom Movements', p.ll O. 
59 Nietzsche, F. On the Genealogy of Morality, p.128. 
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Though he finds Nietzsche's Ubermensch 'problematic', Horkheimer proposes a 
historical materialist interpretation of it, in his notion of a 'changed humanity'. A 
changed humanity means a new egoism, not the old ego following new imperatives, as 
attributes to its essence (an 'eye turned in no particular direction'). This is arguably the 
ongoing challenge of Adorno and Horkheimer to the Marxist tradition - both humanist 
and structuralist, given the controversy over Marx's reliance upon F euerbachian 
metaphysics. It is also their (ongoing) challenge to vitalism. Nietzsche's Ubermensch, 
like the V 01 sung blood, is hardly universal in its orientation. It too is a spurious, and 
ultimately catastrophic universal. 
Nietzsche nevertheless confronts the structural paradox proposed in the 
opposition: old and new humanity. This opposition cannot be understood by the old 
humanists. How can the overcoming of the old humanity proceed from the old 
humanity, from the old humanism? Nietzsche's mediation is not, observes Horkheimer, 
sufficiently historical. But Horkheimer and Adorno take from Nietzsche and Marx the 
thesis that a changed humanity means a changed comportment of humanity, to itself, as 
much as the actualisation of imperatives arising from, for instance, a pre-commitment to 
a human essence. The changed comportment is the possibility, not the redundancy of 
the commitment. Commitment is concomitant with the changed comportment. 
Modem art demands a new comportment. Art distracts perspective seeing from 
the old comportment, an eye turned in no particular direction, in the attention of a new 
perspective - or rather, the 'perspectival'. The'!, is 'liquidated'. Something like 
Benjamin's thesis on 'distraction [Zerstreuung], can be seen in Adorno's near-
contemporaneous 'theory of decadence', in spite of Adorno's cautious reception of 'The 
Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction' (1936). The 'contemplation' that 
was expected of art (its 'aura') is displaced by the distraction of mass art, specifically 
cinema. The cinema promises to politically 'mobilise' the masses. Benjamin's 
optimistic conception of the masses, and of mass art, leads him into an optimistic 
conception of popular political mobilisation (but what, precisely, is the popular here?). 
If Adorno is right about the 'source of Hitler's ideology' then the political mobilisation 
that the mass art ofWagnerism contributed to is not the one that Benjamin had in mind: 
'communism'. The political judgement of the 'masses' is 'weakened' by and as 
distraction, thus handing power to an authoritarian ego. But in the second, suppressed 
moment of Adorno's analysis, the 'weakening' of the ego is equally the possibility of its 
transformation (which in no way is to say that fascism is the possibility of communism; 
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they are truly antithetical). Concentration and distraction are in that case mediated in , 
and as, the modem artwork. 
For Benjamin, 'the mode of human sense perception [Sinneswahrnehmung] 
changes with humanity's entire mode of existence [Daseinsweise].,6o The 'with' is 
equivocal here. What is its determining function? On the one hand, humanity's mode of 
existence determines its perception, as base determines superstructure. But Benjamin 
and Adorno suggest that the change in perception also determines the change in the 
mode of existence. The transformation of egoism is in that case something like 
Adorno's social alternative to Benjamin's mass art. For Benjamin's mediation of art and 
politics is one-sided, from a Hegelian perspective. The'!, becomes 'We' without the 
'We' becoming'!'. And vice versa.61 
Adorno bemoans 'the chimera of the pure, unhistorical, immediate human 
being' in Wagner's myth. He thus rejects both Wagner's attempt to realise sociality in 
art-religion and Schopenhauer's aesthetic of redemption, which goes beyond the 
principium individuationis. His metaphysics resonates with and does not directly 
contradict Feuerbach's sensuous humanism. Love, says the author of Death and 
Immortality, 'is a consuming fire. ,62 Feuerbach goes beyond Hegel's account of love as 
the immanently inter-subjective movement of spirit (an account that would in any case 
not have been known to Feuerbach).63 According to Feuerbach's erotic humanism, the 
fire threatens to consume love itself, anticipating the fate of Briinnhilde.64 
60 Benjamin, W. 'The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction', in 
Illuminations, p.2l6. 
61 The 'absolute substance which is the unity of what Spirit is - this absolute substance 
which is the unity of different independent self-consciousnesses which, in their 
opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and independence: the'!, that is 'We' and 'We' that 
is'!,.' Hegel, G. W. F. Phenomenology of Spirit, p.ll O. 
62 Feuerbach, L. Thoughts on Death and Immortality, p.37. 
63 Hegel develops his concept of love as spirit through an interpretation of the Last 
Supper. Spirit is the task of humanity, left behind by the 'death of God' in the 
Ascension: 
the bread and the wine are not just an object, something for the intellect. The action of eating and 
drinking is not just a self-unification brought about through the destruction of food and drink, nor is it 
simply the mere tasting of food and drink. The spirit of Jesus, in which his disciples are one, has become 
a present object, a reality, for external feeling. Yet the love made objective, this subjective element 
becomes a thing, reverts once more to its nature, becomes subjective again in the eating. This return may 
perhaps in this respect be compared with the thought which in the written word becomes a thing and 
which recaptures its subjectivity out of an object, out of something lifeless, when we read. 
G. W. F. Hegel. 'The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate', in Early Theological Writings, 
trans. T. M. Knox (University of Chicago Press, 1961), p.25!. 
64 Death and Immortality is not yet the anthrotheology of The Essence of Christianit)', 
in which the attributes of the Christian religion become the externalisations of 
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Adorno's 'liquefied' '1' is no postulation of a universal love or will, but is rather 
'Erfahrung', understood after both Hegel's 'experience of consciousness' and 
Benjamin's post-idealist reformulations. The experience of art is, in structurally 
Hegelian terms (but not Hegel's terms), that of love. Given Adorno's problems with 
Hegelian metaphysics, with all metaphysics 'after Auschwitz', can he bestow 
universality upon the sociality that is promised 'in' modem art, or at least in the kind of 
'subjectivity' that is promised in such art, which must of course exceed art? More 
broadly, what is Adorno's conception of spirit (since spirit is both the experience of 
conSCIOusness and love)? Adorno's seeming avoidance of Feuerbach renders this 
question ever more pressing, to the extent that Marx's 'Gattungswesen' partially 
constitutes an interpretation of the Feuerbachian inversion of Hegelian spirit (assuming 
that Adorno's philosophical materialism is Marxian). Of course, the affinity of Marx to 
F euerbach is, at one level, itself formal. The content is completely transformed by 
Marx. Feuerbach's Idealist (or rather, Rationalist) deduction of the universality of 
thought neglects 'practical, human-sensuous activity', the genuine human universality. 
Adorno follows Marx's critique of Feuerbach but understands it counter to Marx's 
interpretation of Hegel (again, Marx and the Young Hegelians were not familiar with 
the Phenomenology). 'What is meant' by the idea of natural-history, Adorno writes, 
is certainly not the anthropological concept of nature of Feuerbach, against 
which Marx aimed dialectical materialism, in the sense of a reprise of Hegel 
against the Left Hegelians.65 
Feuerbach's formalism is nevertheless equally a problem in the early Marx. 
Aside from the question as to which sensuous human activity ought to be universal for a 
fulfilled humanity (in Feuerbach, the question is 'which thought?'), an equally 
fundamental, related problem concerns the original positing of the universality itself. 
For it is not only 'unhistorical' humanism that Adorno objects to. Adorno counters this, 
following Marx, with a 'dialectical materialism': the attempted overcoming of 
naturalistic humanism with historical humanism. Rather, an additional (neo-) Kantian 
humanity. But the love of Death and Immortality is already the Christian love that, as 
'Heart', forms one of the three attributes in The Essence of Christianity, constituting, 'in 
[humanity] his species, his humanity proper'. A further parallel to Schopenhauer 
appears when Feuerbach defines the 'Will' as 'feeling', taking the example of music. 
'Who has not experienced the irresistible power of musical sounds? And what else is 
this power if not the power of feeling? Music is the language of feeling - a musical note 
is sonorous feeling or feeling communicating itself. ' 
65 Adorno, T. W. Negative Dialectics, pp.347-51. 
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adjective is connected to the 'unhistorical' in Adorno's criticism: 'geschichtslos-reinen, 
unmittelbaren Menschenwesens'. In parallel to the problem of naturalism, Adorno 
identifies the problem of transcendental-formalism - of, that is, an abstract universal of 
the human that is not humanly posited; and not therefore posited critically, from 
experience. As in Kant, pure, rein, signifies the formal-transcendental ('pure reason', 
'pure concept'). The unhistorical and the formal-transcendental converge. Following 
Hegel's critique of Kant, this purity remains without mediated content: the historical 
experience 'of' consciousness - including what self-consciousness is not (yet). Adorno 
is aware of this problem, as his reprisal of Hegel would suggest. But this reprisal 
equally throws Adorno back onto the metaphysical problem of positing and grounding 
(whether the absolute Idea or spirit). Adorno's idea of natural-history is not free from 
his own implicit charge against existing humanism. 
What, then, is the ground of an original positing of universality? It was 
suggested in the previous chapter that Hegel effectively attempts to determine (world-) 
spirit by way of a historical dialectic of human re-cognition (which can be understood 
as all activity, not merely the activity of cognition in a narrow sense). This marks 
Hegel's universality out from both the anthropological universality of Feuerbach and 
from the transcendental-subjective universality of Kant. It remains, in the former case, 
unclear as to how claims of value could be derived - without, of course, being grounded 
in theology. Can philosophical anthropology posit values, without anthrotheology? Can 
what humanity has been determine what it ought to be? Surely not, if is to be a 
'changed humanity'. 
Adorno does not lurch from the problem of positing to non-positing; to a 
sceptical, anti-humanist positivism. Hence, Adorno conceives of spirit as internally 
divided, between what society is and what it is not (yet). The hope for virtuous 
universality, for society as content, is the question or problem of what Adorno will call 
'metaphysical experience', experience of what is missing from that content 
('Something's Missing'). Hope is precarious after the crisis of metaphysics, which 
explicitly includes metaphysical humanism. Reflecting upon this, Adorno conceives of 
an expression of waiting in vain. The meaning of this expression can be further 
understood with respect to the foregoing account of music and distraction, in relation to 
the will and egoism, given Adorno's emphasis upon the musical character of the 
expression of waiting in vain. Distraction and waiting in vain are seemingly connected 
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via boredom. Adorno thus writes of the 'Wagnerian longueurs' .66 Egoism and egotism 
are kinds of (non-) willing. The transformation of the comportment of willing can be 
understood as the possibility of a philosophy of waiting after messianism; that is, of the 
awaited: humanity proper. 
Hegel's Aufhebung, taken over by Marx, is ontological with respect to history 
and humanity as a whole. History progresses according to an original positing, in the 
ruse of reason and in the modes of production respectively - until the last (which, for 
Marx, is the first).67 Adorno's Nietzschean critique of humanism includes a critique of 
the positing that promises (this) progress. This is because Adorno locates the problem of 
immediacy, and thus positing, in the problem of the will itself. Scientific, positive 
historical materialism becomes affirmative by comporting itself to the future in the 
mode of expectation. This arises from its faith in an incessant, logical-historical 
movement towards a posited-positive outcome (scientific socialism then is utopian, in 
the pejorative sense). This political comportment turns out to be structurally identical 
with the principle of identity that dominates current modernity. Adorno knows that the 
will to identity culminates in real passive nihilism: 'Auschwitz confirms the 
philosopheme of pure identity in death. ,68 Again, Adorno does not seek to negate the 
will. To do so would be an act of the will itself. It would be to abstractly negate 
modernity from out of modernity (the will is modem). Rather, Adorno hints at a 
qualitatively changed willing in terms of a 'musical' auto-differentiation that is itself 
thoroughly modem, or rather modernist (and there is no post-modernism without 
modernism!). This changed human comportment is the 'progressive moment', and is 
hence not pessimistic or reactive. Willing as an expression of waiting in vain is not, 
thereby, quietism. 
A significant problem remains, concerning the qualitative meaning of this new, 
'active' waiting-comportment. Everything seems to rest upon an experiential dimension 
of modem art - and thereby an ontological claim about 'shudder', 'mimesis' and 
'expression'. But even if the waiting-comportment exceeds art in the narrow sense - as 
66 Adorno, T. W. In Search o/Wagner, p.27. 
67 'The bourgeois mode of production is the last antagonistic form of the social process 
of production ... the productive forces within bourgeois society create also the material 
conditions for a solution of this antagonism.' Marx, K. A Contribution to the Critique 0/ 
Political Economy, trans. S. W. Ryazanskaya (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1971), 
p.21. There is not room for a discussion of Marx's historical dialectic in this thesis. But, 
to generalise the foregoing critique: it is the necessity, not the possibility, of dialectical 
sublation that must be questioned - in order to make its necessity possible. 
68 Adorno, T. W. Negative Dialectics, pp.354-358. 
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is suggested - why should there be any promise to such waiting? Why should the 
expression of waiting in vain not be an all-too-human vanity? Why should it be directed 
'towards' utopia, as an actual, historical possibility; and not, for that matter, 'towards' 
dystopia? There is a problem of 'joining' the waiting to the a-waited - systematically, 
coherently - such that waiting is in some way 'constitutive of the awaited, without 
becoming representing-expectation. This is the messianic problem; the problem of the 
meSSIamc. 
Heidegger offers a critique of the metaphysical dualism of waiting and awaited. 
It is an ontological critique of metaphysics itself - but this does not mean that 
Heidegger does without history, metaphysics or modernity. On the contrary. 
Heidegger's ontology is not solely ancient or scholastic ontology. Heidegger's revised 
understanding of waiting, in relation to the problem of the modem will, can be shown to 
emerge out of his historical-philosophical interpretation of Nietzsche and Wagner. 
Part II. Heidegger and Wagner 
In 'The Will to Power as Art', Heidegger explicitly formulates a 'history of 
metaphysics'. In spite of the 'historizing' of Being and Time, that work remained 
primarily concerned with the existential structure of Dasein - including its structural 
historicity. Karl L6with witnessed Heidegger's subsequent translation of 'One's 
Ownmost Individual Dasein' into 'the German Dasein'. Adorno cites L6with in his 
critique of Heidegger's concept of historicity. But L6with simultaneously excludes the 
possibility of a historical and collective determination of Dasein other than the' German 
Dasein'. As L6with explains, it was the doctrine of 'one's ownmost' that rendered 
Heidegger's 'private existentialism' useless to the Nazi ideologues. L6with is 
paradoxically inattentive to existential solipsism as being a factor in Heidegger's 
support for National Socialism (see chapter 5). The history of metaphysics in the 
Nietzsche lectures can nevertheless initially be understood as a continuation of the 
earlier 'task of destroying the history of ontology'. 69 This task quickly comes up against 
the difficulty of the destruction of metaphysics from out of metaphysics. How can 
Platonic metaphysics overcome itself - without, in the case of Nietzsche, merely 
reversing and thus re-installing it? 
Heidegger's remarks on history are 'stylistically' indebted to Hegel. The 'Six 
Basic Developments in the History of Aesthetics' cite Hegel's Aesthetics lectures. 
69 Heidegger, M. Being and Time, p.41. 
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Heidegger draws upon the etymology of the aesthetic itself. Aesthetics is a question of 
'sense', as opposed to the 'supersensuous', which is posited in opposition to sense. 
Classicist aesthetics is concerned with taste. Romantic aesthetics is concerned with 
feeling. As was shown in the previous chapter, ideas of music are never very far away 
from these developments in the history of aesthetics. Heidegger takes modem 
subjectivity to be fundamentally aesthetic. Nietzsche had already suggested that 
aestheticism becomes an ascetic ideal; the negation of life rather than its enhancement. 
Heidegger will suggest that Nietzsche's concept of 'life' is equally, in the final instance, 
aesthetically over-determined. Nietzsche perpetuates the scission, and the de-cision, 
between the sensuous and the supersensuous, by valorising the former over the latter. 
Conversely, Platonic Idealism, in all of its diverse forms, valorises the latter over the 
former. 'Nietzsche's philosophy, according to his own testimony, is inverted 
Platonism. ,70 
Heidegger seeks to extend Nietzsche beyond Platonism (beyond Nietzsche) by 
pursuing a twofold strategy. Either he rejects Nietzsche's vitalistic and biological 
concepts ('[t]o deliver art over to physiology seems tantamount to reducing art to the 
functional level of the gastric juices') or he radicalises them such that they are no longer 
strictly vitalistic. Tied to the critique of vitalism is a critique of the will. Nietzsche 
continues to conceive of the will as affective, and thus primarily sensuous - as opposed 
to, but equally as willing the supersensuous. Nietzsche only becomes aware of these 
problems in his last coherent writings. 
Heidegger finds a cue for a non-vitalist reinterpretation of the will to power in 
Nietzsche's aborted plan 'Toward a Psychology of Art'. Nietzsche had intended to 
enquire into the nature of 'rapture [Rausch]' , which Heidegger now sharply 
differentiates from 'affect' (where Nietzsche tends to confuse the two). Rapture 
distinguishes 'passion' from mere feeling.71 It is here that a certain re-emphasis or re-
definition of Being and Time's 'resoluteness' is attempted. 'Entschlossenheit' is no 
ontic resolution, but is rather the openness, Er-schlossenheit, to the possibility of 
resolution: world-disclosure. 
In 'The Will to Power as Art', Heidegger initially seeks to complete Nietzsche's 
break with Wagner on Nietzsche's behalf. 'Wagner' names a decision about art as 
aesthetic.72 Heidegger's philosophical history of art is both a history of the aesthetic and 
70 Heidegger, M. Nietzsche, vol. I , p.200. 
71 Ibid. p.94. 
72 Ibid. vol. I , p.78. 
83 
a history of aesthetics. Art and its theoretical reflection go together. In accordance with 
the orientation of Western metaphysics, the aesthetic becomes the object of the subject. 
Aesthetics is the subject's external reflection upon an aesthetic object. Heidegger 
stresses the need for reflection on art, but claims that, historically, aesthetics 'slips 
markedly, even exclusively, into the relation of man's state of feeling, aesthesis. ,73 This 
is structurally reminiscent of Hegel's end of art, as Heidegger himself acknowledges: 
At the historical moment when aesthetics achieves its greatest possible 
height, breadth, and rigour of form, great art comes to an end. The 
achievement of aesthetics derives its greatness from the fact that it 
recognises and gives utterance to the end of great art as such. The final and 
greatest aesthetics in the Western tradition is that of Hegel. 74 
Hegel is both inside and outside of the 'Six Basic Developments'. Hegel marks the 
apogee of aesthetics, and is thus implicated in the slippage. But Hegel is also exempt 
from the slippage, being the thinker to have bestowed the end with philosophical 
pathos. Aesthetics is the occasion for the end of great art, but aesthetics is capable of 
greatness, as the expression of art's end. All aesthetics other than that of Hegel is a 
'logic of sensuousness' .75 
As was said, there are two connected concerns in Heidegger's narrative on 
aesthetics. The first is initially sympathetic with Nietzsche's account of the will. 
Determined metaphysically, the will is the will to something, re-presented before it -
even, or especially, if that something is nothing. This is the representational-idealist 
structure of aesthetic contemplation, and it is paradigmatic of modern subjectivity -
SUbjectivism - more generally. The metaphysical will is will and representation (as we 
shall see, Schopenhauer and Wagner will occupy a certain height of metaphysics). 
Heidegger's second concern marks him out from Nietzsche, whose valorisation of the 
sensuous must be to the detriment of 'being as a whole,:76 
Feeling, as feeling oneself to be, is precisely the way we are corporeally. 
Bodily being does not mean that the soul is burdened by a hulk we call the 
body. In feeling oneself to be, the body is already contained in advance in 
that self, in such a way that the body in its bodily states permeates the self. .. 
We do not "have" a body; rather, we "are" bodily.77 
73 Ibid. p.83. 
74 Ibid. p.84. 
75 Ibid. p.83. 
76 Ibid. p.92. 
77 Ibid. pp. 98-9. 
84 
Narratives of embodied Dasein, such as this one, often react to the so-called mind-body 
dualism in pursuit of an unhistorical monism. The Stimmung of Dasein, its being-
bodily, is, however, a dissonant historicity - not an unhistorical harmony (see chapter 
1). What marks the Nietzsche lectures out from Being and Time is their account of a 
historical idealisation of the sensuous that comes to determine the historical self-
understanding ofDa-sein. 
In the third essay of the Genealogy, Nietzsche introduces Wagner as exemplar of 
the 'ascetic ideal'. The ascetic ideal embraces affectivity, either as consolation or as 
narcotic. Nietzsche refers to the marriage scene of Die Meistersinger: 
What does it mean if an artist like Richard Wagner pays homage to chastity 
in his old age? I accept that he has always done this in a certain sense; but 
only in the very end in an ascetic sense. What does this change of 'sense' 
mean, this radical alteration of 'sense'? - because it was such a change, 
Wagner made a complete turnabout and became his exact opposite... For 
there is not, necessarily, an antithesis between chastity and sensuality; every 
good marriage, every real affair of the heart transcends this antithesis.78 
Nietzsche locates the 'turnabout' of Wagner in his last music-drama, Parsifal 
(completed in 1882) - though their parting of ways was a long time in the making, from 
the 1870s. The attack is not confined to Wagner's libretti, even though Nietzsche's 
attack precedes his having properly listened to Parsifal. The later Nietzsche now hears 
in Wagner's hypnotic 'tone' the will to redemption through sensational 'effects'. 
Wagner is the 'actor'. The 'unending melodies', 'sick' and 'feminine', oppose art in the 
'grand style'. Nietzsche compares Carmen favourably to the German's compositions.79 
At least Bizet is honest about sensuality. Wagner, by contrast, is in bad faith. Sensuality 
reactively compensates self-denial. 'So what do ascetic ideals mean?', Nietzsche asks. 
'In the case of an artist, we have concluded: nothing at all! ... or so many things that it 
. hi ,,80 IS tantamount to not ng. 
Nietzsche attributes Wagner's aesthetic of redemption to Schopenhauer's 
aesthetics of music, which Wagner had studied from the 1860s onwards: 
All at once [Wagner] grasped that with Schopenhauer's theory and 
innovation more could be done in majorem musicae gloriam, - in fact, with 
the sovereignty of music as Schopenhauer understood it: music set apart 
from all the other arts, the inherently independent art, not providing 
78 Ibid. p.73. 
79 Nietzsche, F. 'The Case of Wagner', passim. 
80 Nietzsche, F. On the Genealogy of A10rality, p.76. 
reflections of the phenomenal world like the other arts, but instead, speaking 
the language of the will itself strai¥ht out of the 'abyss', as the latter's most 
unique, original, direct revelation.8 
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Nietzsche's assessment of his old 'educator' is based upon Book Three of The World as 
Will and Representation (1818/1844): 
Music is thus in no sense, like the other arts, the image of ideas, but the 
image of the will itself, which also takes objective shape in ideas; and for 
this very reason the effect of music is far more powerful and penetrates far 
more deeply than the other arts; for they communicate only shadows, 
whereas it communicates the essence. 82 
As an image of no image, music is an image of the will itself - the thing-in-itself 
beyond all things as the ground of all things; the image of all images (see chapter 3). 
Schopenhauer is for Nietzsche and Heidegger a passive nihilist because the highest aim 
of the will, from the standpoint of a life that is meaningless, is nothing. Nietzsche 
attempts to overcome his former Schopenhauerian pessimism (the 'amor fatr) with the 
'will to power', the' countermovement to nihilism'. 
Importantly, Heidegger looks for a confmnation of Nietzsche's polemic in the 
theoretical writings of Wagner. Heidegger is sufficiently interested in the case of 
Wagner, and by extension the case of music, to go beyond Nietzsche's own research. 
There is nevertheless doubt as to Heidegger's knowledge of Wagner's music. Heidegger 
does not need to listen to Wagner, for his music-dramas are the mere instantiations of 
theoretical intentions that are all-too-easily understood: 
the nineteenth century once more dares to attempt the "collective artwork". 
That effort is associated with the name of Richard Wagner. It is no accident 
that his effort does not limit itself to the creation of works that might serve 
such an end. His is accompanied and undergirded by reflections on the 
principles of such works, and by corresponding treatises. 83 
Wagner's 'reflections' exemplify the attempt to objectify art from the subject of a 
science of art. Heidegger accuses Wagner of willing his art into existence, as a closed 
form of expectation, not experimentation. Heidegger speaks of 'a will as a going after', 
81 Ibid. p.77. 
82 Schopenhauer, Arthur. The World as Will and Representation, trans. E. F. 1. Payne, 
(New York: Dover, 1969), vol. I , p. 25 7. 
83 Heidegger, M. Nietzsche, vol. 1 , p.85. 
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in which 'we are directed towards a thing by way of representation. ,84 Because the 
music-drama is willed re-presentationally, Wagner's art is not the will to power as art; 
not art at all. 
Heidegger interprets the will to power as art, against affective willing and 
against representing willing, as a 'resolute openness to oneself... always a willing out 
beyond oneself. Is not this ec-static 'willing out' the (egoist) 'willing out' of love? 
Affect is a short-lived feeling, says Heidegger. Whereas, passion 'restores our essential 
being'. Love is a name for this passion. And yet, love is not the only passion that 
Heidegger names here: 'hate and love not only last longer, they bring perdurance and 
permanence for the first time to our existence. ,85 Can a 'willing out beyond oneself be 
hatred? In his Freiheitschrift - on which Heidegger lectured in this same year, 1936-
Schelling suggests that evil, as the dark ground, is a precondition of love. But in the 
Ages of the World, egoism is defined as contraction and love as an expansion - in 
Heidegger's terms, perhaps, a 'willing out beyond oneself. Heidegger's conflation of 
the passions of love and hatred might then point to an experiential block on his part over 
the meaning of resolute openness (and thus, waiting). It is nevertheless through this 
concept of resolute openness that Heidegger confronts metaphysical willing 
philosophically. The passive-dominating will is the dark secret of metaphysics. The 
willing-representing subject becomes the comportment of 'modem technology' (a 
comportment, as opposed to a totality of technological things or information). Modem 
technology, a fulfilment of metaphysical willing, becomes for the post-war Heidegger, 
the 'danger' of 'enframing [Gestell] , . Enframing is the 'destining' of metaphysical 
willing; 'man's ordering attitude' .86 
Music and Language 
According to Heidegger, what is intended in the total work of art is a stimulation of the 
senses in their totality: a 'pure affective state'. Wagner's drama, 
possesses its importance and essential character, not in poetic originality, 
i.e., not in the well-wrought truth of the linguistic work, but to things 
pertaining to the stage, theatrical arrangements and gala productions. 
Architecture serves merely for theatre construction, painting provides the 
84 Ibid. p.39. 
85 Ibid. p.49. 
86 Heidegger, M. 'The Question Concerning Technology', trans. William Lovitt (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1977), p.326. 
backdrops, sculpture portrays the gestures of actors. Literary creation and 
language remain without the essential and decisive shaping force of genuine 
knowledge. What is wanted is the domination of art as music, and thereby 
the domination of the pure state of feeling - the tumult and delirium of the 
senses, tremendous contraction, the felicitous distress that swoons in 
enjoyment, absorption in the "bottomless sea of hannonies," the plunge into 
frenzy and disintegration into sheer feeling as redemptive.87 
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Wagner's dilettantism lies not in his attempt to unify the arts as such, but in his 
subjugation of this unity to music and not poetry - which, as poesis, would not be a 
subjugation. For Adorno, matters stand the other way around, even though the question 
is equally about 'music and language' . Wagner supposed - with and against 
Schopenhauer - that music remains too absolute by itself. Music must incorporate the 
other arts, non-music, in order to fulfil its essence. The Leitmotiv, associated with a 
character or event, recalls or anticipates characters and events that are not present, on 
the stage. As Boulez noted, the Leitmotiv produces a certain 'malleability in time'. 
'Debussy's mot about Leitmotivs being signposts was altogether too facile. ,88 This time 
should be understood along with the repetition of the Leitmotiv, according to the 
duration of the music-drama as a whole (the 'Wagnerian longueurs'). 
Heidegger's conjunction of 'the domination of art as music, and thereby the 
domination of the pure state of feeling' denotes a series of equivalences: 'Wagner', 
'music' and 'pure state of feeling'. Music is 'thereby', in its essence, affective. Music is 
the valorisation of the sensuous according to the supersensuous. Music is the art of 
nihilism par excellence: 
Whenever Nietzsche deals with art in the essential and definitive sense, he 
always refers to art in the grand style. Against this backdrop, his innennost 
antipathy to Wagner comes to light most sharply, above all because his 
conception of the grand style includes at the same time a fundamental 
decision, not only about Wagner's music, but about the essence of music as 
such. 89 
It is thus, for Heidegger, music as such, not only the music of Wagner, that occupies the 
height of subjective-aesthetic metaphysics. The will to nothing of Schopenhauer 
paradoxically coincides, in tenns of Heidegger's later thought, with the will to 
87 Ibid. p.85-6. My emphasis. 
88 Boulez, Pierre. Orientations, ed. Jean-Jacque Nattiez, trans. Martin Cooper (London: 
Faber & Faber, 1986), pp.265-6. 
89 Heidegger, M. Nietzsche, p.129. My emphasis. 
88 
domination of modem technology. As in Adorno, there is a coinciding passive and 
dominating willing (that can co-exist in the same individual or group). 
But does Nietzsche actually make a 'fundamental decision' about 'the essence of 
music as such'? We read that 'The Case of Wagner' was 'inspired ... by gratitude'. 
Indeed, the two postscripts and epilogue are symptomatic of Nietzsche's 'difficulty" 
over his divorce from Wagner.90 Moreover, Wagner is held responsible for having 
'made music sick'. But Nietzsche does not equate Wagner with the sole possibility of 
music. 'What we can still experience at best are exceptions. From the role that 
corruption is on top, that corruption is fatalistic, no god can save music. ,91 
Nietzsche thus makes no such 'fundamental decision' about music. This has 
important consequences for the meaning of Heidegger's lectures. Heidegger cites some 
Will to Power fragments in order to attempt to substantiate Nietzsche's final 
renunciation of music: 'The poet allows the drive for knowledge to play; the musician 
lets it take a rest.' But, once again, it is by no means clear that the later Nietzsche treats 
this 'rest' solely pejoratively. In The Gay Science (1882), Nietzsche writes of the 'slow 
periods' of artists: 
This is how all artists and people of 'works' feel, the motherly type: at every 
chapter of their lives - which is always marked by a work - they always 
think they've reached their goal; they would always patiently take death 
with the feeling 'we are ripe for it'. This is not the expression of weariness -
rather that of a certain autumnal sunniness and mildness that the work itself, 
the fact the work has become ripe, always leaves behind in its creator. Then 
the pace of life slows down and becomes thick and flows like honey - to the 
point of a longfermata, of the faith in the 10ngfermata.92 
The 'longfermata', the musical pause, is 'not an expression of weariness'. It is the time 
of waiting for further possibilities of creation. Not only waitingfor creation: the fermata 
is constitutive of creation. The later Nietzsche held Goethe's least appreciated work, the 
Venetian Epigrams, in the highest regard (partly on account of their censorship by 
Schiller, preacher of the German 'moral sermon', heir to Wagner).93 Goethe's twenty-
seventh epigram names the mother of the muses as, not Mnemosyne, but 'Boredom' .94 
90 Nietzsche, F. 'The Case of Wagner', p.192. 
91 Ibid. p.188-9. 
92 Nietzsche, F. The Gay Science, trans. Josefine Nauckhoff (Cambridge University 
Press, 2001), Book V, §376, pp. 240-l. 
93 Nietzsche, F. 'The Case of Wagner', pp.161-2. 
94 It is tempting to think that this epigram inspired 'The Storyteller': 'Memory creates 
the chain of tradition which passes a happening on from generation to generation. It is 
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Like many a thinker before and after him, Heidegger has an idea of music that is 
not informed by an experience of music. It is true that Heidegger shares Adorno's 
critique of Classicist aesthetics. Adorno too observes a slippage between taste and 
feeling, Classicism and Romanticism.95 But Adorno, unlike Heidegger, recognises 
dissonant, modernist music. In the 1930s, Heidegger is unable or unwilling to recognise 
the music that had been under way for well over two decades (both in the German 
speaking world, and over the border from Freiburg). He will nevertheless (later) 
recognise several German Expressionist poets. Neither does Heidegger afford a 
consideration of musical settings of (this) poetry. In an essay on Stephan George (,The 
Word', 1958), Heidegger writes, 
If we fail to understand the lofty meaning of song as Saying, it becomes the 
retroactive setting to music of what is spoken and written.96 
The Second Viennese School, Bartok, Ravel and Stravinsky were all drawn to the 
'retroactive setting of music' during the first third of the twentieth-century. The 
rejection of Wagnerian bombast, the affirmation of sparseness and objectivity, leads to a 
foregrounding of the voice in music and text (as in W ebern' s op.14 Trakl settings). 
Schoenberg thus writes in The Blue Rider Almanac (1912) that the text is the vehicle for 
the voice, not vice versa. As a continuation from Wagner, the text now provides music 
with a durational structure amidst the disintegration of musical logics (notwithstanding 
Stravinsky'S Neoclassicism). Schoenberg and his students effectively take up Wagner's 
example of non-strophic, through-composed 'song' - in works such as Erwartung. 
For Heidegger, music exemplifies everything that poetry is not. The limitation 
of Wagner's music-drama does not primarily concern the poverty of Wagner's poetry. 
Rather, it concerns the reduction of poesis to mousike - though Heidegger would have 
done well to consult his beloved Presocratics where the latter is concerned. Music is the 
impossibility of 'literary creation', which Heidegger tellingly refers to in the 
contemporaneous 'Origin of the Work of Art' (1936) as 'Gestell'. Variations on stellen 
are to be found throughout the Nietzsche lectures, prompted by Nietzsche's 'grand 
the Muse-derived [das Musische] element of the epic art in a broader sense and 
accompanies its varieties. In the first place among these is the one practiced by the 
storyteller'. And every storyteller needs a listener: 'If sleep is the apogee of physical 
relaxation, boredom is the apogee of mental relaxation. Boredom is the dream bird that 
hatches the egg of experience'. Benjamin, W. Illuminations, p.97; p.91. 
95 Cf. Adorno, T. W. In Search a/Wagner, pp.86-7. 
96 Heidegger, M. 'Words', in On the Way to Language, trans. Peter D. Hertz (London: 
Harper Collins, 1971), P .148. 
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style'. For instance: 'der gestalteten Wahrheit des Sprachwerkes'. 'The Origin of the 
Work of Art' corroborates with the verdict on the relative standing of poetry and music 
given in the Nietzsche lectures: 'If the essence of art is poetry, then architecture, the 
visual arts and music must all be referred back to poesy.'97 Heidegger proposes an 
affinity between style and the figure(s) of poetic language - in an avowedly virile 
manner (to style: to erect).98 But given Heidegger's subsequent and opposing 
redeployment of' Gestell', enframing, and given his opposing redeployment of the 'will 
to power', does Heidegger also redeploy, reassess, music and 'thereby' the musical? 
Twisting Free as Musical Waiting 
Like Adorno, Heidegger conceIves of mUSIC as language negatively. It IS their 
evaluation of this negativity that is - on the surface, at least - divergent. For the 
Heidegger of the 1930s, music is not so much 'discourse [Rede]' as 'idle talk [Gerede]'. 
These are concepts in Being and Time. The 'public understanding' and 'average 
intelligibility' of 'the They [das Mann]' is the 'They-self of everyday, inauthentic 
Dasein (not-its-own, Un-eigentlich). The 'They-self is the 'most everyday and most 
stubborn "Reality" of Dasein'; a Reality that is articulated in idle talk.99 Heidegger 
states that idle talk 'is not ... a "disparaging" signification'. But he cannot conceal the 
implicit evaluation, given that discourse discloses the world of Dasein itself, to itself. 
The 'They' seems to draw upon two sources. 'They' are the crowd - Being and 
Time having been composed in a time of socio-economic transformation (in some of the 
urban parts of Germany, from which the province offered only retreat). The anxiety 
about crowds in the 1920s is not unique to Heidegger (Benjamin, Simmel, Kracauer, 
Canetti), who had, for a time, been impressed by Georg Simmel's writings. There is an 
implicit recognition of the authoritarianism of the crowd: 'the dictatorship of the They'. 
But there is equally no recognition of the possibilities of the crowd (not until 1933 ?). In 
spite of its claim to neutrality, 'the They' is both a critique of authoritarianism and is an 
anti-modem reaction to a burgeoning modernity and its metropolitan culture. Heidegger 
97 Heidegger, M. 'The Origin of the Work of Art', in Off the Beaten Track, trans. Julian 
Young & Kenneth Hayes (Cambridge University Press, 2002), p.45. 
98 'No figure, no Gestalt, in truth, can arise or detach itself from an art that refuses even 
in its principles the very element of figuration, of Gestaltung: language or speech, die 
Sprache, which is in its essence secret, as the contemporary lectures on The Origin of 
the Work of Art recall, die Sage - that is to say, in its fullest sense, mythos.' Lacoue-
Labarthe, P. Musica Ficta, p.l 02. 
99 Heidegger, M. Being and Time, p.214. 
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learns from Nietzsche that Wagner is the decadent manipulator of the metropolitan 
masses. 100 Wagner, 'the actor should not seduce those who are authentic. ,101 
Heidegger's portrait of Wagner resonates with the earlier account of 
inauthenticity: 
While the particular Dasein drifts along towards an ever-increasing 
groundlessness as it floats, the uncanniness of this floating remains hidden 
from it under the protecting shelter. 102 
the. .. absorption in the "bottomless sea of harmonies," the plunge into 
frenzy and disintegration into sheer feeling as redemptive. 103 
Idle talk is connected to 'curiosity' and 'concern': 'Care becomes concern with the 
possibilities of seeing the 'world' merely as it looks while one tarries and takes a rest. .. 
curiosity is concerned with the constant possibility of distraction [Zerstreuung]'; and 
'ambiguity [Zwiedeutigkeit],. 104 As musical, Dasein cannot be authentic. 
According to Heidegger, Nietzsche finally attempts to 'twist free' of Platonic 
metaphysics by way of a historical self-understanding. In Twilight of The Idols (1888), 
Nietzsche summarises 'How the True World Finally Became a Fable: the History of an 
Error': 
The title ... says that here a history is to be recounted in the course of which 
the supersensuous, posited by Plato as true being, not only is reduced from 
the higher to the lower rank but also collapses into the unreal and nugatory. 
Nietzsche divides the history into six parts, which can be readily recognised 
as the most important epochs of Western thought, and which lead directly to 
the doorstop of Nietzsche's philosophy proper. 105 
The 'six parts' name the history of metaphysics itself (Plato, Platonism, Kant, German 
Idealism, Schopenhauer and Positivism). They are six comportments towards the 'True 
World'; evaluations of the sensuous and supersensuous (recalling Benjamin's 
'Sinneswahrnehmung'; that which 'sense takes to be true' historically). All parts 
thereby share the 'above and below' structure that Nietzsche seeks to twist free of -
100 'Let anyone walk through a city: everywhere he will hear how instruments are 
ravished in a solemn rage - interspersed with a savage hOWling. What is going on?-
The youths are worshipping Wagner'. Nietzsche, F. 'The Case of Wagner', p.185. 
101 Ibid. p.180. 
102 Heidegger, M. Being and Time, p.214. 
[03 Heidegger, M. Nietzsche, vo1.l, pp.85-6. My emphasis. 
[04 Heidegger, M. Being and Time, pp.216-217. 
[05 Heidegger, M. Nietzsche, vo1.l, p.202. 
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rather than will. In the sixth and last part, Nietzsche suggests that (his) Positivism, 
including atheism, has abolished the supersensuous only to deny the consequences of its 
nihilism: 
The true world we abolished: which world was left? the apparent one 
perhaps? ... But no! along with the true world we have also abolished the 
apparent one!106 
The abolition of the supersensuous world leads to radical uncertainty about the reality of 
sensuous appearance. Appearance becomes appearance of nothing, since it is abolished 
along with the supersensuous. 
Heidegger understands Nietzsche's attempt to overcome passive nihilism as the 
will to power of the Ubermensch: 'the overturning of Platonism and the ultimate twist 
out of it imply a metamorphosis of man. ,107 And it is here that Heidegger reintroduces 
his interpretation of the will to power as art. Art in the grand style is a metamorphosis of 
sense, Sinn. With art, the sensuous and the supersensuous, the real world and the 
apparent one, do not perpetually oppose one another, in the 'above and below' manner. 
Heidegger suggests that Nietzsche's perspectivism should be understood ontologically 
and not pantheistically (or naturalistically). Being 'is in itself perspectival-perceptual, 
and that means, in the sense now delineated, "sensuous".' 108 This allows for a new 
interpretation of the sensuous, which is not simply opposed to the supersensuous, and 
hence need not be 'abolished' along with it. Instead of appearance, or the apparent: 
'semblance [Schein],. As with Adorno, Schein evades the opposition of appearance and 
true reality by way of a temporalising of its concept. When 'Nietzsche uses the word 
semblance [Schein] it is usually ambiguous. He knows it too.' 109 Schein is merely 
appearance only 'when what becomes manifest in one perspective petrifies and is taken 
to be the sole definitive appearance'. If Being is perspectival then Being is becoming. 
Art is not one perspective among others. It presents the perspectival as such, in 
the midst of which, according to 'The Origin of the Work of Art', a new perspective or 
world becomes possible, for the first time. Hence, the artwork neither transcends world-
perspectives, as it does in Schopenhauer's aesthetics, nor does it show the real world as 
such, as it does in Wagner's mythology (according to Heidegger). Instead: 'Art induces 
reality.' Reality, truth, is the fixed. Art, the 'shining of the perspectival', must then be in 
106 Ibid. p.20? 
107 Ibid. p.208. 
108 Ibid. p.213. 
109 Ibid. p.215. 
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'discordance [Zweispalt]' with the truth. The 'unity of their belonging together is 
granted by the one reality, perspectival shining.' 110 This discordance (dissonance?) has 
not yet been understood or experienced. The twisting free of Platonism would be this 
experience: '" Ubermensch" is the man who grounds Being anew - in the rigor of 
knowledge and in the grand style of creation. ,Ill 
Heidegger thus brings out the historical dimension in Nietzsche: 
The more clearly and simply a decisive enquiry traces the history of 
Western thought back to its few essential stages, the more that history's 
power to reach forward, seize, and commit grows. This is especially the case 
where it is a matter of overcoming such history ... The greater a revolution is 
to be, the more profoundly must it plunge into its history. I 12 
Heidegger refers to 'essential stages [wesentlichen Schritte]' here. Does not Heidegger 
combine Hegel's Aesthetics with Nietzsche's six-part history of Platonism, into the 'Six 
Basic Developments in the History of Aesthetics'? Of course, 'stage' is not to be 
understood in a Hegelian sense, as the one-sided manifestation of the absolute spirit or 
Idea. 'Western thought', including that of Hegel, has perpetuated the error of Platonic 
idealism. It has not learned from its error. And yet, in a crucial sense, it was not ready to 
do so. Its lateness, its decadence, was always too early. 
The affinity to Hegel does not, however, concern the concept of stage, but rather 
height - and the associated notion of destiny. This is taken from Nietzsche also 
(compare: 'Selbst-aufhebung'): 'Midday; moment of the shortest shadow; end of the 
longest error; highpoint of humanity; INCIPIT ZARA THUSTRA.' The twisting free of 
Platonism is thus a singular event - what Heidegger will later call 'Ereignis' - rather 
than a series of 'A ufhebungen , .113 Twisting free is a twisting free of the 'above and 
below' logic of Aufhebung itself: 
At the end of Platonism stands a decision concerning the transformation of 
man. That is how the phrase 'highpoint of humanity [Hohepunkt der 
Menschheit]' is to be understood, as the peak of decision, namely, decision 
as to with the end of Platonism man as he has been hitherto is to come to an 
end whether he is to become that kind of man Nietzsche characterised as , 
the 'last man', or whether that type of man can be overcome and the 
'overman' can begin ... By the word' Ubermensch' Nietzsche does not mean 
110 Ibid. p.217. 
111 Ibid. p.220. 
112 Ibid. p.203. 
113 Heidegger, M. 'The Turning', in The Question Concerning Technology, trans. 
William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), p.45. 
some miraculous, fantastic being, but the man who surpasses [hinauskommt] 
former man. 114 
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The highpoint of humanity is, then, the last' essential stage', and is the occasion for the 
possibility of a first - according to Michel Haar, and in contrast to Hegel, 'a totally 
different, unprecedented, absolutely new commencement.' 115 
In fact, the 'penultimate' and 'last' stages run into each other in Nietzsche's 
history of an error, to the extent that Nietzsche himself turns from the brink of 
unreflective positivism, at its brink. In Heidegger's account, Nietzsche breaks with 
Wagner, as Schopenhauer - the 'penultimate' stage - in order to become Nietzsche 
'proper'. Nietzsche turns to an affirmation of life by way of a negation of its negation. 
This tum is entangled with his relationship to Wagner. Hence, as Adorno latently 
knows, the decadent is not only the last but is also the first. Wagner, at the 'highpoint' 
of metaphysical 'humanity' is, perhaps, to be 'surpassed' in this sense - particularly if it 
is the case that a certain Hegelian logic comes to inform Heidegger's otherwise 
Nietzschean 'history of metaphysics'. Auf-hebung is also a rising up, a height, which 
includes that which it cancels. But does this mark a return to the 'above and below'? 
Can Heidegger do without Hegel? 
Heidegger misses Nietzsche's ambiguous (and, anti-German) decadence, only to 
take it over implicitly and emphatically in his sensitivity towards Nietzsche's overall 
understanding of the ambiguities of metaphysics. To say that the 'highpoint of 
humanity' is to be surpassed is, it seems, to imply its 'fulfilment' - the term that 
Heidegger uses in 'European Nihilism'. Heidegger acknowledges music to the extent 
that its nihilism is to be experienced in its fulfilment. Heidegger must incorporate both 
sides of Nietzsche's 'ambiguous' nihilism in order for his interpretation, and his 
original contribution, to remain coherent. If the height of metaphysics is musical then its 
being surpassed, its twisting free, is also musical, and in a different manner to 
114 Heidegger, M. Nietzsche, vo1.l, p.208. 
115 Comparing the philosophies of history in Hegel and Heidegger, Haar concludes, 
For Heidegger it is a question of thinking history as "the dialogue of the dusk with the dawn." But then is 
not eschatology the equivalent of absolute knowledge insofar as each epoch fmally fmds its sense with 
respect to the totality of the process? Yet this point of proximity is also, paradoxically it seems, the point 
of greatest remove inasmuch as the Heideggerian totality rests on the abyss of the ungrounded, and 
inasmuch as the Greek dawn is not the only commencement possible. Besides the Greek dawn there is 
indeed a "new dawn" that offers the possibil ity of an end of history that is radically different from that of 
Hegel insofar as for Heidegger it is not a recommencement but a totally different, unprecedented, 
absolutely new commencement. 
Haar, Michel. The Song of the Earth, trans. Reginald Lilly (Indiana University Press, 
1987), p.68. 
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Nietzsche. As was said, Heidegger will subsequently conceIve of the height, the 
fulfilment of metaphysics in terms of modem technology. And 'modem technology' 
must, states Heidegger, be 'aufgehoben in the Hegelian sense'.116 'Musical' modernity 
must then similarly be included and cancelled. This means, for Heidegger as for 
Adorno, that there is a necessary moment of decadence, distraction and ambiguity in the 
twisting free. The manner of the surpassing-twisting-free is, with and against 
Heidegger, 'musical'. 
A 'musical tum' in Heidegger might even be sensed in 'The Will to Power as 
Art' (albeit in those Romantic anti-capitalist terms that Adorno attributes to Wagner): 
such arousal of frenzied feeling and unchaining of "affects" could be taken 
as a rescue of "life," especially in view of the growing impoverishment and 
deterioration of existence occasioned by industry, technology, and finance, 
in connection with the enervation and depletion of the constructive forces of 
knowledge and tradition, to say nothing of the lack of every establishment 
of goals for human existence. Rising on swells of feeling would have to 
substitute for a solidly grounded and articulated position in the midst of 
beings, the kind of thing that only great thought and poetry can create. I 17 
Music 'would have to ... substitute' for poetry. The necessity of this substitution is 
seemingly reinforced by a later letter in which Heidegger praises a performance of two 
works by Stravinsky: Persephone (text by Andre Gide) and Symphony of Psalms: 'They 
are music in the highest sense of the word: works sent from the muses.' 118 Heidegger's 
letter evidences, at the very least, a recognition that modem music is not Wagner alone, 
after Wagner (Stravinsky the anti-Wagnerian). From the art of passive nihilism to music 
in the highest sense of the word, Heidegger's re-evaluation of 'modem' music seems 
complete. What are the consequences of this for Heidegger's understanding of the 
problem of willing, and of waiting? 
As was suggested, Heidegger's contribution to the problem of the will is located 
beyond the Nietzsche lectures. 'The Will to Power as Art' is devoted to the problem of 
the will as well as the problem of art. But the latter is disproportionately developed over 
the former as the lectures proceed. The twisting free of metaphysics is not the sole 
116 Heidegger, M. 'Only a God Can Save Us', p.44. 
117 Heidegger, M. Nietzsche, vol. 1, p.88. 
118 Heidegger, M. Denkerfahrungen (Frankfurt-am-Main: Klostermann, 1983), p.113. 
Heidegger's letter is nevertheless grist to Adorno's mill. Stravinsky and Heidegger are 
the reactionary modernist antipodes, in art and philosophy, to the progressives, 
Schonberg and - Adorno. The two named works come form Stravinsky'S Neoclassical 
period. In fact, the Symphony of Psalms marks an attempted disintegration of 
Neoclassicism by way of montage construction. 
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concern of art, in any narrow sense. Twisting free is a question about willing as such _ 
including, we must presume, political willing. The historical 'twisting free' that is to 
bring about the 'changed humanity' would seem to require representing willing: the 
new polis must be, in some regard, represented so that it can be willed and constructed. 
At the same time, representing willing is part of the problem of the existing humanity 
and the existing humanism. 'Twisting free' must then overcome the oppositions of 
willing and non-willing, active and passive (nihilism), expectation and waiting in vain. 
Heidegger develops a conception of willing - as also waiting - that attempts to 
overcome these metaphysical dualisms. And it all began, to some extent, with Wagner. 
The tum away from the will to power in 'European Nihilism' paves the way for 
both the 'Letter on Humanism' (1946) and the conversation between the teacher, 
scientist and scholar (1944-5), published in the Discourse on Thinking (1959). In this 
latter text, 'Gelassenheit' becomes the name for a willing-non-willing. The reader of 
these later works could be forgiven for thinking that Heidegger lapses into a new kind 
of resigned, Schopenhauerian metaphysics - and that this explains a possible 'musical' 
tum. In the conversation, 'non-willing' means 'willingly to renounce willing' .119 This 
'non-willing' will haunt Heidegger's Gelassenheit - necessarily so (see chapter 5). But 
an obvious difference to Schopenhauer opens up when we consider that it is also a kind 
of finite willing. Heidegger's Being is not Schopenhauer's Will. Gelassenheit is not a 
reI easement from Being but is, conversely, the 'releasement toward things', as the 
'openness to the mystery' - of Being. 120 And Heidegger's Being is ec-static, not static. 
For, why is there Being and not nothing? Heidegger can claim that, since it is the 
concern of Being, Gelassenheit is not resigned pessimism. Equally against the vitalist 
Nietzsche, Gelassenheit is not representing-willing. Because this new kind of 
comportment is necessarily temporal, and because the meaning of Being is time, 
Heidegger will attempt to conceive of Gelassenheit in tenns of waiting: 
Teacher: Waiting, all right; but never awaiting, for awaiting already links 
itself with re-presenting and what is re-presented. 
Scholar: Waiting, however, lets go of that; or rather I should say that 
waiting lets re-presenting entirely alone. It really has no object. 
Scientist: Yet if we wait we always wait for something. 
Scholar: Certainly, but as soon as we re-present to ourselves and fix upon 
that for which we wait, we really wait no longer. 
Teacher: In waiting we leave open what we are waiting for. 
119 Heidegger, Martin. Discourse on Thinking, trans. John M. Anderson and E. Hans 
Freund, Harper & Row (1969) p.59 
120 Ibid. pp.54-5. 
Scholar: Why? 
Teacher: Because waiting releases itself into openness ... 
Scholar: ... into the expanse of distance ... 
Teacher: ... in whose nearness it finds the abiding in which it remains. 
Scientist: But remaining is a returning. 
Sc~olar: Openness itself would be that for which we could do nothing but 
Watt. 
Scientist: But openness itself is that-which-regions ... 
Teacher: ... into which we are released by way of waiting, when we think. 
Scientist: Then thinking would be coming-into-the-neamess of distance. 121 
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Open waiting is not an open waiting for nothing. In order to argue this, Heidegger must 
paradoxically 'spatialise' waiting, 'finitely' - as the temporalisation of 'space'. Hence: 
' ... into the expanse of distance ... ', and 'Then thinking would be coming-into-the-
nearness of distance.' Heidegger distinguishes between an expecting a-waiting, waiting 
for, and a waiting upon. That upon which the comportment of Gelassenheit waits is the 
approprating event of Being. Gelassenheit does not will the beyond because there is no 
beyond for it. The distance of regioning is not beyond. The waiting of Gelassenheit is 
not, it seems, the waiting in vain of the infinite task (where the horizon of waiting is 
always infinitely distant). Moreover, Heidegger suggests that, since it is the concern of 
Being as a whole rather than traditional (dualistic) metaphysics, Gelassenheit is a kind 
of willing that does not perpetuate the representing willing of a subject that seeks to 
dominate, to 'enframe', an object: 'world'. 
Heidegger's Gelassenheit and Adorno's expressIOn of waiting in vam each 
constitute, in difference ways, a response to the problem of the metaphysical will; a will 
that comes to characterise a particular, dystopian modernity. As a response, they each 
await another - utopian? - possiblity-necessity. Heidegger's concept is philosophically 
'more' radical in the sense that it seeks an ontological twisting free of metaphysics. The 
spectre of quietism remains, however, not only in Heidegger's language of 'meditative 
thinking', but also in the absence of an explicit utopian-political orientation. In his 
'Letter on Humanism', Heidegger complains that existing humanism does not 'realize 
the proper dignity of man'; 'does not set the humanitas of man high enough' .122 This 
height takes on a quasi-utopian meaning. But Heidegger does not propose any 
determinate way towards this highpoint (when he does, it is either ineffective or 
reactionary). We are not ready for such an orientation, not yet on the right way, such is 
our forgetfulness of Being: 'we can at most awaken the readiness of expectation'. 
Adorno's expression is more radical, and more promising politically, because he knows 
121 Ibid. p.68. 
122 Heidegger, M. 'Letter on Humanism', in Basic Writings, pp.233-4. 
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that the (broadly) historical materialist task remains, in spite of its problems, the only 
one worth waiting upon, and therefore worthy of being practiced today. Could these two 
'waitings' be combined - as a combination of the philosophically and politically radical 
moments? This has been suggested, on the basis of a musical modernism. 
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3 
The Dialectical Image of Musical Experience 
Adorno's essay 'On the Fetish-Character in Music and the Regression of Listening' 
(1938) has been categorised, in its Anglophone reception, as either sociologically-
inflected musicology or as culture-industry critique.! The essay can, however, be read as 
an eminently philosophical reflection upon the temporal experience of modernity. This 
formative text will, in this chapter, serve to introduce something approaching a (hitherto 
neglected) philosophy of time in Adorno's writings on music; one that can elucidate the 
meaning of 'waiting in vain', as 'music alone' can 'express'. Since it is largely hidden 
amongst his music aesthetics, this philosophy of time is somewhat fragmentary, in both 
productive and unproductive ways. It is here that Heidegger's more explicitly 
philosophical account of time and metaphysics can be brought into a productive 
dialogue with those reflections. 
In contrast to Heidegger, Adorno's understanding of the time of modernity is 
informed by the historical materialist tradition - in particular, Marx's account of the 
commodity form. The 'fetish-character' essay interprets 'The Fetishism of the 
Commodity and its Secret' section of Capital. For Marx, the fetish names the 'strange' 
form of the commodity. The commodity does not essentially consist in its matter. 
Neither does the commodity directly manifest the concrete labour of its producers. The 
problematic abstraction of exchange from use value is at the same time an abstraction 
from the conditions of its production. Hence, 'abstract labour'. The commodity is the 
bearer of 'congealed labour'. Marx's materialism considers the contradiction between 
the appearance of the commodity and the social conditions of its existence. The 
commodity is 'nothing but the definite social relation between men themselves which 
assumes here, for them, the phantasmagorical form of a relation between things.,2 The 
materiality of the commodity is everywhere and nowhere (in it). This ensuing 
contradiction gives rise to an experience ('for them', for us) of 'phantasmagoria'. 
! This is reflected in the fact that the essay is available to the English-speaking reader in 
two alternative collections: The Culture Industry and Essays on Music (see 
bibliography). 
2 Marx, K. Capital, trans. Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin, 1976), vol. 1, p.165. 
Translation amended. 
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'Fetish' and 'phantasmagoria' connote illusion and magic. Adorno emphasises 
that the fetish character not only names the estrangement of social labour in the 
commodity, but equally the compUlsion to enter into its promise. The commodity 
promises enchantment; release from the estrangement that it in fact reproduces. This 
desire, or fixation, recalls Freud's essay on fetishism, though Adorno is reluctant to 
acknowledge this model ('the concept of fetish character cannot be psychologically 
derived,).3 Adorno's understanding of the fetish character is seemingly informed rather 
by the identity philosophies of German Idealism. For Adorno conceives of identification 
in terms of identity and non-identity. This might be to conflate a process with a result. 
But identification is regarded here not as identity itself, but as the will to identity. The 
commodity fetish structures or manipulates the will through an illusory subject-object 
identity: 'just in this way [the fetish] becomes "property".,4 The allusions to Hegel, 
whom Adorno read extensively in the late 1930s, can be drawn out of 'The Fetish-
Character', in order to uncover its post-Hegelian, philosophical-materialist orientation. 
The 'fetish character of music produces its own camouflage through the 
identification of the listener with the fetish.,5 The fetish is identification. But this 
identification is subjected to a second, anterior identification that conceals the fetish 
character of the fetish. The commodity fetish is in this sense viciously circular. Identity 
appears, each and every time, as non-identity, and thus, enchantment. At the end of the 
essay, Adorno speaks of his hope for musical listening to 'leave the road of the always-
identical' and to align itself with Hegel's idea of 'progress in the consciousness of 
freedom,.6 Adorno's account of musical experience is nevertheless more informed by 
the Preface to the Phenomenology than it is by Hegel's lectures on history. The fetish 
aims at the identity of consciousness and its object. But the contradiction that this 
identity must yield to difference, what the identity is not, is pre-empted in commodity 
music. For Hegel, 
3 Adorno states, not entirely accurately, that 'Marx defines the fetish-character of the 
commodity as the veneration of the thing made by oneself which, as exchange-value, 
simultaneously alienates itself from producer to consumer.' Adorno, T. W. 'On the 
Fetish Character in Music and the Regression of Listening', in Essays on Music, 
pp.295-296. The 'veneration' that Adorno attributes to Marx seems to come closer to 
Freud's contention that the fetishist 'reveres his fetish'. Freud, S.'Fetishism' (1927) in 
The Future of an Illusion, Civilization and its Discontents and Other Works, trans. 
James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1964), p.157. 
4 Adorno, T. W. 'On the Fetish Character in Music', p.298. 
5 Ibid. p.305. 
6 Ibid. p.3l4. 
Inasmuch as the new true object issues from it, this dialectical movement 
which consciousness exercises on itself and which affects both its 
knowledge and its object, is precisely what is called experience 
[Eifahrung].7 
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The subsequent importance of this passage to Adorno is clear from 'The Experiential 
Content of Hegel's Philosophy' (1958).8 What Adorno takes from Hegel's concept of 
experience is its dialectical becoming, as pitted against stasis. But he refutes its 
purported synthesis. 
One of the parallels between Heidegger and Adorno concerns their critique of 
Lebensphilosophie. Behind this affinity lies an opposition between stasis and becoming; 
and a concern with the problem of time. The primary theme of the philosophies of life, 
the Erlebnis, is neither inter-subjectively nor historically constituted, according to 
Adorno. The'!, of the Erlebnis is the unhappy consciousness. This is suggested in 
Adorno's distinction between Erlebnis and Eifahrung. Simmel had taken the artist to be 
exemplary of the 'adventure,.9 Adorno is outwardly dismissive of both Simmel and of 
Benjamin's appropriation of him. \0 Benjamin had sought to transform the Erlebnis into 
a messianic-political 'Chockerlebnis' - in the name of Eifahrung. 11 The Chockerlebnis 
breaks the law of traditional experience. But the law, as Eifahrung, is in a state of 
exception. It has 'fallen in value' .12 The Chockerlebnis takes exception to the exception. 
This account of experience, from 'The Storyteller', can be compared to Benjamin's later 
thesis on historical exceptionality: 'the tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the 
state of emergency in which we live is not the exception but the rule. ,13 Discussing 'The 
Storyteller', Agamben uses the term 'expropriated experience', emphasising that 
7 Hegel, G. W. F. Phenomenology of Spirit, p.55. 
8 Adorno denies, against Heidegger, that Eifahrung is 'ontological' in Hegel. 
Nevertheless, Adorno 'will be dealing here with some models of intellectual experience 
as it motivates Hegel's philosophy ... and makes up its truth content.' Hegel: Three 
Studies, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 
1999), p.53. Cf. p.56. 
9 Simmel, Georg. 'The Adventurer', in On Individuality and Social Forms, ed. Donald 
Levine (The 
University of Chicago Press, 1971), p.189. 
10 Adorno, T. W. to Walter Benjamin, November 10th, 1938, in Aesthetics and Politics: 
The Key Texts of the Classic Debate Within German Marxism (London: Verso, 1977), 
p.129. 
II Benjamin, W. 'On Some Motifs in Baudelaire' in Illuminations, p.190. 
12 Benjamin, W. 'The Storyteller', p.83. 
13 Benjamin, W. 'Theses on the Philosophy of History', in Illuminations, p.248. 
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Erfahrung is itself appropriation. 14 This terminology also warns against nostalgia: 
Erfahrung is expropriated. The Chockerlebnis is the mimetic appropriation of 
expropriated Erfahrung; the appropriation of that which has paradoxically not yet been. 
In the 'Fetish Character' essay, a contrast is drawn between stasis and becoming 
through the pairing of forgetting and memory: 
Just as every advertisement is composed of the inconspicuous familiar and 
the unfamiliar conspicuous, so the song remains salutarily forgotten in the 
half-dusk of its familiarity, suddenly to become painfully over-clear through 
recollection, as if in the beam of a spotlight.1s 
The reciprocal can be contrasted with the dialectical here. Forgetting and sudden recall 
substitute for the 'cancelling' and 'preserving' sublation that is, for Hegel, 
'remembrance [Erinnerung]'.16 For Benjamin too, 'remembrance [Gediichtnis], is 
produced in the conveying of historical experience. History is (its) memory, written 
down by storytellers. 17 Benjamin's concept of Erfahrung differs, and even opposes, that 
of Hegel the 'progressive': 'Overcoming the concept of "progress" and overcoming the 
concept of "period of decline" are two sides of one and the same thing.' 18 This is of 
course complicated by Benjamin's Goethean reflections on experience. A concept of 
becoming is at stake in both bodies of thought - a series of becomings in Hegel and a 
singUlar, revolutionary becoming in Benjamin (though perhaps in Hegel too there is a 
becoming of all becomings). Adorno takes up both of these ideas, as determinate 
critiques of the stasis that is called reification. 
Reification is a function of the commodity form, in turn part of a broader 
history. Exchange value appears as use value, as if new. But because of its 
determination in the exchange process, this is not new at the level of history. It has not 
14 Agamben, G. Infancy and History: Essays on the Destruction of Experience, trans. 
Liz Heron (London: Verso, 1993), p.13. 
15 Adorno, T. W. 'On the Fetish Character', p.305. 
16 'Sublation [Aujhebung] exhibits its true twofold meaning which we have seen in the 
negative: it is at once a cancelling and a preserving.' Whereas sublation characterises 
each moment or stage of the phenomenology of spirit, Erinnerung only appears at its 
end (as 'Absolute Knowing'). 'In the immediacy of this new existence the spirit has to 
start afresh to bring itself to maturity as if, for it, all that preceded were lost and it had 
heard nothing from the experience of the earlier Spirits. But recollection [Erinnerung], 
the inwardizing, of that experience, has preserved it and is the inner being, and in fact 
the higher form of the substance'. Hegel, G. W. F. Phenomenology of Spirit, p.68. 
Translation amended. 
17 Benjamin, W. 'The Storyteller', p.97. 
18 Benjamin, W. The Arcades Project, trans. Howard Eiland & Kevin McLaughlin 
(Harvard University Press, 1999), p.460. 
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become new. The relations of production reproduced in the commodity remain the same 
old ones. Adorno takes the commodity of music to be strangely privileged in this 
process: 
If the commodity in general combines exchange-value and use-value, then 
pure use-value, whose illusion the cultural goods must preserve in 
completely capitalist society, must be replaced by pure exchange-value, 
which precisely in its capacity as exchange-value deceptively takes over the 
function of use-value. The specific fetish character of music lies in [this] 
quid pro quo. 
Commodity music exemplifies the substitution of exchange value for use value - Marx's 
'quid pro quo' denoting an exact substitution; a 'transubstantiation' (Cacciari).19 
How does Adorno make this claim for, or rather against, commodity music? The 
'feelings [die Affekte] which go to the exchange value create the appearance of 
immediacy at the same time as the absence of a relation to the object. ,20 The affectivity 
of music is at the same time the production of its novelty. Novelty is immediate. Or, 
what amounts to the same thing, immediacy is novel. The feeling is prior to mediation. 
Adorno seems to propose a dualistic account of experience here, in his suggestion that 
feeling is not understood and the understanding is not felt. Yet Adorno's point is surely 
that the commodity form imposes this dualism upon experience, from within it. 
Commodity music is contrasted with what Adorno will call 'serious music'; 
elsewhere, 'modern music'. But here is the peculiarity of Adorno's construction: 
the diverse spheres of music must be thought of together ... The unity of the 
two spheres of music is that of an unresolved contradiction.21 
This statement stands-out, amidst Adorno's continued preoccupation with the value of 
modern music - the 'pure' art. 22 How can music be pure commodity and pure art at 
once? The paradoxical autonomy of the artwork leads to an exaggerated formula in 
Aesthetic Theory: 'The absolute artwork converges with the absolute commodity. ,23 But 
19 Cacciari, Massimo. Architecture and Nihilism, trans. Stephen Sartarelli (Yale 
University Press, 1993), p.6. 
20 Adorno, T. W. 'On the Fetish Character of Music', p.296. 
21 Ibid. pp.392-3. 
22 'Perhaps the strict and pure concept of art is applicable only to music, while great 
poetry or great painting - precisely the greatest - necessarily brings with it an element 
of subject-matter transcending aesthtic confines, undissolved in the autonomy of form'. 
Adorno, T. W. Minima Moralia, p.223. . 
23 Adorno, T. W. Aesthetic Theory, p.21. 
104 
Adorno's thinking of these absolutes in music hints at a particular account of modernity 
from the standpoint of the problem of time. 
Adorno notes that the notion of music as the art of feeling appears in philosophy 
as early as Plato's Repuh/ic.24 But, as in the case of Heidegger's initial assessment of 
music, there is something unsatisfactory about Adorno's equating of music with 
affectivity. Music's affectivity should rather be understood according to its imagistic 
and spatial characteristics, both intrinsically and extrinsically. And it is through these 
associations that Adorno's philosophy of time can be articulated. The privileging of 
music as affective corresponds to a temporal privileging. Specifically, both 'spheres' of 
music involve the image in ways that bring Adorno's concept of experience into a new 
relationship with both Benjamin and Heidegger. 
The Image and the Imageless 
Adorno's most explicit consideration of the relationship between music and the image 
appears to have been prompted by a work of music: Schoenberg's Moses and Aron, 
which was premiered at the 1951 Fereienkurse for Neue Musik, Darmstadt. Moses 
addresses, in word and music, the meaning of the image in the biblical story: 
The Jewish prohibition on making images which forms the centre of the text 
also defines the approach of the music. Another chorus from Opus 27 
begins, 'Thou shalt make no graven image'. Music is the image less art and 
was excluded from that prohibition. That is no doubt the key to the 
relationship between Judaism and music. But at the historical stage of 
musica jicta, stile rappresentativo and of expressive music which makes 
sensuous something other than itself, music had become interwoven with 
the pictorial arts throughout Europe ... Music learned to imitate.25 
The stile rappresentativo emerged out of debates within the Florentine Camerata over 
how the ancient tragic chorus could be imitated in the 'new music' - the problem being 
that no ancient models (scores) existed in any parallel manner to the visual and literary 
artS.26 Modem music is accordingly: musica jicta.27 A response to the quandary of 
24 Adorno, T. W. 'On the Fetish Character', p.289; Cf. Plato, Republic, p.116. 
25 Adorno, T. W. 'Sacred Fragment: Schoenberg's Moses und Aron' in Quasi una 
Fantasia, trans. Rodney Livingstone (London: Verso, 1992), p.230. 
26 For a flavour of these debates see: Palisca, Claude V. 'The Artusi-Monteverdi 
Controversy', in eds. Denis Arnold & Nigel Fortune, The Monteverdi Companion 
(London: Norton, 1972). 
27 Cf. Lacoue-Labarthe, P. Musica Ficta, xvi-xvii. 
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imitation emerged in the guise of Monteverdi's seconda prattica, a new musical 
language of monody and dissonance that sought to re-present feeling in music. Tragic 
pathos was reconfigured as baroque affectivity. 
Adorno aligns the attempt of music to represent with the word and not the 
image. Much of the compositional theory (the seconda prattica and Caccini's nuove 
musiche) was indeed motivated by an interest in lyrical articulation, a mimesis of 
antique declamation. The proliferation of songs during this period is symptomatic of 
this.28 The stile rappresentativo is nevertheless a representation of dramatic situations, 
and is thus the concern of word and image. It is remembered not so much for its 
madrigals as for inauguration of opera - with Monteverdi's Orfeo (1607). Adorno 
recognises this attempt to 'imitate'. But music is not fully 'interwoven' into the 
'pictorial arts'. Music, 'itself, 'is' (not was) the 'imageless art'. 
What, then, is the relationship between Adorno's evaluation of modem music 
and his thinking of it as fundamentally imageless? In what way does he thereby valorise 
the imageless? Adorno takes the ideal of the image, as represented in the dominant 
Platonic-idealist tradition, to signify synthesis. The ideal image is, or would be, the 
radical expropriation of Erfahrung, characterised in terms of becoming. Synthesis and 
identity are ends exclusive of becoming (whether or not this applies to Aristotelian 
metaphysics will be addressed in chapter 5). The temporal meaning of the ideal image, 
the image as ideal, is stasis. The prototypical ideas are eternal. In the Nietzsche lectures, 
Heidegger recalls the affinity of idea and eidos. Platonic metaphysics concretises this 
affinity in a variety of manifestations. Heidegger translates the Greek of Plato (whom he 
distinguishes from Platonism) in his own way: 'The ideai ... are what is apprehended 
when we look at things to see how they look, to see what they give themselves out to 
be, to see their what-being (to ti estin).' Given that the idea is supersensuous, things 
must be seen, 
not with the sensory eye of the body, but with the eye of the souL .. Sight ... 
must measure itself against the supersensuous, the Idea; it must somehow 
bring forward what is not sensuously visible for a face-to-face encounter: it 
29 
must put forward or represent. 
Heidegger will later go on to claim that 'world' itself comes to be viewed as an image: 
'Understood in an essential way, "world picture" does not mean "picture of the world" 
28 Fortune, N. 'Monteverdi and the secconda prattica', in The Monteverdi Companion, 
p.183. There is of course a relationship to the image here - the rise of monody 
~aral1eling linear figuration in baroque painting. 
9 Heidegger, M. Nietzsche, vol. 1 , p.15l. 
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but rather "the world grasped as picture". ,30 The determination of 'world' as 'totality of 
beings' collapses the ontological difference, of Being and beings. There is nothing to 
'be before' where the totality has already and in advance been determined to its end.31 
In one of his two essays on music and painting, Adorno writes, 'in an image 
everything is simultaneous.' Adorno's claim invites the question as to whether and how 
a real image can be simultaneous. Simultaneity means 'at the same time' ['Gleich-
zeitig'] and is therefore not temporal. Simultaneity is the impossibility of experience if 
experience is fundamentally temporal (as temporalising): 
In the context of his chapter on schematism, Kant observes that even the 
pure act of thinking involves traversing the temporal series as a necessary 
condition of its possibility, and not only of its empirical realisation. The 
more emphatically a painting presents itself, the more time is stored up in it. 
Adorno's initial claim resists this attempted readjustment. Simultaneity is emphatically 
simultaneous. But Adorno is surely making a similar move to the one made in the 
'Fetish Character'. As with identity, as identity, the ideal of the image, its simultaneous 
synthesis, cannot be dismissed as a mere impossibility. Rather, it has a 'regulative' 
significance, in the sense of Nietzsche's critique of idealism. Its totality ('everything is 
simultaneous') is its real possibility, as something that is willed. Following this line of 
thought (where aesthetics is concerned) art that is worthy of its name determinately 
negates its image-character. 'Those pictures seem the most successful in which what is 
absolutely simultaneous seems like a passage of time that is holding its breath. ,32 
Hence, 'The Old Testament prohibition on images has an aesthetic as well as a 
30 Heidegger, M. 'The Age of the World Picture' in Off the Beaten Track, p.67. 
31 The deconstruction of presence is anticipated in the Kantbuch. Heidegger states that 
the concept of the understanding is the 'regulative unity' (not regulating unity) of a 
'range of possibilities'. Heidegger does not want to do away with logic - he wants to 
loosen the grip, Griff, of the concept, Begriff. The dualism of intuition and 
understanding arises from a need to determine the concept as non-finite - as Kant puts 
it, 'never [to] be encountered in an intuition' (intuition being finite for Kant). The form-
content problem is the finitude problem; in Kant's terms, antinomy. But the schema 
refers both to the regulative unity and to the horizon of possibility; the 'intuiting look'. 
Hence, 'beyond the representation of [the] regulative unity of the rule, the concept is 
nothing. What logic refers to as a concept is grounded in the schema.' Heidegger cites 
Kant. The concept' always refers immediately to the schema.' The subsumed object, by 
way of the schema-image, would equally be nothing. Kant, 1. Critique of Pure Reason. 
A137, B176, p.27l. Heidegger, M. Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 5th edition, 
trans. Robert Taft (Indiana University Press, 1997), p.69. My emphasis of Heidegger. 
Heidegger's emphasis of Kant. 
32 Adorno, T. W. 'On Some Relationships Between Music and Painting', trans. Susan 
H. Gillespie, in The Musical Quarterly 79, Spring (Oxford University Press, 1995), 
p.69. Translation amended. 
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theological dimension. ,33 In Negative Dialectics, Adorno's critique of the image is more 
explicit: 
The materialistic longing, to comprehend the thing, wishes the opposite; the 
full object could only be thought devoid of images. Such imagelessness 
[Bilderlosigkeit] converges with the theological ban on the graven image. 
Materialism secularized it, by not permitting utopia to be positively 
pictured; that is the content of its negativity.34 
The depiction, representation, of utopia brings an end to the task of depicting utopia, as 
its objective presentation, 'the full object'. The abyssal absence (not non-presence) of 
depictions guarantees this utopian task of presentation.35 Adorno's image critique here 
follows Marx's attack upon utopianism. It is equally motivated by his debates with 
Benjamin. 
The image is a central concern of Benjamin's writings, from the allegorical 
images of the Trauerspiel to the dialectical images of The Arcades Project. Benjamin 
often conceives of the singular temporality of capitalist modernity by way of the 
temporality of the image, which in tum attains its meaning by way of its modernity. 
Judging from the 1947 study Composing for the Films, Adorno follows Benjamin's 
diagnosis but not his 'remedy': the dialectical image. In the 'bourgeois rational and, 
ultimately, highly industrialised order', Adorno writes, 'the eye... has become 
accustomed to conceiving reality as made up of separate things, commodities, objects 
that can be modified by practical activity.' By contrast, 
listening, as compared to seeing is "archaic"; it has not kept pace with 
technological progress. One might say that to react with the ear, which is 
fundamentally a passive organ in contrast to the swift, actively selective eye, 
is in a sense not in keeping with the present advanced industrial age and its 
cultural anthropology. 3 
Ironically, these remarks have a precedent in the citation of Simmel in Benjamin's essay 
on Baudelaire.37 What does it mean to pit the ear against the eye in this manner - to 
33 Adorno, T. W. Aesthetic Theory, p.67. 
34 Adorno, T. W. Negative Dialectics, pp.204-207. 
35 Cf. Adorno, T. W. 'The Experiential Content of Hegel's Philosophy', in Hegel: Three 
Studies. 
36 Adorno, T. W & Eisler, Hans. Composingfor the Films, (London: Continuum, 1994), 
fP.20-21. The chapter from which this citation is taken was written by Adorno. 
7 'The person who is able to see but unable to hear is much more ... troubled than the 
person who is able to hear but unable to see. Here is something ... characteristic of the 
big city. The interpersonal relationships of people in big cities are characterised by a 
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propose a non-synchrony of the senses? Do not the senses co-exist in the same body at 
the same time? 
Prefiguring Guy Debord's The Society of the Spectacle, Adorno suggests here 
that the commodity privileges the image. The concepts of simultaneity and stasis are 
once again invoked. A 'reality as made up of separate things' is a reality of things side-
by-side one-another in (idealised) space. How does the image 'privilege' this 
simultaneity? This is not fully explained in the work on film music. A response can 
nevertheless be proposed on the basis of the distinction between the new and novelty. 
Commodification, the re-production of novelty, is a pre-eminently temporal 
phenomenon; the concern of the temporal. Novelty is not merely the old. Novelty is a 
repetition of the same; the pursuit, perhaps, of what Simmel terms an 'intensification of 
nervous life. ,38 The absolute commodity, adjusting Adorno's maxim on art, converges 
with the absolute image, in simultaneity. For Debord, 
Consumable pseudo-cyclical time is the time of the spectacle: in the narrow 
sense, as the time appropriate to the consumption of images, and, in the 
broadest sense, as the image of the consumption oftime.39 
Comparable reflections can be found in Minima Moralia. The power of the ideal image 
is the powerlessness of conceptual abstraction. In the 'real abstraction' of 'people to 
each other and to things', abstraction becomes a product, not a production (abstract, not 
abstraction). Following Kant, the image is the already schematised, already subsumed 
concept. The real image excludes the quasi-intellectual schema-image. Adorno 
conceives of a new, mythic iconography: 'advertisements, newspaper stereotypes [and] 
toys' .40 An apocalyptic parallel is possible on the basis of Benjamin's characterisation 
of capitalist modernity as 'the time of Hell', the anti-Eden of already named things.41 
Adorno concludes that the imagistic is paradigmatic of the consciousness of modernity, 
or at least the dialectic of enlightenment, including its philosophy: 
markedly greater emphasis on the use of the eyes than on that of the ears.' Quoted in, 
Benjamin, W. 'On Some Motifs in Baudelaire' in Illuminations, p.187. 
38 Simmel, G. 'The Metropolis and Mental Life', in On Individuality and Social Forms, 
~.325. Translation amended. 
9 Debord, Guy. The Society of the Spectacle. trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (New 
York: Zone Books, 1995), p.112. 
40 Adorno, T. W. Minima Moralia, p.140. 
41 Benjamin, W. The Arcades Project, p.843. 
The objective tendency of the Enlightenment, to wipe out the power of 
images over man, is not matched by any subjective progress on the part of 
enlightened thinking towards freedom from images. While the assault on 
images irresistibly demolishes, after metaphysical Ideas, those concepts 
once understood as rational and genuinely attained by thought, the thinking 
unleashed by the Enlightenment and immunised against thinking is now 
becoming a second figurativeness [Bildlichkeit], though without images or 
spontaneity.42 
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Kant is seemingly unmasked here as another mythologist, thus contradicting the 
enlightenment that he 'inaugurated' .43 A critique of the eidos in Kant must proceed via 
Kant. 
Rhythm, Schematism and Temporalisation 
The schematism chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason addresses the fundamental 
problem of how the contents of intuition, appearances (or 'representations'), are 
mediated with the formal concepts of the understanding (through the 'pure concepts', 
the categories). An account of how objects are logically subsumed under concepts, in 
judgement, is required in order to substantiate the transcendental deduction of 
apperception. This is because the synthetic unity of apperception (the subject) requires 
the synthetic unity of representations (the object). The schematism chapter attempts to 
elaborate the workings of the 'productive imagination', which occupies the middle 
synthesis in the threefold synthesis of the first edition.44 
Kant initially proceeds according to the Platonic paradigm of the image: 'For the 
imagination [Einbildungskraft] is to bring the manifold of intuition into an image 
[BildJ. ,45 This is consistent with the 'eidetic' paradigm of the Critique as a whole 
(Erscheinung, Anschauung, etc.). Kant's original move - his twofold critique of 
Empiricism and Rationalism - is to ask how the image is produced, and not simply 
42 Adorno, T. W. Minima Moralia, p.140. 
43 Adorno acknowledges the Platonism of Kant's Critique in his 1959 lectures, focusing 
upon the ideas rather than the image. See Adorno, T. W. Kant's Critique of Pure 
Reason, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), p.24. 
44 'The first thing that must be given to us a priori for the cognition of all objects is the 
manifold of pure intuition; the synthesis of this manifold by means of the imagination is 
the second thing, but it still does not yet yield cognition. The concepts that give this 
pure synthesis unity, and that consist solely in the representation of this necessary 
synthetic unity, are the third thing necessary for cognition of an object that comes 
before us, and they depend on the understanding.' Kant, I. Critique of Pure Reason. 
A 78-79/B 1 04, p.21I. 
45 Ibid. A 120, p. 239. 
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received, or intuited. There must be a 'third thing' that mediates intuition and 
conceptual image: 
This mediating representation must be pure (without anything empirical) 
and yet intellectual on the one hand and sensible on the other. Such a 
representation is the transcendental schema.46 
Adorno's 1959 lecture on the chapter reproduces Kant's conclusions in an 
unproblematic manner: 'time is the factor that is both common to thought and intuition.' 
Adorno repeats the problems associated with Kant's mediation. Time, along with space, 
is a 'pure form' of intuition, 'in which nothing is to be encountered that belongs to 
sensation. ,47 But how can 'pure' time mediate? Neither does Adorno discuss the image. 
The chapter is read as an example of confronting contradictions.48 But as Heidegger saw 
matters, in his Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1929), it is precisely the meaning 
of time, as the 'meaning of Being', that is at stake in this chapter, 'the central core of 
the whole voluminous' Critique.49 
For Kant, the schema presents the definiteness of an image for a concept. It is 
image-like. At the same time, 'the schema is clearly distinguishable from the image'. 
The schema is a product of the schematism. Schematism is nothing without the schema. 
Equally, the schema is nothing without the image. A problem with Kant's mediation 
concerns the hierarchical dependency upon the image, which the schema was intended 
to avoid. Whence comes the image? Kant reveals the gravity of this problem in his 
textual contortions: 
This schematism of our understanding with regard to appearances and their 
mere form is a hidden art in the depths of the human soul, whose true 
operations we can divine from nature and lay unveiled before our eyes only 
with difficulty. We can say only this much: the image is a product of the 
empirical faculty of imagination, the schema of sensible concepts (such as 
figures in space) is a product and as it were a monogram of pure a priori 
imagination, through which and in accordance with which the images first 
become possible, but which must be connected with the concept, to which 
they are in themselves never fully congruent, always only by means of the 
schema that they designate. 50 
46 Ibid. AI38/B177, p.272. 
47 Ibid. A20IB34, p.156. 
48 Adorno, T. W. Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, pp.133-4. Adorno promised a more 
detailed lecture on the schematism chapter, which was never given. 
49 Heidegger, M. Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, p.63. 
50 Kant, I. Critique of Pure Reason, A141-2/B180-1, pp.273-4. 
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Heidegger cites this passage in the introduction to Being and Time. Kant is 'the fIrst and 
only person who has gone any stretch of the way towards investigating the dimension of 
Temporality' .51 
The interest of the early Romantics in an idea of music can be understood as a 
response to problems identifIed by Kant, including those concerning the schematism. 
Following the Romantics, Andrew Bowie considers the schematism to be musical. He 
has two characteristics in mind. (l) Its ambiguous meaning-production. The schema is 
neither chaotic nor fInally subsumed; an image. This is the discursive nature of 
schematism - hence, for Schelling, 'the whole mechanism of language will rest upon' 
it.52 (2) The synthetic role of time in schematism, as in music. Schematism is 'musical 
rhythm' .53 Adorno similarly defInes schematism as 'traversing the temporal series.' But 
these defInitions touch upon the fraught meaning of time in Kant's chapter. It is no 
more evident, as Heidegger observes, than in Kant's remark that 'the pure image of all 
magnitudes (quantorum) for outer sense is space; for all objects of the senses in general, 
it is time. ,54 Time itself is a 'pure image'. This can be understood in radically different 
ways. 
Kant defInes the schemata as 'nothing but a priori time-determinations in 
accordance with rules'. 55 Time is immanent to the schema because time is both the 
'formal condition of the manifold of inner sense' and is 'contained in every empirical 
representation of the manifold. ,56 But this immanence could signify either 
'determination in time' or 'determination of time'. This fundamental ambiguity is 
reflected in Kant's elucidation of the role of time with respect to four of the categories, 
the last of which ('magnitude') concerns 'the sum total of time in regard to all possible 
objects.'57 The 'pure image' of time is, it seems, the subsumption of 'all possible 
objects', under one overarching Concept - as one Object and one Subject. But this 
positive, absolute synthesis is antithetical to Kant's negative-critical project as a whole, 
even if such a Concept were to be understood as regulative (and yet: Kant's 'ideal' of 
51 Heidegger, M. Being and Time. pA5. 
52 Schelling, F. W. J. System of Transcendental Idealism, trans. Peter Heath (University 
Press of Virginia, 1993), p137. 
53 Bowie, A. Aesthetics and Subjectivity, p.38. Bowie develops the parallel between 
music and schematism in his essay, 'Adorno, Heidegger, and the Meaning of Music', in, 
ed. Tom Huhn, The Cambridge Companion to Adorno (Cambridge University Press, 
2004), pp.262-263. 
54 Kant, I. Critique of Pure Reason, A l421B 182, p.274. 
55 Ibid. A 1351B 184, p.276. 
56 Ibid. A 138-91B 177-8, p.272. 
57 Ibid. A 145/B 184-185, p.276. 
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reason). Reason seeks a totality of conditions in vain because the task of discovering the 
totality adds another condition to the totality. The unconditioned cannot be made 
apparent: 'this unconditioned is always contained in the absolute totality of the series if 
one represents it in imagination. Yet this absolute complete synthesis is once again only 
an idea.,58 If Kant's 'pure image' of time is an image of the unconditioned, then it must 
be an inconceivable image - apropos, perhaps, of Moses and Aron: 
Only one, infinite, thou omnipresent one, 
unperceived and inconceivable God!59 
Holderlin, aware of Kant's example of the Jewish prohibition, in the 'Analytic of the 
Sublime', names Kant as 'the Moses of our nation' (a Protestant identification of Jewish 
identity, of course).60 
When Kant refers to 'all possible objects', he means objectivity in general; the 
transcendental conditions for the possibility of objects as such, not an actual or 
empirical totality. But how can there be one image (time) of objects in general? In what 
sense can the transcendental structure be an image of itself? A possible interpretation of 
the 'pure image' arises from Kant's definition of time in the Transcendental Aesthetic: 
time cannot be a detennination of outer appearances; it belongs neither to a 
shape or a position, etc., but on the contrary detennines the relation of 
representations in our inner state. And just because this inner intuition yields 
no shape we attempt to remedy this lack through analogies, and represent 
the temporal sequence through a line progressing to infinity, in which the 
manifold constitutes a series that is of only one dimension, and infer from 
the properties of this line to all the properties of time, with the sole 
difference that the parts of the fonner are simultaneous but those of the 
I I . . I 61 atter a ways eXIst succeSSIve y. 
Could the 'line' constitute a pure image of time, the fonn of all possible fonns on which 
(its) detenninations are, in a sense, 'punctuated'? 
Kant's line, the series of conditions, follows III a traditional, Aristotelian 
understanding of linear time. Or rather, Kant renders metaphysical Aristotle's physics, 
58 Ibid. A416/B444, p.464. 
59 'Einziger, ewiger, allgegenwiirtiger unsichbarer und unvorstellbarer Gott!' The first 
line of Moses and Aron, delivered by Moses. 
60 Cited in: Lacoue-Labarthe, P, Musica Ficta, p.137. 'Perhaps there is no more sublime 
passage in the Jewish Law than the commandment: Thou shalt not make unto thee a 
graven image, or any likeness of any thing that is in heaven or on earth, or under the 
earth, etc.' Kant, 1. Critique of Judgement, p.12 7. 
61 Kant, I. Critique of Pure Reason, A33/B49-50, p.163. 
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just as he renders Aristotle's categories transcendental. This tradition is already seen in 
Leibniz's 'order of successions'. Kant's time series, the 'repeated addition of units to 
each other' , faces the same criticisms made of the Rationalist paradigm of 
conditionality. Kant acknowledges, in his Thesis to the First Antinomy, that the infinite 
time line leads into its opposite: simultaneity. All points of the infinite line are equally 
infinitely distant from the beginning as from the end.62 This is destructive for Kant, if it 
is true that the Antinomy ultimately sides with infmity. 
For Heidegger, the understanding of time as a series of points on a line, of intra-
temporal points in time, is ultimately the determination of time as space, not time at all. 
It is the 'ordinary [vulgar] conception of time'. Kant's 'pure image' of time is 
nevertheless fundamental to Heidegger's alternative reading of the schematism chapter. 
Heidegger focuses upon the role of the schema in the above-mentioned category of 
magnitude, to which Kant attributes 'the generation of time itself. ,63 Kant's 'pure 
image' is, against Kant's intentions, not formal-transcendental. Having interpreted 
intuition [Anschauung] as the 'pure look [Anblick], of the 'horizon' - the anticipatory 
horizon of possibility - Heidegger now states that intuition refers to the 'schema-image' 
with respect to the 'pure image' of time.64 The varied but interrelated terminology of 
'image' in the Critique acknowledges a unifying ground (the ground that unifies but is 
not united) of the 'sources of knowledge': intuition and understanding.65 Heidegger's 
'pure image' is finitely disclosing, the 'look' and not the Platonic eidos. As the horizon 
of possibility of the productive imagination, time is finite in a disclosing manner. Its 
limitation (the horizon is 'finite') is not to be understood pejoratively. In the terms of 
Being and Time, which the Kantbuch was intended to 'clarify', the schematism of the 
productive imagination is the 'temporalising' of possibility (see chapter 5).66 
The subsequent Heidegger of 'the turning' will locate this originary 
temporalising, in new philosophical language, in the work of art (but not music). The 
origin of the work of art means that the work of art is originary. 'To be a work means: 
to set up a world'. 67 The 'resoluteness' of Being and Time, the 'authentic' possibility of 
62 Ibid. A428IB456, p.470. 
63 Ibid. A145IB184, p.275. 
64 Heidegger, M. Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. p.63; p.73. 
65 The 'image' [Bild] of 'imagination' [Einbildungskraft] is taken in three senses: as the 
'look' [Anblick], the specific image of a being 'at hand', and as a 'likeness' (a 
'photograph' or a 'death mask'). The 'pure look' defines intuition [Anschauung]. It is 
'the horizon of the letting-stand against [Gegenstehenlassen].' Ibid. pp.63-64. 
66 Preface to the Fourth Edition, ibid. xvii. 
67 Heidegger, M. 'The Origin of the Work of Art', p.22. 
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the temporalisation of possibility, is exemplified in the work of art - which, as 
enigmatic, is best placed to bring the 'enigma of Being' into nearness. The work of art 
gives historical, 'thingly' substance to Heidegger's solipsistic existentialism. At the 
same time, this valorisation of the work of art leaves Heidegger open to the charge of 
blocking concrete possibilities outside of art. Or, the concrete possibility that Heidegger 
takes art to temporalise is already temporalised ideologically (nationalism). 
It is widely claimed, across a variety of philosophical aesthetics, that the time of 
the artwork is an unfamiliar time - where familiar time is variously named, and 
confused, as vulgar temporality, chronometric time, temps espace, and so on. The 
autonomous artwork is, either in actuality or as semblance, supposed to signal 
authentically lived time, temps duree, etc. The peculiarity of modem music, as art, is 
that it seems irredeemably chronometric, and to that extent always 'inauthentic' 
(Heidegger's initial evaluation of this medium). Every artwork endures in time, 
intratemporally. Perhaps, then, we may speak of a musical tendency of modem art that 
is most obvious in modem music. 
Schelling's philosophy of music resonates with the schematism chapter of his 
System of Transcendental Idealism (1801).68 As with Hegel, spirit, of which art is a 
unique manifestation, is the finite determining of the infinite: 
The necessary form of music is succession, for time is the universal form of 
the informing of the infinite into the finite and to that extent is intuited as 
form, abstracted from the real. 69 
Schelling was familiar with August Schlegel's lectures, Schone Literatur und Kunst and 
Vorlesungen fiber Philosophische Kunstlehre (1798). Schlegel defines music as 
'rhythm, modulation and harmony' .70 The historical lag of actual music (in Vienna) 
behind its idea (in Jena) is evident from Schelling's Schlegelian consideration of 
rhythm. Musical rhythm is said to incorporate two 'levels'. The first is measure: 'An 
image of this might be equally large, equally separated points'. The second is 'tact' (a 
category that had gained currency with Beethoven), which Schelling defines (whether 
against or unaware of Beethoven) as the alternation between strong and weak beats. 71 
68 Schelling, F. W. J. System of Transcendental Idealism, pp.134-139. 
69 Schelling, F. W. 1. The Philosophy of Art, p.l09. 
70 Schlegel, A. W. Vorlesungen fiber Philosophische Kunstlehre (Leipzig: Theodor 
Weicher, 1911), pp. 224-227. Cf translator's introduction to Schelling, F. W. 1. The 
Philosophy of Art, xxvii; Frank, Manfred. Das Problem 'Zeit' in der Deutchen 
Romantik (Munich: Winker Verlag, 1972), p.382. 
71 Schelling, F. W. 1. The Philosophy of Art, pp.llO-lll. 
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But with Beethoven, the two levels cannot be conflated. Indeed, the emancipation of 
rhythm from measure comes to define modem, autonomous music. Neoplatonic 
rhythmos migrates from the number to the name, but it retains the memory of its 
number, which it cannot forget so long as it is music. The revolution in rhythm is not to 
be found in the classicism of Haydn (Schelling's sole example) but in Beethoven, 
already into his middle-period by 1800. Rhythm is no longer the elaboration upon 
Baroque and Classical dance forms (the minuet, for instance). Adorno notes the 
following in his unfinished project, Beethoven: 'By work, time is killed in earnest ... 
Extremely important: to be taken further - Beethoven's rhythm and tonality.,72 
This is also the period of the invention of the metronome, a rationalisation of the 
chronometric in music. Beethoven's enthusiasm for metronome tempo markings should 
be understood as his attempted definition of rhythm, articulated though the unfolding 
musical material as a whole, rather than as the valorisation of measure for its own sake. 
Schelling tends to posit measure and rhythm dualistically, as nature and spirit. Music is 
the harmonious unity of the ideal and real 'series'; in Kantian terms, the unity of the 
transcendental and the empirical. 
The musicological concept of rhythm remains disputed. 73 And much of the 
confusion concerns the question of the relative autonomy of rhythm from measure. The 
dispute is symptomatic of the contradiction that is modem music itself. Rhythm can be 
defined as musical time, but musical time is positively interrupted by chronometric 
time. It is the vulgar temporality of music that has drawn philosophers of time to its 
example. Adorno, whose philosophy of music remains exceptionally un-vulgar, cites 
the concept of rhythm sparsely, no doubt because it connotes for him an archaic reaction 
into the mythic (Stravinsky); into the mythic-rationalist rhythmos. Adorno nevertheless 
alludes to a productive rhythm in his fragmentary works: 'On the theory of Beethoven 
and the symphony, Schelling's concept of rhythm in the Philosophy of Art' .74 
Adorno characterises the peculiarity of musical time in his own way, but it 
follows the general notion of a contradiction of times, in Schelling and beyond: 
The self-evident fact, that music is a temporal art, that it unfolds in time, 
means, in the dual sense, that time is not self-evident for it, that it has time 
72 Adorno, T. W. Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music, trans. Edmund Jephcott 
~Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), p.8. . 
3 'What is rhythm? The answer, I am afraid, is, so far, just - a word: a word WIthout 
generally accepted meaning ... The confusion is terrifying indeed'. Sachs, Curt. Rhythm 
and Tempo (New York: Dent, 1953), p.12. 
74 Adorno, T. W. Beethoven: The Philosophy of Music, p.117. 
as its problem. It must create temporal relationships among its constituent 
parts, justify their temporal relationship, synthesise them through time. 
Modem music is 'in time' and (yet) is a synthesis 'through time': 
Zeitkunst, the temporal art, is equivalent to the objectification of time. This 
applies to the individual elements, or musical content, to the extent that they 
come together in a context by means of the organisation of their sequence, 
rather than dissolving as they pass away; and to the temporal dimension 
itself, which aims, potentially, at its own sublation [AufgehobenJ, based on 
the strength of the unity of what occurs within it, following the example of 
certain movements of the truly symphonic Beethoven. 75 
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Typically, Adorno renders music's relationship to time as dialectical. And yet, even 
dialectics struggles to grasp this extra-musical problem. 
As art, modem music calls for aesthetic judgement. Such judgement is, 
according to Kant, without a concept. This means: conceptual (logical) without being 
subsumed under one concept.76 Adorno coins the term 'logicity,.77 In the third Critique, 
Kant cites the schematism chapter of the first Critique as an account of the subsumption 
of determinate and not reflective judgements.78 But if, given Heidegger's 'violent' 
reading of Kant, schematism is productively, and hence originally indeterminate in its 
determining judgement, then modem music, as art, temporalises. 79 We may stop short, 
today, of claiming that the modem artwork positively 'historises', in the prophetic sense 
of Heidegger's Holderlin. 
The work of modem music aims at a 'sublation' of time according to Adorno. 
What time does musical time sublate? Music 'must act upon time, not lose itself to it; 
must stem itself against the empty flood.' Is not the empty flood another time-series, 
another representation of time as movement and accumulation of points in time? 
Adorno's formulation is Bergsonian, to the extent that the sublating time of music must 
negate a 'quasi -spatial time': 
The objective time factor in all parameters and the living experiential time 
of the phenomenon are by no means identicaL .. In the controversy on this 
75 Adorno, T.W. 'On Some Relationships between Music and Painting', p.66. 
76 'The cognitive powers brought into play by this representation are here engaged in a 
free play, since no definite concept restricts them to a particular rule of cognition'. Kant, 
I. Critique of Judgement, p.58. My emphasis. 
77 Adorno, T. W. Aesthetic Them}', p.136. 
78 Kant, I. Critique of Judgement, p.59. 
79 'Readers have taken constant offence at the violence of my interpretations. Their 
allegation of violence can indeed be supported by this text. .. Thinkers learn from their 
shortcomings to be more preserving.' Heidegger, M. Preface to the Second Edition, xx. 
point the concept of time is used equivocally [in the recent debate]. It covers 
both temps espace and temps duree, physically measurable, quasi-spatial 
time and experiential time. Bergson's insight into their incompatibility 
cannot be erased. 80 
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In Time and Free Will (1889), Bergson takes music, 'notes of the tune ... rhythm', to 
exemplify 'true duration'. By contrast, spatial time is the representation of a 'series' of 
'states of consciousness' before (that) consciousness, in an 'image'. Representation thus 
distinguishes spatial time from experienced duration, time's presentation (tellingly, 
Adorno calls the latter 'experiential time,).81 Bergson takes music to subvert the re-
presentation of time, since it is close to time's presentation (the presentation of Kant's 
'inner sense'). 
Yet, as has been suggested, the genesis of modem music is entwined with 
chronometric, 'spatial' time (in the sense that points in time are represented as side-by-
side each other in space). Bergson unwittingly reminds us that, as much as music 
opposes intra-temporality, modem music must also contain it. Hence, Heidegger 
concurs with Bergson that spatial time is the problem, but claims, against Bergson, that 
temps duree is in the final instance another temps espace. 82 Heidegger's criticism is 
recognisable: for Bergson, the notes of the tune are analogous to the series of 'states of 
consciousness', as points in the consciousness time-series. The same observation can be 
made of Husserl's musical analogy, in his lectures On the Phenomenology of the 
Consciousness of Internal Time (of course, Heidegger did not object, having co-edited 
the lectures himself, in 1928).83 Bergson's 'vulgar' conception of time is more than a 
mere conception however. In Heidegger's own terms, everyday temporality IS a 
80 Adorno, T. W. 'Vers une musique informelle' in, Quasi una Fantasia, p. 312. 
81 Bergson, Henri. Key Writings, ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson (London & New York: 
Continuum, 2002), p.60. 
82 'We call the temporal attribute of entities within-the-world "within-time-ness" [die 
Innerzeitkeit]. The kind of 'time' which is first found ontically in within-time-ness, 
becomes the basis on which the ordinary conception of time takes form. But time, as 
within-time-ness, arises from an essential kind of temporalizing of primordial 
temporality. The fact that this is its source, tells us that the time 'in which' what is 
present-at-hand arises and passes away, is a genuine phenomenon of time; it is not an 
externalisation of a 'qualitative time' into space, as Bergson's Interpretation of time -
which is ontologically quite indefinite and inadequate - would have us believe.' 
Heidegger, M. Being and Time, p.333. 
83 Hussurl considers the 'tone' as the being the 'temporal object' of immediate 
consciousness, the preceding tones the having-been objects, and the expected tones the 
anticipated objects. Music (the melody) is the analogy for time itself. And as in 
Bergson, the 'tone' is the analogy for the 'now' that is in time. Husserl, Edmund. On the 
Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, trans. John Barnett Brough 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1990). See, for instance, pp.24-25. 
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temporalisation, albeit the one already temporalised, by 'the They'. Heidegger 
confronts, but also reacts against this time of modernity, a time that is moreover 
represented in the intellectual figure of a Bergson. 
But the advantage of Heidegger over Bergson is twofold, here at least. Firstly, 
Heidegger opens up an understanding of possible temporalisations according to, and 
within, a 'systematic', not avowedly dualistic, philosophy of time (nor a monistic one, 
as is found in the later work of Bergson). The possibility of temporalisation is once 
again a possibility of Dasein as facti city. Dasein is already thrown into its historical 
time. Temporality is not subjectively produced; neither ideally nor psychologically. 
Heidegger instead makes a claim for (fundamental) ontology, according to which the 
question of Being is the possibility of possibility: Dasein' s self-temporalisation. 
Secondly, the conjunction of temporalisation with the horizon of possibility promises to 
overcome the spatial re-presentation of time, which, as re-presentation, threatens to 
collapse ec-static Dasein into presence. Heidegger calls this 'inauthentic' because to be 
Dasein is to be 'Fragwiirdig': worthy of the question of ec-static Being. 
The example of music in Bergson nevertheless provides the basis for a critique 
of Heidegger. Bergson returns the charge of dualism, for he problematises the decisive 
structure in Heidegger: authenticity or inauthenticity; resoluteness or everydayness -
poetry or music. This criticism is not to relativise authenticity into an ahistorical, 
invariant category - to decide, that is, for indecision. Rather, the possibility of 
authenticity and of temporalisation is the possibility of all futural temporalisation. If the 
time of capitalism is regulated by the cyclical time of the image then temporalisation is 
the possibility - as the seeming impossibility - of a break-out from the mythic cycle 
into history. In utopian-political terms, this is the possibility of conceiving 'the totality 
as something that could be completely different'. 
Music is modem by virtue of its vulgarity. Is music's 'own sublation' thereby 
possible? Can music cancel and preserve its time, the time that it already is? Adorno 
suggests that the late work of Beethoven anticipates this problem. The 'intensive type' 
of Beethoven's Classical period is the expression of musical time through symphonic 
unfolding. This is the temporality, the rhythm, of the French Revolution; of the Eroica: 
'By work, time is killed in earnest'. Time is, as it were, prematurely, hastily fulfilled. In 
Beethoven's late-middle period, however, the 'extensive type' emerges. This time is 
characterised as the sublation of the former types, eventually culminating in the late 
period. 'The actual organising principle of the extensive form is', admits Adorno, 'still 
very obscure to me': 
The extensive fonn contains a certain moment of renunciation, an 
abandonment of the balance of opposites to be found in paradox, so that the 
fractures already emerge, although they do not yet become, as in the late 
sty~e, ci~he:s; rather, they contribute to contingency in the sense that greater 
weIght IS gIven to the moment of abstract time than to the construction of 
the constitution of fonn. But this temporal moment is itself thematic 
perhaps as in the novel, and is the main subject: not an 'idea' which fill~ 
time ... Abdication before time, and the shaping of this abdication, make up 
the substance of the extensive type.84 
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The later work of Beethoven shapes 'abstract time', the shapeless time of the 'empty 
flood'. This is the extensive type. Can Adorno's conception of 'empty time' be clarified 
any further? 
In Negative Dialectics, Adorno suggests that by conceiving of schematism as 
logical time detennination Kant paved the way for Hegel's identification of time, 
history and logic: 'Hegel, Kant's critic, was Kant's executor'. Adorno could have cited 
the Philosophy 0/ Nature, in which Hegel places time solely on the side of spirit: 'it is 
not in time that everything comes to be and passes away, rather time itself is the 
becoming, this coming-to-be and passing away,.85 Hegel negates Kant's mechanistic 
antinomies only to expose a new contradiction between absolute Idealist time and the 
time of the natural sciences. Hegel radicalises Kant's 'objects in general' into a unitary 
Idea, whose task and essence is the inwardisation of the Object from the standpoint of 
an absolute Subject (standing both at the beginning and at the end of historical time). 
The Bilderverbot thus extends, suggests Adorno, to Hegel. Hegel's 'version of 
dialectics' , 
becomes ontologized, turning from a subjective fonn into a structure of 
being pure and simple, itself something eternal. Hegel's speculations, which 
equate the absolute idea of the totality to the transience of everything finite, 
are founded on such. His attempt to deduce time, as it were, and to 
eternalize it as something which does not tolerate anything outside itself, is 
appropriate to this conception just as much as to absolute idealism, which 
can so little resign itself to the separation of time and logic than Kant could 
to that of the intuition and understanding. 
This 'detemporalisation of time [Entzeitlichung der Zeit]' is eminently Platonic.86 
Adorno reiterates Feuerbach's verdict that 'Hegelian philosophy must necessarily result 
84 Adorno, T. W. Beethoven, p.90. 
85 Hegel, G. W. F. Philosoph.v o/Nature,. ~.35. C~. Phen~meno~og): o/Spirit: 'History, is 
a conscious, self-mediating process - Spmt emptIed out mto TIme, p.492. 
86 Adorno, T. W. Negative Dialectics, pp.324-328. 
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in the immobility of time. ,87 Adorno cites Bergson as the strongest intellectual protest to 
date (alongside Proust) against bourgeois detemporalisation. Bergson (not Husserl and 
certainly not Heidegger) is Adorno's philosophical alternative to Kant and Hegel. 
Adorno entertains and even relies upon what he calls Bergson's 'crass dichotomy'. In 
re-presenting both times (in both spatial and imagistic terms, including movement the 
movement of some-thing in space) Adorno faces the objection that multiple spaces 
cannot occupy the same space at the same time. It is thus a spatial and not a temporal 
contradiction that now confronts Adorno. Adorno's earlier notion of the 'two spheres' 
of music can nevertheless offer, along with Heidegger's critique of metaphysical time, a 
more promising response to this contradiction. 
What Passes for Musical Time? 
Adorno's claim that modem music is imageless contains an assumption that music takes 
place in an imageless environment. He tends to conflate musical form with the abstract 
(the 'pure' and 'imageless' art). But the abstract is the opposite of abstraction. As 
imageless, without one image, modem music is concerned with the image, negatively -
and has been so since at least the stile rappresentativo. The possibility of representation 
in music is surely premised upon its ambiguously imagistic character. This is attested to 
by the prominence of fantasy in music and its discourse. Wackenroder's musical 
aesthetics, for instance, follows Tieck' s aesthetics of painting: 
Sometimes music appears to me like a phoenix, which lightly and boldly 
raises itself for its own pleasure, floats upwards triumphantly for its own 
gratification, and pleases gods and men for the flapping of its wings ... what 
a magnificent fullness of images !88 
In his 'Beethoven's Instrumental Music', Hoffmann sees '[b ]urning flashes of light 
shoot through the deep night ... we become aware of giant shadows that surge back and 
forth, driving us into narrower and narrower confines until they destroy us' .89 This 
(early) musical Romanticism reveals a constitutive, not accidental role of the imagistic 
in music. Whereas, Adorno's essay 'On the Contemporary Relationship of Philosophy 
87 Feuerbach, L. The Fiery Brook, trans. Zawar Hanfi (Minnesota: Anchor, 1972), pp. 
57-8. 
88 Wackenroder, W. H. 'The Marvels of the Musical Art' in, eds. Hennand, 1. & Gilbert, 
M. German Essays on Music (New York: Continuum, 1994), p.36. 
89 Hoffmann, E. T. A. 'Beethoven's Instrumental Music', in ibid. pp.60-61. 
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and Music' (1953) refers to an 'enigmatic character' that is 'specific to music' and is 
'emphasised by its distancing from the visually or conceptually determined world of 
objects'. Furthermore 'this character is almost urged upon us by music itself.'90 In the 
visual arts, by contrast, the 'relationship to objects is merged with the content, even in 
the case of the associations of abstract painting. ,91 What does it mean to suggest that 
musical abstraction is more abstract than painterly abstraction, or other abstractions? 
Does not music's 'distancing' of the image imply the possibility of another moment of 
nearness to the image - as in the 'dialectical' case of music and language? Matters are 
more nuanced in Adorno's 1965 essay on music and painting: 
The old aim of secular music, that of the divertissement that distracts from 
boredom, testifies to [music acting upon time], a fact that lives on in the 
relationship to time of autonomous music.92 
Adorno's remark can be radicalised here, so as to state that distraction makes possible 
music's claim to autonomy, for the first time (both historically and structurally), and 
that, insofar as distraction involves fantasy, music too is 'imagistic' .93 Music is modem 
by virtue of its propensity for the image, not in spite of it. This was, for Wagner, the 
privilege of music. 
Following tradition, Adorno takes music to be both the 'imageless art' and the 
'art of time'. But what if modem music is imageless insofar as it is a quasi-imagistic 
'rendering' of time, through which the image passes (through, in both senses of the 
word)? Divertissement passes the time, the empty time of boredom, but not in a 
vacuum. Images pass in and for modem music. It is already an abyssal 'image' into 
which images are drawn. Two aspects coincide here: the quasi-image of musical 
rhythm, discussed above, and the extra-musical image(s), introduced in this section. As 
Adorno says of language in music, 'signifying intentions flood into' it. In fact, Adorno 
comes to a similar conclusion where the image is concerned: 
The dispute over whether music can portray anything definite, or is only a 
play of sound-patterns in motion, no doubt misses the point. A far closer 
parallel is the dream, to the form of which, as Romanticism well knew, 
music is in many ways close ... Images of the objective world appear in 
90 Adorno, T. W. 'The Contemporary Relationship of Philosophy and Music' in Essays 
on Music. p.138. 
91 Ibid. p.139 
92 Adorno, T. W. 'On Some Relationships between Music and Painting', p.66. 
93 Perhaps the historical case study would be Mozart's divertimento in B-flat, the Gran 
Partita. 
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music only in scattered, eccentric flashes, vanishing at once; but they are, in 
their transience, of music's essence. 94 
Adorno is reluctant to connect this dream world of music to the real world in the , 
manner of Bloch, perhaps. Adorno's shift of position on the image tracks his shifting 
evaluation of the dream, from hostility towards Benjamin's appropriation of Klages and 
Jung to the recording of his own dreams.95 Adorno declares in the above note , 
unpublished in his lifetime: 'I believe the images flitting past to be objective, not merely 
subjective associations. ,96 
If the interdependence of music with the image is rationalised in commodity 
music, then the identification of the fetish character must be said to extend to the 
environment of musical listening. There is, necessarily, a space of fantasy. This is left 
largely untouched by Adorno. But insofar as the context of both 'spheres' of music is 
what Simmel called the 'Metropolis', this context is one that already privileges the 
image; is the privilege of the image. The environment is not accidental to the 
identification, given the (non-)temporal affinity of logical identity and the eidos. This 
context even constitutes the 'commodity-being' of music. Perhaps music's affectivity -
which, according to Adorno, is responsible for its exemplary commodity character -
concerns the need to feel that everything is in its place, in the 'non-dwelling' of the 
Metropolis (see chapter 4). 
Commodity music goes beyond the principium individuation is; beyond the 
'representation' of 'Ideas' (Schopenhauer). Early Romantic fantasy is absolutised in 
Schopenhauer's high Romanticism. Fantasy becomes bourgeois escapIsm. 
Schopenhauer is very much alive (Heidegger was careful to take him seriously). 
Perhaps commodity mUSIC presents an expropriated environment (expropriated 
experience as social expropriation) as appropriate; as a 'proper place'. It presents 
Erlebnis as Erfahrung, rather than transforming the one into the other. But these are not 
binary opposites. The 'two spheres' of music - or rather, of a musical experience of 
modernity - 'must be thought of together'. Modem music, like commodity music, 
speaks the language of fantasy. Where commodity music is receptive to the image, 
modem music seeks to appropriate this reception productively. 
94 Adorno, T. W. Beethoven, pp.7-8. 
95 Cf. Adorno, T. W. Dream Notes, eds. Christoph Godde & Jan Philipp Reemsta, trans. 
Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007). 
96 Adorno, T. W. Beethoven, pp.7-8. 
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Adorno's two essays on mUSIC and painting propose an explicit relationship 
between the 'art of time' and the 'art of space'. 'The pseudomorphosis [of music] 
toward painting... must be understood, today, as a stage in the process of 
convergence.,97 The shared qualities of modem music and modem painting include 
simultaneity, abstraction, graphicness and ecriture. The earlier essay begins with some 
historical correspondences - Wagner and Renoir, the Second Viennese School and the 
Blue Rider, Stravinsky and Picasso - emphasising a 'playful' relationship (also between 
Gennany and France, the 'inner' and 'outer' intellectual cultures).98 By 1965, Adorno 
has witnessed the rise of both 'new music' and painterly abstraction. The later text is 
dedicated to the collector and critic of Cubism, Daniel-Henry Kahnweile. Yet no 
painters are cited. Indeed, the 'convergence' is ambivalent for Adorno, who addresses 
the twofold possibilities of modem art and the end of art, temporalisation and 
reification. The two issues tend to be confused, but can be read together. If art is defined 
in tenns of Erfahrung, then the possibility of modem music is the possibility of its 
becoming. How is music to become, amidst the disintegration of compositional 
paradigms of development? Modem music embraces its fragmentation so as to inscribe 
the becoming of musical experience anew. But this experiment, should fragmentation 
become atomistic, threatens to enforce the stasis that is already promised in the 
disintegration itself. Adorno's 'ambivalent' experience of Wagner is, in part, 
attributable to the composer's fonnative role in a tendency that will come to be 
definitive of modem music. In Search of Wagner cites the transfonnation scene of 
Parsifal: 
You see, my son, time here becomes space.99 
But whereas this previously signified detemporalisation and reification, the post-war 
Adorno takes this 'spatialising' tendency to have productive possibilities: 
In the most recent music, which draws so near to painting and the graphic 
arts, the trend toward the static becomes quite marked - here, too, 
something is fully realized that Wagner had envisioned earlier... Colour 
.. k· d f . 100 itself became archItectOnIc ... a new III 0 constructIon. 
However, 
97 Adorno, T. W. 'On Some Relationships between Music and Painting', p.67. 
98 Adorno. T. W. 'Zum Verhiiltnis von Malerei und Musik heute', GS 18, pp.140-142. 
99 Wagner, R. Parsifal, Act 1. Quoted in Adorno, T. W. In Search afWagner, p.88. 
100 Adorno, T. W. 'Wagner's Relevance for Today' in Essays on Music, p.594. 
chromatic music always has an affinity to identity ... one might go so far as 
to surmise that Wagner's compositional process prophesied the dawning 
horror of the transition from a society that had reached the apogee of its 
dynamism to one that had again turned rigid, become utterly reified: a new 
feudalism, to use Veblen's term. 101 
The problem of modern music thus articulates an extra-musical problem. 
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Adorno's musical aesthetics draws, at various junctures, upon Ernst Kurth's 
Musikpsychologie (1930). Kurth had sought to understand the relationship between the 
'inner' and 'outer' aspects of musical listening. How does the compositional structure 
relate to the experience of spatial depth and collectivity traditionally associated with the 
performance of music? They are distinct yet intimately connected phenomena. The 
composition 'determines' in some way the spatiality of the musical experience. Adorno 
does not consider this spatiality in terms of architecture or the architectural. And yet, 
musical space, 
springs from the collective implications of all music, the character of 
something that embraces groups of human beings, which gradually carried 
over to the sound as such. The phenomenon can only be described in 
analogies, but can be perceived very distinctly. 
Adorno finds this relationship obscure yet fundamental: 'the spatial quality adheres to 
the harmonic structure and the instrumental sound.' 102 
F or Kurth, the question about space is equally a question about the image. 
Neither in his 1933 review of Kurth's book, nor in subsequent writings does Adorno 
acknowledge the important section on the 'Bewegungsbild' , the dynamic image. 103 
Though music is no 'visual image', its 'dynamic sequence' gives rise to an '''image''.' 
Music's 'after-image' (a term borrowed from eidetic psychology) pertains to the 
phenomena of high and low, line and rhythm. Counterpoint is at once harmonic and 
rhythmic. The musical work is no mere succession of atomised notes. 104 The emphasis 
of 'Gestalt psychology' upon the whole makes its theoretical application to music 
highly appropriate. 105 It is this whole, even or especially as a negative whole, that 
adheres music to space. 
101 Ibid. p.598. 
102 Adorno, T. W. 'The Contemporary Relationship of Philosophy and Music', in 
Essays on Music, p.150. 
103 Kurth, Ernst. Musikpsychologie, 2nd edition (Bern: Krompholz, 1947), pp.85-97. For 
Adorno's review, see GS 19, p.350. 
104 Ibid. pp.86-87. ... . 
lOS This marks a break with the conSIderatIOns of mUSIC III Schopenhauer and the early 
Nietzsche. 'The two deities of art, Apollo and Dionysos, provide the starting-point for 
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The work of music is a '''simultaneous'' dynamic image'. It is experienced as 
one, at once, in an 'instant [Augenblick],. And yet, the work is temporal. Kurth 
conceives of a 'contradiction [Widerspruch] of the temporal and non-temporal unity. ,]06 
He aligns the Augenblick with the non-temporal. Despite his interest in inter-
disciplinary education, it is unlikely that Kurth had read the recently published Being 
and Time. For Heidegger, the 'Augenblick' is not the 'now' but 'an authentic Present 
[Gegenwart] or waiting-towards [Gegen-wart], that 'permits us to encounter for the 
first time what can be "in a time".' 107 Equally contrary to Bergson's 'crass dichotomy', 
Kurth's 'Widerspruch' acknowledges the contradiction of musical time. 
The dynamic image is constitutive of the work of modem mUSIC. The 
simultaneity of this image is its (by no means authentic) Augenblick. Adorno's thesis on 
music and the 'graphic arts' can be read as a historical materialist radicalisation of 
Kurth. Music's tendency toward the image is inseparable from, though not identical to, 
the imagistic character of its emergence. ]08 The modem musical work effectuates a 
quasi-simultaneous image. Adorno hears in the 'new music' a peculiar repetition, a 
mimesis, of the image. Its temporal character is no longer immanent to the intrinsic 
musical language ( or, logic), but is instead imposed extrinsically: 
To this extent [the new music] obeys the romantic principle against which it 
is rebelling, by pursuing the spatialisation of time in a merely fictitious 
our recognition that there exists in the world of the Greeks an enormous opposition, 
both in origin and goals, between the Apolline art of the image-maker [Bildner] and the 
imageless art of music, which is that of Dionysos.' Nietzsche, F. The Birth of Tragedy, 
p.14. Both Adorno and Nietzsche call music the 'imageless art'. But whereas Adorno 
can say that the musical work has a singular form, Nietzsche cannot - he gives form to 
the arts of Apollo alone: poetry, the plastic arts and the dream image. For the early 
Nietzsche, music is confined to chaos. 
106 Kurth, E. Musikpsychologie, p.96. 
107 Heidegger, M. Being and Time, pp.387-88. 
108 This is not to say that the goal of modem music is its origin. It does not negate 
'expendable conventions', in pursuit of its essential medium. In contradistinction to 
Clement Greenberg, Adorno suggests that the arts converge in a manner that cannot be 
assumed to be progressive. For Adorno, music has historically lagged behind painting, 
in that it sought to imitate it, catching up only in the twentieth century. It had been late 
since the late renaissance of the stile rapprasentativo. Greenberg argues, by contrast, 
that painting and literature took music, which matured early, for their model. 'Because 
of its 'absolute' nature, its remoteness from imitation ... music had come to replace 
poetry as the paragon of art. It was the art which the other avant-garde arts envied most, 
and whose effects they tried hardest to imitate.' Greenberg, Clement. 'Towards a Newer 
Laocoon' in, eds. Charles Harrison & Paul Wood, Art in Theory 1900-2000 (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2003), p.565. 
[fiktiv] manner, treating time without consideration, as if it were space, with 
all the inconsistencies that characterise the magician's act. 109 
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Non-temporalised music is not modem music. And yet, it is precisely here, in the most 
unlikely of places, that a certain resistance to detemporalisation is proposed. Adorno 
describes Schoenberg's Moses as 'musica ficta... elevated to a different plane 
[aufgehoben].' The figurative image has become music: 'The pictorial aspect of music 
is now shifted on to the individual figures, as if the non-pictorial might result from their 
demise.,110 This is the result of Schoenberg's 'constructivist' totality; a non-image 
absolute in music. It is not the chronometric measure that produces this anti-rhythm 
image, but rather the 'establishing [of] sound relationships vertically'; the neutralising 
of harmonic meaning in a relentless 'twelve-tone technique'. 'The simplest way to 
describe the general effect is to say that the music is dissonant from the first bar to the 
last, but that it does not sound dissonant for a single second.' III Its static rhythm is a 
function of the static tonality. Against Adorno's literal reading, in order to concur with 
him: Schoenberg'S newly-found 'timbre' is not always 'integrated into the 
construction'. In the Burning Bush scene, for example, the murmuring voices do not 
produce a positive totality. There is both fragmentariness and becoming. As Adorno 
acknowledges, '[t]oday music rebels against conventional temporal order; in any case 
the treatment of musical time allows for widely diverging solutions. ,112 
We may therefore speak of a spatialising 'of time' that temporalises; a 
temporalising-becoming mimesis 'of detemporalisation. The meaning or status of this 
mimesis is not arbitrary. It is to be understood, to some extent, in Adorno's sense of a 
dialectic of mimesis and rationality. Mimesis is the productively tragic recognition of a 
rational limit. The limit becomes the 'tragic' possibility of the mimesis (see chapter 4). 
Nono's 'Tragedy in Listening' expresses the time of waiting in vain. 
The New Music and Luigi N ono 
Adorno was well-aware that the 'spatialising' tendency in the new music might lead to 
detemporalisation, or rather non-temporalisation (,The Aging of the New Music'). This 
is the underlying issue of Adorno's proto-manifesto, 'Vers une musique informelle' 
(1960). Adorno applauds the experimental works of some of the younger composers, 
109 Adorno, T. W. 'On Some Relationships between Music and Painting', p.67. 
110 Adorno, T. W. 'A Sacred Fragment' in Quasi una Fantasia, p.231-232. 
III Ibid. p.237. 
112 Adorno, T. W. Aesthetic Theory, p.23. 
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only to fault them for a lack of historical self-consciousness. Whereas the 'new 
serialists' confuse the new with complexity, composers of the 'single note' forget 
history with their naturalistic-acoustic materialism. It is this 'acute antinomy' that an 
'informal music' seeks to overcome. 
Adorno is particularly interested in Stockhausen's works, 'ZeitmajJe, Grnppen 
and Kontakte', as well as his essay' " .how time passes ... ' (1959): 
My first reaction to ZeitmajJe, in which I relied exclusively on my ears, 
involved me in a strange interaction with his theory of a static music which 
arises from a universal dynamics as well as with his theory of cadences. I 13 
Adorno goes on to dispute musical naturalism, in Cage rather than Stockhausen. In fact, 
Stockhausen's essay is no less naturalistic, responding as it does to the German 
catastrophe by neglecting historical consciousness altogether in favour of 'the nature of 
sound'. This nevertheless involves a historical reconstruction of the recent musical 
tradition in order to oppose it with a 'conception of musical time that is absolutely 
new,.114 
Despite this naturalism, Adorno has sympathy with Stockhausen's thesis that 
musical rhythm has continued to follow the harmonic series of diatonic music long after 
that series became obsolete. The cadence stands metonymically for narrative, or linear 
becoming: 'In traditional listening the music unfolds from the parts to the whole, in tune 
with the flow of time itself.' Serialism attempted to overcome tonal harmony but 
remains enslaved to its rhythm. Stockhausen complains that, '[ m ]ost people who today 
write pitches in this system are not aware that they are giving form to time-
proportions.,115 Traditional rhythm lends itself to graphic notation - measure, time 
signature and tempo. Its musical time can be seen: 
up till now, one could see from the score the time-relationships composed in 
a piece of music, quite independently of its realisation in sound, and the 
"rightness" of a realisation in sound could be checked against the time-
notation of the score. 
113 Adorno, T. W. 'Vers uns musique informelle' in Quasi una Fantasia, p.271. 
114 Adorno, T. W. Aesthetic Thoery, p.29. 
115 Stockhausen, Karlheinz. ' ... how time passes ... " in Die Reihe, eds. Herbert Eimert & 
Karlheinz Stockhausen (London: Theodore Pressner Company & Universal Edition, 
1957-68), vol.3, p.ll. 
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Stockhausen opposes this with a notion of improvisation: 'field-composition' .116 But he 
remains tied to a quantitative determination of 'time-proportions'. Contrary to Adorno's 
defence, Stockhausen's musical time remains measured 'duration'. 117 This is perhaps 
revealed in the fact the Stockhausen negates one image, the score, only to introduce 
another, the field (and hence Adorno's observations about the convergence of music and 
painting). 
Nono shared Adorno's concern about the absence of historical consciousness in , 
his lecture, 'History and the Present in the Music of Today' (1959) - the delivery of 
which was to mark his parting of ways with what he once considered the 'School of 
Darmstadt' .118 Nono opposes the 'fiction of the tabula rasa' in Schillinger and Cage. It 
is obliquely directed at Stockhausen's 'year zero' .119 Nono had by this time taken 
Stockhausen to have misinterpreted his cantata, II canto sospeso (1957): 'It was said 
that I had gratuitously destroyed the texts, had wanted to render them harmless.' 
Stockhausen had identified in the expulsion of semantic content from Nono's settings of 
letters, written by anti-fascist resistance fighters facing execution or worse, the attempt 
to make the listener 'ashamed'. It was nevertheless ( also) a mystical-naturalistic 
conception of language that was being pursued by Stockhausen. 120 For both Nono and 
Adorno, Stockhausen's abstract negation of language is an abstract negation of history. 
In many respects, 11 canto sospeso is prophetic of Adorno's 'informal music'. In 
its modernist historical consciousness, it recalls both Schoenberg and Web ern, and in a 
post-modern vein, Renaissance polyphony. Nono's treatment of sonority counters this 
polyphony, which, as Kurth emphasised, aims at progressive-forward movement. The 
counter-movement, which can only be isolated theoretically, has an affinity to the 
contemporaneous experiments in Stockhausen. Here too there is a departure from the 
cadential paradigm. 121 
Nono thus addresses both extremes of Adorno's 'acute antinomy', in theory at 
least. But the cantata is not what Adorno had expected of an informal music. Adorno 
had Nono down as one of the new serialists. He did not foresee (or hear) Nono's 
116 Ibid. p.37. 
117 , [Stockhausen] too refers to the antinomy of material and composed music ... in the 
context of the problem of the relationship between physically measurable and 
authentically musical time.' I have not been able to verify this claim in Stockhausen's 
essay. Adorno, T. W. 'Vers uns musique informelle', p.288. 
118 Cited in: Flamm, C. Preface to the score of II canto sospeso (Eulenburg, 1995), p.iii. 
119 Nono, Luigi. 'Geschichte und Gegenwart in der Musik von Heute' in Texte zu seiner 
Musik, ed. Jiirg Stenz! (Zurich: Atlantis, 1975), p.34. 
120 Cf. Stockhausen, K. 'Speech and Music', in Die Reihe, vo1.6 (1959), p.49. 
121 Stenz!, Jiirg. Luigi Nono (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1998), p.43. 
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autonomy from this groupmg ('Nor can I accept the label "serial" without 
reservations'). But 'Vers une musique informelle' does not, cannot, prescribe how the 
antinomy must be overcome. This caution leads to the suggestion on Adorno's part of 
an impossible compromise - the consequence, perhaps, of its idealism: 'Informal music 
is a little like Kant's perpetual peace'. 122 By contrast, the Canto sospeso addresses the 
antinomy not as one of music-becoming-stasis, but rather as music-having-become-
stasis. It is not so much a question of mediating two extremes but rather of addressing 
that which unifies the antimony itself: the 'tragic' nihilism of detemporalisation. 
The first parts of Il canto sospeso navigate a course between Moses, late Webem 
and Luigi Dallapiccola. Part IV, an orchestral interlude that interrupts the melismatic 
text-settings of the adjacent movements, is composed of extremely long notes in the 
strings, punctuated by instrumental groupings. Forward movement is interrupted by the 
vertical arrangement ('sospeso' can mean both floating and interrupted): 
I wanted a horizontal melodic construction encompassing all registers; 
floating from sound to sound, from syllable to syllable: a line which 
sometimes consists of a succession of individual tones or pitches, and 
sometimes thickens into chords. 123 
Nono contradicts Stockhausen's interpretation of his work. Nono does not merely 
substitute the horizontal for the vertical; becoming for stasis; discourse for sound; 
history for nature. His handling of dynamics, for instance, effectuates a peculiar kind of 
becoming, the strings moving from ppp (240-246) to fff (260-262), returning to ppp 
(279-284). Equal pitch values pass across the different instrumental groupings, in a new 
kind of polyphonic writing. 
This musical time could be described as compellingly slow. But the work is not 
experienced as slow. Tempo, which cannot be isolated from the other aspects of musical 
interpretation, is a matter of 'Right and Wrong', states Adorno. 124 Slowness of itself 
would perhaps constitute a reaction to Simmel's metropolitan 'intensification'. Nono's 
slowness is itself an intensification. Neither is the Canto sospeso a lament. The tone is 
one of resistance, not resignation: 'I go believing in a better life for you'. As to the 
question of becoming, there is no gradual unfolding in Nono. Is not this music then 
Stockhausen's 'static music'? No, for Nono's musical time is as far removed from 
122 Adorno, T. W. 'Vers uns musique informelle', p.322. Translation amended. 
123 C II . Quoted in, Flamm, . canto sospeso, IX. 
124 Adorno, T. W. Towards a Theory of Musical Reproduction, trans. Wieland Hoban 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006). p.56. 
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Stockhausen as his silence is from Cage. Stockhausen defines his 'moment fonn' as 
follows: 
Each moment, whether a state or a process, is individual and self-regulated, 
and able to sustain an independent existence. The musical events do not take 
a fixed course between a detennined beginning and an inevitable ending, 
and the moments are not merely consequents of what precedes them and 
antecedents of what follows; rather the concentration on the Now - on every 
Now - as if it were a vertical slice dominating over any historical 
conception of time and reaching into timelessness, which I call eternity: an 
eternity which does not begin at the end of time, but is attainable at every 
moment. 125 
Stockhausen's (meta-)physics of musical time leads him into a dualism of finite sound, 
the empirical 'Now', and the infinity that transcends it. By contrast, Nono's 'Now' is in 
the medium of the music; its rhythm. Nono does not conflate musical material with 
acoustical matter. 126 'It is particularly in a work like 1/ canto sospeso that one can see 
the beginnings of the gap - now a gulf - between composers like Stockhausen and 
Nono.' According to Helmut Lachenmann, an untimely combination of constructivism 
and expressionism had invited the accusation of stasis, in both senses, in Nono's 
compositional development: 
Structural purification of a new, terse expressiveness which is almost 
archaic in quality, and thus liberated from its conventional reification - this 
was what Nono had "ground to a halt" in. Or, perhaps one should say ... 
Nono in the late fifties had remained clinging to a rough, inhospitable 
landscape of naked signs from which others were striving to find their way 
to more homely surroundings - forwards, backwards or sideways ... In those 
days Nono did not move further on - he went deeper. 
Lachenmann does not refer to 'metaphysical' depth: 'With [Nono] the processes of 
structuring and differentiation were ultimately detennined by their function of driving 
. . ,127 
mUSIC mto space. 
N ono' s student touches upon that which connects 1/ canto sospeso to the later 
work. 128 Against the notion of a decisive turn, away from the political, a certain 
125 Stockhausen, K 1961 concert note for Kontakte, in Worner, Karl H. Stockhausen: 
Life and Work, trans. Bill Hopkins (University of California Press, 1973), pp.46-47. 
126 For this reason, it is misplaced to apply Jonathan Kramer's concept of 'vertical 
time' unreservedly to Nono. cf. Davidsmoon, S. 'Marking Time' in Contemporary 
Music Review, vol. 18, part 1 (London: Taylor & Francis, 1999), p.85; Kramer, Jonathan 
D. The Time of Music (New York: Schinner, 1988) pp.54-55. 
127 Lachenmann, Helmut. 'Touched by Nono', in Contemporary Music Review, vol.l8, 
Part 1 (1999), pp.20-21. My emphasis. 
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radicalisation can be proposed (and hence a continuity from the politically committed 
works). His major late work, Prometeo, replays the earlier, fraught game with stasis and 
space, incorporating the experiments in sonority from the 1970s (for instance, the wind-
swept landscape of Como una ola difuerza y luz). What is new is that the play becomes 
emphatic - in a certain sense, a tragedy about listening. 
The integration of material is the secret of the fermata in N ono' s late work. The 
fermata is not ornamental, but is the rhythm itself; or rather, the performers' production 
of the musical time. Fermata, pause, comes from the Latinjirmare, to stop. Thefermata 
is a coming-to-a-standstill without coming to a standstill (compare: Nietzsche's "long 
fermata'). This is not thereby an opposition of chronometric time to musical time. There 
is a distant metre to Prometeo, which of course employs traditional measure in the 
score. Adorno's single concrete suggestion for an informal music concerns a distancing 
of 'pulse', which 'could augment rhythmic flexibility to a degree as yet undreamed 
of. ' 129 The necessity of the pulse, however distant, means that it is immanent to the anti-
pulse, rhythm. The obscure relationship of chronometric time and musical time is 
exaggerated in Nono's late work, giving rise to 'a passage of time that is holding its 
breath' . 
Cacciari compiled the libretto of Prometeo from fragments of Hesiod, Holderlin, 
Benjamin (the 'Theses') and himself (a poem, The Master of the Game). It is a 
collaborative work. In a conversation reproduced for the 1984 premiere, N ono and 
Cacciari raise the issues of space and the image in relation to music. Music, Cacciari 
suggests, proposes a certain resistance to the image, amidst 'a civilization placed under 
the sign of the idei"n, of knowledge envisaged with idei"n'. Music has nevertheless 
remained subservient to representational paradigms. The unidirectional performance, 
centring attention upon stage and performer, aims at an identification of an image by 
means of music, not in spite of it (as true of 'classical' as of 'popular' music). Prometeo 
has no single group of soloists to focus upon; no narrative action but rather 'islands' 
forming an 'archipelago'. Faced with nothing other than Piano's minimal set, there is a 
compUlsion towards the invitation of the music to listen rather than to look, and 
ultimately to 'believe'. 
128 Stenzl, liirg. 'The New Luigi Nono', in Verso Prometeo (Venice: Ricordi, 1984). 
Translated by Adeline Mannarini, based upon Thierry Baud's translation of the Italian 
for the Festival d'Automne a Paris, 1987, accessed at, www.festival-
automne.com/public/ressourc/publicatlI987nono/sommaire.htm, on November 23, 
2008. 
129 Adorno, T. W. 'Vers une musique informelle', p.322. 
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But this thought invites the same criticism that can be made of Adorno's remark 
in Composingfor the Films. To pit listening against sight is to conceive of an autonomy 
of the individual senses. But music is already imagistic. To listen is to see, though not in 
an equivalent manner. Nono and Cacciari align listening to the abstract and sight to 
representation. As with Adorno, language is the privilege of music (albeit as stripped-
down language). Only images are forbidden. Perhaps Prometeo constitutes a peculiar 
abstraction of its own. The fragmentary figurations of Prometeo - of the texts, the 
music, the text-music - are absorbed into its spatial singularity. Indeterminacy is 
determined where distraction is concentrated. This absorption, recalling Adorno's 
'adherence' of inner to outer musical space, constitutes both an acknowledgement of the 
image and a promise to go beyond it. 
N ono and Cacciari respond with a notion of sound that initially comes close to 
the naturalism of Stockhausen. Cacciari is aware that in considering how music might 
oppose the image, he must paradoxically think of it in terms of colour and, recalling 
Adorno, painting. Composers like Scriabin (who thought of music as colour) lapse into 
a 'symbolic system'. What, wonders Cacciari, would be non-symbolic, non-
representational music? Cacciari steers his friend away from an overly empirical 
response, a 'natural' idea of sound-colour, towards two alternatives: 'silence' and 
'multiple geometry' .130 Nono is undoubtedly interested in these alternatives. Where the 
latter is concerned, Prometeo presents a 'mobile sound'; a 'multi-directional listening' . 
N ono believes that the spatial characteristics cannot be separated from the temporal 
ones (see chapter 4). But Cacciari takes this correspondence more literally than the 
composer. In a sense, Prometeo eludes Cacciari's theoretical grasp on this point. This 
might be explained biographically by the fact that N ono' s musical time emerges out of 
the practical engagement with the Darmstadt debates discussed above, and not 
(primarily) out of a philosophy of time, such as Cacciari's. 
In his essay on Prometeo, Cacciari refers to the 'tempo' of 'The Master of the 
Game' as, 'the a-rhythmic succession of the punctual', according to which, 
the past is nothing more than having-been ... and the present is a space from 
which we throw ourselves 'all together' into the future; or, as 
Michelstaedter used to say, we 'enfuture' ourselves. On the other hand, the 
tempo of the Master is polyphonic; his dimensions are given 
simultaneously; the past of such a line, of such thought, of such speech, may 
be the future of any other. The present is not a space common to 'all', but 
130 'Conversation Between Luigi Nono and Massimo Cacciari with Michele Bertaggia', 
in Verso Prometeo. 
the irreplaceable instant, fugitive, clear and living, of the Unique. Like a 
New Angel, ~e chants the instant, but this instant, precisely, is unique and 
non-reproducIble, and by the very fact of this uniqueness and of this 
unrepeatable quality, it never-ceases-to-be; it is necessary. To think 
necessity and creation simultaneously, snatching something from the instant 
- the fugitive nature of the instant - that which can break the 
'movimentum', is infinite temporality, the 'development' from one being to 
another, as from death to death: this is what constitutes the unique quality of 
the Master of the Game, his 'weak messianic force,.131 
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Cacciari speaks of a productive contradiction here, between single, linear time - 'the 
succession of the punctual' - and plural, 'polyphonic' time; the contradiction being that 
both times can occur (in this' dran') at the same time, 'simultaneously'. The singular 
time is, structurally, both the historical time of the having-been and is the futural-
messianic time. The having-been and the futural share a singularity, but what they are, 
singularly, is of necessity radically different. The possibility of this difference is marked 
in the plurality of times, different times that, in tum, refer back to a singular time, the 
unique time of the 'instant', such that the different times opens up a real possibility, not 
an ideal one (hence, not 'difference' for its own sake). 
This is a recurrent theme of the roughly contemporaneous essays collected in 
Cacciari's Zeit ohne Kronos (1986), dedicated to Nono. And although Nono is not 
discussed, it is by way of a musical analogy that the meaning and problem of Cacciari' s 
philosophy of time comes to the fore. William Hogarth's The Bathos and Goya's Saturn 
each portray the' death of time', of 'Chronos'. It is not clear whether Chronos is natural, 
cosmological time (the god of agriculture) or socio-historically produced time (Saturn, 
the melancholy planet). Chronos is perhaps the naturalisation of social time. According 
to the tragic nihilism of Cacciari (led by Kossaleck, Michelstaedter and Benjamin), it is 
in the death of Chronos that the possibility of another time emerges, 'kairos', since the 
death of Chronos cannot be the end of all time(s). That there is something and not 
nothing after the death of Chronos shows that another time is possible; in Heidegger's 
terms, that Chronos does not exhaust the meaning of Being. The straight pipe of time, 
held by the old man in Hogarth's engraving - 'the single arrow, passing in one 
direction' - undergoes a series of 'contortions [Umgekehrungen]', 'almost like a crab in 
the sense of the musical method!'. Cacciari's 'crab' refers to the retrograde canon, the 
cancrizans (which, on the score, resembles this aquatic creature). Serialists employed it 
as a means of producing duration out of the series. That such a means is described in 
terms of an image is not, in the light of Adorno's reflections, coincidental. 
131 Cacciari, M. 'Verso Prometeo / The Tragedy of Listening', in Verso Prometeo. 
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The 'crab' would surely have come to Cacciari from Nono, who had immersed 
himself in Renaissance tracts on polyphony around this time. But according to their 
conversation, Nono is primarily concerned with such precedents for understanding new 
possibilities of musical space. Cacciari translates Nono's spatial mUltiplicity into a 
temporal multiplicity, thus leading to the contradictions faced by Adorno and others. 
Cacciari writes: 'instantaneous times, stratifications of time that unfold 
simultaneously.,132 The alternative times (to Chronos) are already given, quasi-spatially, 
in the 'polyphonic' tempo (though it is true that the crab is something of an analogy 
here). Cacciari follows in a tradition of subverting Chronos from within, in the instant, 
the anti-Chronos. This tradition traverses several forms of messianism. It is to the credit 
of Cacciari that he is conscious of the singularly modem nature of his appropriation -
that kairos is not to be rescued. This appropriation nevertheless remains problematic, 
for two reasons. 
Firstly, the instant might simply be the intra-temporal point in time, the time of 
Chronos once over. Adorno and Cacciari, following Benjamin, each pursue, in different 
ways, a 'dialectic of nihilism', according to which it is in the tragic acknowledgement 
of intra-temporal, spatial time - its divine mastery, as it were - that another time is 
made manifest (the exception to the exception). Secondly, as was the case with 
Stockhausen, the instant might be out of time altogether, resulting in a dualism of the 
temporal and the timeless. This dualism lacks the mediation necessary even to account 
for the transition, or transformation, from the one to the other. Benjamin arguably veers 
from one side to the other, in his dialectical image. Nevertheless, an interpretation of 
the dialectical image might provide the means for mediation, bringing us back to the 
'two spheres' of the musical time of modernity. 
For Adorno, the temporal meaning of the ideal image is stasis. For Benjamin, 
the 'image is dialectics at a standstill'. The 'genuine' dialectical image is a 'flash ... 
suddenly emergent' .133 In the 'Theses', Benjamin claims that the dialectical image 
'flashes up at the instant [Augenblick] when it can be recognised and is never seen 
again.' 134 But unlike the instant, the image, understood in its relation to space, reminds 
us that detemporalisation endures, as the empty time of boredom; as alienation. It was 
suggested that Adorno has various ways of describing this time ('the empty flood', the 
'extensive type'). And it is this sense of stasis that Prometeo mimetically responds to, 
132 Cacciari, M. 'The Death of Time', in Zeit ohne Chronos, trans. Reinhard Kacianka 
(Klagenfurt: Ritter Verlag, 1986), p.25. 
133 Benjamin, W. Arcades Project, p.462. 
134 Benjamin, W. 'Theses on the Philosophy of History' in Illuminations, p.247. 
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whilst waiting upon another time (as Cacciari is right to suggest). As mimesis, Prometeo 
has its own time. Cacciari thinks of this time plurally, in the music - hence, not as 
transcendence into the timeless. Plurality is Cacciari's weapon against the bad infinity. 
But how plural is it? And is not quantitative plurality another bad infinity (how many)? 
In contrast to Cacciari, it is proposed that the time of Prometeo is the time of its 
fermata. The Augenblick inheres in the fermata. This Augenblick is to be understood in 
Benjamin's sense, to the extent that it recognises the crisis of mythic commodity time; 
but also in Heidegger's sense, in that another temporality is proposed in its 
temporalising. This 'enfuturing' exceeds the work. Possibility is not immanent in the 
work, as plural temporality. Neither is it transcendent, into the timeless. 
Adorno had questioned Benjamin's Jungian-Platonic 'dream image' of the 
future, 'as Utopia' .135 The question of what the dialectical image gives rise to is, in one 
sense, the problem of the 'Bergsonian' dualism. The 'ur-phenomenon' is not originary 
in the sense of Heidegger's 'temporalising'. Heidegger's Augenblick is the disclosing of 
possibility out of, and into, the facti city of history. By contrast, that which originates in 
Benjamin's Augenblick is 'the image of history in itself.' 136 For, in 'the dialectical 
image, what has been within a particular epoch is always, simultaneously, "what has 
been from time immemorial".' 137 
At this level of Benjamin's thought, the image is not teleologically progressive, 
in a Kantian or Hegelian sense. It is 'simultaneously' mythical. The 'immemorial' is 
eternal, but not as transcendent of the finite. Its infinity must instead be thought of in 
terms of the mythic repetition of a concrete singularity. This repetition is occasioned by, 
and gives rise to, history - as catastrophe and revolution, not teleology and progress. It 
is this almost impossible conjunction of mythic time and historical time that Benjamin 
tentatively formulates in the most ambitious' convolute' of the Arcades Project: 'On the 
Theory of Knowledge, Theory of Progress'. Can a phenomenon be historically singUlar 
and immemorial? Perhaps it is the Augenblick itself, in excess of itself: 'What is 
"always the same thing" is not the event but the newness of the event, the shock with 
h· h . ,138 W IC It eventuates. 
135 Adorno, T. W. to Walter Benjamin, August 2nd, 1935, in Aesthetics and Politics, 
p.ll1. 
136 Tiedemann, Rolf. 'Dialectics at a Standstill', in Benjamin, W. The Arcades Project, 
r·940. . 
37 Benjamin, W. Arcades ProJect, p.464. 
138 Ibid, p.868. 
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Benjamin's 'imagistic' Augenblick is a vertical instant in historical time, and to 
this extent is chronometrically overdetermined. At the same time, the dialectical image 
is not determined chronometrically enough. Benjamin no longer acknowledges, as he 
did in the Trauerspiel study, that the chronometric tends towards the imagistic. 
Benjamin had proposed that the baroque 'slow procession' constitutes a 'choreographic' 
rendering of time, in time. This insight is not followed up in the Arcades Project. The 
Trauerspiel study is perhaps limited by the obsolescence of its object. Conversely, the 
elevation of the phenomena of nineteenth-century Paris to aesthetic contemplation 
yields to the methodological obsolescence predicted by Adorno. The advantage of No no 
is that he can be criticised as art, in experience. 
The foregoing account of the temporalities of modern music provides clues for 
the meaning of an expression of waiting in vain. Adorno's own musical examples of 
this expression are Berg's music-dramas. Nono departs from this paradigm of waiting, 
away from Adorno (Berg's student), in that the rhythm of the Second Viennese School 
is, as Stockhausen observed, premised upon a critique of verticality in harmony and 
cadence. It is those unresolved, dissonant chords of Berg that Adorno has in mind, when 
he speaks of an expression of waiting in vain. 
In his 1929 essay on Wozzeck, Adorno suggests that Berg's music articulates 
BUchner's words in a tragic-ironic opposition to words, so as to bring out the 
contemporaneity of hope in these 'classic' fragments. The mimetic expression, the 
'reflection [Reflex], of this 'Trauerspiel' is 'clouded in the light of tragic irony'. 
Perhaps Adorno's notion of a music that 'counts the minutes to death' already 
anticipates Nono's Jermata. 139 For there is a necessarily tragic ironic moment in the 
mimesis of detemporalisation (see chapter 4). The 'Fetish Character' essay closes with a 
remark that pits stasis against becoming, but not as an antinomy; not as tragic 
peSSImIsm: 
As little as regressive listening is a symptom of progress in the 
consciousness of freedom, it could suddenly turn around in art, in unity with 
society, should it ever leave the road of the always identical. l40 
There is an inner logic of mimetic repetition here. The 'turn around [umzuspringen] ' 
happens 'suddenly', out of regressive (tragic?) listening. Something other than music is 
given rise to, 'in unity with' a society to come. 
139 Adorno, T. W. GS 18, p.479. 
140 Adorno, T. W. 'On the Fetish Character', p.314. 
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4 
Invincible in the Wasteland? 
Music, Space and Utopia 
The mimetic, 'spatial' temporalisation of Prometeo cannot be separated from its spatial 
environment. Where both 'spheres of music' are concerned, today, this environment is 
preeminently metropolitan. During the 1970s, Cacciari engaged with some of the classic 
theoretical reflections on the 'Metropolis' (which he capitalises for reasons discussed 
below). In this research, Cacciari conceives of an 'architecture of nihilism' as 
constituting the 'tragic' acknowledgement of and resistance to the capitalist 'project' of 
the Metropolis. I The category of the tragic is at stake in the temporal-musical mimesis 
discussed above, just as it is at stake in the spatial-architectural mimesis outlined below. 
Cacciari was aware of a musical character 'in' the architectural - increasingly, 
perhaps, through his conversations and collaborations with Nono.2 Yet Cacciari does 
not explicitly call upon his earlier research when writing about and for Nono. Nor does 
he draw upon a long-standing (though marginal) literature on 'music and space' - a 
literature that he and Nono contribute to. Nono's late work can nevertheless be 
understood as a new response to those problems raised by Cacciari, whose architectural 
paradigm remained largely contemporaneous with his classic theoretical reflections. By 
contrast, Nono reads and translates the musical avant-garde, as practice, into an artwork: 
Prometeo. 
It is suggested in what follows that Prometeo asks a question of the meaning of 
place, in relation to that 'no-place' (or, 'non-place'), utopia. This was always part of its 
programme: Prometheus as both the tragedy of humanity and the possibility of 
overcoming the tragedy through humanity. The texts, compiled by Cacciari, refer to 
I This research is largely represented in English in Architecture and Nihilism trans. 
Stephen Sartarelli (Yale University Press, 1993). 
2 Cacciari writes of 'the shadowy possibility of consonance between music and 
monumental architecture.'But the affinity of music and architecture is dependant, here, 
upon an association of 'nothing' with 'silence', and 'being' with 'listening', recalling 
Heidegger's (phonocentric) call to thinking. Cacciari, M. 'Eupalinos or Architecture' 
(Review of Tafuri & Dal Co, Architettura contemporana) in Oppositions, (New York: 
MIT Press, 1980), no.21, p.ll 1. 
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Benjamin's 'weak meSSIamc force' as a name for this possibility. But the current 
interpretation departs from existing interpretations of Prometeo, including Cacciari's. In 
spite of the recognition of space as being a central to this work, no attempt has been 
made to situate this concern within the problematic of modernity. If the time of 
modernity impinges upon its space, and vice versa, then Prometeo can be said to 
allegorise this double impingement. An expression of waiting in vain, Prometeo 
proposes an immanent critique of Adorno's concept. A productively tragic-mimetic 
waiting would confront the 'vanity' of waiting in vain. The 'in vain', the infinitely 
deferred (bad) utopia, must not be taken for granted, since that would lead to a 
pessimistic decisionism just as dogmatic as the optimistic-humanist one (Cacciari 
speaks of 'the New Prometheus'). 
Cacciari's theoretical reflections on 'non-dwelling' come close to Adorno's 
critiques of origins - including the mythic home that would be utopia once over. 
Adorno attributes this archaism to Heidegger, of course, with some justification. But a 
great irony of 'Adorno and Heidegger' is that the latter systematically confronts the 
metaphysics that underpins the utopian concept of place, as the will to identity out of an 
absolutely posited difference (most obviously, as the reconciliation of nature and spirit 
or history). This metaphysical difference perpetuates a 'forgetting of Being'. Adorno 
participates in the metaphysical, ontotheological schema, in spite, it seems, of his idea 
of natural-history. For his part, Heidegger must rely upon a 'history of Being' (that does 
not acknowledge its ontotheological ruse). Both Heidegger and Cacciari risk a certain 
valorisation of waiting without the awaited - an open waiting that closes in on itself and 
which invites those regressive infinities associated with Adorno's own Kantian-
Romantic inclinations. A revised idea of natural-history might nevertheless be directed 
against the latent pessimism of Cacciari's tragic negativity - if, that is, the Hegelian-
Marxism of Adorno's promethean tragic is equally emphasised. 
The structure of this chapter breaks down into four parts. The first reconstructs 
Cacciari's research into the Metropolis and tragic negativity in order to suggest that the 
question of negation is already implicated in the questions of place, dwelling and 
utopia. This will have resource to other philosophies of the tragic. Cacciari' s 
Nietzschean tragic and Adorno's 'dialectical' tragic can each be viewed as productive 
fonns of mimesis. Second, as something of an intermezzo, the marginal yet significant 
literature of music and space will be reconstructed in order to set-up an affinity between 
concepts of music and utopia. Thirdly, Adorno's concept of aesthetic autonomy will be 
read according to the preceding narratives in order to stress the spatial permutations of 
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art, in relation to the questions of place and utopia. This critique will be mounted from 
the standpoint of Prometeo - that which, finally, will be considered according to its 
particular spatio-temporality as an expression of a waiting in vain. 
The Metropolis and Tragic Negativity 
Cacciari's essay 'Metropolis' takes Simmel's 'The Metropolis and Mental Life' (1903) 
as its point of departure. The Metropolis is ' a determinant moment of modern 
existence'. The Metropolis differs decisively from the city. It is 'the phase, or the 
problem, of the rationalisation of all social relations, which follows that of the 
rationalisation of the relations of production.' These rationalisations cannot do without 
the Metropolis - 'there is an objective reason' for it, as the singular expression of 
economic, political and social space (hence its capitalisation).3 'Metropolis' does not 
merely signify a subjective consciousness of capitalist modernity. It names its spatially 
and socially concrete reality. A productive tension thus pervades Cacciari's concept of 
the Metropolis. On the one hand, it is the real (and late?) capitalist Metropolis.4 On the 
other hand, the Metropolis is an ideal - the progressive yet impossible realisation of 
what Cacciari's colleague Manfredo Tafuri called the 'project' (in Progetto e Utopie, 
1973). Cacciari follows, in part, Tafuri's critique of the ideological syntheses 
manifested in architectural projects of the Enlightenment (in France, England and the 
USA).5 He does not, however, follow Tafuri's tendency to conflate the avant-garde with 
the project tout court. 
Cacciari initially seeks to expose the ideological implications of Simmel. The 
end of the nineteenth-century gives rise to an ideal of Aujkliirung in Germany - by way 
of a restoration of Kant and Goethe - which is bound to notions of individual 
cultivation, Bildung (this tendency is of course anticipated in England in 1. S. Mill's 
liberalism). 'The Metropolis and Mental Life' is a thesis on the manner of individuation 
in the Metropolis: the 'intellectualisation [Vergeistigung]' of 'mental life 
[Geistesleben] ' . 
3 Cacciari M. Architecture and Nihilism, p.4. 
4 The me;opolis has of course undergone transfor:n~tions both since its re~ection in the 
classic theoretical texts and since the 1970s. CaCClan takes the transformatIOn of the 
first third of the twentieth-century to be decisive on account of its contemporaneous 
reflection in both theory and ideology. 
5 Tafuri, Manfredo. Architecture and Utopia: Design and Capitalist De',elopment 
(1973), trans. Barbara Luigia La Penta (MIT Press, 1976), ch.l. 
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According to Simmel, the 'intellect [Verstand]' is 'intensified' as a 'protective 
organ' against the stimulation of 'nervous life [Nervenleben]'.6 Nervous stimulation 
threatens to 'uproot' the individual (the Kantian synthesis of the sensuous manifold is 
clear). The resulting 'reserve ... assures the individual of a type and degree of personal 
freedom to which there is no analogy in other circumstances ... the individual gains a 
freedom of movement' .7 Cacciari highlights the' synthesis' of Simmel' s closing remark: 
'it is not our task to complain or condone, but only to understand.,8 For Cacciari, the 
synthesis and totality of the Metropolis, an aggregate of free individuals (of seemingly 
no particular class) 'recuperates the value of community... in order to reaffirm it in 
society. ,9 
This leads to the second aspect of Simmel's ideology. The Metropolis is, in 
reality, a perpetually becoming ideal. It simultaneously posits and proscribes its utopia, 
in bad faith (Cacciari has more recently proposed that 'perpetual peace is a bad utopia', 
indicating perhaps that he is now open to the possibility of a 'virtuous' utopia, that not 
all utopias are 'bad,).l0 Following Nietzsche's blunt critique of Kantian metaphysics, 
Cacciari suggests that the ideal of the Metropolis is willed by, and as, the real 
Metropolis. 11 
For Simmel, the intellect is the productive schematism of 'continuous 
"innovation".' But as Cacciari observes, the life of the nerves and the intellect must 
stand in a reciprocal relationship, meaning that the intellect and not only intuition risks a 
passive receptivity: 'The Nervenleben is a condition of the intellect - an internal 
condition of its power, its dominion, completely integrated within it.' For the 'life of the 
nerves' is implicit and complicit in the reproduction of the commodity form and its 
attendant relations of production, including the spatial construction of the Metropolis. 
6 Simmel, Georg. 'Metropolis and Mental Life', in On Individuality and Social Forms, 
ed. Donald Levine (The University of Chicago Press, 1971), pp.325-326. 
7 Ibid. p.332. 
8 Ibid. p.339. 
9 Cacciari, M. Architecture and Nihilism. p.12. 
10 Cacciari, M. 'la paz perpetua es una mala utopia' (interview with Manuel Calderon), 
in Minerva, no.7 (Summer, 2008). Accessed at, 
www.circulobellasartes.comlag_ediciones-minerva-
LeerMinervaCompleto.php?art=229, on November 23, 2008. 
11 Matters are more complex than Cacciari gives credit here. Nietzsche attributes the 
ascetic ideal of 'intellectualisation [Vergeistigung]' to Kant, among other ascetic priests. 
But the language of Vergeistigung is equally an inflection of the va~~es of Aujkliirung, 
and in this respect the critique of Geist is no advance on Marx's cntIques of Hegel and 
Feuerbach. The Ol~ission of Hegel in Cacciari's early essays is notable given Hegel's 
attempt to overcome the Kantian, liberal (and legal) subject. 
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Cacciari is at one with Adorno here, who describes this reciprocal movement in 
terms of memory and forgetting (see chapter 3). For Simmel, this process 'dissolves 
individuality into the current of impressions and reintegrates these, precisely by virtue 
of their constitution, into the overall process of Vergeistigung.' 12 As the manifestation 
of the convergence between Vergeistigung and the exchange process, the Metropolis 
socialises (and naturalises) estranged relations of production (or, relations that re-
produce alienation). The Metropolis re-presents itself as place; as the familiar home 
promised in its name (,metro-polis', 'mother-city'). The real-ideal synthesises the 
contradiction that individuation based upon exchange relations alone does not produce 
reconciliation but rather blocks it. The Metropolis is the phantasmagoria of home; 'the 
futility of the search for the unicum'. \3 
Cacciari's critique of the 'unicum' can be understood according to a certain 
philosophical history. According to Cacciari's ambitious genealogy of modernity, 
philosophical idealism is a symptom of a broader (history of) metaphysics. Cacciari is 
initially careful not to subsume Kant (on whom he wrote his doctoral thesis), and Hegel, 
into the tendency of Vergeistigung, which remains a broadly neo-Kantian appropriation 
(recalling Rose's critique of Simmel). Ver-geistigung is, in this sense, part of a longer 
German tradition. Cacciari is aware of this tradition, through the figure of Schiller, 
whom he radically distinguishes from his contemporary, Goethe. Schiller represents not 
only the will to identity but also a determination of that will as infinite longing. This is a 
trope of much Romanticism. 
N ovalis famously declared that 'philosophy is really homesickness, an urge to 
be at home everywhere' .14 In the light of Cacciari's thesis, Novalis simultaneously 
expresses the problem of modernity and its solution. Philosophy is always in danger of 
being a form of consolation, at least so long as philosophy is understood as an 
autonomous mode of reflective existence, a utopia of its own making. The 'urge to be at 
home everywhere' determines 'home' as 'everywhere' and nowhere (so long as it 
remains philosophical). If longing is infinite then utopia is placed beyond this world. 
The question of music holds a privileged position in this Romantic metaphysics. 
For Cacciari, Simmel appropriates the Goethean counter-tradition, in spite of, or 
because of, his neo-Kantianism: 
12 Cacciari, M. Architecture and Nihilism. p.5. 
13 Ibid, p.8. . 
14 Quoted in, Heidegger, M. The Fundamental Concepts of JvfetaphyslcS, p.5. 
Simmel's most outstanding perception is his recogmtIOn of the most 
appropriate, expression of such an ideology in the form of negative thought. 
If the blase type fully reflects the structure of the Metropolis, it is not 
because he is fully consistent with it or because he is a mere reflection of it 
but rather because he understands it from the perspective of his ow~ 
inability to go beyond it, that is, from the perspective of his own negated 
individuality . 
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The 'blase' is an abstraction from use value: 'the money economy and the domination 
of the intellect stand in the closest relationship to one another. They have in common a 
purely matter-of-fact attitude in the treatment of persons and things'. 15 As Cacciari puts 
it, 'The monetary economy formalises economic relations, just as the intellect 
formalises psychic relations and movements.' 16 The Vergeistigung of the Metropolis 
aims at a unicum of things without use values. The blase-type is Robert Musil's Man 
Without Qualities. But 'negative thought' is the self-consciousness of this abstraction. 
And negative thought is tragic rather than dialectical. For it does not presume any 
gradual (and historical) progress. That would be to repeat the ideology of Vergeistigung 
itself. It is here that tragic negativity is contrasted with dialectical negativity. This is 
commonly understood as a mythic (or even, cosmological) notion of tragic repetition as 
versus the historical and humanist understanding of the tragic. This opposition is 
complicated for two reasons. Firstly, Cacciari's tragic negativity is already historical, or 
is at least a productive understanding of the tragic. Secondly, Adorno's post-Hegelian 
conception of negation comes close to - and must even coincide with - the tragic 
'moment' of the dialectic itself. 
What is Cacciari's concept of negation? In the essay 'On the German Sociology 
of the City at the Tum of the Century', Cacciari draws-out the negative thought of 
Simmel, whom he now situates in relation to Weber. Weber's critique of Tonnies' 
'Community and Society' (1887) is read against the backdrop of Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra (1882). Although Weber's 'The City' comes much later (1911-13), 
Cacciari draws upon Weber's Nietzscheanism (which must be summarised below, given 
that an account of this is largely absent from both Cacciari and from the Anglophone 
Weber literature). 17 
15 Cacciari, M. Architecture and Nihilism, p.9. 
16 Ibid. pp.6-8. . . 
17 Karl Lowith writes of this affinity. 'Weber's 'methodologIcal' questIOn as to the 
value of science is basically the same question that Nietzsche posed in regard to 
philosophy when he inquired after the meaning ~~ value ?f 'truth' - for "\vhat sense 
could our existence have, if not the sense that wIthm us thIS urge towards truth has 
become conscious of itself as a problem?".' Lowith. K. Max Weber and Karl Marx 
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Weber had confronted the dominant metaphysical assumptions of the 
Geisteswissenschiifte; of, notably, the Heidelberg neo-Kantian historian, Friedrich 
Rickert. 18 A crisis in the cultural sciences arises from the question of their metaphysical 
grounding. For Rickert, a regulative horizon of truth can be assumed to validate and 
unify the science of history. But for an anti-metaphysician such as Weber, this 
assumption remains merely an assumption. Weber attributes an ensuing epistemic crisis 
to the withering of the theological presuppositions of that metaphysics. 19 
'Disenchantment' is the (post-religious) phenomenon arising from the contradiction that 
rationalisation, motivated by science, leads to the impotence of science.2o Science is 
ideologically blinded to its impotence. 
Weber's response is the attempted 'value free [werifYei], perspective. This does 
not mean a relinquishment of the problem of value (as in Simmel's 'it is not our task to 
complain or to condone'). Cacciari's imagined dialogue between Simmel and Weber 
proposes an active nihilism: 'it is precisely this tragic, value free character of the 
negative that most accurately expresses the form and function of the Metropolis'. 21 The 
value-free perspective has three moments. (1) A self-consciousness of the historical 
conditions of the cultural sciences.22 (2) A 'Goethean' hypothesis of the 'ideal-type'. 
This is 'formed', 
by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the 
synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and 
occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged 
according to those one-sidedly emphasised viewpoints into a unified 
analytical construct. In its conceptual purity, this mental construct cannot be 
found anywhere in reality. It is a utopia.23 
(1932), (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), p.30. Lowith quotes here from the 
third essay of the Genealogy. 
18 Cf. Owen, David. Maturity and Modernity (London: Routledge, 1994), pp.84-89. 
19 For Weber, positive science, God's murderer, wrests the providence of truth away 
from God, whereas for Nietzsche this murder is responsible for the equally 
metaphysical 'will to truth' of positive science itself, that which 'never creates values'. 
Nietzsche F. On the Genealogy of Morals, p.120. 
20 'The fa;e of our times is characterised by rationalisation and intellectualization and, 
above all, by the "disenchantment of the world.'" Weber, Max. 'Science as a Vocation' 
(1922) in, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (London: Routledge, 1991), p.155. 
21 Cacciari M. Architecture and Nihilism. p.28. 
22 Weber, M. "'Objectivity" in Social Science' (1904), in The Methodology of the Social 
Sciences, trans. Edward A. Shils & Henry A. Finch (Glencoe Free Press, 1964), p.81; 
r· 112. 
3 Ibid. p.90. 
144 
Weber's self-conscious disenchantment is exhibited in this tragic-ironic reference to 
'utopia' (his ideal-types are not to be confused with Kant's regulative ideas). And yet, 
the ideal-type aims at knowledge, which is grounded in a valuation of enlightenment 
(hence, it is not entirely value free). The parallel to Nietzsche's Genealogy is clear. The 
ideal-type acknowledges a tendency, and in so doing challenges it, opposing it with 
another possibility - hence, revaluation through evaluation.24 The ideal-type is a 
productive mimesis. The value-free perspective is the productive mimesis of scientific 
objectivity. 
This tragic reversal in the meaning of utopia, which Weber merely hints at, is a 
reversal of the contemporaneous, Classicist interpretations of Goethe, in Dilthey, 
Simmel and Meinecke. These figures interpret the Goethean trope of contradiction (in 
Elective Affinities) as 'at once problem and solution, question and answer, lack and 
fulfilment ... from the perspective of the Schillerian utopia' - recalling the dictum of 
Novalis. Conversely, Nietzsche and Weber recognise that 'in Goethe the tragedy is the 
impossible utopia of the artistic representation's total ascendancy over modem social 
relations' .25 In Adorno's terms, modem art is semblance as dissonance. 
(3) Weber foregrounds the 'commitment' and 'character' of the scientist, as a 
'heroic' calling.26 The three moments of the value free perspective all share the 
characteristic of distance. According to L6with, 'What this doctrine demands is not the 
elimination of guiding "value ideas" and interests, but their objectification, so as to 
provide a basis for us to distance ourselves from them.,27 This is the distance of the 
blase-type, as Zarathustra. Distance is the freedom from and of value judgement. But 
not as negative, abstract freedom. The distancing gaze cannot lose sight of its object, 
just as the scientist cannot objectively relinquish the problem of value. Conversely, the 
distance of the gaze is produced in the re-valuation itself.28 The concept of distancing 
24 Weber invokes the Goethean image of the stream: 'if the professional thinker has an 
immediate obligation at all, it is to keep a cool head in the face of the ideals prevailing 
at the time ... and if necessary, "to swim against the stream".' Weber, M. 'The Meaning 
of "Ethical Neutrality'" (1917) in The Methodology of the Social Sciences, p.47. Weber 
cites Goethe's 'floor of waves beneath me ' (Faust, Act I, Scene II) in the earlier 
'"Objectivity''' essay: 'The light of the great cultural problems moves on. Then science 
too prepares to change its standpoint and its analytical apparatus and to view the 
streams of events from the heights of thought'. Ibid. p.112. 
25 Cacciari, M. Architecture and Nihilism, pp.70-71. 
26 Weber, M. Economy and Society (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), p.1116. 
27 L6with, K. Max Weber and Karl Marx, p.30. 
28 Nietzsche begins to outline his response to the crisis of value~ in Hum.an, All Too 
Human. This marks a departure from The Birth of Tragedy, whIch remamed confin~d to 
Schopenhauer's paradigm of tragic fate. The earlier understanding had led to a dualIsm 
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once again promises to overcome an antithesis of immanence and transcendence. It is 
no coincidence that Adorno has Weber in mind when he conceives of his dissonant 
nominalism. Though distancing is most obviously imagined spatially, it is equally a 
temporal concept: 'dissonantly musical' waiting as the historical possibility of nearness, 
the awaited. 
Book Three of Zarathustra provides Cacciari with a literal instance of tragic 
negation in the Metropolis. Zarathustra finds himself outside of the 'Groj3stadt'. A 
dwarf appears to him as 'the spirit of gravity'. 
Everything that rises must fall - you hurl a stone high into the air, and it will 
strike you - yet this pessimism, at bottom, is characterised by an ideal of 
perfect equilibrium. This pessimism regarding the direction of life's 
movements is only the equilibrium and the fulfilment of Schopenhauer's 
nirvana, which we later find in Parsifal. This pessimism is countered by the 
idea of the eternal return. 29 
Like the dwarf, the ape mistakes the 'eternal return' for equilibrium (he apes it). He 
urges Zarathustra to curse the Metropolis and return to the mountains: 'Rather spit on 
the city's gate and turn back. ,30 For Cacciari, this moment refers to the nostalgic return 
proposed by Tonnies, criticised in 'The City'. Zarathustra 'instead, gazes a long time 
upon the Metropolis, and remains silent.' His silence is tragic in that there is knowledge 
in excess, in the acknowledging gaze: 'the tragic vision illuminates the destiny of the 
Metropolis.,3\ Zarathustra concurs with the blase-type - 'there is nothing to make 
better, nothing to make worse' - but ultimately promises to go beyond him. Zarathustra 
neither remains at the city gate, nor does he return home. He does not resent: 'Where 
one can no longer love, one should - pass by!,32 Zarathustra's perspective encompasses 
two moments: 'repeating' (in the acknowledging gaze) and 'going beyond' (in the 
of 'setting man and fate over against one another as two separate things.' The task of the 
scientist, today, is to see fate from on high. The 'region ... of torrential streams ... cannot 
in any way be painted unless one is hovering above it in the air like a bird. Here the so-
called bird's eye view is for once not an artistic caprice but the sole possibility.' The 
stream emerges before the gaze, in the gaze, as the 'sole possibility' of the stream's 
emergence. Hence, Nietzsche does not merely 'go against the stream' offate, as in the 
more modest interventions of Weber (and Foucault?). Nietzsche wants to redirect the 
stream itself. Nietzsche, F. Human, all too Human, trans. R. 1. Hollingdale (Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), p.325; p.343. 
29 Cacciari, M. Architecture and Nihilism. p.25. 
30 Ibid. p.26. 
31 Ibid. p.28. .. 
32 Nietzsche, F. Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. R. 1. Hollmgdale (London: PenguIn, 
1969), p.198. 
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excessive knowledge). Cacciari emphasises the historicity of Nietzsche's eternal return, 
over its cosmological or pessimistic interpretations. 
The conceptual pairs of progress and repetition, revolution and catastrophe, 
history and fate, can be read into the contrasting interpretations of tragedy in modem 
philosophy - indeed, as the inception of modem philosophy itself.33 Heroic resistance to 
the gods' power brings something of the gods' power - divinity - to the heroes, 
humanity. For Benjamin, therefore, the tragic death is 'an ironic immortality.'34 Human 
knowledge encompasses a finite limit that is acknowledged and experienced in its 
repetition. Divine knowledge is repeated in this appropriation, an appropriation of the 
power of recurrence itself. It is the meaning of this liminal repetition that is disputed in 
the philosophies of the tragic. For, the tragic is not necessarily pessimistic. The 
principle thinkers to conceive of the tragic as productive, as a form of transformation, 
are conventionally opposed: Hegel and Nietzsche. According to the latter, the nihilism 
of Zarathustra demands an awareness that 'repeats... as going beyond.' The 'going 
beyond' is the transgression of the tragic cycle/rom the tragic cycle alone. 
Tragedy is equally one of Hegel's first models for confronting the antinomies in 
the practical philosophies of Kant and Fichte. In his early essay On the Scientific Ways 
0/ Treating Natural Law (1802-3), Hegel displaces a negative concept of freedom, 
which situates the individual against abstract, universal law, with a positive, finite 
conception of freedom, as mediated in (or as) the 'absolute idea of ethical life 
[Sittlichkeit]'. According to Hegel, 
Tragedy consists in this, that ethical nature, in order not to become 
entangled with its inorganic nature, separates the latter from itself as a fate 
and opposes itself to it; and by acknowledging this fate in the struggle 
against it, ethical nature is reconciled with the divine being as the unity of 
both. 
Greek tragedy is, in Hegel's Hellenocentric schema, the historical emergence of the 
notion of spirit, since spirit is the self-consciousness of the contradiction of finite and 
infinite as contradiction. Modernity is thereafter the determinate unfolding of spirit in 
its actuality (the Messiah comes gradually). In more structural terms, the dialectic must 
encompass the tragic - though it is surely going too far to say that, for Hegel, 'the tragic 
33 The most important of these philosophical interpretations are critically compared in, 
Szondi, Peter. An Essay on the Tragic, trans. Paul Fleming (Stanford University Press, 
2002). 'Since Aristotle, there has been a poetics of tragedy. Only since Schelling has 
there been a philosophy of the tragic.' p.l. 
34 Benjamin, W. 'Trauerspiel and Tragedy', in Collected ~Vritings, vol. I , p.56. 
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and the dialectic coincide' .35 Hegel and Nietzsche share a productive understanding of 
the tragic, against Schopenhauer. There is a 'speculative' promise of going beyond, as 
the anti-tragic moment of the tragic.36 From both ends of the nineteenth-century, these 
thinkers are motivated, as L6with knew, by the stasis of bourgeois society (though 
Hegel became party to it!).37 
Cacciari comes close to Benjamin's sketch for an interpretation of the later 
Nietzsche in the Arcades Project. Eternal recurrence is the time of novelty; of the 
commodity. Where Adorno tends to find only stasis and death in this repetition of the 
same, Benjamin finds a rupture of the new, as a new Erfahrung. 38 'On eternal 
recurrence: "The great thought as a Medusa head: all the features of the world become 
motionless, a frozen death throe". ,39 Benjamin undoubtedly sees Nietzsche as a product 
of his age: 
The notion of eternal return appeared at a time when the bourgeoisie no 
longer dared count on the impending development of the system of 
production which they had set going.4o 
But if Benjamin were only interested in historicising Nietzsche, then he would surely 
not have included the following citation (because it has a catastrophic connotation): 'we 
have created the weightiest thought - now let us create the being for whom it is light 
d I . ,,41 an p easmg. 
Why, in that case, does Cacciari go to Nietzsche and not to Benjamin's friend, 
Adorno? Cacciari did 'not intend to go into a discussion of the various "critical 
theories'" .42 His early essay 'On the Genesis of Negative Thought' sought 'a rigorous 
35 Szondi, Peter. An Essay on the Tragic, p.16. 
36 'The true sense of [tragedy] is the ... insight that what the hero atones for is not his 
own particular sins, but original sin, in other words, the guilt of existence itself.' 
Schopenhauer, A. The World as Will and Representation, vol. 1, p.254. 
37 L6with, K. From Hegel to Nietzsche: The Revolution in Nineteenth-Century Thought, 
trans. David E. Green (Columbia University Press, 1964), p.175. 
38 L6with, K. Nietzsche's Philosophy of the Eternal Recurrence of the Same (1935), 
trans. 1. Harvey Lomax (University of California Press, 1997). Benjamin appears to 
overlook the cosmological interpretation of eternal recurrence presented by L6with, 
which, as cosmological, L6with takes to be inconsistent with the 'will to power'. 
39 Benjamin, W. Arcades Project, p.115. 
40 Ibid. p.117. 
41 Ibid. p.116. 
42 Cacciari M. Architecture and Nihilism, p.16. Tafuri observes the 'anti-Hegelian 
rediscove~ of the negative' in Bloch and Marcuse. Why not Adorno'? Tafuri, M. 
Architecture and Utopia, p.59. 
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systematisation of an anti -dialectical thought. ,43 Of course, Adorno shares Cacciari' s 
aversion to synthesis. The anti-dialectics of negative thought is no doubt comparable to. 
though not identical to, the 'anti-system' of negative dialectics. This possibility can be 
pursued, to some extent, before coming across the old problem of positing (progress). 
Adorno comes close to Cacciari' s Nietzschean reflections, to the extent that he 
posits ideal-types as hypothetical extractions of 'tragic' historical tendencies. And like 
Cacciari, these ideals name certain limits that regulate the real - even though, and 
especially because, they cannot not themselves be realised. The 'totally administered 
society', reification, is always imminent but never immanent (Adorno knows that the 
claim for final reification must contradict itself since the claim presumes a standpoint of 
non-reified subjectivity).44 Adorno's 'absolute commodity' is, perhaps, one such ideal-
type.45 Hence, Cacciari's formulations closely resemble the 'Fetish Character' essay, in 
which music is taken to be in some sense an exemplary commodity: 
the whole system becomes clear: the Nervenleben corresponds to the 
continuous and relentlessly innovated transubstantiation of exchange value 
into use value - that is, it corresponds to the necessary instance in which 
exchange value becomes real value.46 
Cacciari's 'transubstantiation' recalls the 'quid pro quo' of Marx and Adorno (a 
'theological nicety'). Adorno and Cacciari each consider the real implications of this 
ideal, a limit that is experientially demarcated and raised to the level of self-
consciousness in art - and (as) architecture. 
For Adorno, 'mimesis' in art acknowledges and goes beyond a rational limit, 
manifested in the 'constructive' aspect of the work. 'Art is a stage in the process of what 
Max Weber called the disenchantment of the world, and it is entwined with 
rationalisation. ,47 Mimesis, like the tragic, is a productive repetition of the limit. Unlike 
in Cacciari however, mimesis and rationality are themselves dialectical limit-concepts, 
43 Lombardo, P. Introduction to Architecture and Nihilism, xxv. 
44 The exceptional limit-concept in Adorno is, of course, 'Auschwitz'. It names a 
reality, not a hypothesis. At the same time, it is the most regulative of all of Adorno's 
'limit-concepts'. As well as the real catastrophe, Auschwitz names another, potentially 
real event: the dissolution of the promise of enlightenment, and hence of utopia i tsel f 
(see chapter 5). . . . 
45 Their shared critique is that Benjamin's Chockerlebnis IS not medIated - III art, 
including architecture. Cacciari, M. Architecture and Nihilism, p.18. See chapter 3, 
above, for Adorno's critique. 
46 Cacciari, M. Architecture and Nihilism. p.6. 
47 Adorno, T. W. Aesthetic Theory, p.54. 
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or categories: 'The dialectic of these elements is similar to dialectical logic, in that each 
pole realises itself in the other, and not in some middle ground.' Thus, 'construction 
gains expression through coldness'; that is, through its non-expressive limit.48 
On the basis of the conceptual affinities between Adorno and Cacciari, and in 
the light of the philosophies of the tragic in Hegel and Nietzsche, Cacciari's 'negative 
thought' is not so 'anti-dialectical' as might be supposed. And Adorno's concept of 
negation seems far from being anti-tragic. Modem art, insofar as it is modem, must 
acknowledge and transgress limits. This is because, according to Adorno, the incessant 
rationality manifested in capitalist society renders most past forms of art obsolete once 
the rational limit that they challenged is fully developed. The acknowledgement of an 
advanced ratio appears in the mimetic repetition of the constructive limit, or limitation, 
in the most advanced art. Hence, Adorno considers the limits of music in 'Vers une 
musique informelle'. There is no possibility of going beyond limits without 
acknowledging them. As his proto-manifesto makes clear, there can be no assumption 
that such limits will indeed be overcome. For, 'It is self-evident that nothing concerning 
art is self-evident anymore,.49 This is crucial for understanding Adorno's (negative) 
dialectic. From the - phenomenological - standpoint of consciousness, the dialectic 
faces a single limit, not a series of limits stretching into an expected future, since such 
limits only become acknowledged as limits after negating existing limits. There is, in 
this sense, no presumption of progress in Adorno's dialectic; no Vergeistigung. 
Hegel has various ways of stating the progressive nature of spirit. The sociality 
of reason must be 'actual', not 'abstract'. That there has been progress - that there has 
been a series of determinate negations - reveals the series to be inherently progressive. 
Each historical shape of consciousness manifests a true moment in the unfolding of 
world-spirit. For Adorno, this quasi-inductive approach cannot - quite - hold, given the 
course of recent history (see chapter 5). 
It was suggested in chapter I that this seeming disavowal of progress leads to 
the problem of positing. The problem of progress and (infinite) regress returns once 
again here. For if it is the case that, in rejecting a progressive dialectic, Adorno 
unwittingly embraces a neo-Kantian infinite task - without radicalising it, a fa Cacciari 
- then this would lend a passive nihilistic meaning to his upholding of the Bilderverbot. 
That is to say, Adorno would thereby uphold the ban on both the representation and the 
presentation of utopia. He would idealise utopia as no-place ever, a 'never-place'. 
48 Ibid. p.44. 
49 Ibid. p.l. 
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Adorno is partly saved from this fate by his idea of natural-history. Nevertheless. in a 
passage from Dialectic of Enlightenment Adorno and Horkheimer slip from the 
disavowal of concrete origins into a disavowal of concrete goals: 
The fact that - despite the fascist lies to the contrary - the concept of 
homeland [Heimat] is opposed to myth constitutes the innennost paradox of 
epic. Precipitated in the epic is the memory of an historical age on which 
nomadism gave way to settlement, the precondition of homeland. If the 
fixed order of property implicit in settlement is the source of human 
alienation, in which all homesickness and longing spring from a lost primal 
state, at the same time it is toward settlement and fixed property, on which 
alone the concept of homeland is based, that all longing and homesickness 
are directed. Novalis's definition according to which all philosophy is 
homesickness holds good only if this longing is not dissipated in the 
phantasm of a lost original state, but homeland, and nature itself, are 
pictured as something that have first to be wrested from myth. 50 
The origin - Heimat - is the goal. But Adorno and Horkheimer invite the reverse 
possibility: the goal is the origin, 'a lost primal state' from which 'longing spring[ s]'. 
The concept of Heimat arises from the experience of its loss. But what is lost was itself 
Heimatlos: nomadism, which Adorno and Horkheimer tend to detennine as exile. 
A contradiction ('paradox') of Heimat and Heimatlos is sustained here. But this 
antinomy tends to synthesise its self-contradiction, in the most Kantian of ways, in its 
suggestion that Heimat is the unending longing of nomadism for settlement, settlement 
for nomadism, and so on, ad infinitum. Adorno wants to preserve a longing for home, as 
utopia. But it cannot be 'wrested from myth' because myth is itself the regressive, 
cyclical infinity of longing. Utopia is thereby Romantically idealised, as it is in Novalis. 
'Nature' remains the unconditioned. 51 At the same time, Adorno and Horkheimer posit 
nature as that which must be reconciled with history, as history's alientated other. This 
(Judeo-Christian) schema is no more apparent than in Adorno's essay on Holderlin: 
Within the sphere of Holderlinian imagery, the domination of nature itself 
comes close to being the original sin; that is the measure of its complicity 
with Christianity ... Philosophically, the anamnesis of suppressed nature, in 
which Holderlin tries to separate the wild from the peaceful, is the 
consciousness of non-identity, which transcends the compulsory identity of 
52 the logos. 
50 Adorno, T. W. & Horkheimer, M. Dialectic of Enlightenment, pp.60-61. 
51 'We look everywhere for the Unconditional Absolute, and all wefind are the 
conditions'. Novalis, 'Miscellaneous Remarks' (1797), in Classic and Romantic 
German Aesthetics, trans. Karl Ameriks (Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.203. 
52 Adorno, TW. 'Parataxis', in Notes To Literature, vo1.2, p.141. 
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The moment of disavowal of utopia is arguably connected to the absence of a 
phenomenology (and politics) of space in Adorno. If utopia is no-place, ever, then it can 
be placed in the present as little as it can be placed in the past or the future. Cacciari 
does not oppose this position, and in many respects he repeats it. For Cacciari does not 
offer a positive utopia, here and now. Rather, following Nietzsche and Heidegger, he 
radicalises the problem, the negativity of its non-place, into the nihilism of 
Vergeistigung itself. It is here that an avowedly 'anti-dialectical' response becomes 
more promising than a 'dialectical' one. Cacciari suggests that there is a compulsion to 
consider the problem of space, since the existing social space is complicit with the 
passive nihilism generated by the project of capitalist modernity itself. The tragic 
acknowledgement of this nihilism, its nothingness, is the possibility of a new space, a 
new place. 
The Non-Place of Non-Dwelling 
Cacciari construes the problem of the Metropolis as a problem for architecture. His 
exemplary architect of nihilism is Adolf Loos. In Aesthetic Theory, by contrast, Loos 
(who makes up most of the few references to architecture) stands for functionality 
without mimesis. Architecture cannot be autonomous art: 
The purely constructed, strictly objective artwork, which ever since Adolf 
Loos has been the sworn enemy of everything artisanal, reverses into the 
artisanal by virtue of its mimesis of functional forms: Purposelessness 
. h b . 53 WIt out purpose ecomes Irony. 
Adorno subsequently adjusts his position on LOOS.54 But for Cacciari, purposeless 
without purpose is ironic and tragic. Loos exposes the structural limits of Vergeistigung. 
Instead of 'dialectics', his multiple 'dialects' eschew the traditional syntheses - of 
modem and traditional, industrial and craft - associated with the contemporaneous 
Werkbund and Werkstiitte architectural movements. The former present the 'immediate 
use value' of handicraft as 'pure value corresponding to precise a priori forms, forms 
constituting artistic creativity.' Such forms purport to lie beyond exchange relations. 
The contradiction that their use value is in fact transubstantiated exchange value, and 
53 Adorno, T. W. Aesthetic Theory, p.58. . 
54 Cf. Adorno, T. W. 'Functionalism Today', in Rethinking Architecture, ed. Nell Leach 
(London: Routledge, 1997), pp.6-20. 
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that one language is many, is suppressed: 'Use value, in its capitalist sense. has no 
"autonomous" quality to manifest. ,55 
This claim to autonomy extends to, or from, the Metropolis itself. The 
Metropolis is placed according to a valorisation of its limit (its 'city-walls'). The limit is 
once again real and ideal. The Metropolis as place stands in contradiction with the 
exchange relations that reproduce it. This is because universal space is an ideal of the 
Metropolis. Its claim to place is made through an ideological valorisation of 'empty 
space'. This is already hinted at in Simmel: 
The calculating exactness of practical life which has resulted from a money 
economy corresponds to the ideal of natural science, namely that of 
transforming the world into an arithmetical problem and of fixing every one 
of its parts in a mathematical formula. 56 
Cacciari reads Simmel's arithmetic in terms of a 'geometric', no doubt as an allusion to 
the Rationalist systems. This shift of emphasis within the mathematical constitutes, at a 
specific level, a critique of Cartesian space - of space as Cartesian, as against the 
spatial - and, at a general level, a critique of the purportedly Rationalist (and, 
rationalised) foundations of modern social and political space. 
The (Lockean) ideal equality of appropriable space - the 'tabula rasa', as 
Cacciari puts it - is the ideal equality of individual, consumer freedom. The abstractness 
of negative freedom is in turn reflected in the abstractness of space; a space that cannot, 
it seems, be a social place at all. The Metropolis presents itself as a place, at the same 
time foreclosing the possibility of a different place to come. It is no surprise, therefore, 
that Cacciari is drawn both to Heidegger's critique of Cartesian space and to his later 
reflections upon the possibility of 'dwelling' amidst the 'homelessness of modern 
man,.57 
In Being and Time, Heidegger observes that the 'res corporea' of Descartes' 
Principia Philosophae is determined as 'substantia': 'Substances become accessible in 
their "attributes", and every substance has some distinctive property from which the 
essence of the substantiality of that definite substance can be read off.' 'Which 
property', asks Heidegger, 'is this in the case of the res corporea?' 
Extension - namely, in length, breadth, and thickness - makes up the real 
Being of that corporeal substance which we call 'world' ... Extension ... 
55 Cacciari, M. Architecture and Nihilism, p.l 03. 
56 Simmel, G. 'The Metropolis and Mental Life', p.237. 
57 Heidegger, M. 'Letter on Humanism', in Basic Writings, p.243. 
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must already 'be' before any other ways in which Being is detennined so 
that these can 'be' what they are.58 ' 
Extension is the essence of substance, against which all other attributes are, precisely. 
accidents. A substance without attributes would remain substantial, because the res 
corporea is essentially res extensa. If the res is an extended thing, then how is its 
extension to be known? How is its truth, and thus truth itself, to be detennined? 'That 
which is accessible in an entity through mathematics, makes up its Being' .59 Heidegger 
does not question the reliability of mathematics, but rather the attempt to render its ontic 
findings as ontological. 
Heidegger's phenomenological alternative to Cartesian space goes under the 
heading of 'The Spatiality of Being-in-the-world'. 'Being in space' might be defined as 
a 'position in "world-space".' Locations "in" space are relative to each other by 
measured extension. Heidegger proposes an alternative conception of distance here, as 
'de-severance [Enifernung] and directionality,.60 'Nearness' does not coincide with 
measured distance. Neither is it 'anti-realistic'. 'Things' are 'equipment', disclosed 
according to the ends to which they are 'assigned' and 'referred', by way of an 
expectation of (their) detenninate possibilities (including 'letting-alone'). Calculating 
measurement would be one such possibility. But that remains a distinctive possibility of 
Dasein as already de-severing. Dasein, the 'Fragwilrdig', is 'scientific' in the broadest 
possible sense. Hence, the spatial is (in transcendental terms) the condition for the 
possibility of space; not vice versa. The detennination of place as idealised space then 
renders place an ideal impossibility. Importantly, this ideal is regulative. It is not that 
place is space (today) but rather that the 'geometric' project forecloses the possibility of 
another, socially self-determined place. In tenns of Heidegger, of course, it closes down 
possibility as such. The detennination of Being as quantifiably extended substance 
leads to the nihilism of 'modem technology'. 
The concepts of place, dwelling and home share connotations of the local, the 
community and the family (the familiar, heim-lich). Loos negates these connotations -
in his homes. He gives voice to the contemporary impossibility of place; to the 
contradiction of space and place. Loos' homes are anti-homes. One of Cacciari's 
arguments about these homes concerns the relationship between interior and exterior: 
the bourgeois, philistine concept of the home - the concept of a totality of 
dwelling, of a reciprocal transparency between interior and exterior. .. is 
58 Heidegger, M. Being and Time, p.125. 
59 Ibid. p.128. 
60 Ibid. p.138. 
logically false. The home is in reality a plurality of languages that cannot be 
red~~e~ .to un~tie~ by the deterministic logic of nineteenth century 
POSI~IVISt1C u~opIams~ ... The archi~ect remains true to his calling as long as 
he gIves maXImum VOIce to these dIfferences and lets them appear in full. 61 
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This multiplicity exceeds the binary of interior and exterior, into the 'silence' beyond 
dialects. By treating the boundary of inner and outer abyssally, Loos both resists the 
'natural' boundaries of the home, or Metropolis, and keeps open the possibility of a 
different dwelling. Possibility originates in nihilation. In his reading of Wittgenstein's 
'oikos' (built for his sister), Cacciari suggests that 'all that remains' after the 
determination of place as space is this silence of possibility. Such silence must be given 
voice; it must become eloquent (contra-Wittgenstein?). The negation of the Metropolis 
through an affirmation of an alternative utopia is the only impossibility, for Loos, since 
the 'metropolitan context ... negates the interior values' of 'place'. The architecture of 
nihilism does not oppose the Metropolis with another place. It might at least open the 
possibility of thinking another place. 
It is here that Cacciari repeats a problem in Heidegger and follows Heidegger's 
response to that problem - albeit with a polemical reversal. In Being and Time, the 
nothingness of 'Dasein's impossibility', death, is that which phenomenologically stirs 
the question of Being (as not nothing). Heidegger's early, active nihilism can be 
characterised as a call to questioning. This gesture appears in Cacciari' s account of the 
abstracted blase-type. The emptiness of the man without qualities plummets him into 
the call for decision. Cacciari ironises Heideggerian 'authenticity [Eigentlichkeit], by 
suggesting that Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften is the modern possibility of authenticity. 
But the structure of nihilation and possibility remains, meaning that Cacciari is 
susceptible to some of the other objections to Being and Time. Possibility, questioning, 
is seemingly (of itself) without content here. Loos risks the abstract over the 
determinate negation by asking non-questions. There is nowhere to 'go beyond' to. 
There can be no going beyond as such. 
Heidegger's self-confessed 'turning' involves the attempt to confront this 
problem of existential questioning for its own sake. The 'enigma [Ratse!] of Being' is 
not infinitely irresolvable. On the basis of his readings of H6lderlin (and in contrast to 
Adorno's H6lderlin) Heidegger suggests that 'we must try to bring the enigma as 
62 A' f enigma closer to us' - in, that is, an unprecedented manner. n mstance 0 
61 Cacciari M. Architecture and Nihilism, p.l 07. 
62 Heidegg~r, M. H6lderlin 's Hymn: "The ISler", pp.34-5. 
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Heidegger's turning can be found in 'Building Dwelling Thinking' (1951). Heidegger 
proposes another non-Cartesian concept of 'space [Raum]': 
A space is something that has been made room for, something that has been 
freed, namely, within a boundary, Greek peras. A boundary is not that at 
which something stops but, as the Greeks recognised, the boundary is that 
from which something begins its essential unfolding. That is why the 
concept is that of horismos that is, horizon, the boundary ... Accordingly, 
spaces receive their essential being from places [Orte] and not from 
"space ".63 
Heidegger's 'boundary' IS equivocal. On the one hand, a nostalgic, provincial 
conception of dwelling can be discerned - belonging to the locality, which for 
Heidegger is not just any locality. The 'clearing away [Raumen], is a dispersing, yet the 
'place' that it places is a 'gathering [Versammeln],. 'Place always opens a region in 
which it gathers the things in their belonging together. ,64 That which does not belong, 
which is not gathered, or is not proper (the metropolis, no doubt) lies beyond the 
horizon of Heidegger' s Ortschaft.65 
On the other hand, 'boundary' signifies that space is bounded, not unbounded, 
as with the Cartesian res (whose extension cannot be limited by any qualities). Space is 
finite for the finite human being: 'To be a human being means to be on the earth as a 
mortal. It means to dwell.' Hence Heidegger connects dwelling to finitude. This is no 
longer the existentialism of 'Being-in-the-World', because dwelling is both a 
questioning and a response. Dwelling cannot, today, be brought about solely by 
building new buildings, or by returning to such buildings as the 'farmhouse' of 
Heidegger's Black Forest. There is a circular, or circling problem of dwelling, building 
and thinking according to Heidegger: 'Only if we are capable of dwelling, only then can 
we build. ,66 But the circle is not solely vicious. The problem of dwelling appears in the 
impossibility of dwelling. In terms of Cacciari' s nihilism, the idealisation of place not 
only raises the question as to the meaning of place (this position would correspond to 
existentialism), it also hints at a response to the problem. What dwelling would be is 
present, presents itself, in the near absence of dwelling. It is in this sense that Cacciari 
63 Heidegger, M. 'Building Dwelling Thinking', in Basic Writings, p.356. 
64 Heidegger, M. 'Art and Space', in Rethin~in? Architec~ure, ~. ~ 23.. . 
65 Heidegger's declaration, 'Why We RemaIn In th~ Pro:Inces , IS gIVen Its d~e by 
Adorno in The Jargon of Authenticity, trans. Fredenc WIll & Knut TarnowskI (London: 
Routledge, 2003), pp.43-44. 
66 Heidegger, M. 'Building Dwelling Thinking', p.349. 
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speaks of 'non-dwelling' as 'the essential characteristic of life in the Metropolis' .67 
Cacciari (mostly) opposes Heidegger's preoccupation with dwelling as 'locale', but he 
equally radicalises Heidegger's unique awareness of the problem of dwelling as 
constitutive of the problem of modem nihilism itself. Hence, Heidegger's equal and 
opposite preoccupation with the 'unheimlich', as 'unheimisch' - that which is without 
place, the abyssal un-ground of Being in its concealment.68 This constitutes Heidegger's 
ontological opposition to the 'onto-theo-logical' grounding of Being - whether as the 
Creation or as (in its secularised form) the absolute logical positing of identity and 
difference.69 
Cacciari sympathises with Heidegger' s critique of Cartesian space, as 
constituting the metaphysical ground of Gestell: 'cities then become, in exact 
accordance with their present image, a total... occupation-plundering of space.' 
Cacciari associates the 'spatial delimitation that one encounters in the history of the 
city' with 'a loss of place' or 'Ent-ortung', de-placement. And yet, Cacciari has already 
noted, in his critique of Tonnies for instance, that the projection of the categories of 
place or home into the contemporary situation must be reactionary. That would be 
precisely the interpretation of decadence, as decline, that Cacciari opposes (in his essays 
on the 'posthumous people' ofjin-de-siecle Vienna). 
Cacciari is sensitive to this problem of nostalgia. How 'can one conceivably 
combat Entortung without making the Angel's gaze towards the past a mere act of 
nostalgia and consolation?' 70 The anti-utopia of Loos provides the clue, once again: 
Loos' architecture does not seek the rationalisation of "pure" places, but is 
aimed at showing the endless contradiction between the thought-out space 
of calculation, the equivalence of the exteriors, and the possibility of place, 
the hope of a place. The Loosian house preserves this hope, just as the gaze 
of Benjamin's Angel preserves the "glimmers" of the past. That which can 
be shown is not the "redemption" of place, but the dissonance existing 
between the equivalence of techno-scientific space and the characteristic of 
space as a game of a combination of places, where things are gathered and 
67 Cacciari, M. 'Eupalinos or Architecture', p.97. 
68 'We mean uncanny in the sense of that which is not at home - not homely in that 
which is homely. It is only for this reason that the un-homely [das Un-heimische] can, 
as a consequence, also be "uncanny" ["unheimlich"] in the sense of something that has 
an alienating or "frightening" effect that gives rise to anxiety.' Heidegger, Martin. 
H61derlin's Hymn: "The Ister ", trans. William McNeill & Julia Davis (Indiana 
University Press, 1996), p.4l. 
69 Cf. Heidegger, M. 'The Onto-theo-Iogical Constitution of Metaphysics' , in Identity 
and Difference, pp.42-76. 
70 Cacciari, M. Architecture and Nihilism, p.169. 
dwell with man. This dissonance must be composed: even the extreme 
dissonances must be the object of composition.7l 
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The composition of the contradiction, its dissonance, contains within it the 'hope of a 
place'. Cacciari' s understanding of nihilism is not nostalgic here. The determination of 
place as space does not call for a return to local places (provinces). Rather, the 
progressive determination of Vergeistigung must be radicalised and ultimately 
overcome, in a manner akin to the 'twisting-free' of metaphysics encountered above. 
Insofar as non-dwelling is the possibility of dwelling, Cacciari' s non-dwelling can be 
termed, against his stated intentions, 'dialectical'. 
It then becomes clearer as to why Cacciari had drawn upon the 'cosmopolitan' 
implications of non-dwelling in Simmel. Following Benjamin's interpretation of 
Simmel, Cacciari suggests that the 'adventure [Abenteuer], is not simply affirmative-
of negative freedom - but is rather, in the light of H6lderlin and Nietzsche, the 
possibility of the journey. The Erlebnis is the possibility of Erfahrung. For Simmel, 
Cacciari and N ono, 'Venice' is an allegory for this possibility: 
That Venice has been and will be the city of adventure is just the most 
perceptible expression of the deepest destiny of its image: it cannot be a 
home for our soul, cannot be anything but adventure.72 
For Nono, this adventure, the determinate negation of home, IS exemplified III the 
acoustico-spatial experience of Venice: 
the sound of bells spreads in different directions: some add to each other, 
are transported over the waters along the channel. Other sounds vaporise 
almost completely, or mingle in various ways with the other signs of the 
lagoon and the city.73 
This remark merely hints at the way in which the negation of home is related to music. 
For music is not sound alone. A literature of music and space will be briefly 
reconstructed here in order to understand the way in which N ono' s Prometeo is a 
'Tragedia dell' ascolto' . 
7l Ibid, p. 172. . .. 
72 Cited in: Cacciari, M. Architecture and Nihilism, IV1l1. . .• 
73 'Conversation Between Luigi Nono and Massimo Cacciari with MIchele Bertaggla , 
in Verso Prometeo. 
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Music and Space 
The tragic-symbolic consummation of the world in mUSIC was theorised by 
Schopenhauer and put into practice by the culture industry. What Safranski calls 'the 
current era's ubiquity of music', which 'knows no bounds' (see introduction) is akin to 
Cacciari's 'futile search for the unicum'. This is the paradox of the 'musical' adventure 
(and journey). On the one hand, the ubiquity of (commodity) music satisfies the need to 
be at home everywhere in the world. This 'homeless' world is ideologically turned into 
'home'. On the other hand, the traversal of boundaries in multiple directions is the 
adventure of the blase-type, the man without qualities, the wanderer - hence, the 
'critique' of home itself. And music seems to hold a privileged position in this 
'twisting' from the no-place to the non-place - on account of its spatial peculiarities. 
Before Schopenhauer had suggested that music goes beyond world space into an 
infinite space beyond, his master, Kant, had already taken notice of music's 
transgression of boundaries: 
Music has a certain lack of urbanity to it. For owing chiefly to the character 
of its instruments, it scatters its influence abroad to an uncalled-for extent 
(through the neighbourhood), and thus, as it were, becomes obtrusive and 
deprives others, outside the musical circle, of their freedom ... The case is 
almost on a par with the practice of regaling oneself with a perfume that 
exhales its odours far and wide.74 
The spatial ambiguity of music, expressed in the question, 'where is this music?' has 
traditionally been acknowledged in terms of a polarity of 'inner' and 'outer'. Kant 
remarks on the outer aspect of music here. But the same Kant would have to say that the 
art of time is accordingly the art of the 'inner sense' (he did not, but Schelling did).75 
How can music be both inner and outer? 
A distinction is made within the outer between musical space and the space of 
the performance. But this is ultimately another 'inner-outer'. Kurth appeals to Kant's 
outer sense: 'With the outer world-image [WeltbUd] we are bound to the intuition of 
space (as a priori origination); something thereof is also conferred upon the inner world 
·77 M . image of music.' 76 Music gives rise to a 'strongly felt' 'analogy' to the 'outer. liSIC 
74 Kant, I. Critique of Judgement, p.196. 
75 'Time is nothing other than the form of inner sense'. Kant, I. Critique of Pure 
Reason, A33/B49, p.163. 
76 Kurth, E. Musikpsychologie, p.118. 
77 Ibid. p.120. 
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is as if space. It is an 'abstract [Undeutlich], and 'enigmatic [Ratselreich] ... spatial 
presentation' .78 But the space of the performance - the' localisation' of the sound - 'has 
nothing to do' with the inner musical space. It is rather the 'opposite of the inner spatial 
presentation' .79 This opposition will be returned to. 
Hegel classifies the forms of art according to the Erinnerung of spirit. Art is an 
externalisation, Entaiisserung, commencing with the most outward, Symbolic art of 
architecture, and ending with most the inner, Romantic arts of painting, music and 
poetry. Hegel's philosophy of music can be read according to the 'architecture' of the 
Aesthetics as a whole. Just as 'music acquires an especially architectonic character', 
'romantic architecture' displays the 'most contrasting eurhythmy'. Hence, 'although 
[music] stands in contrast to architecture, it still has an affinity with it. ,80 This is the 
affinity of the first and the last, as well as the outer and the inner. Hegel echoes 
Schelling's definition of architecture as 'music in space ... frozen music' (a dictum 
popularised by Goethe as, 'muted music [verstummten ... Tonkunst]').81 
Like Hegel, Bloch associates the outer with the architectural and the inner with 
music. But the outer is, precisely contra- Hegelian Idealism, collective utopia. This 
Hegelian structure would have come to Bloch from Lukacs, who turned the dictum of 
Novalis into a statement on modem SUbjectivity. The 'urge to be at home everywhere' 
demonstrates that, 
philosophy, as a form of life or as that which determines the form and 
supplies the content of literary creation, is always a symptom of the rift 
between "inside" and "outside", a sign of the essential difference between 
the self and the world, the incongruence of soul and deed.82 
In Bloch's appropriation of Lukacs, the 'musical' connotations of Novalis come to 
fruition. Bloch's intended title for The Spirit of Utopia was Music and Apocalypse.83 
According to Bloch's experimental synthesis of expressionism and constructivism, great 
78 Ibid. p.128; p.1l9. 
79 Ibid. p.128. 
80 Hegel, G. W. F. Aesthetics, p.894; p.685; p.893. 
81 Schelling, F. W. J. The Philosophy of Art, p.165. 'A noble philos~pher spoke of 
architecture as frozen music and it must have warranted much shakmg of the head. We 
believe this beautiful thought is no better introduced as when we call architecture muted 
music [verstummten ... Tonkunst].' Goethe, J. W. Cited in: Leonhard L. Mackell, 
'Goethes edler Philosoph', in Euphorion 11 (1904) ff. . 
82 Lukacs, Georg. Theory of the Novel, trans. Anna Bostock (London: Merhn Press. 
1978), p.29. 
83 Cf. Scholem, G. The Story of a Friendship, p.97. 
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music is the inner anticipation of an outer collectivity. The 'ornament' is the inner 
expressed through the outer; an 'exteriorised interiority'. The movement of the 'I who I 
will be', recalling Hegel, is the movement towards the ' We'. 84 In Bach's Passions 
, 
Bloch hears, 
the fusion and balance of the lyrical and the structured in an essentially 
architectonic, Gothically architectonic harmony and counterpoint, which 
acts as the particular house, the so to speak spatially constitutive system of 
this lyricism.85 
For Cacciari, following the anti-ornament of Loos and Web ern, Bloch's 'Antizipation' 
would be more Romantic Sehnsucht; longing for a projected utopia. Adorno's utopian 
anticipation is, by contrast, dissonant. An expression of waiting in vain does not 
anticipate the awaited in the sense of expectation. It is, however, clear that (in spite of 
his criticisms of Bloch's aesthetics of music) Adorno's aesthetic theory owes much to 
the Spirit of Utopia (by way of Benjamin, perhaps) - notably, in its dialectic of 
expression and construction; but also in the sense that the artwork has an inner, 
autonomous character only insofar as it is outer, as social (as 'spirit'). The artwork is a 
'monad'. This inner-outer paradigm is in fact confronted and questioned in N ono' s 
Prometeo. 
Prometeo and the Place of the Artwork 
For Prometeo, Nono employs a modem version of the cori spezzati. The singers, 
speakers, chorus, solo strings, solo winds, glasses, orchestral groups and live electronics 
are arranged spatially about the audience. A productive tension reigns in this work 
between the musical space and the space of the performance, which the former 
occupies. What is the nature of this occupation, and how is it productive? The editor of 
Nono's collected writings in French has suggested that, in these later works, 'the music 
composes the space'. 86 But how can such space be composed in an already composed 
space - in the case of the premier, the San Lorenzo. 
84 The last chapter of The Spirit of Utopia is entitled: 'Karl Marx, Death, and the 
Apocalypse, Or, the Ways in This World by Which the Inward Can Become Outward 
and the Outward Like the Inward'. 
85 Bloch, E. The Spirit of Utopia, p.55. ,. .. 
86 Feneyrou, Laurent; cited in Pape, G. 'Nono and his Fellow Travellers, In LUIgi 
Nono: The Suspended Song, p.60. 
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The spatial expenence of Prometeo can initially be described in terms of 
Adorno's 'adherence to the harmonic structure'. Adorno is aware, in his additional 'or 
the instrumental sound', that a new space promises to emerge out of the disintegration 
of traditional harmony. In Wagner, 'colour itself became architectonic'. Nono does not 
valorise colour over structure, sound over music. The harmonic material of Prometeo is 
polarised between close intervals, including micro-intervals, and expansive ones (the 
'Promethean' fifth being a constant), amidst similarly polarised pitch and dynamic 
ranges. Nono exploits a fundamental characteristic of music (described in great detail by 
Kurth): height and depth.87 There is no legato rising and falling of voices however. 
N ono interrupts linear articulation and anticipates the problem of atomisation by way of 
an articulation through 'colour'. Nono calls this articulation 'the smallest transition'. It 
is supposed to counter the 'dramaturgy of contrasts' that characterised most bourgeois 
music, especially opera, as a mode of representation. 88 Similar figures are thus repeated 
in different instrumental grouping, such that the transition of texture and colour 
challenges the 'figurativeness' that Adorno attributed to Schoenberg's Moses. For 
Cacciari, 'to eliminate all figurative appearance ... has been the greatest problem for 
Nono in the general conception (but perhaps also in the "musical thought") of his 
work. ,89 As was suggested, Nono does not so much eliminate figurativeness as 
radicalise-sublate it. 
This attempted sublation (of stile rappresentativo) is explained by Nono and 
Cacciari in terms of the problematic affinity between representation and space: 
In parallel to the cemeteries, asylums and prisons, the theatres and concert 
halls are built... The concentration and homogenisation of space, the 
disappearance of the multi-spatial possibility of the musical event, is closely 
related to the obvious reduction of polyvocity, of the multi vocal possibility 
of "directions" in listening. Inside these convoluted constraints, listening 
and the space of listening coincide; are apprehended together. All this 
during what one could perhaps call "the bourgeois era" of listening. 
Cacciari traces the emergence of the institutional spaces of music in 'parallel' to these 
other institutions. The 'constraint' of music implies that unconstrained music, outside of 
or against this 'era', offers a potential for resistance, to a 'civilization placed under the 
sign of the ide in'. 90 
87 Kurth, E. Musikpsychologie, pp.116-136. 
88 Cited in: Stenzl, 1. Luigi Nono, p.112. 
89 Cacciari M. 'Verso Prometeo / A Tragedy of Listening'. in Verso Prometeo. 
90 'Conver~ation Between Luigi N ono and Massimo Cacciari', in, ibid. 
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Nono and Cacciari suggest that the 'multi-spatiality' of music derives from its 
capacity to estrange what is listened to from the listening. This refers not only to the 
abstraction of music (which, as we have seen, is quite amenable to representation) but 
also to an estrangement of the music from the locality of its production. This 
estrangement is ideologically cut short with the cult of the performer. What we see is 
what we hear. The inner-outer relation can be understood in terms of a distinction 
between the necessity (fatality) of the spectacular - whereby the inner and outer are 
collapsed - and the possibility of the non-spectacular, according to which the meaning 
of the outer is in some way suspended by the inner. 
The claim for this potential of music is nevertheless fraught, insofar as it relies 
upon a version of empirical acoustics. As Kant observed to his distaste, sound crosses 
space. Unlike light, sound can pass through walls. In a way, headphones formalise this 
phenomenon: 'I take the music with me'. Music, it seems, depends upon sound. And 
yet, following an 'Origin of the Work of Art' thesis, sound is not the origin of music; 
modern music is the origin of (its) sound, its 'thingly character'. 
Nono speaks of a 'mobile sound' that 'does not fill the space, but discovers it, 
unveils it. And this provokes an unexpected and unpredictable being in the sound, not to 
begin to perceive, but to feel part of the space, to play. ,91 This play is not harmonious. It 
is a tragic play; a modem-day Trauerspiel. Nono's 'tragedy in listening' can, up to a 
point, be understood as a continuation of Cacciari's 'negative thought'. The space of the 
performance is determined by the geometric space of the Metropolis. Given Cacciari' s 
Foucauldian language, the deconsecrated San Lorenzo perhaps constituted a 
'heterotopia,.92 But aside from what precisely is meant by heterotopia, this would only 
be the case insofar as the art-work of Prometeo productively contradicts the space of the 
San Lorenzo, the real space of here-and-now. According to Cacciari, a manifestation of 
negative thought 'repeats' as 'going beyond' the real-ideal space of the Metropolis. The 
blase, the wanderer, is the productive mimesis of the ideal space, the bad utopia. 
If Prometeo is a manifestation of negative thought, then the 'mobile sound' is 
the 'figure' of the wanderer, and that 'in which' the music wanders is the geometric 
space. As N ono makes clear, this mobile sound is produced in the disclosing of the 
space - which must then 'include' the performance space. Negative thought repeats and 
goes beyond the present space, the space of the present. Going beyond, as mimesis, is 
91 Quoted in, Pape, G. 'Nono and his Fellow Travellers', p.62 .. Tr~slat.ion ~~ended. 
92 Cf. Foucault, Michel. 'Of Other Spaces', trans. Jay Miskowlec, In DWCrItICS, vol. 16, 
no. 1 (Spring, 1986). 
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not world transcendence here. Prometeo does not abstractly negate present space. It 
radicalises the abstraction in the name of a second concreteness. Neither does it valorise 
its own musical space, in the sense of absolute music: 'to me, "symphony" means 
constructing a world' (Mahler).93 The mobile sound of Prometeo refers incessantly to 
the performance space, without ever valorising it. It is 'here and now' that the spatial 
and temporal dimensions of Prometeo converge. For Nono, 
the composition of music that wants to restore infinite possibilities in 
listening today, by use of a non-geometrised space, also runs up against the 
dissolution of normal time, of the time of narration and of visualisation. 
Nono's fermata 'dwells' on the performance space, its incontrovertible reference - as 
'non-dwelling'. The mimetic stasis of the music resonates with its 'Um-welt'. The 
listener wanders purposefully - like the performers of La lontananza nostalgica utopica 
futura (1988-89). The fermata says that what is purposeful in the wandering is the 
transformation of this space; this' Welt'. In the text of Prometeo, Cacciari truncates the 
final line of Moses and Aron, 
But in the wasteland you shall be 
invincible and shall achieve the goal: 
unity with God 
into the last part of Prometeo (the Stasimo Secondo), stripping it of its theistic 
eschatology, and appending it to his own reflections on Prometeo, as name and as 
nomos: 
of many names but one form 
it is original division 
it is the bursting in governing 
it is the transgressing the recasting 
it is the plunging the defending 
it is what the circle of the fire reveals 
it opens multiple paths 
it urges us to arouse the broken 
to renovate silences 
it transforms 
it recalls 
it flashes 
it is invincible in the wasteland 
93 Bauer-Lechner, N. Recollections of Gustav Mahler, trans. Dika Newlin (London & 
New York: Faber & Faber, 1980), p.40. 
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The wasteland (' die Wilste', the desert) is precisely not the abyss of empty universalised 
space. This desert resembles the abyss, as its mimesis - the fundamental difference 
being, perhaps, that even a desert occupies this world. It is equally not the abyss. 
This sense of transformation within the world, of this world, is also captured in 
Aesthetic Theory: 
If Schopenhauer's thesis of art as an image of the world once over bears a 
kernel of truth, then it does so only insofar as this second world is composed 
out of elements that have been transposed out of the empirical world in 
accord with Jewish descriptions of the messianic order as an order just like 
the habitual order but changed in the slightest degree. 94 
Adorno's allusion to the 'utopian' meaning of art (its 'messianic order') hints at how 
Prometeo extends beyond Cacciari' s theoretical research. What is missing from 
Cacciari is the sense in which Prometeo produces the problem of space and utopia as an 
artwork. Conversely, and relatedly, a problem arises concerning negative thought, as to 
whether it can actually go beyond the contradiction that it tragically acknowledges. 
Negative thought threatens to hypostatise possibility as such, theoretically blocking 
praxis. This problem can perhaps be discerned in Cacciari's texts for Prometeo - none 
more so than in his appropriation of Moses. If the 'New Prometheus' is 'invincible in 
the wasteland', then why go beyond it into the promised land? What is the promise of 
the wasteland? As was the case in the passage from Dialectic of Enlightenment, there is 
a tendency to melancholically valorise the wasteland and to proscribe promise. 
Adorno is in fact less sceptical about utopian promise in his aesthetic theory. Art 
constitutes a peculiarly radical kind of promise: 
As a musical composition compresses time, and as a painting folds spaces 
into one another, so the possibility is concretised that the world could be 
other than it is. 
Is not this 'other than it is' more of the same 'possibility for its own sake'?; the abstract 
negation of this place without the promise of another one? Adorno offers a speculatively 
positive moment of 'otherness' here. For although Adorno upholds the Bilderverbot on 
representations of utopia, the utopian meaning of the artwork consists in its autonomy, 
which Adorno accounts for with various (non-representational) categories - including 
'coherence' and 'unity' (see chapter 1). As Adorno's writings on Beckett make clear, 
the unity of the modem artwork is a negative presentation; the near-impossibility of 
94 Adorno, T. W. Aesthetic Theory, p.138. 
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unity and meaning, today. But this presentation is itself a unity as semblance. Hence, 
although Adorno might be faulted for neglecting the spatial-utopian meaning of art, he 
does acknowledge its collective-utopian meaning, albeit - of necessity - speculatively. 
The question of space in music is, for Adorno, primarily the question of its 'collective 
implications'. Collective utopia is not represented in the artwork. For (and this comes 
closer to Heidegger than Adorno would have liked) it is only in the experience of (non-) 
dwelling, that the possibility of building is given. 
Further spatial implications of Adorno's aesthetic theory can be drawn out, in 
relation to Nono - in the light of his understanding of autonomy. Art 'becomes social by 
its opposition to society, and occupies this position only as autonomous art'. An 
abstraction from 'empirical society' in 'an obscured form', the artwork both draws from 
empirical society and discloses the possibility of a difference whole. 95 Adorno once 
again refers to the idea of the monad. The artwork determinately negates the ideological 
unity of the familiar world. It is 'the determinate negation of a determinate society' 
because its determinate unity and coherence opposes the existing unity and coherence 
(there is only space for one!). The utopian meaning of art is to imagine 'the totality as 
something that could be completely different'. In this sense, the artwork must remain 
outside of itself. The inner is inner qua different outer. As with the Jewish-mystical 
teaching, the two outers, empirical society and utopia, cannot be absolutely 
distinguished. Adorno's account of autonomy can be taken to address the question, 
which he otherwise tends to remain silent over, about the space and place of the 
artwork. 
There is a utopian meaning of art insofar as 'place' appears in it negatively, 
'only' as semblance. But Schein is itself internally contradictory. Place does not appear 
as true in the artwork. The artwork is not a place (whether a utopia or a heterotopia). 
And yet, Adorno seems to draw upon associations of place with autonomy, ap-
propriation and (proper) naming. These are not simply bourgeois concepts of property 
and appropriation. The monad is the negating-mimesis of the bourgeois individual, not 
the bourgeois individual itself. The monad is not individualistic because it 
systematically refers to a 'totality as ... completely different' - according to which 
totality the individual would equally be completely different.96 
When Adorno comes to consider a different totality, it is precisely a concept of 
place, or place-name, that is invoked: 
95 Ibid. pp.225-6. 
96 My emphasis. 
What metaphysical experience would be, to those who eschew the reduction 
of this to presumably religious primal experiences, is closest to how Proust 
imagined it, in the happiness promised by the names of villages like 
atterbach, Watterba~h, Reu~nthal, Monbrunn. You think that if you go 
there, you would .be I? what ~s fulfilled, as if it really existed. If you really 
go t~ere., that ~hlCh IS promIsed recedes like a rainbow. Nevertheless you 
aren t dlsappomted; rather, you feel that you are too close, and that's why 
you don't see it. This is presumably why the difference between landscapes 
and the districts, which determine the world of images of childhood, is not 
that great. What Proust experienced at Illiers was something many children 
of the same social strata shared at different places. But for this generality, 
what is authentic in Proust's portrayal, to form, one must be enraptured at 
that one spot, without squinting at the generality.97 
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The singularity of place inhabits experience ('one place', but, as 'generality', any-one-
place). Memories are themselves placed (or not: 'I can't place it'). The journey of 
experience (thefahren of Erfahnmg) arises from an already interpreted world of already 
named places, without this experience being a tautological re-presentation of them. 
Place-names are named as dis-unity. The poverty of experience is, in this sense, a being 
without place-names, without any place - even, or especially, the place to come. This 
situation is expressed Romantically as 'homesickness'. Does Adorno keep to his 'tragic' 
reading of Proust? (,Proust remarks on the caesura which voyages make in the course of 
life by "leading us from one name to another name".')98 Or does the supposedly 
universal trope of childhood uphold the nostalgic longing for the familiar home; for that 
which Michel de Certeau terms, the 'original spatial structure' of 'the mother,?99 
Adorno acknowledges a concept of place as social but not explicitly spatial. 
Hence, perhaps, the near absence of architecture in his aesthetic theory - as well as his 
valorisation of modem music (as the Hegelian other of architecture). With his absolutist 
evaluation of modem music, Adorno tends toward the undialectical (where this dialectic 
of music and space has been recognised from Kant and Hegel to, more recently, 
Safranski and Jacques Attali).lOo Modem music must make this demand of the dialectic, 
as happens in Prometeo. 
The musical space of Prometeo is, in Adorno's sense, the 'inner' moment of its 
autonomy. But this moment cannot be sustained without the space of the performance; 
97 Adorno, T. W. Negative Dialectics, pp.366-368. . 
98 Adorno, T. W. 'Valery Proust Museum', in Prisms, trans. Samuel & Shlerry Weber 
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1981), p.178. . . 
99 De Certeau, Michel. The Practice of Everyday Life, trans. Steven Rendall (UmversIty 
of California Press, 2002), p.l 09. .. 
100 AUali, Jacques. Noise. A Political Economy of Music, trans. Snan MassumI 
(University of Minnesota Press, 1986). See, for instance, p.21. 
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its heterogeneous moment, as it were. Although Adorno stresses that the artwork takes 
elements from the existing world, and is thereby social, its original transformation of 
these elements constitutes a different unity, as its autonomy. Hence, the heteronomous 
moment of the work is already mediated in autonomy. Although the musical space and 
time of Prometeo could therefore be understood as 'autonomous' (having mediated 
social rationality into its constructive language) this work simultaneously refuses to 
mediate the space of the performance into the musical space. Its mediation is its refusal 
to mediate. It does not propose the absolutism that Adorno sympathetically attributes to 
Mahler: 
When some well-intentioned person advised Mahler to darken the hall 
during the concert for the sake of the mood, the composer rightly replied 
that a performance at which one didn't forget about the surroundings was 
worthless. 101 
How does Prometeo problematise Adorno's Aesthetic Theory? In the light of 
Cacciari's research, the problem of space is not simply one problem among others, just 
as space is not simply one attribute of place. It is the ideological determination of place 
through idealised space that forces the question of place. Cacciari tentatively 'goes 
beyond' in his suggestion that the space of the Metropolis opens up the possibility of a 
new dwelling. None of this critique of space features in Adorno's reflections upon the 
meaning of place or of utopia - in spite his Weberian fears about rationalisation and his 
Hegelian fears about Rationalism. It is, once again, the space of this sociality that 
Adorno tends to neglect. Something like this is nevertheless hinted at in Adorno's 
foregrounding of music in his philosophy of modernity. 
Prometeo negates its medium - music, which aims to be at home everywhere in 
the world. Like Adorno, Nono knows that the two spheres of musical experience must 
be thought of together. Nono suggests that the 'Walkman', 
makes it possible to understand and render comprehensible that sounds are 
not stable and transmitted on only one axis, but are in a situation of constant 
mobility in comparison to our [visual] perception, thus contributing to refine 
it... The [bourgeois] listening about which we spoke thus develops through 
modernity and inside it. 
Prometeo 'reveals the space' insofar as the musical space comes into conflict with the 
space of the performance, as play without resolution; the 'composing [of] ... 
101 Adorno, T. W. 'Valery Proust Museum', p.17S. 
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dissonances'. Prometeo aims to affinn both its place, as semblance, and the non-place 
of the perfonnance. This dual occupation of the same place is 'tragic' in the sense 
indicated above - a 'Tragedy in Listening', but also a 'Tragedy about Listening': about 
that is, social space. 102 
That semblance is contradictory is to say that 'the artwork is here and is not 
here'; a place and no-place. Adorno recognises the attempted destruction of semblance 
in 'the most recent works', which are themselves works of semblance. Hence, the 
'dialectic of modem art is largely that it wants to shake off its illusoriness like an animal 
trying to shake off its antlers.' 103 Adorno and Cacciari, with Goethe and against 
Schiller, want to affirm this sense of the tragic contradiction in art. According to 
Cacciari, the error of the prevailing Promethean humanism of the late eighteenth-
century was to take the promise of reconciliation for granted: 
the romantic "prometheism" of the whole humanist tradition regarded 
[Prometheus] as not only the powerful voice of technai, but also as the one 
who brought to man the supreme techne that would enable him to liberate 
himself from divinity. 104 
Cacciari risks valorising the im-possibility of reconciliation. But N ono' s Prometeo 
draws Cacciari into a more 'productive', though indeed mystical position. Can 
Prometheus be at once tragic and utopian, unreconciled and reconciling? Prometheus is 
the anti-tragedy. In the version told by Aeschylus (Cacciari relies upon Hesiod), 
Prometheus must wait thirteen generations to be released. The thirteen generations stand 
for a radically indetenninate and thus non-conciliatory time of waiting - not a long as 
versus a short time of waiting. Prometheus remains tragic, but not, we hope, 
102 But does not music mark the death of tragedy? (which only interested Nietzsche 
insofar as it was already music). Monteverdi's 'Tragedy in Music', Orfeo - the rebirth 
of ancient tragedy in modem opera - is baroque melodrama. Opera is, writes Benjamin, 
'the dissolution of Trauerspiel.' According to George Steiner, in 'the second half of the 
nineteenth century ... opera puts forward a serious claim to the legacy of tragic drama. ' 
Music cancels and includes the tragic: 'just as tragedy marks the transition from 
historical time to dramatic time, the Trauerspiel represents the transition from dramatic 
time to musical time.' Benjamin, W. The Origin o/German Tragic Drama, pp.211-2: 
'Trauerspiel and Tragedy', p.57. Steiner, George. The Death o/Tragedy (London: 
Faber, 1961), p.284. 
103 Adorno, T. W. Aesthetic Theory, p.l 03. 
104 Cacciari, M. 'Verso Prometeo / The Tragedy of Listening'. in ~ 'erso Prometeo. 
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indefinitely. Marx regarded Prometheus as 'the most eminent saint and mamT in th 
_ e 
philosophical calendar.' 105 
Prometeo initially appears to be weighed-down by these philosophical and 
intellectual themes, just as Nono's settings of political texts initially appear impossibly 
awkward. And yet - in both cases - N ono makes the impossible possible, because he 
knows how these 'programmes' each relate to music. And, 'I am only a musician by 
chance'. Nono knows that music stands in a specific position to address the problem of 
'utopia'. Nono addresses this problem as tragic, in spatio-temporal listening. The texts 
of Prometeo remain inaudible. They are more like the theme and motive of the work 
(interestingly, some of the texts are read by the performers, but not set to music). 
Utopia is neither expected nor relinquished in Prometeo. Its time, therefore, is 
neither the bad utopia of waiting without the awaited nor the bad utopia of merely 
expecting the awaited. There is, once again, a peculiar convergence of the temporal and 
the spatial. Nono was aware of this, with his dictum on the 'dissolution of normal time' 
as 'a non-geometrised space'. Perhaps Prometeo is a 'spatial' articulation of waiting in 
vain. Or, an expression of waiting in vain is already spatial. That waiting could and 
even must have a spatial character is not, it was suggested above, alien to the thought of 
Adorno. His late remark on 'the static character of films like Antonioni' s La Notte' is 
prescient of a scene from The Passenger, in which the deceased reporter looks out into 
the desert: 'So still. A kind of waiting' .106 
Ever since Thomas More's invention, utopia has been an imagined place. 
Cacciari worries that utopia is precisely the no-place of u-topia as place. There is, it was 
suggested, an equal and opposite danger of revealing and then simply affirming this no-
place, to the detriment of utopia as place. U-topia could signify: no familiar place - but 
a place nonetheless. It could signify: happy place, eu-topia - happy in an unfamiliar and 
unprecedented sense. The thought and the politics of the utopian cannot do without 
place. The shift from space to time in the utopia literature cannot become absolute. No 
. . . h h 't d 107 waItmg WIt out t e awal e . 
105 Marx, K. 'The Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of 
Nature in General', in Livergood, Norman D. Activity in Marx's Philosophy, (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967), p.62. 
106 Adorno, T. W. 'Transparencies on Film', in The Culture Industry, p.l ~O. . 
107 'At the very beginning Thomas More designated utopia as a plac~, an Island III the 
distant South Seas. The designation underwent changes later so that It left space and 
entered time.' Bloch, E. 'Something's Missing: A Discussion between Ernst Bloch and 
Theodor W. Adorno on the Contradictions of Utopian Longing', p.3. 
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5 
The Expression of Waiting in Vain 
I. Adorno 
The Promise of Metaphysics 
In the first chapter, it was suggested that the melancholy science of natural-history is a 
materialist-utopian philosophy of waiting. The retrospective projection of Adorno's 
reflections on 'waiting in vain' back onto the earlier work (including the 1932 lecture) 
is philologically justified by the reappearance of the idea of natural-history in his later 
work. The translator into English of 'The Idea of Natural History' contends that 
Negative Dialectics follows 'precisely the same plan' as the lecture - 'a critique of 
Heidegger is followed by the presentation of the central concepts of the form of the 
critique'. 'The Idea of Natural History' is, in this sense, an embryo of Negative 
Dialectics (as well as Dialectic of Enlightenment). This parallel is nevertheless limited, 
as we shall see, by the fact that the last 'model' of Negative Dialectics was motivated by 
an event that was not expected in July of 1932. Adorno's 'Meditations on Metaphysics' 
immediately follow the two sub-sections on natural-history. I The last part of Negative 
Dialectics is in that sense not prefigured in the lecture, but rather begins where the 
lecture left off 
At the same time, Adorno's later version of natural-history seems to proceed 
from the concluding remark of the earlier one. This philosophy is 'only an interpretation 
of certain fundamental elements of the materialist dialectic.,2 In Negative Dialectics, 
Marx's mediation of nature and history is stressed alongside the mediations of 
Benjamin and Lukacs (the latter two being relied upon exclusively in the 1932 lecture).3 
Adorno attempts that which he failed to demonstrate previously: a 'radical'. 
'ontological reorientation of the philosophy of history'. Negative Dialectics no longer 
I Hullot-Kentor, Robert. 'Introduction to Adorno's "Idea of Natural History"'. in Telos, 
no.60, p.1 03. 
2 Adorno, T. W. 'The Idea of Natural History', p.124. 
3 Cf. Adorno, T. W. Negative Dialectics, pp.366-368. 
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employs this language, which belies the early influence of Heidegger. Adorno had 
acknowledged Heidegger's attempt to overcome historicism in Being and Time - 'false 
stasis and formalism have been eliminated' - only to retract this in his subsequent 
polemics. The later Adorno seeks a reorientation of the philosophy of history that is not 
ontological (though he stands by the lecture, which, 'in its broad outlines has retained 
its validity,).4 Nor can he depend upon philological sources, since that would not 
amount to a philosophical response at all. This was the problem with the 1932 lecture. 
Nor can it be a positivist sociology, since that would remain at the falsely descriptive 
level. The same applies to an anthropological approach - Adorno pits Marx against 
Feuerbach to this end, though not always consistently.5 Adorno knows that his form of 
historical materialism, however materialist, must contend with metaphysics, both as its 
other and as (the problem of) its grounding. The idea of natural-history is equivalent to 
'the transmutation of metaphysics into history,6 - the problem being that, on turning the 
page of Negative Dialectics, we read that 'after Auschwitz', 
The capacity for metaphysics is crippled, because what occurred smashed 
the basis of the compatibility of speculative metaphysical thought with 
. 7 
expenence. 
This problem or crisis of metaphysics is not resolved by its transmutation into history so 
long as the nature of this transmutation remains obscure. The transmutation is already 
founded upon an original positing of metaphysics, according to a philosophy of history 
that is itself metaphysical. What is the nature of this positing, of this grounding? The 
transition to the 'Meditations on Metaphysics' leaves a tension both within Negative 
Dialectics and within the thought of Adorno as a whole, not least because the question 
of metaphysics, of (its) grounding, is the abiding question of Heidegger. In a sense, 
Adorno returns to Heidegger's problem, and not only to the problem of Heidegger. 
Adorno and Heidegger each contend that the question of metaphysics 'after' 
metaphysics is a question about time and history. More precisely still, this 'after' 
concerns a question about waiting. 
4 Adorno. T. W. History and Freedom, trans. Rodney Livingsto~e (Ca~bridge: P~lity, 
2006), p.124. Hullot-Kentor is thus wrong to suggest, on the basIS that It was publIshed 
posthumously, that Adorno had disowned the lecture. 
5 Adorno, T. W. Negative Dialectics, pp.347-351. 
6 Ibid. pp.351-353. 
7 Ibid. pp.354-358. 
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Why is 'the capacity for metaphysics crippled' after Auschwitz? Metaphysics is 
no Hinterwelt for Adorno. The tradition of philosophical metaphysics is bound to 
history and culture: 
That it could happen in the midst of all the traditions of philosophy, art and 
the enlightening sciences, says more than merely that these, as the spirit, 
were not capable of seizing and changing human beings. In those branches 
themselves, in the emphatic claim of their autarky, dwells untruth. All 
culture after Auschwitz, including its urgent critique, is garbage.8 
Adorno problematically implies that the tradition of metaphysics has been historically 
European - German even. The term 'midst' signifies a temporal and spatial proximity 
where these 'enlightening' forces are concerned. The latter proximity is an especially 
fraught notion given that other catastrophes in which Europe has been culpable have 
occurred, and continue to occur, outside of its geographical boundaries. In his 1965 
Metaphysics lectures, Adorno acknowledges the contemporary situations in Vietnam 
and in South Africa, alongside the 'word symbol' of Auschwitz, which nevertheless 
remains 'the most symbolic thing of all' .9 
Adorno privileges an enlightened, historical moment that coincides with the 
historical moment of the Enlightenment - represented, paradigmatically, in the figures 
of Kant, Hegel and Marx. This moment was, of course, an unfulfilled promise. 
Philosophy 'remains alive because the moment of its realization was missed.' \0 This 
promise is tested after Auschwitz, for the promise is needed more than ever in the 
moment of its being broken. An equivocation over this promise of metaphysics is 
evident from Adorno's shift of emphasis from each of the twelve Meditations to the 
next. Adorno writes that 'culture', not metaphysics, is 'garbage'. And yet 'metaphysics 
is fused with culture' .11 Is not metaphysics then garbage? Adorno is careful not to damn 
metaphysics, not least because he has not fully worked-out what will take its place. It is 
precisely Adorno's hint of what must that will be followed up here and related back to 
the interpretations of waiting in vain in the previous chapters. 
To damn metaphysics - and not simply negate it abstractly, in the sense of 
positivism - would already amount to a metaphysical judgement. Both the promise and 
the disappointment arising from its being broken are metaphysical. For the promise is 
8 Ibid. pp.358-361. Translation amended. 
9 Adorno T. W. Metaphysics: Concept and Problems, p.lOl; p.130. Is the problem, 
therefore' that Adorno is simply too generous about these enlightening traditions, at 
work within urbanised Germany? Is he too generous about (its) urbanisation, and about 
enlightenment as such, given his thesis on its dialectic? 
\0 Adorno, T. W. Negative Dialectics, pp.15-l6. 
II Ibid. pp.358-361. 
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itself metaphysics. This is the underlying thesis of Adorno's contemporaneous lecture 
course. Adorno makes two strategic decisions in these lectures. The fIrst is to offer an 
introductory, though fundamental definition. For, what is it that is crippled? The second 
decision is to generalise the tradition of metaphysics under one name: 'metaphysics 
began with Aristotle' .12 Like Heidegger, Adorno acknowledges that Aristotle never 
used this title, but that he remains its author in spirit. Adorno faults Heidegger for his 
violent interpretations of Aristotle, but Adorno's interpretation is already mediated 
through the violent Hegelian interpretation of Eduard Zeller. 13 
Adorno is at one with Heidegger on the question of the origins of metaphysics, 
when he states that, in contrast to Aristotle, Plato bequeathed a dualism to philosophy. 
The 'Ideas' are 'the true, the One, the essential', whereas 'the world of the senses' is 
'absolutely without being'. Plato is the first metaphysician only to the extent that he 
asks about 'the cause of all things'. The ideas are 'the cause of appearances'. Adorno 
recognises the 'profound and lasting influence' of Plato upon 'later western 
philosophy'. But he does not, here at least, take up Nietzsche's thesis on the complicity 
between Platonism, Judeo-Christian modernity and nihilism. 14 Whereas, for Heidegger, 
Nietzsche's account of nihilism is the problem and history of metaphysics, Nietzsche 
included. 
Adorno and Heidegger are also in some agreement about a fall or crisis of 
metaphysics in the age of modernity, even though modernity is construed in different 
ways. For Heidegger, the crisis is that of modernity itself, whereas for Adorno, the crisis 
emerges in the wake of a specific event of modernity. There is fatalistic sense in which 
Auschwitz was always coming, nevertheless - that Auschwitz is another name for 
modernity - when Adorno and Horkheimer suggest that anti-Semitism is constitutive of 
the structure of (the dialectic of) enlightenment itself.15 The bourgeois ratio must 
eliminate the principle of non-identity, as represented in the non-representable absolute, 
if it is to actualise its principle of identity as domination. If the dialectic of 
enlightenment is modernity then modernity is itself, as it is in Heidegger, the problem -
for Heidegger. 
According to Adorno, Aristotle attempted to mediate where Plato proposed only 
a dualism. As a consequence, Plato's philosophy remains within the mythic, cyclical 
12 Adorno, T. W. Metaphysics, p.15. 
13 Ibid. p.24. 
14 Ibid. pp.15-16. . . .. . 
15 Cf. Rabinbach, A. 'Why Were the Jews SacnfIced?: The Place of AntI-SemItIsm III 
Dialectic of Enlightenment' in New German Critique, no.81 (Autumn, 2000), pp.49-64. 
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time of the Greek religion. Platonism is not metaphysics proper, the thinking of the 
whole. The Ideas, which have no cause in the sensuous, must have sensuousness 
conferred upon them extrinsically, in order to individuate them as ideas. Platonism is 
late polytheism. Aristotle, by contrast, attempts to mediate the divine - ultimately, God 
- and humanity. All of the metaphysical systems of Western philosophy attempt to 
succeed where Aristotle failed. 
Mediation is becoming. In Plato, the first cause is the prototypical 'idea' _ 
meaning that the true Being is non-temporal - whereas, in Aristotle, the first cause is 
always already manifest in sensuous matter, 'hyle [UA11]' , as its final form, 'morphe 
[flopqrr)]'. Being is (in) becoming: 
this world of sensible appearance is teleologically oriented towards these 
ideas, or pure possibilities [reinen Moglichkeiten], which are supposed to be 
contained within them. In Aristotle there is an expression for this 
relationship of the ideas or possibilities to the existent: EV KaL<l JtOAAWV: 
that is to say, the One in the Many. 16 
Pure possibility is more precisely potentiality (or EVLEAExna). The actualisation of 
potentiality is not a possibility, but a certainty. It is the question of 'when?' and not 'if?' 
Aristotle's Metaphysics is full of promise, in the fullest sense of the word, even though 
it does not yet bear a historical, let alone utopian self-consciousness. Metaphysics, 
mediation towards the highest, is promise. Adorno's history of ancient philosophy is 
already Aristotelian. Aristotle inaugurates the promise. 
Adorno thus thinks of the promise of metaphysics in terms of history, including 
the history of philosophy. The 'proposition, that movement is the realization of the 
possible, already implies the Hegelian thesis of history as progress in the consciousness 
of freedom.' Of course, the promise is actualised discontinuously. The dialectic of 
enlightenment is the dialectic of promise and broken promise; progress and regress in 
the consciousness of freedom and unfreedom. Promise already has a maximal and a 
minimal signification: expectation and hope respectively. In the 'Meditations', hope, let 
alone expectation, is now thrown into question. This is why Adorno considers the 
possibility of waiting in vain; the possibility of impossibility. 
The reason that Aristotle fails in his mediation is that he merely displaces the 
problem of the Many and the One from the first to the final cause, which is just as non-
temporal as the Platonic forms. This problem is initially muted in Adorno's account of 
metaphysics, but it becomes louder. There must be something that unifies all final 
16 Adorno, T. W. Metaphysics, p.33. 
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fonns, something final that is not itself a fonn - a mover, since All is Becoming, that is 
not itself moved. As Adorno puts it, 
everything that has not evolved or become what it is, and is therefore the 
oldest thing, which has always existed, is regarded as the condition of the 
possibility of any becoming - an idea taken over directly from Aristotle by 
Hegel; and in which the final cause, that is, the divinity, is seen as the 
'unmoved mover' of all things. Aristotle's famous fonnulation of this 
doctrine of the unmoved mover is uKlvrrcov KtVOUV. 17 
The unmoved mover cannot be seen in itselfbut (only) in what (it) moves, as the One in 
the Many. What if what moves, seen historically, is catastrophic? At one point in his 
lectures, Adorno defines the 'principle of inertia' as 'radically evil' .18 What kind of 
absolute are we talking about in this case, if we may continue to speak of the absolute at 
all? After Auschwitz, it 'can no longer be asserted that the immutable [das 
Unveriinderliche] would be the truth and what moves, the transient, would be 
appearance [Schein], .19 Again, Adorno does not leap to conclusions about the end of 
metaphysics: 'historical compassion... prevents one from presupposing such an 
immutability, and thus changes the contents of metaphysics. ,20 
Auschwitz puts an end, Adorno suggests, to expectant promise. This promise 
applies to history as much as it does to the individual. Adorno draws upon the 
traditional metaphysical idea that the individual is a microcosm of the whole. The 
individual is a whole in itself (the Many in the One). This is a prominent idea of 
Neoplatonism. It recurs in Kant, as well as in Goethe and in his interpreters. These 
Goetheans include Benjamin, Dilthey and, indirectly, Heidegger. 
Adorno reads Heidegger's 'Being-towards-death' as a desperate attempt to 
confer meaning upon that which has become meaningless - and not, as Heidegger sees 
it, as the tragic recognition of the meaninglessness of traditional metaphysics itself. 
There is a philosophical-modernist struggle for contemporaneity between Heidegger 
and Adorno: 
The current metaphysics of death is nothing but the powerless solace of 
society over the fact that through social transfonnations, human beings 
came to be deprived of what was once supposed to have made death 
bearable to them, the feeling of its epic unity with the rounded life.21 
17 Ibid. pAO. 
18 Ibid. p.115. 
19 Adorno, T. W. Negative Dialectics, pp.354-358. 
20 Adorno, T. W. Metaphysics, p.l 00. 
21 Adorno, T. W. Negative Dialectics, pp.361-366. 
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Adorno does not reject the tradition of death metaphysics (and this will be crucial for 
his comparison to Heidegger). He upholds it, negatively, with the suggestion that the 
horrific nature of death in the camps has permanently unsettled the epic unity of a life 
that ends meaningfully in death - not only for the victims and survivors, but, indirectly, 
for all who belong to the history that made the camps possible: 
What the sadists in the camps told their victims: tomorrow you will be 
smoke rising from these chimneys into the sky, names the indifference of 
the life of every individual, which history is moving towards.22 
The knowledge of death as the end of life, a classical humanist distinction between 
human and animal, underlies what Adorno means by 'metaphysical experience'. After 
Aristotle, metaphysics is nothing if it is not experienced.23 Otherwise, it remains 
religion or idealism alone. 
Adorno seems to have Benjamin's 'The Storyteller' in mind, when he writes 
that, 'Death and history, particularly the collective one of the category of the individual 
[Individuum], form a constellation.'24 Adorno emphasises the individual death - death 
and individuation - more than does Benjamin, for whom death is a generational and 
hence collective concern.25 Adorno's worry about the fate of the individual explains 
some of his sensitivity towards Heidegger's philosophy of death. It might be supposed 
that a Hegelian-Marxist would accuse Heidegger of individualism. Adorno does the 
opposite. The existential categories are formal-transcendental, and to that extent 
'impersonal' .26 Given that Adorno rejects the responses to the 'fall' of metaphysics in 
dialectical (scientific) materialism, traditional historical materialism, philosophical 
positivism and Heideggerian nihilism, what, in that case, is his response? 
22 Ibid. pp.354-358. 
23 In notes for his third lecture, Adorno writes, 'The entwinement of metaphysics with 
thought. inaugurates so emphatically by Aristotle in opposing hylozoism, is 
irrevocable.' Metaphysics, p.14. 
24 Adorno, T. W. Negative Dialectics, pp.361-366. 
25 Storytelling overcomes the death of the generation by transmitting experience to the 
next generation. In his 1921 essay on Elective Aff!nities, Benjamin s~ggests that Goethe 
had seen the folly of his paganism in the imperatIve for the redemptIOn of all the dead. 
Where Adorno points in the direction of a metaphysics of dying, Benjamin tends 
towards a metaphysics of the dead, including the unborn. . 
Benjamin, W. 'Goethe's Elective Affinities', trans. Stanley Corngold, In Selected 
Writings, vol. 1, p.314. 
26 Adorno, T. W. Negative Dialectics, pp.275-277. 
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After Metaphysics? 
Does not Adorno witness III concrete history that which was already declared 
philosophically decades before? As Lacoue-Labarthe put this: 'God died at 
Auschwitz.,27 Adorno, who has much to say about death and Auschwitz, refrains from 
saying this, in so many words. But he does anticipate and refute the charge of nihilism: 
'Philosophy need not do with the word any more,.z8 Adorno's declaration is 
complicated by the fact that he does not distinguish between passive and active nihilism 
(or, he considers them identical) and because his most original response to the problem 
of metaphysics constitutes - according to this interpretation - a post-active-nihilism. 
Having outwardly excluded nihilism, Adorno retreats into the familiar territory 
of Kant. That four of the twelve Meditations revolve around Kant suggests, along with 
the lengthy 'Metacritique of Practical Reason', that Adorno regards him as occupying 
the pinnacle of the metaphysical tradition. The problem of metaphysics is, in its purely 
philosophical form, a Kantian problem, a problem after Kant. If metaphysics has been 
put into question historically then an engagement with the thinker that put metaphysics 
into question structurally - for whom metaphysics is constitutively questionable -
would seem inevitable. 
Adorno's position on Kant is, on the surface, ambivalent, because, whilst Kant 
refuses an affirmative absolute, thus siding with the negative, he thereby risks affirming 
that refusal absolutely. Kant's 'philosophy circles, probably just as every other one does 
by the way, around the ontological proof of God. With magnificent ambiguity, he left 
his own position open.' At the same time, the 'authority of the Kantian concept of truth 
became terroristic with the ban on thinking the absolute' .29 Adorno is aware of the 
problem of the regressive infinity (and thus nihilism) within Kant's critique of pure 
reason. But this awareness tends to get lost in a focus upon the third antinomy alone. 
27 Lacoue-Labarthe, P. Heidegger, Art and Politics, trans. Chris Turner (Oxford 
University Press, 1990), p.43. 
28 Adorno, T. W. Negative Dialectics, pp.369-374. Adorno associates contemporary 
nihilism with Heidegger's 'destruction'. The 'destruction of the ontological tradition' 
(of metaphysics) would become its de-construction; the remembrance of what has been 
forgotten of Being. Adorno nevertheless considers Heidegger's initial conc~ption to 
have 'led directly to barbarism and fascism', Adorno worries about destructIOn as such. 
'Cultural critique and barbarism are not without a certain understanding'. Is t~i~ the. 
same culture that Adorno brands as garbage? Is all destruction thereby barbanc. Or IS 
not destruction, as culture critique, the negation of the negation? Adorno, T. W. 
Metaphysics, p.127. 
29 Adorno, T. W. Negative Dialectics, pp,377-382. 
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Kant's doctrine of the mundus intelligibilis is the prism through which Adorno yiews 
Kantian metaphysics as a whole. According to Adorno, Aristotle's 'doctrine of 
immutability ... has survived throughout the history of metaphysics, to the point that it 
became the subject of Kant's third antinomy. ,30 The problem of 'the intelligible 
character' is, for Adorno, the problem of the promise of metaphysics. 
Like Schelling, Adorno observes that the third antinomy is doomed to a dualism 
of nature and spirit because Kant remained tied to the Rationalist paradigm of causality 
from which he initially sought to free philosophy. The unconditioned, freedom, cannot 
be permitted into the conditioned series except through a notion of pre-established 
harmony, an act of God (see chapter 1). Kant employs a concept of the intelligible 
character in his practical philosophy that cannot have been derived from his theoretical 
work. The first Critique could only claim that 'freedom is at least not incompatible with 
nature'. It did not show how they are compatible.31 As Adorno puts it, 
According to the critique of reason, this [spontaneity] could no more be 
spoken of positively than the transcendental causes of the phenomena of 
external senses, while without the intelligible character, the moral act in 
what is emEirical, the effect on this - and thereby morality - would be 
impossible. 2 
Transcendental causes can more readily be shown to be necessary theoretically than 
practically. It is easier to describe and thus posit the unity of experience in terms of the 
former than in terms of the latter - this being the neo-Kantian distinction between 
validity and value; the 'is' and the 'ought'. The problem is that of what and how much 
can be transcendentally deduced from the unity of experience (that is, which unity?). 
Adorno nevertheless stays with Kant's paradigm of freedom, to the extent that 
the doctrine of the intelligible remains the sole condition of its possibility. Otherwise 
freedom is simply arbitrary (Hume) or simply necessary (Leibniz, Spinoza) - not true 
freedom in either case. Adorno is not interested in grounding the intelligible character in 
theoretical philosophy at al/- by proposing a new paradigm of causality, for instance. 
The theoretical cannot ground the moral. Adorno argues for the intelligible character, of 
which 'there is nothing better amongst human beings', in another way. In order to do so, 
he takes up the metaphysical and Kantian 'unity of the person' as being 'the location of 
the doctrine of the intelligible', and then interprets this unity as the speculative whole of 
Erfahrung, not the unity of a formal structure. 
30 Adorno, T. W. Metaphysics, p.58. 
31 Kant, I. Critique of Pure Reason, A558/B586, p.546. 
32 Adorno, T. W. Negative Dialectics, pp.283-287. 
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Kant's conception of freedom is formalistic because it fails to mediate the 
empirical with the pure consciousness. His 'critique of Hume's personality is rigidified 
into a principle beyond individual persons. He grasps the unity of consciousness 
independent of every experience. ,33 Adorno once again conflates the unity of 
experience with the experience of the 'person'. He is left with an individualism that he 
does not want - the result of combining the metaphysical whole with a proto-vitalist 
emphasis upon lived experience (in a manner that contradicts Hegelian Erfahrung). This 
concept of experience is, however, Adorno's way of mediating the empirical with the 
intelligible. It moves in the opposite direction to Kant's attempted mediation. Rather 
than the intelligible character being the condition for the possibility of the unity of 
individual experience, the unity of individual experience is now the empirical ground 
for the possibility of the intelligible character: 
If one dared to wager as to what the Kantian X of the intelligible character 
owes its true content, which maintained itself against the total indeterminacy 
of the aporetic concept, it would probably be the historically most advanced, 
periodically flaring, swiftly fading consciousness, which is inherent in the 
impulse to do the right thing. It is the concrete, intermittent anticipation 
[Vorwegnahme] of the possibility, neither alien to human beings nor 
identical with them. 
Adorno's interpretation of the intelligible character is experimental. Can what is posited 
out of experience, the intelligible 'X', simultaneously be the condition for the 
possibility of that same experience? Another problem is that the 'impulse to do the right 
thing' looks too existential for Kant, for whom doing the right thing is a matter of 
rational choice, not impulse. Where is reason here? Adorno seems to respond that the 
'impulse' does not come ex nihilo, existentially, but is instead given as a historical 
possibility - both as a possibility in history and as a possibility of history. The right 
thing is the right history and is therefore social as well as individual (the unity of the 
social as the unity of 'persons'). Adorno does not dismiss Kantian reason. He displaces 
it onto the right history, which flares up intermittently - from out of the wrong history, 
presumably, because reason is (bound to) rationality - as the 'anticipation' of (its own) 
'possibility'. Adorno thus conceives of a non-transcendent absolute in Aristotelian-
Hegelian terms: 'the intelligible character is, like freedom, something becoming. ,34 
Adorno attempts to ground the actuality of metaphysical experience upon the 
experience of the right history, in an almost inductive manner. The tum of the 
33 Ibid. pp.287-292. 
34 Ibid. pp.292-294. 
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nineteenth century (up to 1848?) experienced this moment of anticipation. Adorno reads 
Kant as a key figure on the stage of this moment of promise, the revolutionary promise 
of maturity. Adorno's own experience of - political- anticipation was no doubt formed 
during the 1920s. However intermittent it may be, metaphysical experience can only be 
spoken of in relation to a metaphysically grounded (or inflected) and materialist 
philosophy of history (given the problem of inductive arguments, for positivism). 
Adorno's philosophy of history is Hegelian to the extent that it sees a ruse of reason at 
work in it, however discontinuously - until Auschwitz. But Adorno does not follow 
Hegel's systematic grounding of history: the 'doctrine of the positive negation, is 
precisely and strictly the point at which I refuse to follow Hegel. ,35 Adorno' s 
metaphysics of history still remains to be explained, therefore, since the 'positive 
negation' is the very possibility of Hegel's history of progressive world-spirit. In 
Negative Dialectics, Adorno believes that he can insert his immanent critique of 
Kantian freedom into Hegel's 'history as progress in the consciousness of freedom'. It 
is true that Adorno shares with Hegel a critique of formal freedom in Kant. But for 
Hegel, the liberal paradigm of individual freedom remains formal. Hegel's attempted 
sublation of transcendental Idealism even proceeded, in the genesis of his thought, from 
an objection to negative freedom. 
The 'Metacritique of Practical Reason' undergoes a two-pronged auto-critique in 
the 'Meditations on Metaphysics': (1) If the anticipation of the intelligible character, 
metaphysical experience, is derived from a history of its anticipations - those of the 
historically most advanced periods - then this anticipation will have to withstand the 
actuality of the least historically advanced, barbaric periods. Adorno is consistent when 
he writes that metaphysical experience, not metaphysics as such, is crippled after 
Auschwitz, to the extent that we are living though an age of immaturity. 'After 
Auschwitz' might then connote a historical phase, one that could be worked-through 
'metaphysically'. Yet this word-symbol is of such magnitude for Adorno that it must 
'transform the content of metaphysics' itself, including the metaphysics of history. This 
'name stands for something unthinkable beyond the unthinkable, namely, a whole 
historical phase. ,36 Hence, (2) what of the intelligible world, the transcendental 
'rationalisation' of the unmoved-mover? What of the promise of metaphysics, and what 
of messianic promise? 
35 Adorno, T. W. Metaphysics, p.144. 
36 Ibid. p. 1 16. 
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Adorno knows that the crisis of metaphysics includes Kantian metaphysics. His 
response, in the last Meditation, goes under the heading of 'Self-reflection of 
Dialectics'. If dialectics is prefigured in the Transcendental Dialectic (as Adorno 
contends) then dialectics is Kantian metaphysics and the reflection of dialectics is the 
meditation on metaphysics. A comparable notion is at stake in Adorno's meta-critique 
of practical reason. The important question therefore concerns the meaning and 
possibility of this reflection, since this is what is supposed to be extra-metaphysical. 
Adorno disappointingly displaces the problem. For this paradigm of reflection is already 
Kantian (or, neo-Fichtean). In his return to the mundus in telligibilis, in the eighth 
Meditation, Adorno suggests that the resources for its retrieval are already contained 
within the Transcendental Dialectic, the 'logic of appearance', as proto-negative 
dialectics: 'That is why the salvation of appearance [Schein], the object of aesthetics, 
has its incomparable metaphysical relevance. ,37 This contradicts Adorno's previous 
attempt to ground the metaphysical experience of the intelligible character outside of 
Kantian Idealism. And yet, at least Kant attempted to ground it, in the Dialectic itself. 
Adorno invites the problem of the infinite regress in the antinomical structure of pure 
reason. In isolating the third antinomy, Adorno perhaps loses sight of its place in the 
overall problematic of the Dialectic. Of course, Adorno might be seeking to revive 
Kantian reason through his heterodox interpretation of the intelligible character. But in 
that case, why return to the 'logic of appearance'? The intelligible must appear, as 
semblance. But this semblance is subject to an anterior antinomy that guarantees that it 
must never appear. 
As was seen, the younger Benjamin was attentive to the problem of the 
regressive infinity in Kantian metaphysics. Adorno's thesis that 'metaphysics migrates 
into micrology' amounts to a restatement of his dissonant nominalism, the' anti-system' 
modelled upon Benjamin's constellational monad and Weber's ideal-type. Benjamin's 
Schellingian-materialist pantheism lives on in Adorno's micrology, to the extent that the 
micro has any claim upon the macro, even, or especially, negatively. Adorno's retrieval 
of the intelligible character through (meta-) reflection nevertheless remains, in much of 
Negative Dialectics, something of a performative contradiction. Adorno replaces that 
which has fallen, Kantian metaphysics, with more of the same Kantian metaphysics. 
Adorno's ambivalence over Kant becomes fixed into a Kantian antinomy of its own, 
which is similarly assumed to be productive ('given to us as a problem'). But the 
antimony of the antinomy is, surely, a mere tautology. The sense of inertia - precisely 
37 Adorno, T. W. Negative Dialectics, pp.382-386. 
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that which Adorno wants to resist - is exacerbated by Adorno's nostalgic presentation 
of the quandary. Metaphysics is crippled, but only metaphysics has the cure. Adorno 
expresses a sense of loss for a metaphysical experience that, perhaps, never was. The 
infinite task of reason becomes Melancholia and not Trauer. 
Fortunately, aside from the micrology, the Kantian-Romantic response is not 
Adorno's only response to the problem of metaphysics. 'Happiness and Waiting in 
Vain' appears as something of a possibility amidst the seeming impossibility of the 
'Meditations'. The section is nevertheless intimately connected to Adorno's overall 
problematic. The crisis of metaphysics is a crisis of promise. Kant's 'kingdom of ends' 
becomes the bad utopia of waiting in vain for an end that we already take to be beyond 
us in advance. The problem of the regressive infinity is, it was suggested, intimately 
connected to the problem of the (Aristotelian) temporal series of conditions (see chapter 
3).38 
In Minima Moralia, Adorno defines the experience of this stretch of time into 
infinity as boredom. In-finite, because this time is alienated from finite experience. As a 
form of alienation, this boredom is no benign idleness: 
The man for whom time stretches out painfully is one waiting in vain [der 
Wartet vergeblich], disappointed at not finding tomorrow already continuing 
yesterday. 39 
In Negative Dialectics, the boredom of 'waiting in vain' is explicitly related to the 
problem of metaphysics. Art 'has demonstrated' the condition of waiting in vain in the 
absence of metaphysical expectation. Art does not tautologically reproduce waiting in 
vain however: in expressing (it), art says something else. In Aesthetic Theory, 
expression is closely related to mimesis, which is equally productive and poetic. The 
expression of meaninglessness is not abstractly negative for Adorno; a lament to what 
has been lost. It is the reverse: 'happiness' - hence the Proustian example (which is 
admittedly Romantic). In his concluding lecture on metaphysics, and in contrast to the 
concluding Meditation (the very end of Negative Dialectics), Adorno says that 'waiting 
in vain' is 'no doubt the form [Gestalt] in which metaphysical experience manifests 
itself most strongly to us. ,40 There can, it seems, be no doubt that 'waiting in vain' is 
central to Adorno's later work. 
38 Kant, 1. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, ed. Mary Gregor (Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), pp.43-4. 
39 Adorno, T. W. Minima Moralia, p.175. 
40 Adorno, T. W. Metaphysics, p.143. 
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How can waiting in vain name both unhappy boredom and the happiness of 
metaphysical experience? This transformation is the work of (its) expression. In the 
lectures, it is the work of the 'Gestalt', as Gestaltung. As Adorno says of Beethoven's 
'expansive type', empty time is 'shaped', albeit as the semblance of what a fulfilled 
time could be. As semblance of the awaited, not the awaited of itself, anticipation is 
here intermittent. Perhaps Adorno's 'intermittent anticipation' (the intelligible 'X') 
pertains to the nature of the anticipation more than it does to the discontinuity of 
historical progress. Hence: 'Waiting in vain does not vouchsafe what the expectation 
aims at, but reflects the condition, which has its measure in the denial.' Reflection takes 
on a different sense to Kantian-Romantic reflection here. It is as tragic as it is ironic, 
since it acknowledges what it is denying for the sake of its knowledge (in the sense of 
the 'tragic irony' explored in chapters 3 & 4). An expression of waiting in vain does not 
negate anticipation, but is instead a new kind of anticipation. The expression of waiting 
in vain is original, not weakened anticipation. Adorno will not use the terminology of 
'origin' (because of Heidegger), but there is an implicit notion of a temporalisation of 
possibility in his concept of expression - if only as a negation of 'detemporalisation'. 
As with Benjamin's 'weak messianic force', weakness is not a comparative to some 
former strength, in the case of intermittent anticipation. This is because fulfilled 
anticipation has not been realised - traditional (Aristotelian) metaphysics even blocked 
the possibility of its realisation by positing its necessity dogmatically, outside of 
experience. Such anticipation can only be produced from the standpoint of 
consciousness, Dasein (and in this sense, Kant was right). 
A tension nevertheless remains between Benjamin's messianism, at work within 
Adorno's thought, and Adorno's late confrontation with metaphysics hitherto, including 
neo-Kantian metaphysics. The problem of waiting in vain is an extension of the radical 
indeterminacy of the 'when?' into the 'if?' This is why we ask, 'is that all?' But given 
that the 'expression' is not itself in vain, Adorno does retain a moment of promise, of 
hope, in his - quasi-messianic - form of waiting. In the 'Finale' to Minima Moralia, 
Adorno acknowledges the necessity of the internal contradiction of impossibility and 
possibility arising from this philosophical messianism. On the one hand, 
The only philosophy which can be practised in the face of despair is the 
attempt to contemplate all things as they would present themselves from the 
standpoint of redemption. 
But on the other hand, this possibility remains, 
the utterly impossibl~ ~hing, because it presupposes a standpoint removed, 
even though by a haIr s breadth, from the scope of existence whereas we 
well know that any possible knowledge must not only be wrest~d from what 
is, if it shall hold good, but is also marked, for this very reason, by the same 
distortion and indigence which it seeks to escape. 
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Adorno does not resolve this antinomy, but rather, again in a Kantian vein, takes the 'as 
if to be productive, a priori, thus siding with possibility against impossibility _ 
regulatively: the 'question of the reality or unreality of redemption hardly itself 
matters'. Taubes and Agamben have taken exception to Adorno's 'Finale,.41 But the 
real problem of Adorno's formulation is applicable to these thinkers to an even greater 
extent: the assumption of 'the messianic light' itself. 42 And unlike Agamben, Adorno 
intemalises this problem, however inconclusively, into his 'Meditations'. Agamben 
gives no consideration to the 'Meditations', to 'waiting in vain' in particular, which is 
all the more messianic because it is, as Agamben says, 'non-messianic'. Adorno's 
extension of the 'when?' into the 'if?' sharpens the problem and meaning of an 
expression of waiting in vain as not in vain. 
The expression of waiting in vain shares a sense of promise, as becoming-
waiting, with the traditional idea of metaphysics, but without being traditional. This 
intermittent promise would even be metaphysical for the first time. It would be, as 
Adorno puts it, 'solidaristic with metaphysics in the moment of [its] fall' .43 The 
expression of waiting in vain can therefore be understood as Adorno's critique of 
anticipation in the intelligible character. This 'changes the contents of metaphysics 
itself. The genitive in the expression of waiting in vain functions in both ways. An 
expression of waiting in vain is not identical with waiting in vain, and in a crucial sense 
opposes it. This is the moment of messianic hope (against all hope) that is to be found in 
much philosophical messianism. But insofar as such messianism does not consider the 
relation to the second aspect of the genitive, it remains, in the last instance, 
overdetermined by traditional-theological metaphysics (as Benjamin himself ruefully 
remarks, the theological tradition is 'wizened and has to keep out of sight').44 This is 
what is new about Adorno's late expression of waiting in vain. For the expression is of 
waiting in vain in the sense of belonging to waiting in vain. There is something of 
41 Cf. Introduction, p.2, n.4. 
42 Adorno, T. W. Minima Moralia, p.247. 
43 Adorno, T. W. Negative Dialectics, pp.397-40? ,. .' _ 
44 B . . W 'Theses on the Philosophy of HIStOry, 10 IlluminatIOns, p.24). enJam1O, . 
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waiting in vain in the expression. The expression is a kind of waiting, the mediating 
event of waiting in vain 'into' the awaited. 
It was suggested in the previous four chapters that the nature of this mediating 
event be elucidated by way of a musical philosophy, or a philosophy of the 'musical'. 
The 'divertissement' of musical time and the 'bad utopia' of musical space each imply 
waiting in vain. But musical dissonance names its expression, and, as musicaL is 
another kind of waiting. It is an-other waiting as not the re-presenting willing of some-
thing, nor of no-nothing. At the same time, it is both waiting and willing. The 
expressIOn of waiting in vain was equally understood as a mimesis of 
detemporalisation, taking the example of Nono's modem music. This 'tragic ironic' 
mimesis is as spatial as it is temporal. 
The meaning and possibility of the expression of waiting in vain nevertheless 
remains somewhat philosophically under-articulated (in the last two chapters, the means 
of argumentation was not purely philosophical, but also proceeded by way of a critique 
of Prometeo). As was suggested, the recourse to a post-Idealist idea of natural-history 
only remains coherent if its metaphysical grounding is confronted. So far as the other 
chapters are concerned, the 'anti-metaphysical' thinking of the tragic might risk the 
wishful thinking associated with traditional philosophical messianism. This remains 
equally the case within Heidegger's active nihilism - as he increasingly comes to 
realise. Some of the results of Heidegger's auto-critique can help to philosophically 
substantiate Adorno's expression of waiting in vain. 
II. Heidegger 
The Fundamental Attunement 
The 'fundamental attunement [Grundstimmung], of 'profound boredom', which 
Heidegger introduces in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, can initially be 
read in terms of the 'fundamental state-of-mind' of Being and Time: 'Angst' .45 This 
shift in terminology anticipates a series of shifts in Heidegger's philosophy at this time, 
amounting to a sustained critique of the book that had brought him notoriety (as early as 
45 Heidegger, M. The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, p.7-t; Heidegger, M. 
Being and Time, p.228. Translation amended. 
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1928, Heidegger would report to Karl Jaspers, 'I no longer think of the fact that a short 
while ago I wrote a so-called book,).46 
In Being and Time, state-of-mind (,Bejindlichkeit': literally, how Dasein finds 
itself) is 'a fundamental existentiale'. For, 'in every case Dasein always has some mood 
fgestimmt ist]' - especially, as we shall see, in the 'pallid, evenly balanced lack of mood 
[Ungestimmtheit]. ,47 In the quasi-transcendental terms of Being and Time, state-of-mind 
is the condition for the possibility of 'Stimmung', mood. In The Fundamental Concepts, 
however, it is 'Grundstimmung' that is fundamental, or grounding, without being a 
formal-transcendental ground. The fundamental attunement signals a departure from the 
latent (neo-) Kantianism of Being and Time, recognised by Adorno in his 1932 
lecture.48 Heidegger's existentiale had performed the function of a category. This was 
not (ostensibly) the Kantian category, for it was intended to elude the formal-
transcendental structure of Kantian (and all post-Cartesian) metaphysics (of subject-
object). JUdging from the The Fundamental Concepts, Heidegger now doubts whether 
this attempt was successful. Heidegger's response is to radicalise state-of-mind into the 
fundamental attunement. In what sense is this a radicalisation? And how does it address 
the problem of formalism, and hence history? 
Heidegger is drawn to the twofold sense of Stimmung as mood and as 
attunement, in the sense of a relation (as, paradigmatically, the tuning of a musical 
interval). Unlike state-of-mind, there can be no attunement in general: 'there is not 
merely one single attunement, but several'. This is because attunement is already a 
manner of being-in-the-world, not a formal condition of its possibility: 'An attunement 
is a way, not merely a form or mode, but a way.' There are profound consequences to 
Heidegger's foregrounding of the fundamental attunement, within and beyond his 
thought. 
Adorno consistently accuses Heidegger of idealism, for the reason that the 
transcendental structure of Dasein, including the category of historicity, is 
foundationalist and thus non-historical. Heidegger naturalises the historical structure of 
Dasein. Existence becomes the timeless ground of time, or Dasein's self-
temporalisation. Adorno's critique is problematic for two reasons: (1) A historically 
attentive reading of Being and Time would suggest that anxiety becomes fundamental in 
accordance with the history (or, fate) of metaphysical modernity. The philosophy of 
46 Heidegger to Jaspers, September 24, 1928. Cited in: Safranski, R. Martin Heidegger, 
trans. Ewald Oders (Harvard University Press, 1998), p.190. 
47 Heidegger, M. Being and Time, pp.72-3. 
48 Adorno, T. W. 'The Idea of Natural History', p.112. 
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history in Being and Time short-circuits this reading to a great extent, because the 
existentiale is, as a 'category', anachronistically projected into the having-been. If 
positive religion and metaphysics excluded, and continue to exclude, an authentic 
attunement of Angst, then authentic 'historizing' was, and remains, an impossibility _ 
even for those untimely poets and thinkers. (2) Adorno's principle objection is that 
Heidegger repeats neo-Kantian historicism along with its epistemology ('critical 
idealism,).49 This leads to an impotence of critical history.50 But does Adorno's 
alternative philosophy of history succeed in overcoming neo-Kantianism, given the 
problems encountered above? This is once again the conflict between existence and 
history, ontology and dialectics, that is represented in the conflict between Heidegger 
and Adorno. Does history ground existence or does existence ground history? 
The Fundamental Concepts lectures already anticipate some of Adorno's 
criticisms, and point towards responses that both resonate with and challenge Adorno's 
alternatives. For the re-interpretation of state-of-mind as attunement impinges directly 
upon the twofold problem of formalism and history. Since the fundamental attunement 
is not formal-transcendental, Heidegger must choose one fundamental attunement, of 
today: 'Profound boredom is the fundamental attunement of our contemporary Dasein'. 
As Miguel de Beistegui has observed, the 'fundamental disposition' of profound 
boredom renders the lecture-course an eminently transitional work (the first work, I 
suggest, of Heidegger's 'turning'), both within the genesis of Heidegger's thought and 
within the structure of that thought. De Beistegui calls (the problem of) this transition: 
'Between Existence and History' .51 Heidegger must support his claim for the 
49 Adorno, T. W. 'The Idea of Natural History', p.112. Cf. Negative Dialectics, p.69. 
50 It should be noted that, whereas Adorno continues to view history as science, in an 
expanded sense, the science of history is only a sub-category of Heidegger's philosophy 
of history - a consequence of the recent Lebensphilosophie critiques of historicism. 
Heidegger's recourse to Dilthey does not help him in this regard, Adorno suggests, 
because his version of history is just as vacuous as Rickert's: 'Dilthey's attempt at an 
historical ontology ran aground because he did not engage facticity with sufficient 
seriousness. ' 
51 De Beistegui rightly flags-up the central 'tension' of the lecture-course, ~etween a 
concept of existence whose essence is 'pure time' and one whose essence IS already 
'subordinated to a task which is historical in nature'. For, 'insofar as Being and Time 
has already identified the "fundamental mean.ing" of Dasein as temporality .... ? :vhy must 
we begin to search for the fundamental me~mg of ?ur co~tempor~ry Dasem. De 
Beistegui also acknowledges that 'the Sol.utIOn to thiS ten~IOn ... WIll .be found only 
when Heidegger will reformulate th~ project of ~he ques~on concern.mg ,the sense of 
being and transform it into the questIOn concernmg the history of ~emg ... The, .. 
demonstration of this move is ultimately confused, however. As Wlt~ ~O\vlth s ~ntlque 
of Heidegger, de Beistegui tends to side with the individual and apolItical Dasem of 
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fundamental attunement of contemporary Dasein with a philosophy of history that goes 
beyond the formal historicity of Being and Time, initially by way of a phenomenology 
of contemporary boredom. Heidegger attempts to show his students that they are 
fundamentally bored. 
With both anxiety and boredom, Heidegger proceeds from the everyday and 
determinate towards the enigmatic and indeterminate. In Being and Time, the way is 
prepared for the account of anxiety with 'fear', that everyday state-of-mind which 
discloses 'the "thrownness" of this entity', Da-sein, 'into its "there". ,52 Fear is 
determinate, intended towards 'something which we encounter within-the-world'. The 
first form of boredom, 'becoming bored by', is similarly determinate. With the example 
of waiting for a train, Heidegger suggests that we are aware both of what we are bored 
by and that we are bored (by it). We are all too aware that we are bored because we 
repeatedly try, and repeatedly fail, to pass the time. In this non-passing of the time, time 
presses itself upon us, not as something external or invisible (Kant) but rather as the 
burden-responsibility of Dasein itself: 
What is at issue in boredom [Langweile] is a while [Weile], tarrying a while 
[Verweilen], a peculiar remaining, enduring ... what is decisive in passing 
the time, and indeed in what it shakes off, namely boredom, is, after all, 
time. Passing the time is therefore a shortening of time that drives time on, 
namely the time that seeks to become long [lang]. It is thus an intervention 
into time as a confrontation with time. 53 
In the second example, 'being bored with', we go to a dinner party and only realise that 
we were bored afterwards. We cannot put our finger on what exactly bored us. We are 
bored by '1 know not what'. 
Hence, 'in the first case we have a determinate boring thing, whereas in the 
second case we have something indeterminate that bores us. ,54 Crucially, the 
comparison between anxiety and boredom breaks down with the third case of boredom, 
Being and Time, against any collective or political Dasein whatever - that which must 
be 'at once too ambitious and naive, too theological and messianic'. Instead of 
messianism, the transition to a history of Being is secured by way of 'the great works 
and lecture-courses of the 1930s' (including, it should be noted, the 'messianic' 
interpretations of Holder lin). These works seek to reawaken the. 'wonder' oft?~ Greek 
Dasein. De Beistegui does not acknowledge that such an operatIOn already pnvtleges a 
particular history in a manner that does not seek to account for this privilege. De 
Beistegui, Miguel. 'Boredom: Between Existence and History', in Thinking With 
Heidegger (Indiana University Press, 2003), pp.61-82. 
52 Heidegger, M. Being and Time, p.174. 
53 Heidegger, M. The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, p. 96. 
54 Ibid. p. 114. 
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'profound boredom', because there were only two kinds of fear: conditioned (fear) and 
condition of possibility (anxiety). In boredom, by contrast, an increasing profundity or 
depth accrues from each form to the next. Hence, the 'second form of boredom has a 
peculiar intermediate position. ,55 At the same time, 'the third form is the condition of 
the possibility of the first and thereby also of the second. ,56 'Profound boredom' IS 
indeterminate: 'It bores one [Es langweilt Einen]'.57 
What, then, distinguishes the second and third forms of boredom, given that 
both are indeterminate? Profound boredom is occasioned by the 'refusal' of 'beings as a 
whole'. Rather than pitting the determinate against the indeterminate, Heidegger now 
suggests that the manifoldness of boredom signifies that its determinacy is a question of 
intensity (or 'depth'). This is the departure from the 'two level' transcendental (and 
empirical) Kantianism. Even, or especially, the deepest boredom is the negative concern 
of 'beings as a whole' - not beings in general (Heidegger wants to wrest the as such 
from the in general; to displace transcendental with ontological difference). 
As was suggested above, Heidegger's description of profound boredom comes 
close to an idea of melancholy, which he names on two occasions in these lectures. In 
profound boredom, 'all and everything appears indifferent to US,.58 The 'all and 
everything' signifies that profound boredom is bored with 'beings as a whole' - just as, 
in this respect at least, anxiety, attested to in 'anticipatory resoluteness', is the secret to 
an authentic (response to) 'Ganzseinkonnen'. The experience of radical indeterminacy is 
Heidegger's way of showing that time is a question about the whole and that the whole 
is a question about time: 
what is at issue is the question of what time itself is, such that it can have a 
relation to things, and furthermore such that from out of such a relation 
something like boredom is possible as an attunement that attunes us through 
h 59 and throug . 
In contrast to determinate fear, that 'in the face of which one is anxIOUS IS 
completely indeterminate'; 'is not an entity within-the-world' .60 What, in that case, are 
we anxious about? When anxiety is introduced in Division I of Being and Time, only 
one of the three ways in which Dasein is anxious has been characterised: thrownness. 
55 Ibid. p.157. 
56 Ibid. p.156. 
57 Ibid. p.134. 
58 Ibid. p.37. 
59 Ibid. p. 105. 
60 Heidegger, M. Being and Time, p.231. 
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The remaining two are Being-towards-death and the call of conscience. In all three 
'phenomena', anxiety rises-up out of the abyss: 
The "~othing" ~it~ w~ich anxiety brings us face to face, unveils the nullity 
by whIch DaseIll, III Its very ground, is defined; and this basis itself is a 
thrownness into death.61 
And yet, Heidegger does not discuss 'Being-towards-death' in The Fundamental 
Concepts (he does, briefly, as an instance of how the 'ordinary understanding' fails to 
grasp a concept when it grasps at it too tightly).62 Heidegger also declines to pursue the 
meaning of the expression 'we are almost dying of boredom,.63 Boredom is clearly a 
question about finitude: 'being affected by time in boredom ... is evidently a peculiar 
impressing of the power of that time to which we are bound.' And profound boredom is, 
like Being-towards-death, radically indeterminate: 'Along with the certainty of death 
goes the indeterminacy [Unbestimmtheit] of its "when".'64 Nevertheless, the 
disappearance of Being-towards-death in the lectures has important consequences for 
Heidegger's evolving understanding of the concepts: world, whole, time and history. It 
paves the way for a complex relation to Adorno's 'waiting in vain'. 
World, Whole, History 
What is fundamental about profound boredom is that its indeterminacy is such that it 
tells of the refusal of 'things as a whole'. The 'silent fog' becomes deafening: 
All telling refusal [Versagen] is in itself a telling [Sagen], i.e., a making 
manifest. What do beings in this telling refusal of themselves as a whole tell 
us in such refusal? What do they tell us in refusing to tell? It is a telling 
refusal of that which somehow could and was to be granted to Dasein. And 
what is that? The very possibilities of doing and acting. The telling refusal 
tells of these possibilities of Dasein.65 
As with the call of conscience, this way of telling 'does not put itself into words at all, 
yet it remains nothing less than obscure and indeterminate. ,66 But in Being and Time. 
the 'resolute' harkening to the call of conscience is only half of the story about 
authenticity. Being-towards-death provides Heidegger with the 'anticipatory 
61 Ibid. p.356. 
62 Heidegger, M. The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, p.294. 
63 Ibid. p.96. 
64 Heidegger, M. Being and Time, p.302. 
65 Heidegger, M. The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, p. 140. 
66 Heidegger, M. Being and Time, p.318. 
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[Vorlaufen]' that,joined with 'resoluteness', becomes 'anticipatory resoluteness' (as we 
shall see, the anticipatory is to be sharply distinguished from anticipation, which is 
expectation).67 In the Fundamental Concepts, by contrast, possibility is not aligned with 
futural temporalisation. The understanding of temporality accordingly differs in these 
two works, in contradictory ways. These contradictions must be noted in order to take 
the most progressive elements from both of these 'modernist' works in a coherent 
manner. 
In The Fundamental Concepts, the fundamental attunement concerns time in its 
inherent relation to world, as things-as-a-whole, rather than to things that are not yet, or 
might never be. In the above citation, Heidegger speaks of possibilities, but these are 
now things according to things-as-a-whole and, though Heidegger will never admit it, 
historical time as-a-whole. Possibility inheres in all three temporal horizons - in the 
'single threefold horizon of time' - whereas, in Being and Time, possibility is the 
necessary privilege of the futural, for the indeterminate expectation of death, the 
anticipatory, is the ontological possibility of determinate possibility: 
The anticipatory makes Dasein authentically futural, and in such a way that 
the anticipatory itself is possible only in so far as Dasein, as being, is always 
coming towards itself - that is to say, in so far as it is futural in its Being in 
general. 68 
This is not the case in The Fundamental Concepts. In fundamental boredom, 
All beings withdraw from us without exception in every respect [Hinsicht], 
everything we look at and the way in which we look at it; everything in 
retrospect [Riicksicht], all beings that we look back upon as having been and 
having become and as past, and the way we look back at them; all beings in 
every prospect [Absicht], everything we look at prospectively as futural, and 
the way we have thus regarded them prospectively. Everything - in every 
respect, in retrospect and prospect, beings simultaneously withdraw. The 
three perspectives [Sichten] of respect, retrospect, and prospect do not 
belong to mere perception... but are the perspecti:es o~ all doing a~d 
activity of Dasein . .. There is a telling refusal of all bemgs SImultaneously III 
. 69 
'what' and 'how' they are: as a whole, as we put It. 
A tension reigns within Heidegger's 'world' of the lectures, between beings as such 
and, in this instance, a totality of beings - past, present and future. The latter even 
67 I have adjusted 'anticipation' to 'anticipatory' in the M~cquarrie & R~binson 
tranlation, in order to clarify its distinction from 'expectatIOn'. The EnglIsh translators 
themselves use 'anticipatory' in their rendering: 'anticipatory resoluteness'. 
68 Heidegger, M. Being and Time, p.373. Translation ame~ded (see note above). 
69 Heidegger, M. The Fundamental Concepts of MetaphYSICS, p. 145. 
192 
resembles a form of pantheism. In his 1932 lecture, Adorno cites Heidegger's 'most 
recent tum towards Hegel' as further evidence of an unacknowledged absolute idealism. 
Adorno's later critique of Hegel's 'detemporalisation' is equally applicable to 
Heidegger in this instance. 70 The evolution of Heidegger's whole from a 
phenomenological to a pantheistic-Aristotelian concept is ambiguous. The totality of the 
whole comes close to the scholastic-nominalist idea that every-thing has its unique time 
and place: haecceitas. This teaching of Duns Scotus interested the younger Heidegger _ 
ultimately, in relation to Hegel.71 Adorno finds this nominalism in Being and Time. in 
spite of its emphasis upon the 'pragmata' of things.72 Heidegger now states, in The 
Fundamental Concepts that, 
boredom is possible only because every thing, and more fundamentally 
every Dasein as such, has its time.73 
This conservative ontology (in every sense) is not modem and post-metaphysical, but 
medieval and eminently metaphysical (even the Nazis would come to fear Heidegger's 
Jesuitic scholasticism). Such an ontology views its world as the natural order of things. 
Prefacing the lengthy discussion of boredom with a discussion of Aristotle's 
Metaphysics, Heidegger devotes the remaining lectures to a comparison between the 
worlds of stone, animal and Dasein. Heidegger's philosophy calls for him to rethink the 
meaning of nature (as not spirit), but he cannot do this whilst confined to an ontology 
that modem technology - the history of modernity - has rendered otiose. What was 
modem about Being and Time, by contrast, was its systematic presentation of possibility 
as possibility. It is a fragmentary, modernist system of freedom. Heidegger 
70 Heidegger's 1931 lectures on the Phenomenology are actually directed against 
interpretations of' absolute knowing' as a totality of knowledge, in favour of' ab-
solving'. Heidegger relinquishes Hegelian mediation in a manner that will increasingly 
become a problem for him. Cf. Heidegger, M. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. 
Kenneth Maly & Parvis Emad (Indiana University Press, 1994). 
71 The conclusion of Heidegger's thesis on 'The Theory of Categories and Meaning in 
Duns Scotus' (1915) reads: 
The philosophy of living spirit, of active love, of reverent intimacy with God, the ~ost ~eneral directio~s 
of which we were only able to indicate roughly, and especially a theory of ca~~gone~ gUld~d by the baSIC 
tendencies of this philosophy, stand before the great task of a fund~ental cntlcal diSCUSSIOn of that 
system of historical worldview that is the most powerful one regardmg fullness as well as depth.' wealth 
of experience and concept-formation and as such lift~d up ~.to its~lf all ?f the fundamental motives 
previously at work in philosophical problems - that IS, a cntlcal diSCUSSion of Hegel. 
Translated by Roderick M. Stewart & John van Buren, in Supplements (State University 
of New York Press, 2002), p.68. 
72 Adorno, T. W. Jargon of Authentici~v, pp.l 02-3; Negative Dialectics, pp.131-2. 
73 Heidegger, M. The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, p. 127. 
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acknowledged, in the tragic sense, that the world is not the stable creation of a creator 
, 
into which we creatures are purposefully placed. Modernity dispels this natural order of 
things. But so long as Dasein is there, things could be otherwise. 
Heidegger remained too optimistic about the tragic in Being and Time. however. 
Or, he focused upon the hero to the neglect of the chorus. This problem is 
acknowledged in The Fundamental Concepts. The problem of 'world' concerns 'us', 
'today'. But, in addressing this problem, Heidegger produces a new set of them. On the 
one hand, world signifies 'beings as a whole', tellingly refused in fundamental 
boredom. On the other hand, 'world-formation' means the 'un-concealment' of 
determinate possibility, illuminated in the 'Augenblick' of the very same fundamental 
attunement. 74 Heidegger risks ending-up either with a one-world monism or a two-
world dualism (the actual world and the possible one). Both are familiar to traditional 
metaphysics. 
If truth is the un-concealment of that which has refused itself then truth is the 
same old world, once over. The anomaly is especially acute in the first instance of the 
temporal horizon. How can the having-been, as some-thing, both refuse itself and be 
disclosed as a possibility? This problem is symptomatic of Heidegger's equivocation 
over whether the resolutely disclosing Augenblick remains held-open in the 
Grundstimmung, as the readiness to act upon possibilities, or is rather Bestimmung, the 
determinate act of itself. Sometimes it appears to be both.75 But so long as we are 
political animals, we can do more about the to-come than we can about the having-been, 
however much the former must be (intellectually) grounded in the latter. As Heidegger 
had put it in Being and Time: 'Only so far as it is futural can Dasein be authentically as 
having been. The character of "having been" arises, in a certain way, from the future. ,76 
Adorno anticipates these problems in his natural-history lecture: (I) What does 
Heidegger mean by 'the whole'? And (2), how can the whole include both the possible 
and the actual? 
[T]he project [Entwwj] of being... takes priority over the subsumed 
facti city; a facti city that is to be fitted in as an afterthought.77 
Adorno picks-up on Heidegger's equivocation between the totality and the as such. In 
Being and Time, the whole 'is no longer held to be a systematic whole, but rather a 
74 Ibid. p. 27-34. 
75 Ibid. p. 149. 
76 Heidegger, M. Being and Time, p.373. 
77 Adorno, T. W. 'The Idea of Natural History', p.116. 
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structural whole, a structural unity or totality.'78 But tellingly, Adorno does not pursue 
the problem of the as such. In The Fundamental Concepts, Heidegger wants the "as' to 
correspond to 'the Being of beings', and thus to ontological difference. Whereas, 
Adorno often defines 'being' in a traditionally Aristotelian manner (following 
Benjamin's scholasticism, perhaps): 'the question of ontology ... is none other than what 
I b" tu ",79 Ad h . mean y na re. orno can t us accuse Heldegger of projecting Dasein, as spirit, 
onto nature, in an eminently (German-, but not Schellingian-) Idealist gesture. 
Heidegger 'only offers an apparent solution to the problem of the reconciliation of 
nature and history,.80 Adorno's determination of Being as (immutable?) nature 
nevertheless seems to remain, from Heidegger's perspective, at the level of an ontic 
misrecognition of the ontological.81 For Heidegger, the Being of beings cannot be 
totalised in this way, since the meaning of Being is time. Adorno seems to miss this 
fundamental thesis in Heidegger (or does he?), which is remarkable given his own 
interest in time and history. Even in the later polemics against Being-towards-death, 
Adorno does not confront Heidegger's rethinking of temporality (in any case, Adorno 
would not have been familiar with the 1929-30 lectures). 
Heidegger's lapse into scholasticism coincides with an attempt to address the 
problems of idealism and solipsism in Being and Time. There is a diremption in that 
book between the whole and the world. The possibility of Being-a-whole is attested to 
authentically in the face of that which radically individuates. Death is 'in each case 
one's own'. 82 How can the radically individuated also be the whole? The whole in 
Being and Time is the whole individual, but only according to an attempted redefinition 
of individual and individuation. Adorno is right to say that Heidegger neglects the 
individual. Firstly, because this is precisely Heidegger's point. Dasein is not the 
'person' (in this sense, Dasein has more in common with Hegelian spirit or Schellingian 
existence than it does with Kantian subjectivity, hence the interpretations of Dasein as 
78 Ibid. p.115. 
79 Ibid. p.III-2. 
80 Ibid. p.1l5. . . . 
81 Much of 'The Ontological Need', in Negative Dialectics, IS taken up WIth a refutatIOn 
of ontological difference. It is a mute point, in spite of his critique of the ideological 
tendencies of ontology (the 'German Ideology'), as to whether Adorno ever confronts 
Heidegger's thesis, since Adorno consistently works with a traditio~al-~etaphysi~al 
definition of 'Being' - whether Platonic (the supersensuous), HegelIan (mdetermmat~ 
immediacy) or Aristotelian (physis). Adorno suggests that it is impossi?le to argue WIth 
Heidegger, on account of the authoritari~ism of ~is jargon: But wh~ dId Ad.orno not. 
produce a refutation of, for instance, th~ mtr~ductIon ~o Bemg and Time, whIch contams 
recognisable arguments for the ontologIcal dIfference. 
82 Heidegger, M. Being and Time, p.284. 
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the 'for-itself). Being is never mine but is always, authentically, a detenninate response 
to the question of Being (and not nothing). Mine-ness means grasping the questionable 
enigma of Being. Without mineness, Being would remain unquestioned and hence 
forgotten. That Being belongs to no-one is another way of saying that authentic Dasein 
is authentic 'Mitdasein': 'Resoluteness brings the Self... into solicitous Being with 
Others [fiirsorgende Mitsein].,83 This sort of thinking is not unique to Heidegger, of 
course. For Adorno, 
Humanity can be thought only through [an] extreme form of differentiation, 
individuation, not as a comprehensive generic concept. 84 
Adorno's speculative universal collectivity is nowhere to be seen in Being and Time, 
however. Heidegger needs a collective movement of history to give content to his 
historicity. Not the collective of humanity, but of the German nation. Nevertheless, The 
Fundamental Concepts lectures show that Heidegger begins to think about concrete 
history ('contemporary Dasein') and collectivity ('our') prior to his ideological 
conversion to National Socialism. Heidegger at no point aligns the 'we' to the Germans 
in The Fundamental Concepts (even though he was probably thinking of it). 
'Ganzseinkonnen' does not explicitly include a world, as 'things-as-a-whole' 
does in The Fundamental Concepts. In Being and Time, things are redefined as 
'equipment' prior to the explicit introduction of the problem of authenticity. Being-in-
the-world (of 'public' things) is thus biased towards the everyday and inauthentic 
(except for a brief return to equipment at the end of the book). Heidegger alludes to this 
problem, his former deconstruction of the res, in the lecture course: 
It never occurred to me ... to try to claim or prove with this interpretation 
that the essence of man consists in the fact that he knows how to handle 
knives and forks or to use the tram.85 
Heidegger now seeks to incorporate explicitly world into the possibility of authenticity 
- except that, not only is the openness of resoluteness, Ent-schlossenheit, now 
emphasised over its mineness (openness to Being as the question of mineness) but 
equally, the problem of authenticity now concerns us. Indeed, Heidegger never really 
deals with the Solitude of his subtitle (which he calls 'individuation' in the lectures). 
83 Ibid. p.344. . 
84 Adorno, T. W. 'Progress', in Critical Models: InterventIOns and Catchwords, cd. 
Henry W. Pickford (Columbia University Press, 1998), p. ~ 51. 
85 Heidegger, M. The Fundamental Concepts of MetaphYSICS, p.177. 
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If ontological questioning is to occupy the void left by metaphysics then it must 
question 'comprehensively', in a manner that 'includes the questioner'. Between 1929 
and 1932, Heidegger experiments with a redefinition (de-construction rather than 
destruction) of metaphysics, because it has traditionally served to ask this question of 
the whole. 86 In Aristotle, physis means both 'nature' and 'nature of .87 Physics is 
already metaphysics. These are but hints of a different kind of 'comprehensive 
philosophizing' for Heidegger, who now follows Schelling in contending that any 
systematic philosophy of facticity must include a positive account of nature. The 
Freiheitschrift is cited towards the end of the lectures. 88 Heidegger's repetition of 
Schelling's incorporation of contemporary natural science also repeats its syncretism, 
however. Heidegger intends to show, against idealism, that Dasein and animals share a 
world, only by sharing, against naturalism, different intensities (or, depths) of world. 
Heidegger combines a pre-modem materialism with modem zoology - a true dialectic 
of myth and enlightenment. Nevertheless, the Schellingian problematic might be 
recuperated in the light of both the ontological post-metaphysics of Being and Time and 
Adorno's melancholy science of natural-history. A historical- and 'musical' - concept 
of Stimmung is central to both philosophies. This sense of historical attunement can 
mediate the two thinkers, the two positions, in order to respond to the question: what is 
the relationship between the world of possibility and the world of the awaited? For this 
is the messianic-utopian question of waiting. 
III. Adorno and Heidegger 
Boredom, Waiting and Death 
In Being and Time, we read of a detenninate and an indetenninate kind of waiting. 
Death always lies ahead, as 'that which is not to be outstripped'. But since the end 
cannot be detennined in its 'what?' or its 'when?' - since Dasein would in these cases 
be 'Nicht-mehr-da-sein', then death cannot be expected, authentically, that is. 
Expectation, Er-wartung, is detenninate waiting, in the sense that we already have what 
we are expecting before us: 
86 This can be glanced at from the titles of Heidegger's works during this time: K~nt 
and the Problem of Metaphysics (1928), The Fundamental Concepts of ,\letaphyslcs 
(1929-30) and the inaugural lecture, What is Metaphysics (1929). 
87 Ibid. p.30. 
88 Ibid. p.364. 
To expect something possible is always to understand it and to 'have' it with 
regard .to ~hethe~ and when and how it will be actually present-at-hand. 
Exp~ctmg IS n?t J.ust an o~casional looking-away from the possible to its 
possIble actu~hzatlOn, b~t IS esse~tially a waiting for that actualization [ein 
Warten auf dzese]. Even m exrectmg, one leaps away from the possible and 
gets a foothold on the actual. 8 
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Expectation does not wait, to the extent that the awaited is already 'present-at-hand', 
projected from the present into the expected future - or, conversely, projected from the 
expected future into presence. We await the train in expectation of it. We know, now 
and in advance, what it will be like for the train to arrive since we have waited for trains 
that have arrived in the 'having-been'. The perpetuating present holds apart the possible 
and the actual, as a long while - as boredom. Heidegger maintains that, in his first 
example, 
it is waiting itself that is boring and that bores us, but boredom is not itself a 
waiting. Furthermore, not every waitinff is necessarily boring. On the contrary, waiting can be full of suspense.9 
Heidegger is surely alluding to the more nuanced account of waiting in his Hauptwerk. 
Read in the light of Being and Time, the first form of determinate boredom must return 
in order for profound boredom to be profound. No indeterminate waiting without 
determinate waiting (as Benjamin observed, 'he who waits ... takes in the time and 
renders it up in altered form - that of expectation,).91 Heidegger is reluctant to define 
boredom as waiting because he wants to retain the theme of attunement. It is not 
obvious that waiting is an attunement. Nevertheless, Heidegger cannot avoid waiting, 
since what is at issue in profound boredom is time, which is (authentically) futural. 
The second example of boredom is defined in terms of the perpetuating present 
of expectation. What differentiates the first and second forms of boredom is not, 
therefore, the question of determinacy alone. Whereas, in the first example we fail to 
pass the time, in the second example we succeed at it, completely. We did not even 
notice that we were bored. Hence, distraction is the flipside of boredom. Warding-off 
boredom through distraction, from boredom, means negating its long while, and 
shortening its time: 
We make time stand. We let the time we have taken for the evening - our 
taking consists precisely in this - endure in such a way during the evening 
89 Heidegger, M. Being and Time, p.306. . 
90 Heidegger, M. The Fundamental Concepts of MetaphYSICS, p.94. 
91 Benjamin, W. The Arcades Project, p.l 07. 
that in ~eing there .alongside and part of whatever is going on we take no 
not~ of Its flow or It.S moments. The enduring of the 'during' swallows up. 
as It were, the flowmg sequence of nows and becomes a single stretched 
'now' which itself does not flow but stands.92 
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Is it any coincidence that the evening's distractions include 'listening to music' - given 
that the temporality of music is, at one fundamental level, that of the sequential 'nows' 
that becomes a single, stretched 'now' ?93 The 'old aim of secular music', suggests 
Adorno, was 'that of the divertissement that distracts from boredom'. Music is the art of 
nihilism par excellence, Heidegger will suggest in the later 1930s. For both Adorno and 
Heidegger, distraction from boredom, perpetuates a fundamental alienation - of, for 
Adorno, the capitalist mode of production. But at the same time, the peculiar connection 
between boredom and distraction 'lives on in the relationship to the time of autonomous 
music', that is, to musically modern time. Autonomy and authenticity are not, in that 
case, the simple 'others' of distraction and inauthenticity. Heidegger's sense of the 
historically telling refusal of things-as-a-whole provides a philosophically 
argumentative way of understanding the messianic 'Augenblick' III Adorno's post-
Benjaminian understanding of boredom, distraction - and praxis-expression. 
The 'Continuous stream of "nows'" is seemingly what Heidegger previously 
called the 'vulgar' 'representation' of time.94 In the lectures, vulgar temporality is made 
present and not merely represented. At the dinner party, 'we are entirely present'. 
Heidegger's conception of the present is already less promising than it was in Being and 
Time. There, the privileging of the futural was even situated in the inauthentic mode of 
Dasein: the everyday 'Present [Gegenwart]' is not simply the perpetuation of 'nows' 
but is rather 'the "waiting towards" [Gegen-wart], .95 This benign optimism about 
everyday temporality is a consequence of the existential structuralism of Being and 
Time. It undergoes a severe reassessment in The Fundamental Concepts. Expressionist 
anxiety is, it could be said, superseded by dada boredom (and is thereby also 
expressionist). It is the seeming im-possibility of possibility that now confronts our 
contemporary Dasein, not the plenitude of heroic possibilities. This seeming 
impossibility is, understood in the light of Adorno's waiting in vain, twofold. Firstly, 
the impossibility of possibility names the reified totality, or totalisation as reification. 
Second this totalisation is the false consciousness. Unfreedom, impossibility, appears , 
92 Heidegger, M. The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, p.124. 
93 Ibid. p.l 09. 
94 Heidegger, M. Being and Time, p.463. 
95 Ibid. p.387. 
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as freedom, possibility. The whole is such that it tends to become impossible to 
conceive of 'the totality as something that could be completely different', even for those 
who are not 'sworn to this world'. 
Heidegger's reassessment of freedom in The Fundamental Concepts anticipates 
some of Adorno's criticisms of Being and Time. Heidegger's formal historicity had led 
him to abstract the meaning of death from its socio-historical context - as if every age 
could be equally heroic. Adorno's critique of Being-towards-death makes sense 
precisely because the fall of metaphysics - of consoling promises of all kinds, including 
consolation for the absence of promise in the various forms of distraction - becomes 
unbearable, leaving talk of authentic Being-towards-death as meaningless. The 'terror', 
not anxiety, about of death today is that 'of seeing how much the living resemble it'. 
Poets such as Georg Trakl gave expression to this situation, Adorno suggests. 
Heidegger's outlook on the contemporary situation in the 1929-30 lectures is similarly 
bleak (he later wrote on Trakl, of course). Could this be a reason why Being-towards-
death disappears from Heidegger's work (until the 'mortals' of 'the fourfold')? Being-
towards-death is, in its heroism, anachronistically 'pristine'. It does not finally shake-off 
the suspicion of solipsism - that it is never the whole. The analysis of fundamental 
boredom can, by contrast, illuminate the meaning of finitude in a way that confronts the 
existential solipsism. 
Neither Adorno nor Heidegger can do without a future-oriented conception of 
finitude. Death pre-eminently articulates this orientation phenomenologically (initially, 
through the death of others). For Heidegger, Being-towards-death is the way in which 
the question of Being appears for Dasein, as its question: 'Why is there Being and not 
nothing?' is no logical conundrum that invintes a propositional answer (as it is given by 
Leibniz, to his own question). Though Adorno rejects Heidegger's ontology, he 
nevertheless understands Erfahrung as a (metaphysical) relation to death and whole 
(individual and social). For Adorno, the 'good life' would be one in which death was 
not terrifying. There is another affinity to Heidegger's 'death metaphysics': the 
expression of waiting in vain, the intermittent anticipation of possibility, is a kind of 
temporalised possibility, in a similar way that, for Heidegger, indeterminate waiting is 
grasped as the possibility of possibility. Both oppose expectation in the name of 
expectation. 
If Heidegger's philosophy of boredom is read as a critical reconceptualisation of 
Being-towards-death, rather than as its mere surrogate - as a necessary critique of 
heroic solipsism and formal-transcendentalism - then it might be possible to understand 
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waiting m vam III terms of profound boredom as a temporalisation of (historical) 
possibility on the (ironic) basis of Heidegger's initial account of originary 
temporalisation in Being and Time. Adorno's metaphysical experience can be read, 
against Adorno, as a critique of Heidegger's 'metaphysics of death' rather than as its 
abstract negation. It is, then, a twofold critique of metaphysical waiting (expectation) on 
the one side and ontological waiting (without expectation) on the other. Indeed, 
Heidegger's ontology provides a means of understanding the expression of waiting in 
vain as more failed promise. In that form, the expression would be in bad faith, since it 
would be the intermittent interruption of that which it had rejected: traditional 
metaphysical promise. On Adorno's side, the critique of anticipatory resoluteness is the 
historical critique of 'trans-historical' existence (de Beistegui), and by extention 
fundamental ontology.96 It proposes that society can and must change - but not 
according to a pre-established harmony. 
This mutual critique promises to set up a post-metaphysical account of the 
expression of waiting in vain that retains the historical facti city in the idea of natural-
history. If the expression of waiting in vain is the interruption of anticipatory 
resoluteness then inauthentic distraction becomes the interruption of authenticity, which 
accordingly becomes a possibility of another modernity, not a reaction to it (as it often 
tends to be in Heidegger; see chapter 2). This interruption is not another form of 
messianism by the back gate. Interruption names the positive character of the waiting-
expression, between metaphysics and ontology, history and existence. 
One of Johann Peter Hebel's Assorted Thoughts (1811) reads: 'Boredom waits 
for death [Die Langweile wartet auf den TodJ,.97 Death cannot be expected, but it can be 
willed. Passive nihilism is the will to nothing. Willing and longing are forms of 
expectation. They actualise the impossible (ideal) and make the actually possible (real) 
impossible. Romantics are waiting in vain because they are waiting for an object of 
infinite willing and longing. Adorno stresses that an expression of waiting in vain is not 
'a sphere of Romantic wishing' .98 In The Jargon of Authenticity, Adorno questions what 
he takes to be Heidegger's dismissal of all reflections upon death.99 But such reflection 
is not necessarily the willing-love of death that concludes Tristan und Isolde (but death 
is precisely ambivalent in the later Wagner's music!). Adorno at one point approves of 
96 De Beistegui, M. Thinking With Heidegger, p.74. 
97 Cited in: Benjamin, W. The Arcades Project, p.l0l. 
98 Adorno, T. W. Metaphysics, p.143. 
99 Adorno, T. W. The Jargon of Authenticity, 107. 
201 
Heidegger's alternative comportment: Vorlaufen. 'Only rarely do Heidegger's words 
contain as much truth as these.' I 00 
The anticipatory is, like the expression of waiting in vain, not expectation. Vor-
laufen is the ronning-ahead of 'that which is not to be outstripped' .101 The anticipatory 
holds-open the greatest possibility in resoluteness. The A ugen b lick of the telling refusal 
in profound boredom must therefore be said to open-up the greatest possibility in the 
mode of the anticipatory - even though this is not said in the lectures. There is an 
affinity between profound boredom and Vorlaufen, on account of the shared 
indeterminacy of their waiting. This return of the futural into profound boredom means 
that the worlds of the existing and the possible are now temporalised, historically, and 
not confused unhistorically. The existing world is the world of contemporary Dasein 
and world formation is the waiting that belongs to the awaited. 
In the early 1930s, Heidegger strategically retreats from the existentialism of 
Being and Time and advances into what he perceives to be the actual possibilities of his 
time - and place. The account of Being-towards-death nevertheless reminds the reader 
of The Fundamental Concepts that the greatest possibility is nothing without facti cal 
possibilities. Heidegger knows this, even though he does not connect boredom to death 
in the lectures. This is the formal-transcendental problem that the fundamental 
attunement was intended to address. Profound boredom does not quite close its eyes to 
the world. The telling refusal is a squinting that seeks out the brightest of dim 
possibilities, possibilities that must be grasped. Where Heidegger makes his way 
through the fog, Adorno goes underground to make a similar point: 
For thought there is really no other possibility, no other opportunity, than to 
do what the miner's adage forbids: to work one's way through the darkness 
without a lamp, without possessing the positive through the higher concept 
of the negation of the negation, and to immerse oneself in the darkness as 
'bl 102 deeply as one PoSS! y can. 
Just over two years after the lectures, Heidegger would become impatient with 
his indeterminate waiting. In the absence of a politically committed philosophy (of 
culture) and in the presence of a popular political movement that confirmed his 
prejudices, Heidegger would make a political decision of his own. Heidegger' s 
activities of 1933 amount to an indictment of existentialism. The problem of formalism 
could not be resolved immanently within Heidegger's system. The historical content 
100 Ibid. p.13!. 
101 Heidegger, M. Being and Time, p.306. 
102 Adorno, T. W. Metaphysics, p.144. 
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had to come from the outside. Waiting without expectation converges with decisionism. 
But what if Heidegger did not remain true to (his) waiting? What if the philosopher of 
waiting failed to experience waiting, or rather its expression? 
Waiting, Destining and the Messianic 
Who is to say when is the right time for waiting and for no-longer waiting? Who, for 
that matter, is to say that boredom is the fundamental attunement of our contemporary 
Dasein (whether it be in 1930 or 2008)? Heidegger gives the following response: l-ve 
are. The telling refusal of factical possibilities itself signifies that profound boredom is 
the fundamental attunement of contemporary Dasein. The fundamental attunement 
simultaneously tells of this refusal. The reason that boredom, and not anxiety, is the 
fundamental attunement of contemporary Dasein, is that 'what oppresses us most 
profoundly and in a concealed manner is the very absence of any essential 
oppressiveness in our Dasein as a whole.' This is not at all to say that there are no 
contemporary 'needs'. Heidegger is more attuned to the (culture of) crisis at the end of 
the 1920s than he would like to admit: 
everywhere there are disruptions, catastrophes, needs: the contemporary 
social misery, political confusion, the powerlessness of science, the erosion 
of art, the groundlessness of philosophy, the impotence of religion. 103 
Heidegger is looking for a deeper, unifying need. This need is 'demanded', 
ontologically, in the telling refusal. What is more, distraction (though Heidegger only 
uses this term in Being and Time) is the telling refusal itself: 
This absence of oppressiveness is only apparently hidden; it is rather 
attested by the very activities with which we busy ourselves in our 
104 
contemporary restlessness. 
Heidegger initially comes close to the philosophy of culture that he dismisses, insofar as 
his claim about boredom relies upon empirical social evaluations. But Heidegger's 
'empiricism' is of a particular kind here. The fundamental attunement is primarily 
'attested to' not, for instance, in the evidence of an emerging culture industry, but rather 
in the attestation itself, which is already the experiential register of the social and 
cultural. The value of (the concept of) attunement now becomes clear: the fundamental 
103 Heidegger, M. The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, p.163. 
104 Ibid. p.164. 
:!03 
attunement is an attestation of something fundamental, beyond the attunement (or, 
attunement as relating beyond). Who does not feel boredom today? No one can remain 
distracted all of the time. There is, of course, a precedent for this notion of attestation, 
as a fundamental and historical condition - in the concept of alienation. 
The fundamental attunement tells of contemporary Dasein as a unique historical 
situation. Only us modems are worthy of profound boredom, and hence worthy of the 
question of 'Being as a whole'. In a sense, the rise in importance of both autonomous 
and (ultimately) heteronomous music is part of the story of the fundamental attunement, 
since each makes a claim of a whole. Heidegger's musical description of Stimmung 
appears as more than a passing reference in the light of his later characterisation of 
music and nihilism. The fundamental attunement of boredom anticipates Heidegger' s 
account of the subject of metaphysical modernity as an affective (and to that extent, 
musical) subject that wills an object in its totality. In the earlier work, this false totality 
(false with respect to 'Being as a whole') is defmed in terms of extreme depth, 'deep 
boredom', and in the later work, extreme height, the 'highpoint of humanity' (see 
chapter 2). In both cases, of extreme depth and height, another whole becomes possible. 
Heidegger subsequently moves away from historicity and towards 'destiny 
[ Geschick], or rather 'destining [Schickung],. This philosophy of history in the strong 
sense of Geschichte, is not yet fully in place in The Fundamental Concepts (as the lapse 
into scholasticism would suggest). Neither is it as yet the 'remembrance' and 'forgetting 
of Being' .105 And yet, in the 1929-30 lecture-course, Heidegger no longer imposes a 
formal structure upon history, but instead attempts to experience it from the qualitative 
standpoint of the contemporary. As with Adorno, destiny is now on the side of a notion 
of facti city, since profound boredom has crept-up on us unawares - as if a Dasein of its 
own. This alien destiny, the wrong history, is the alienation of another destiny, the right 
history. What Adorno calls reification, the 'naturalisation of history' is, to this extent, 
comparable to Heidegger's 'darkening of the world'. The 'refusal of things' is, at some 
105 The concept of 'fate' was of course introduced in Being and Time. 'Ganzseinkonnen' 
is not a contingent, relativist philosophy of history, Heidegger insists, but is rather the 
greatest possibility of historical Dasein: 
Once one has grasped the finitude of one's existence, it snatches one back from the endless multiplicity of 
possibilities which offer themselves as close~t ,to o~e ... ~nd b.ring~ ?asein int~ the. simplicity of its/ate. 
[Schicksals]. This is how we designate Dasem s.pnmordI.al histonzmg ~ursprunghche Gesc~ehen], WhICh 
lies in authentic resoluteness and in which Dasem hands Itself down to Itself, free for death, In a 
possibility which it has inherited and yet has chosen. 
Heidegger, M. Being and Time, p.435. 
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level, comparable to a notion of re-ification (the refusal of things as the world becoming 
a thing). 
The attunement of Trauer, in allegorical praxis, allows for the possibility of 
arresting and overcoming reification. During the 1960s, Adorno moves away from a 
'purely derogatory' concept of reification (a move away from Lukacs, for various 
reasons). lO6 This possibility of negating the negation looks more piecemeal in Adorno 
than it does in Heidegger's (and some of Benjamin's) philosophy of the event. Can an 
event ever be piecemeal? But the increasingly metaphysically fraught nature of the 
melancholy science brings Adorno, unwittingly perhaps, closer to Heidegger's terrain, 
such that the problem of the metaphysical grounding of the melancholy science 
becomes more acute. In The Fundamental Concepts, Heidegger cites and then rejects 
Oswald Spengler as a misreader of Nietzsche. 107 What Adorno says of Spengler in the 
1960s equally applies to Heidegger, who sought to colonise the space of these 
philosophers of crisis: 'After Auschwitz, a regression ... has already taken place and is 
not merely expected a la Spengler' .108 Heidegger is the philosopher of the problem of 
nihilism but Adorno is thrown onto this problem by the force of a history that 
Heidegger both failed to foresee and to remember. 
For both thinkers, however, waiting in vain is alienation and the possibility of 
the self-negation of alienation, by way of (its) determinate expression. For Adorno 
particularly, boredom is not an existential a priori. Boredom 'need not necessarily 
exist' .109 As a historical phenomenon, it can change and even disappear. What does an 
expression of waiting in vain promise, in that case? The right history for Adorno; the 
right destiny for Heidegger - the appropriating-event of Being. The problem of waiting 
is then indistinguishable from the problem of history as destiny. If the possibility of an 
expression of waiting in vain were solely contingent, then there would indeed be no 
awaited in the singular. Such waiting, before the 'endless multiplicity' of possibilities 
(Heidegger), is, in that case, constitutively in vain. Heidegger's tum from the historicity 
of Being and Time to contemporary Dasein sets up the turning from Dasein to Being. 
The wrong history is now 'the forgetting of Being' and the right history 'destining' 
through 'remembrance of Being'. In his 'Letter on Humanism' , Heidegger 
autobiographically dates his turning, 'from "Being and Time" to "Time and Being",' to 
his lecture-course 'On the Essence of Truth', which was given shortly after The 
106 Adorno, T. W. Metaphysics, p.142. 
lO7 Heidegger, M. The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, pp.69-74. 
108 Adorno, T. W. History and Freedom, pA. 
109 Adorno, T. W. 'Free Time', in Critical Models, p.171. 
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Fundamental Concepts. IIO The turning is equally a turning to a notion of destiny that is 
intended to counter the bad infinity of an endless mUltiplicity of possibilities; that is. a 
history without beginning. This also gives a different sense to Heidegger's subsequent 
return to waiting, which is no longer solely phenomenological, but is now equally now 
'messianic'. What it lacks is a coherent political direction (after Heidegger's 
condemnation of militarism). This is the gain of historical materialism, which 
nevertheless lacks the ontological grounding that was so necessary for Heidegger. 
Heidegger's heterodox 'tum to Hegel', decried by the younger Adorno, becomes 
strangely pronounced in his 'history of metaphysics' (it was suggested in chapter 2). 
The problem of metaphysics (including Hegel's?) is that its interpretation of Being, as 
object-dominating subject, becomes a totalising interpretation of all possible 
interpretations. The 'enframing' of the 'world picture' is, accordingly, a 'forgetting of 
Being' as 'the mystery'. Profound boredom can be said to arise from the nothing that is 
left after the totalising interpretation, which nevertheless does not put an end to Da-sein 
(which asks, 'is that all?' - this asking is not nothing). This interpretation must 
nevertheless fail from the standpoint of the appropriating event, of 'Time and Being'. 
The necessity of this 'only' is structurally messianic - but without, outwardly at least, 
the ontotheological problems of traditional (dogmatic) messianism. 
In its content, Heidegger's conception of history takes on an increasingly 
nationalistic character during the 1930s. Even when he ceases to believe that National 
Socialism is of the essence of the history of Being, Heidegger will contrive it as of the 
essence of the forgetting of Being - thus serving to absolve himself, Germany and 
Europe from any historical responsibility for its consequences. III In Negative 
Dialectics, Adorno confronts these developments in Heidegger's philosophy of history. 
Yet he neither mentions Heidegger's conception of destiny nor its possible relation to 
National Socialism. Rather, Adorno writes of Heidegger's attempt to 'justify 
SUbjugation to historical situations, as if it were the behest of being itself. ,112 But this is 
mainly the critique of formalism once again - that which did make possible Heidegger's 
'decision'. It is as if Adorno has denied himself that critique because he has already 
branded Heideggerian historicity as ineffectual. It is the concept of 'destruction', not 
historicity, that 'led directly to barbarism and fascism'. But ever since his curiosity 
about Being and Time, Adorno had shared Heidegger's imperative for a strong 
110 Heidegger, M. 'Letter on Humanism', in Basic Wri.tings,. p.23.!. 
III Cf. Wolin, Richard. The Politics of Being (ColumbIa UmversIty Press, 1990). 
pp.137-147. 
1 [2 Adorno, T. W. Negative Dialectics, p. 134. 
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philosophy of history; an imperative that becomes increasingly heterodox-Hegelian for 
both thinkers, in very different ways. I 13 
The contemporary 'demand' of Dasein is a privileging of the contemporary: 
This ?ccurrence of a fundamental attunement itself and the very choice in 
questIOn as an engagement of the philosopher's existence is rooted in the 
history of Dasein.114 
Heidegger does not (yet) say it in so many words, but this 'history of Dasein' IS a 
destiny of Dasein, because the occurrence of the fundamental attunement of profound 
boredom discloses the problem of metaphysics - of the whole - for the first time. The 
'history of Dasein' no longer signifies historicity - that which 'brings history to a halt in 
the unhistorical' (Adorno). The genitive in 'history of Dasein' now functions in both 
senses. At the same time, Heidegger is not yet proposing what the whole will be: 
The possibility of a different kind of necessary grounding for metaphysics 
must remain open. However this possibility is not some empty, formal or 
logical possibility; rather what is possible regarding this possibility depends 
entirely upon the destiny of man [Schicksal des Menschen].115 
When Heidegger does not wait in naming this destiny (as 'Germania'), he does not 
remain true to waiting as naming. At the same time, there is no naming without the 
name, no waiting without the awaited. I 16 
Adorno's idea of waiting in vain founders, it was suggested, upon its self-
problematised metaphysical (non-)grounding. Heidegger's confrontation with 
metaphysics signals a response, to which Adorno must in tum respond. Both Heidegger 
and Adorno connect the waiting of boredom to a form of post-metaphysical waiting. 
Both connect a particular attunement to an-other possible historical whole, and to the 
whole as possibility of history. An expression of waiting in vain is, then, the 
113 Adorno relies upon a citation of Lowith for the explicit connection between 
Heidegger's decisionism and Hitlerism ('a vulgarly decisive moment'). But as was 
suggested above, Lowith seems to oppose any and all possible historical determinations 
of Dasein. He stands by the structural existentialism of Being and Time. Adorno does 
not mean to legitimate Lowith's position here. But the reliance upon Lowith, allied with 
the absence of a critique of destiny, is notable, given Adorno's own, strong conception 
of history. Where the younger Adorno had opposed natural-history to Hegelianism, the 
Adorno of Negative Dialectics critically incorporates Hegel. Adorno's destruction of 
Hegelian spirit seeks to retain Hegel's sense of history in the singular. Hence: 'World-
spirit and Natural History. Excursus on Hegel'. Adorno, T. W. Negative Dialectics. 
p.295. 
114 Heidegger, M. The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, p.182. 
115 Ibid. p.17l. Translation amended. 
116 Cf. Diittmann, A. G. The Memory of Thought, part II. 
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intermittent anticipation of the right history, since the expression, the act, seeks to bring 
about that history. Why should there be any anticipation at all? Because to experience is 
to be anticipatory and is to anticipate. 
In The Fundamental Concepts, Heidegger makes an ontological claim on behalf 
of expropriated experience. He simultaneously acknowledges the impossibility of a 
heroic experience of Being-towards-death. The anti-hero is profoundly bored (The Man 
Without Qualities). But on Adorno's side, death remains the fundamental problem of 
experience. An expression of waiting in vain is the critique of anticipatory resoluteness, 
the authentic mode of Being-towards-death. This is equally the 'twisting free' of 
traditional metaphysics (discussed in chapter 2) since it combines the non-willing of the 
anticipatory with the willing expectation of the awaited. For Adorno, metaphysics after 
metaphysics means 'thinking beyond itself, into openness.' 117 Of course, this is not the 
'clearing of Being', or 'the open' in Heidegger. And yet, in both cases, openness names 
the necessity of thinking out( -side) of metaphysical willing, as the possibility of 
confronting its nihilism. 
Adorno and Heidegger each turn to the category of thinking, both in relation to 
waiting. The former can maintain that 'thought' is consistent with a notion of 
determinate critique and not resigned quietism. And yet, since 'praxis is delayed for the 
foreseeable future', such 'thought' once again conjures-up the spectre of the regressive 
infinity; of a theory without praxis. It is telling that, in his radio-lecture 'Resignation' 
(1969), Adorno does not address the objections of his detractors to theory but rather 
turns the table on their equal-and-opposite valorisation of praxis. The question of the 
mediation of theory and praxis - of, in a sense, waiting and awaited - is sidetracked 
(and this relates to the whole problem of critical theory as methodology). Adorno is left 
defending theory as the 'happiness' of the 'thinking person' .118 This does not seem very 
far from Heidegger's 'piety of thought' .119 
Heidegger's 'thinking' makes no such claim of determinate negation, since this 
identity philosophy is part of the problem of metaphysics. Like Adorno, Heidegger 
questions the metaphysical distinction between theory and practice itself But 
Heidegger's 'task of thinking', after 'the end of philosophy', does threaten to valorise a 
waiting without expectation, sliding into the regressive infinity to which it was 
originally opposed. Man's 'essence [Wesen]', Heidegger will state in 1949, 'is to be the 
117 Adorno, T. W. Metaphysics, p.68. 
118 Adorno, T. W. 'Resignation', in Critical Models, p.293. 
119 Heidegger, M. The Question Concerning Technology, p.35. 
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one who waits' .120 Man is condemned to wait, for nothing. Notwithstanding 
Heidegger's speculative redefinition of 'essence', waiting comes to be in vain after all-
'Gelassenheit' as 'being left empty [Leergelassenheit].' 121 
In his Spiegel interview, Heidegger counters the charge of quietism with a 
notion of destiny. Destining is the time of the awaited. Since Heidegger thinks the 
whole after metaphysics as the Being of beings, and (still) as time, the destining of 
Being is the appropriating event of Being amI/as Time. The whole, the awaited, would 
then be experienced in a non-dominating comportment, since domination marks the 
non-time of presence: 
It is not a matter simply of waiting until something occurs to man within the 
next 300 years, but of thinking ahead (without prophetic proclamations) into 
the time which is to come, of thinking from the standpoint of the 
fundamental traits of the present age, which have scarcely been thought 
through. Thinking is not inactivity but is in itself the action which stands in 
dialogue with the world mission [Welt-geschick].122 
If the active elements of the 'thought' of waiting - in Adorno and Heidegger - are 
brought together, then the expression of indeterminate waiting, of waiting in vain, 
becomes the possibility of determinacy. An expression of waiting in vain is, in that 
case, not in vain. 
120 Ibid. p.42. . 
121 H ·d M The Fundamental Concepts of MetaphYSICS, p.117. el egger, . 
122 Heidegger, M. 'Only a God Can Save Us', p.42. 
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Coda 
Two interconnected questions were asked in the introduction: (I) How can a concept of 
waiting contribute to a systematic philosophy 'after' messianism? (2) How is this 
waiting musical in its expression? We are now in a position to summarise the response. 
(I) A problem with historical materialism arises, it was suggested, from the 
question of its self-grounding - especially, it seems, when it does not seek to address 
this question. This is equally the problem of positing its value-concepts: humanity, 
history and utopia. Like the German Idealists, Heidegger understands the problem of 
grounding as the problem of metaphysics itself. However, the dominant Platonic 
metaphysics, including Idealism, has perpetuated a representating, dualistic paradigm of 
grounding-positing that is complicit with nihilism. This issue appears in Adorno as the 
critique of identity. The problem with the Heideggerian destruction is that it does not 
get to grips with the problem of history - and, therefore, humanity and utopia - because 
its concept of existence is 'trans-historical'. Its exceptionally authentic Ereignis is all 
too amenable to a trans-social solipsism. 
The tradition of historical materialism - Hegelian-Marxist, metaphysically 
Aristotelian - gives rise to a teleological form of a-waiting, including utopian waiting 
(however scientific). 'Non-Christian' messianism problematises this expectation 
without always confronting the metaphysical grounds of its alternative (to Aristotelian) 
metaphysics. Heideggerian existentialism, on the other hand, offers a deepened account 
of waiting which nevertheless tends to valorise itself into a waiting without expectation 
of the awaited: utopia. Hence, there is an opposition of 'waiting for', which over-wills 
the awaited, and 'waiting not for', which under-wills it. 
The strategic thrust of the response has been to suggest that (the) two key 
proponents of both 'sides', Adorno and Heidegger, are not so opposed as is often 
thought - meaning that they also share problems (notably, neo-Kantianism). The first 
response to this opposition was to interpret Adorno's idea of natural-history in relation 
to a particular philosophical counter-tradition, in order to propose a notion of historical 
facti city that shares characteristics of ScheUingian-Heideggerian existence without 
being 'existentialist'. This anticipated the examination of Heidegger's fundamental 
attunement, which promises to ground metaphysics, quasi-ontologically, from the 
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standpoint of its fall: our contemporary Dasein. As historical, this out-of-tune 
attunement is specific to an experience of modernity as a standpoint upon history as a 
whole. For, what is surely definitive about modernity (about all modernities) is its 
capacity to totalise. This has consequences for the time of modernity, since there is, 
according to these totalisations, no time or place of waiting. Totalisation as such is not 
the problem here, however, since modernity is (we cannot not totalise). Rather, it is the 
manner of the contemporary totalisation, in capitalism. The dissonant attunements of 
Trauer and fundamental boredom are, in that case, other manners of relating to the 
whole (and perhaps more should have been said about a distinction between a 
quantitative totality and a qualitative whole). Both Adorno and Heidegger conceive of a 
changed comportment as a non-transcendental condition for the possibility of a changed 
whole (the comportment is not itself the changed whole). The idea that this can promise 
historical change is equally suggested in the fact that Heidegger himself comes close to 
a 'messianic' philosophy of history that can (violently) be interpreted in relation to 
historical materialism. As with totality, the danger of a strong concept of history, 
Heidegger's included, does not of itself warrant its rejection (as happens in many a 
liberal-minded critique of meta-narrative), if only because we cannot escape it. This 
danger is itself the twofold possibility of catastrophe and of utopia. As materialist, the 
expression of waiting in vain is already on the way from theory to the praxis of a 
historical-utopian task (an account of this would require an investigation into the 
relationships between Trauer, alientation and labour, which was beyond the scope of 
this study). 
A kind of post-active nihilism connects the thought of Adorno and Heidegger, 
such that an-other time becomes thinkable in the midst of the totalisation, and hence 
'detemporalisation', of historical time. Detemporalisation is the time of reification. Its 
mimetic temporalisation is post-actively nihilist in the sense that (i) it resists the will to 
nothing of passive nihilism, and (ii) it resists the will to power of active nihilism. It can 
only do so with a new conception of willing - and resisting - as also waiting. The 
necessity of this other time, which can indeed be termed quasi-messianic time, was 
proposed by way of a critique of Heidegger's anticipatory resoluteness as the 
expression of waiting in vain. Again, this comprised an attempt to mediate existence 
and facticity, ontology and history, according to the overall problematic of a system of 
freedom. 
(2) The attunement of waiting in vain is 'musical' on account of the shared 
affective, temporal and spatial properties of music. An attunement, as mood, is 
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affective. This, no doubt, lies behind the actualisation of (commodity) music as a 
seemingly privileged cultural form of 'world consummation'. Music is specifically 
modern on account of its totalisation of the affective, willing subject of a spatio-
temporal continuum: world as willed (non-) object. The dissonant attunement is 
opposed to affective willing, from out of it, since the melancholy science is the concern 
of knowledge and thus of world disclosure. This 'out of was understood by way of a 
critical reversal of the traditions of the harmony of the spheres and of music as sui 
generis language (attempts to conceive of the whole as logos). An expression of waiting 
in vain is a dissonant attunement - a relating in the sense of ratio - to the possibility of 
an-other whole; the temporalising mimesis of the contemporary impossibility of utopian 
dwelling as its future possibility. 
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